GÖRING: No. One, as far as I remember, was taken to a concentration

camp, and the other was for the time being placed under a sort of house

arrest, if I remember correctly.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, going back to the time when you met Hitler;

you said that he was a man who had a serious and definite aim, that he

was not content with the defeat of Germany and with the Versailles

Treaty; do you recall that?

GÖRING: I am very sorry, the translation was rather defective and I

cannot understand it. Please repeat.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: When you met Hitler, as I understand your

testimony, you found a man with a serious and definite aim, as you said,

in that he was not content with the defeat of Germany in the previous

war and was not content with the Versailles Treaty.

GÖRING: I think you did not quite understand me correctly here, for I

did not put it that way at all. I stated that it had struck me that

Hitler had very definite views of the impotency of protest; secondly,

that he was of the opinion that Germany must be freed from the dictate

of Versailles. It was not only Adolf Hitler; every German, every

patriotic German had the same feelings; and I, being an ardent patriot,

bitterly felt the shame of the dictate of Versailles, and I allied

myself with the man about whom I felt that he perceived most clearly the

consequences of this dictate, and that probably he was the man who would

find the ways and means to set it aside. All the other talk in the Party

about Versailles was, pardon the expression, mere twaddle.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: So, as I understand you, from the very beginning,

publicly and notoriously, it was the position of the Nazi Party that the

Versailles Treaty must be set aside and that protest was impotent for

that purpose?

GÖRING: From the beginning it was the aim of Adolf Hitler and his

movement to free Germany from the oppressive fetters of Versailles, that

is, not from the whole Treaty of Versailles, but from those terms which

were strangling Germany’s future.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And to do it by war, if necessary?

GÖRING: We did not debate about that at all at the time. We debated only

about the foremost condition, that Germany should acquire a different

political structure, which alone would enable her to raise objections to

this dictate, this one-sided dictate—everybody always called it a

peace, whereas we Germans always called it a dictate—and not merely

objections, but such objections as would demand consideration.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That was the means—the means was the

reorganization of the German State, but your aim was to get rid of what

you call the dictate of Versailles.

GÖRING: Liberation from these terms of the dictate of Versailles, which

in the long run would make German life impossible, was the aim and the

intention. But by that we did not go as far as to say, “We want to wage

war on our enemies and be victorious.” Rather, the aim was to suit the

methods to the political events. Those were the basic considerations.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And it was for that end that you and all of the

other persons who became members of the Nazi Party gave to Hitler all

power to make decisions for them, and agreed, in their oath of office,

to give him obedience?

GÖRING: Again here are several questions. Question One: The fight

against the dictate of Versailles was for me the most decisive factor in

joining the Party. For others, perhaps, other points of the program or

of the ideology, which seemed more important, may have been more

decisive. Giving the Führer absolute powers was not a basic condition

for getting rid of Versailles, but for putting into practice our

conception of the Leadership Principle. To give him our oath before he

became the head of the State was, under the conditions then existing, a

matter of course for those who considered themselves members of his

select leadership corps. I do not know and I cannot tell exactly, just

how the oath was given before the seizure of power; I can only tell you

what I myself did. After a certain period of time, when I had acquired

more insight into the Führer’s personality, I gave him my hand and said:

“I unite my fate with yours for better or for worse: I dedicate myself

to you in good times and in bad, even unto death.” I really meant

it—and still do.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: If you would answer three or four questions for me

“yes” or “no,” then I would be quite willing to let you give your entire

version of this thing. In the first place, you wanted a strong German

State to overcome the conditions of Versailles.

GÖRING: We wanted a strong State anyhow, regardless of Versailles; but

in order to get rid of Versailles the State had, first of all, to be

strong, for a weak State never makes itself heard; that we know from

experience.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the Führer principle you adopted because you

thought it would serve the ends of a strong State?

GÖRING: Correct.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And this aim, which was one of the aims of the Nazi

Party, to modify the conditions of Versailles, was a public and

notorious aim in which the people generally joined—it was one of your

best means of getting people to join with you, was it not?

GÖRING: The dictate of Versailles was such that every German, in my

opinion, could not help being in favor of its modification, and there is

no doubt that this was a very strong inducement for joining the

movement.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, a number of the men who took part in this

movement are not here; and, for the record, there is no doubt in your

mind, is there, that Adolf Hitler is dead?

GÖRING: I believe there can be no doubt about that.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the same is true of Goebbels?

GÖRING: Goebbels, I have no doubt about that, for I heard from someone

whom I trust completely, that he saw Goebbels dead.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you have no doubt of the death of Himmler, have

you?

GÖRING: I am not certain of that, but I think that you must be certain,

since you know much more about it than I, as he died a prisoner of

yours. I was not there.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You have no doubt of the death of Heydrich, have

you?

GÖRING: I am absolutely certain about that.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And probably of Bormann?

GÖRING: I am not absolutely certain of this. I have no proof. I do not

know, but I assume so.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And those are the chief persons in your testimony,

who have been mentioned as being responsible—Hitler for everything,

Goebbels for inciting riots against the Jews, Himmler, who deceived

Hitler, and Bormann, who misled him about his will?

GÖRING: The influence exerted on the Führer varied at different times.

