The answer to (1) becomes obvious in light of the answers to (2), (3),
(4), (5), and (6), all of which must be considered together. We know
that a standard H-bomb would be the equal to ten nominal A-bombs in its
power to destroy by blast and to as many as thirty A-bombs in its
incendiary effects. In terms of total area, the H-bomb can destroy by
blast an area of more than 300 square miles, as compared with an area of
only ten square miles for the nominal A-bomb, and more than 1,200 square
miles by fire and burns, as compared with only four square miles for the
early A-bomb model. As for neutron economy, we have seen that this vast
increase in power could be achieved at a cost in fissionable A-bomb
material possibly as low as one twelfth, and no higher, at the most,
than the plutonium required (according to Professor Oliphant’s estimate)
for just one A-bomb. It thus becomes obvious that such a weapon not only
is much cheaper, in terms of destruction and cost of materials, than the
conventional A-bomb, but is much more easily and safely delivered, since
it would still be highly effective as a blasting weapon if exploded more
than five miles from its target, while as an incendiary it would still
be highly effective as far as fifteen miles away. Hence there can be no
question that H-bombs vastly excel A-bombs in permitting a highly
destructive attack to be compressed in time, and that its psychological
effect in impairing an enemy’s will to resist is also incalculably
greater.
Its vastly greater range of destructiveness, its economy of material,
and its surer delivery also make the H-bomb vastly superior to the
A-bomb as a tactical weapon. Neither the H-bomb nor the A-bomb appears
to be practical for use against guerrilla fighters, except possibly as a
threat.
As already discussed at length in Chapter III, there could be no
possible justification, on moral as well as military grounds, for using
the H-bomb as a strategic weapon to destroy large urban centers,
especially those containing no armaments plants, except in retaliation
for such use against us or our allies.
2. IF THE H-BOMB IS DEEMED TO BE DECISIVE OR FAR MORE DANGEROUS THAN THE
A-BOMB, SHOULD INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF HYDROGEN WEAPONS TAKE PRIORITY
OVER CONTROL OF ORDINARY ATOMIC WEAPONS? SHOULD THE UNITED STATES
PROPOSE A SEPARATE PLAN EXCLUSIVELY DESIGNED TO REGULATE H-BOMBS?
The official United Nations proposals for international control of
atomic energy apparently involve the assumption that A-bombs are so
unique technically and so menacing as to set them apart from
conventional weapons and to justify separate consideration in the United
Nations and a separate regulatory system. If the step from A-bombs to
H-bombs is considered to be as great as the step from conventional
weapons to A-bombs, does it follow that hydrogen warfare should become
the subject of a separate control proposal and should receive separate
consideration in the United Nations?
Are the technical facts of atomic and hydrogen weapons so intimately
related that both must be controlled if either is to be controlled? Are
the political facts such that the two problems must be regarded
inseparably?