The chief influence on the Führer, at least up till the end of 1941 or

the beginning of 1942, if one can speak of influence at all, was exerted

by me. From then until 1943 my influence gradually decreased, after

which it rapidly dwindled. All in all, I do not believe anyone had

anything like the influence on the Führer that I had. Next to me, or

apart from me, if one can speak of influence at all, Goebbels, with whom

the Führer was together quite a good deal, exerted an influence in a

certain direction from the very beginning. This influence wavered for a

time and was very slight, and then increased greatly in the last years

of the war, for it was easy to win influence by means of . . .

Before the seizure of power and during the years immediately following

the seizure of power, Hess had a certain influence, but only in regard

to his special sphere. Then, in the course of the years, Himmler’s

influence increased. From the end of 1944 on this influence decreased

rapidly. The most decisive influence on the Führer during the war, and

especially from about 1942—after Hess went out in 1941 and a year had

elapsed—was exerted by Herr Bormann. The latter had, at the end, a

disastrously strong influence. That was possible only because the Führer

was filled with profound mistrust after 20 July, and because Bormann was

with him constantly and reported on and described to him all matters.

Broadly speaking these are the persons who had influence at one time or

another.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You took over a special intelligence organization

in 1933 which was devoted to monitoring the telephone conversations of

public officials and others inside and outside of Germany, did you not?

GÖRING: I have explained that I had erected a technical apparatus which,

as you said, monitored the conversations of important foreigners to and

from foreign countries—telegrams and wireless communications which were

transmitted not only from Germany to foreign countries, but also from

one foreign country to the other through the ether, and which were

intercepted. It also monitored telephone conversations within Germany

of: (1) all important foreigners; (2) important firms, at times; and (3)

persons who for any reason of a political or police nature were to be

watched.

In order to prevent any abuse on the part of the police, this department

had to obtain my personal permission when it was to listen to telephone

conversations. Despite this there could, of course, be uncontrolled

tapping of wires at the same time, just as that is technically possible

everywhere today.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You kept the results of those reports to yourself,

did you not?

GÖRING: No; this was the procedure: These reports in which the Foreign

Office was interested were released to the Foreign Office. Those reports

which were important to the Führer went to the Führer. Those which were

important to the military authorities went to the Minister of War, or to

the Air Ministry, or to the Ministry of Economy. I or my deputy decided

whether a report was important for this or that office. There was a man

there whose job and responsibility it was to see that these secret

reports were submitted only to the chief. I could, of course, order at

any time that this or that report should be exclusively for my knowledge

and not be handed on. That was always possible.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You had a good deal of difficulty with other police

authorities who wanted to get possession of that organization, did you

not?

GÖRING: That is correct. The police did strive to get this instrument

into their hands. But they did not get it from me, and perhaps they kept

a watch of their own here and there. But the decisive control which had

to be directed through the Ministry of Posts could technically be

ordered only by me.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You have listened to the evidence of the

Prosecution against all of the defendants in this case, have you not?

GÖRING: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Is there any act of any of your co-defendants which

you claim was not one reasonably necessary to carry out the plans of the

Nazi Party?

GÖRING: At present those are only assertions by the Prosecution; they

are not yet facts which have been proved. In these assertions there are

a number of actions which would not have been necessary.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Will you specify which acts, of which defendants,

you claim, are beyond the scope of the plans of the Party?

GÖRING: That is a very difficult question which I cannot answer straight

away and without the data.

DR. STAHMER: I object to this question. I do not believe that this is a

question of fact, but rather of judgment, and that it is not possible to

give an answer to such a general question.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Justice Jackson, the Tribunal thinks that the

question is somewhat too wide.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You have said that the program of the Nazi Party

was to rectify certain injustices which you considered in the Treaty of

Versailles; and I ask you whether it is not a fact that your program

went considerably beyond any matter dealt with in that Treaty?

GÖRING: Of course, the program contained a number of other points which

had nothing to do with the Treaty of Versailles.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I call your attention to a statement in _Mein

Kampf_ as follows:

“The boundaries of 1914 do not mean anything for the future of

the German nation. They did not constitute a defense in the past

nor do they constitute a power in the future. They will not give

to the German people inner security or ensure their food supply,

nor do these boundaries appear to be favorable or satisfactory

from a military point of view.”

That is all true, is it not?

GÖRING: I should like to reread the original passage in _Mein Kampf_ in

order to determine if it is exactly as you have read it. I assume that

it is correct. If so, I can reply that this is the text of a public book

and not the Party program.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The first country to be absorbed by Germany was

Austria, and it was not a part of Germany before the first World War,

and had not been taken from Germany by the Treaty of Versailles; is that

correct?

GÖRING: For this very reason this point was distinctly separated from

Versailles in the program. Austria is directly connected with Versailles

only insofar as the right of self-determination, as proclaimed there,

was most gravely infringed; for Austria and the purely German population

were not allowed the Anschluss which they wanted to see accomplished as

early as 1918, after the revolution.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The second territory taken by Germany was Bohemia,

then Moravia, and then Slovakia. These were not taken from Germany by

the Treaty of Versailles, nor were they part of Germany before the first

World War.

GÖRING: As far as the Sudetenland is concerned the same applies as for

Austria. The German representatives of the German Sudetenland likewise

sat in the Austrian Parliament, and under their leader, Lottmann, cast

the same vote. It is different in the case of the last act, that is, the

declaration of the Protectorate. These parts of Czech territory,

especially Bohemia and Moravia, were not constituent parts of the

smaller German Reich before the Treaty of Versailles, but formerly they

had been united to the German Reich for centuries. That is an historical

fact.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You still have not answered my question, although

you answered everything else. They were not taken from you by the Treaty

of Versailles, were they?

GÖRING: Of course Austria was taken away by the Versailles Treaty and

likewise the Sudetenland, for both territories, had it not been for the

Treaty of Versailles and the Treaty of St. Germain, would have become

German territories through the right of the people to

self-determination. To this extent they have to do with it.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You have testified, have you not, on interrogation,

that it was Hitler’s information that the United States would never go

to war, even if attacked, and that he counted on the isolationists of

that country to keep it out of war?

GÖRING: This interrogation must have been recorded entirely incorrectly.

That is the very reason why I refused from the beginning to give my oath

to these interrogations before I had been able to look carefully at the

German transcript and determine whether it had been correctly understood

and translated. Only once, and that was on the part of the Russian

Delegation, was a completely correct transcript submitted to me. I

signed it page by page and thereby acknowledged it. Now, as far as this

statement is concerned, I should like to put it right. I said that, at

first, the Führer did not believe that America would intervene in the

war, and that he was confirmed in this belief by the attitude of the

isolationist press, while I, on the contrary, unfortunately feared from

the very beginning that America would in any case intervene in the war.

Such nonsense—I hope you will excuse me—as to say that America would

not come into the war even if she were attacked, you will understand

that I could never have uttered, because, if a country is attacked, it

defends itself.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Do you know Axel Wennergren?

GÖRING: He is a Swede whom I have seen two or three times.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You talked with him about this subject, did you

not?

GÖRING: About the subject of America’s entering the war I can very well

have talked with him; it is even probable.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You told him that a democracy could not mobilize

and would not fight, did you not?

GÖRING: I did not tell him any such nonsense, for we had one democracy

as our chief enemy, namely England, and how this democracy would fight

we knew from the last World War, and we experienced it again during this

war. When I talked with Wennergren, the war with England was in full

swing.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You have testified on interrogation, if I

understand you correctly, that there were at all times two basic ideas

in Hitler’s mind, either to ally himself with Russia and seek increase

in living space through the acquisition of colonies, or to ally himself

with Britain and seek acquisition of territories in the East. But in

view of his orientation, he would very much have preferred to ally

himself with Great Britain, is that true?

GÖRING: That is correct. I need only to refer to the book _Mein Kampf_,

where these things were set down in thorough detail by Hitler.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, as early as 1933 you began a real program to

rearm Germany regardless of any treaty limitations, did you not?

GÖRING: That is not correct.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: All right; tell us when you started.

GÖRING: After all the proposals of disarmament which the Führer made

were refused, that is, shortly after our withdrawal from the disarmament

conference he made several proposals for a limitation; but, since these

were not taken seriously or discussed, he ordered a complete rearmament.

At the end of 1933 already certain slight preparations were started by

me personally, to the extent that I had made some inconsiderable

preparations in regard to the air and had also undertaken a certain

militarization of the uniformed police. But that was done by me

personally; I bear the responsibility.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, then, the militarization of the police

auxiliary was not a state affair. It was your personal affair. What do

you mean by that?

GÖRING: Not the auxiliary police, but the municipal police; that is,

there was one uniformed police force which had simply police duty on the

streets, and a second which was grouped in formations and was at our

disposal for larger operations—not created by us, let it be understood,

but existing at the time of the seizure of power. This municipal police,

which was grouped in units, uniformed, armed, and housed in barracks, I

formed very soon into a strong military instrument by taking these men

out of the police service and having them trained more along military

lines and giving them machine guns and such things, in addition to their

small arms. This I did on my own responsibility. These formations were

taken into the Armed Forces as regular Army units when the Armed Forces

Law was declared.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I want to ask you some questions from your

interrogation of the 17th day of October, 1945. I will first read you

the questions and answers as they appear in the interrogations and I

shall then ask you whether you gave those answers, and then you can make

the explanations if you desire, and I assume you do. The interrogation

reads:

“I wanted to ask you today about some of the economic history of

the period. When was the armament program first discussed, that

is, the rearmament program? What year?

“Answer: Immediately; in 1933.

“Question: In other words, Schacht had assumed the obligation at

that time already, to raise funds for the rearmament program?

“Answer: Yes. But, of course, in co-operation with the Minister

of Finance.

“Question: During the years 1933 to 1935, before general

conscription came in, naturally, the rearmament was a secret

rearmament, was it not?

“Answer: Yes.

“Question: So that money that was used outside of the budget

would have to be raised by some secret means not to be known to

foreign nations?

“Answer: Yes, unless they could be raised from normal Army

funds.

“Question: That is to say, you had a small budget for the

standing 100,000 man Army which was open, and the rest of the

rearmament had to be from secret sources?

“Answer: Yes.”

Were you asked those questions and did you give these answers, in

substance?

GÖRING: More or less; generally speaking that is correct. I have these

remarks to make: Firstly, I was asked when rearmament had been

discussed, not when it had been started. It had, of course, been

discussed already in the year 1933, because it was clear at once that

our government had to do something about it, that is to say, to demand

that the others should disarm, and, if they did not disarm, that we

should rearm. These things required discussion. The conclusion of the

discussion and the formulation into a definite order followed after the

failure of our attempts to get other countries to disarm. As soon as we,

or rather the Führer, saw that his proposals would not be accepted under

any circumstances, a gradual rearmament, of course, began to take place.

There was no reason whatsoever why we should inform the world about what

we were doing in the way of rearmament. We were under no obligation to

do that, nor was it expedient.

Herr Schacht, in the year 1933 at the very beginning, could not raise

any funds because at the start he held no office. He was able to do this

only at a later date. And here it was understandable that the funds had

to be raised through the Minister of Finance and the President of the

Reichsbank according to the wishes and the orders of the Führer,

especially as we had left no doubt that, if the other side did not

disarm, we would rearm. That had already been set down on our Party

program since 1921, and quite openly.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Is it not a fact that on the 21st of May 1935, by a

secret decree, Schacht was named Plenipotentiary for the War Economy?

GÖRING: The date—if you will kindly submit the decree to me, then I can

tell you exactly. I have not the dates of decrees and laws in my head,

especially if they do not have anything to do with me personally; but

that can be seen from the decree.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: At any event, shortly after he was named, he

suggested you as Commissioner for Raw Materials and Foreign Currency,

did he not?

GÖRING: If Herr Schacht made this suggestion shortly after his

appointment, then that appointment could not have taken place until

1936, because not until the summer of 1936 did Herr Schacht, together

with the Minister of War, Von Blomberg, make the proposal that I should

become Commissioner for Raw Materials and Foreign Currency.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, I ask you if you did not give this answer to

the American interrogator on the 10th day of October 1945, referring to

Schacht:

“He made the suggestion that I was to become the Commissioner

for Raw Materials and Foreign Currency. He had the idea that, in

that position, I could give the Minister for Economics and the

President of the Reichsbank valuable support.”

How did you give that answer, and is that information correct?

GÖRING: Will you please repeat.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Referring to Schacht, the record shows that you

said:

“He made the suggestion that I was to become the Commissioner

for Raw Materials and Foreign Currency. He had the idea that, in

that position, I could give the Minister for Economics and the

President of the Reichsbank valuable support.”

GÖRING: That is absolutely correct, with the exception of the word

“Reichstagspräsident;” that ought to be President of the Reichsbank.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes. That is the way I have it.

GÖRING: It sounded like “Reichstagspräsident” over the earphones.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: “Moreover, he was very outspoken in the

suggestion that he and Blomberg made, that I should be put in

charge of the Four Year Plan. However, Schacht’s idea was that I

did not know very much about economy, and that he could easily

hide behind my back.”

GÖRING: That I said the other day quite clearly.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, from that time on you and Schacht collaborated

for some time in preparing a rearmament program, did you not?

GÖRING: From that time on I worked together with Schacht in economic

matters and covered the whole field of German economy, including the

armament program, which of course was a sine qua non for the reassumed

German military sovereignty.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you and he had some jurisdictional differences

and executed an agreement settling your different spheres of authority,

did you not?

GÖRING: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And that was in 1937 on the 7th of July, right?

GÖRING: On that day a certain proposal for a settlement was made, but

this did not lead to anything final being accomplished. That was because

of the nature of the two posts and our personalities. Both of us, I, as

Delegate for the Four Year Plan, and Herr Schacht, as Minister of

Economics and President of the Reichsbank, were able to exercise very

great influence on German economy. As Herr Schacht also had a very

strong personality and felt his position keenly, and I likewise was not

inclined to hide my light under a bushel, whether we were friends or not

we could not help getting in each other’s way because of this question

of authority, and one of us had finally to give in to the other.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And there came a time when he left the Ministry and

the Reichsbank?

GÖRING: First he resigned from the Reich Ministry of Economy in November

1937, and, as far as I know, he resigned as President of the Reichsbank

at the end of 1938, but I cannot be certain about that date.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: There was no disagreement between you and him that

the program of rearmament should be carried through, was there? You

disagreed only in the methods of doing it.

GÖRING: I assume that Herr Schacht also, as a good German, was, of

course, ready to put all his strength at the disposal of Germany’s

rearmament, in order that Germany should be strong; and therefore

differences could have occurred only in regard to methods, for neither

Herr Schacht nor I was arming for a war of aggression.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And after he left the rearmament work he remained

as a Minister without Portfolio and sat in the Reichstag for some time,

did he?

GÖRING: That is correct. The Führer wished it because, I believe, he

wanted in this way to express his recognition of Herr Schacht.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And do you recall the time when you considered the

calling up of 15-year-olds, the conscription of 15-year-olds?

GÖRING: During the war you mean?

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes.

GÖRING: It was a question of Air Force auxiliaries, that is correct.

They were 15- or 16-year-olds, I do not remember exactly which, and were

called in as Air Force auxiliaries.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I will ask that you be shown Document Number

3700-PS and ask you whether you received from Schacht the letter of

which that is a carbon copy.

[_The document was handed to the witness._]

GÖRING: Yes, I certainly did receive that letter. The year is not given

here; that is missing in the copy.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Could you fix, approximately, the date of its

receipt?

GÖRING: It says here 3rd of November, but from the incidents described

on the other side, I assume it must be 1943. On this copy the year,

strangely enough, is not given, but I believe it was in the year 1943, I

received this letter.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you reply to Document 3700-PS? Did you reply to

this letter?

GÖRING: I cannot say that today with certainty—possibly.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, the Four Year Plan had as its purpose to put

the entire economy in a state of readiness for war, had it not?

GÖRING: I have explained that it had two tasks to fulfill—1) to

safeguard German economy against crises, that is to say, to make it

immune from export fluctuations, and, as regards food, from harvest

fluctuations, as far as possible; and 2) to make it capable of

withstanding a blockade, that is to say, in the light of experiences in

the first World War, to put it on such a basis that in a second World

War a blockade would not have such disastrous consequences. That the

Four Year Plan in this respect was a basic prerequisite for the entire

building-up and expansion of the armament industry goes without saying.

Without it the rearmament industry could not have been shaped in this

way.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: To get a specific answer, if possible, did you not

say in a letter to Schacht, dated the 18th day of December 1936, that

you saw it to be your task, using these words, “within 4 years to put

the entire economy in a state of readiness for war”? Did you say that or

did you not?

GÖRING: Of course I said that.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, do you recall the report of Blomberg in 1937

in which—and you may examine if you wish Document Number C-175—in

which he starts his report by saying:

“The general political position justifies the supposition that

Germany need not expect an attack from any side.”

GÖRING: That may have been quite possible at that moment. I took a most

reassuring view of the German situation in 1937. It was after the

Olympic games and at that time the general situation was extraordinarily

calm. But that had nothing to do with the fact that I felt obliged,

quite apart from passing fluctuations from a calmer to a more tense

atmosphere, to make German economy ready for war and proof against

crises or blockades, for exactly 1 year later incidents of a different

nature occurred.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well now, does not Blomberg continue:

“Grounds for this are, in addition to the lack of desire for war

in almost all nations, particularly the Western Powers, the

deficiencies in the preparedness for war of a number of states,

and of Russia in particular”?

That was the situation in 1937, was it not?

GÖRING: That is the way Herr Von Blomberg saw the situation. Concerning

the readiness for war in Russia, Herr Von Blomberg, in the same way as

all those representatives of our Reichswehr mentality, was always really

mistaken in contrast to the opinion expressed in other quarters with

regard to Russian armaments. This is merely the opinion of Herr Von

Blomberg—not the Führer’s, not mine, and not the opinion of other

leading people.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That, however, was the report of the

Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces on the 24th of June 1937, was it

not?

GÖRING: That is correct.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You organized, 1 month later, the Hermann Göring

Works?

GÖRING: Right.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the Hermann Göring Works were concerned with

putting Germany in the condition of readiness for war, were they not?

GÖRING: No, that is not right. The Hermann Göring Works were at first

concerned solely with the mining of German iron ore in the region of

Salzgitter and in a district in the Oberpfalz, and, after the

annexation, with the iron ore works in Austria. The Hermann Göring Works

first established exclusively mining and refining plants for this ore

and foundries. Only much later steel works and rolling mills were added,

that is to say, an industry.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The Hermann Göring Works were a part of the Four

Year Plan, were they not?

GÖRING: That is right.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you have already said that the Four Year Plan

had as its purpose to put the economy in a state of readiness for war;

and the Hermann Göring Works were organized to exploit ore mining and

iron smelting resources and to carry the process through to completed

guns and tanks, were they not?

GÖRING: No, that is not correct; the Hermann Göring Works had at first

no armament works of their own, but merely produced, as I again repeat,

the basic product, steel, crude steel.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, at all events, you continued your efforts and

on the 8th of November 1943, you made a speech describing those efforts

to the Gauleiter in the Führer building at Munich, is that right?

GÖRING: I do not know the exact date, but about that time I made a short

speech, one of a series of speeches, to the Gauleiter about the air

situation, as far as I remember, and also perhaps about the armament

situation. I do not remember the words of that speech, since I was never

asked about it until now; but the facts are correct.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, let me remind you if you used these terms,

refreshing your recollection:

“Germany, at the beginning of the war, was the only country in

the world possessing an operative, fighting air force. The other

countries had split their air fleets up into army and navy air

fleets and considered the air arm primarily as a necessary and

important auxiliary of the other branches of the forces. In

consequence, they lacked the instrument which is alone capable

of dealing concentrated and effective blows, namely, an

operative air force. In Germany we had gone ahead on those lines

from the very outset, and the main body of the Air Force was

disposed in such a way that it could thrust deeply into the

hostile areas with strategic effect, while a lesser portion of

the air force, consisting of Stukas and, of course, fighter

planes, went into action on the front line in the battlefields.

You all know what wonderful results were achieved by these

tactics and what superiority we attained at the very beginning

of the war through this modern kind of air force.”

GÖRING: That is entirely correct; I certainly did say that, and what is

more, I acted accordingly. But in order that this be understood and

interpreted correctly, I must explain briefly:

In these statements I dealt with two separate opinions on air strategy,

which are still being debated today and without a decision having been

reached. That is to say: Should the air force form an auxiliary arm of

the army and the navy and be split up to form a constituent part of the

army and the navy, or should it be a separate branch of the armed

forces? I explained that for nations with a very large navy it is

perhaps understandable that such a division should be made. From the

very beginning, thank God, we made the correct, consistent decision to

build up a strong—I emphasize the word “strong”—and independent Air

Force along with the Army and the Navy; and I described how we passed

from a tentative air force to an operative air force.

As an expert I am today still of the opinion that only an operative air

force can have a decisive effect. I have also explained, in regard to

two- and four-engine bombers, that at first I was quite satisfied with

the two-engine bombers because, firstly, I did not have four-engine

bombers; and secondly, the operational radius of the two-engine bombers

was wide enough for the enemy with whom we had to deal at that time. I

further pointed out that the main reason for the swift ending of the

campaign in Poland and in the West was the effect of the Air Force.

So that is quite correct.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I remind you of the testimony of the witness Milch,

sworn on your behalf, as to a subject on which I have not heard you

express yourself. He said:

“I had the impression that already at the time of the occupation

of the Rhineland, he, Göring, was worried lest Hitler’s policy

should lead to war.”

Do you remember that?

GÖRING: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And was it true or false? True or mistaken,

perhaps, I should say.

GÖRING: No, I did not want a war and I thought the best way to avoid a

war was to be strongly armed according to the well-known adage, “He who

has a strong sword has peace.”

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, you are still of that opinion?

GÖRING: I am of that opinion today, now that I see the entanglements

more than ever.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And it is true, as Milch said, that you were

worried that Hitler’s policies would lead to war at the time of the

occupation of the Rhineland?

GÖRING: Excuse me, I just understood you to ask whether it is also my

opinion today that only a nation that is strongly armed can maintain

peace. That is what I meant to answer with my last statement.

If you are connecting this question to the statement of Milch, that I

was worried lest the policy of the Führer might lead to war, I should

like to say that I was worried lest war might come; and if possible I

wanted to avoid it, but not in the sense that the policy of the Führer

would lead to it, because the Führer also desired to carry out his

program by agreements and diplomatic action.

In regard to the occupation of the Rhineland I was somewhat worried at

the time about the reactions; all the same, it was necessary.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And when nothing happened, the next step was

Austria?

GÖRING: The one has nothing to do with the other. I never had any

misgivings about Austria leading to a war, as I had with the Rhineland

occupation, for in the case of the Rhineland occupation I could well

imagine that there might be repercussions. But how there could be any

repercussions from abroad over the union of two brother nations of

purely German blood was not clear to me, especially since Italy, who

always pretended that she had a vital interest in a separate Austria,

had somewhat changed her ideas. It could not have mattered in the least

to England and France, nor could they have had the slightest interest in

this union. Therefore I did not see the danger of its leading to a war.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I ask you just a few questions about Austria. You

said that you and Hitler had felt deep regret about the death of

Dollfuss, and I ask you if it is not a fact that Hitler put up a plaque

in Vienna in honor of the men who murdered Dollfuss, and went and put a

wreath on their graves when he was there. Is that a fact? Can you not

answer that question with “yes” or “no”?

GÖRING: No, I cannot answer it with either “yes” or “no,” if I am to

speak the truth according to my oath. I cannot say, “Yes, he did it,”

because I do not know; I cannot say, “No, he did not do it,” because I

do not know that either. I want to say that I heard about this event

here for the first time.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, in June of 1937, Seyss-Inquart came to you and

State Secretary Keppler, and you had some negotiations.

GÖRING: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And it was Seyss-Inquart’s desire to have an

independent Austria, was it not?

GÖRING: As far as I remember, yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And Keppler was the man who was sent by Hitler to

Vienna at the time of the Anschluss and who telegraphed to Hitler not to

march in, do you recall?

GÖRING: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is the telegram that you characterized as

impudent and senseless from the man who was on the spot, and who had

negotiated earlier with Seyss-Inquart, do you recall that?

GÖRING: I did not characterize the telegram with this word which has

just been translated to me in German, that is “impudent.” I said that

this telegram could no longer have any influence and was superfluous,

because the troops were already on the move and had their order; the

thing was already underway.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You had demanded that Seyss-Inquart be made

Chancellor? Is that right?

GÖRING: I did not desire that personally, but it arose out of the

circumstance that at that time he was the only man who could assume the

Chancellorship because he was already in the Government.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, did Seyss-Inquart become Chancellor of Austria

with the understanding that he was to surrender his country to Germany,

or did you lead him to believe that he would be independent, have an

independent country?

GÖRING: I explained the other day that even at the time when he left by

plane the next morning, the Führer himself had still not made up his

mind as to whether the union with Austria should not be brought about by

means of a joint head of state. I also said that I personally did not

consider this solution far-reaching enough and that I was for an

absolute, direct, and total Anschluss.

I did not know exactly what Seyss-Inquart’s attitude was at this time.

Nevertheless I feared that his attitude was rather in the direction of

continued separation with co-operation, and did not go as far as my

attitude in the direction of a total Anschluss. Therefore I was very

satisfied when this total Anschluss crystallized in the course of the

day.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I respectfully submit that the answers are not

responsive, and I repeat the question.

Did Seyss-Inquart become Chancellor of Austria with an understanding

that he would call in the German troops and surrender Austria to

Germany, or did you lead him to believe that he could continue an

independent Austria?

GÖRING: Excuse me, but that is a number of questions which I cannot

answer simply with “yes” or “no.”

If you ask me, “Did Seyss-Inquart become Chancellor according to

Hitler’s wishes and yours?”—yes.

If you then ask me, “Did he become Chancellor with the understanding

that he should send a telegram for troops to march in?”—I say, “No,”

because at the time of the Chancellorship there was no question of his

sending us a telegram.

If you ask me, thirdly, “Did he become Chancellor on the understanding

that he would be able to maintain an independent Austria?”—then I have

to say again that the final turn of events was not clear in the Führer’s

mind on that evening.

That is what I tried to explain.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Is it not true that you suspected that he might

want to remain as independent as possible, and that that was one of the

reasons why the troops were marched in?

GÖRING: No. Excuse me, there are two questions: I strongly suspected

that Seyss-Inquart wanted to be as independent as possible. The sending

of troops had nothing at all to do with that suspicion; not a single

soldier would have been needed for that. I gave my reasons for the

sending of the troops.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But it was never intimated to Seyss-Inquart that

Austria would not remain independent until after—as you put it—the

Führer and you were in control of Austria’s fate? Is that a fact?

GÖRING: That was certainly not told him beforehand by the Führer. As far

as I was concerned, it was generally known that I desired it, and I

assume that he knew of my attitude.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, you have stated that you then, in conversation

with Ribbentrop in London, stressed that no ultimatum had been put to

Seyss-Inquart, and you have said that legally that was the fact.

GÖRING: I did not say “legally,” I said “diplomatically.”

THE PRESIDENT: Is that a convenient time to break off?

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes, Your Honor.

[_The Tribunal adjourned until 19 March 1946 at 1000 hours._]

EIGHTY-FIFTH DAY

Tuesday, 19 March 1946

_Morning Session_

DR. STAHMER: With the permission of the Tribunal, I shall call as

witness the civil engineer, Birger Dahlerus of Stockholm.

[_The witness Dahlerus took the stand._]

THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your name?

BIRGER DAHLERUS (Witness): Birger Dahlerus.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me:

I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that the evidence I shall

give shall be the truth—the whole truth—and nothing but the truth—so

help me God.

[_The witness repeated the oath._]

THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down if you wish.

DR. STAHMER: Mr. Dahlerus, would you please tell the Court how you, as a

private person and a Swedish citizen, came to work for an understanding

between England and Germany?

DAHLERUS: I knew England very well, since I had lived there for 12

years, and I also knew Germany very well. I had been able to observe the

first World War from both sides, as I stayed both in Germany and in

England during that time.

During a visit to England at the end of June 1939, I traveled around a

number of cities, Birmingham, Coventry, Manchester, and London, and I

found everywhere an absolute determination that the British would

tolerate no further aggressive acts on the part of Germany.

On 2 July I met some friends in the Constitutional Club. We discussed

the current situation and they gave a pretty clear picture of public

opinion in Great Britain.

As this summary of public opinion in Great Britain was the basis for my

discussions afterward with Göring, I think I should quote it.

“Outline of conclusions reached by observation of conditions in

Great Britain and by conversations with people of the country:

“A. Agreement that Berchtesgaden and Czechoslovakia have shaken

confidence, and that immediately after Berchtesgaden, before

Czechoslovakia could possibly be in a position to accomplish by

co-operation many things already decided upon by Germany.

“B. Public opinion in Great Britain now extremely bitter. It is

resolved: so far and no farther.

“C. Great Britain from now on has obligations which did not

exist at time of Berchtesgaden meeting. Poland and Danzig: An

attack on Danzig means war with Poland and Britain. Great

Britain will be involved automatically as a consequence of its

obligations. Hence, automatically, war with Great Britain.

“D. Great Britain does not make her strength known; this is not

even known to the British public.”

Then follows Statement Number 2, about Lord Halifax’s speech:

“My personal observations indicate that England stands firmly

behind its declarations. . . .”

THE PRESIDENT: One moment. I am afraid the Russian is coming through on

the French again. I am afraid the Tribunal must adjourn then.

[_A recess was taken._]

THE PRESIDENT: Before the witness goes on with his evidence, the

Tribunal want me to say that the system by which the earphones are

connected with the interpreters was checked over after the Court rose

last night, was checked over again at 9:30 this morning, and again at

9:55 this morning. But everyone who comes into this court must realize

that it has not been possible to bury these cables so as to make them

altogether safe. It is, therefore, of the very greatest importance that

everybody who comes into this court should take real care to avoid, if

possible, treading upon these cables, which may become injured by being

kicked and broken, and in that way the faults in the system occur.

Everything is being done to maintain the system as efficiently as

possible. It, therefore, rests with those who use this court to see that

they do their best to assist in keeping the system efficient.

DR. STAHMER: Mr. Dahlerus, would you please continue.

DAHLERUS: Point Number 2: Lord Halifax’s speech:

“Personal observations indicate that England stands firmly

behind its declaration. Lord Halifax underestimates England’s

situation, which is customary with the British; that is, he

makes out the state of the strength of Great Britain to be

weaker than it actually is. Perhaps in Germany this is not fully

realized.

“Point Number 3: England wants peace, but not peace at any

price. The German people are quite acceptable to the British,

and there seems to be no good reason for an armed conflict. As

before, Germany will certainly be defeated again, and will

accomplish far less by war then by peaceful negotiations.

England and her friends will likewise have to suffer much;

possibly it will mean the end of civilization.”

Having observed that there was a disinclination in the Third Reich to

forward unfavorable reports, I felt both that it was my duty and that it

might be of great value if these clear expressions of British opinion

were to be transmitted to the highest quarters in Germany.

DR. STAHMER: Mr. Dahlerus, may I interrupt with a question? Were these

friends of yours members of the British Parliament?

DAHLERUS: No, they were people from the business world, and if the

Tribunal desires, I can submit a list of the names.

DR. STAHMER: What were their names?

DAHLERUS: May I save time and submit the list of names to the Tribunal?

THE PRESIDENT: Their names are not of any great importance, are they, if

they were people in the business world?

DAHLERUS: After having agreed with my friends on the advisability of a

trip to Germany, I left for Germany and received an appointment with

Göring for 6 July at 4 o’clock in the afternoon, at Karinhall.

I told him what I had observed in England and strongly emphasized the

necessity of doing everything to avoid the possibility of a war. Göring

expressed doubts as to whether these observations were not perhaps an

attempt by the English to bluff. He likewise pointed out that he was of

the opinion that England wanted to control developments on the

Continent.

I told him that I did not want him to accept statements of mine, of a

neutral citizen, and I suggested to him that a meeting should be

arranged where he and some other members of the German Government might

have the opportunity of meeting British citizens who had absolute

knowledge of conditions. I suggested that such a meeting could well take

place in Sweden, possibly on the invitation of the King of Sweden, or

the Swedish Government.

On 8 July I received from Göring a reply that Hitler had agreed to this

plan, and I left for Sweden to ascertain whether it would be possible to

make such an arrangement in Sweden.

The Swedish Government, for certain reasons, considered it inadvisable

for the Swedish King or the Swedish Government, to extend such an

invitation, but they had no objections to private persons arranging such

a meeting.

Count Trola Wachmeester willingly placed his castle, Trola Beelda, at

the disposal of such a meeting. I left then on 19 July for London to

begin the preparations.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, can you not take the witness on, in order to

save time, to the actual negotiations? All these preliminaries do not

seem to the Tribunal to be very important. Can you not take him on to

the actual negotiations?

DR. STAHMER: Yes, he will come directly to the meeting, to the

preliminary meeting that took place on 7 August at Soenke Nissen Koog.

Witness, will you tell us of the meeting. You were about to state that

on 19 July you flew to London and there, on the 20th met Lord Halifax?

DAHLERUS: Yes.

DR. STAHMER: I consider this statement very material. Would you tell the

Tribunal of the content of this meeting with Lord Halifax?

DAHLERUS: I met Lord Halifax on 20 July. He said particularly that he

did not want any members of the British Government or Parliament to

participate. However, His Majesty’s Government would await the results

of the meeting with the greatest interest. The meeting took place at

Soenke Nissen Koog, in Schleswig-Holstein, near the Danish border. The

house belongs to my wife. Seven Englishmen, Göring, Bodenschatz, and Dr.

Schoettl were present.

DR. STAHMER: On what day was this?

DAHLERUS: It was on 7 August, and the meeting started at 10 o’clock. The

meeting started with Göring’s request to the Englishmen to put to him

any questions they desired. Then, a long discussion took place on

political developments, particularly with reference to relations between

Great Britain and Germany. Finally, both sides came to the question of

Munich and the events after Munich. The English representatives

emphasized that the policy of aggression in Europe would have to cease.

Then the question of the Corridor and Danzig was discussed.

The Englishmen made it perfectly clear that if Germany were to try with

force to occupy any foreign territory, the British Empire, in accordance

with its obligations to Poland, would stand at the side of Poland.

Göring indicated, on his word of honor as a statesman and a soldier,

that although he had the control and command of the strongest air force

in the world and might be tempted to lead this air force into battle, he

would do everything in his power to prevent a war.

The result of the meeting was that all present agreed on the fact that

it would be of the greatest value if a meeting could be arranged as soon

as possible by representatives of England and Germany. The conference

ended late at night, but next morning the English delegates suggested

that such a conference should be extended to include four nations, Great

Britain, France, Italy, and Germany. I went to Sylt, where Göring was

staying, and he was prepared to consent, in the name of Germany, to this

modified proposal.

DR. STAHMER: Did English Members of Parliament participate in this

meeting?

DAHLERUS: No, English businessmen only.

DR. STAHMER: Was a full report on this visit given to Lord Halifax?

DAHLERUS: The English participants left Germany early on 9 August and

immediately on their return submitted a report to the Foreign Office.

DR. STAHMER: Did this meeting that was planned then materialize, or how

did the matter further develop?

DAHLERUS: I received a confirmation from Göring personally that Hitler

agreed to such a conference. The matter was then discussed in London,

and on 19 August, a request came to me to go to Paris, evidently to

receive a reply from the British side. Before I left, on 21 August, I

was informed that a commercial agreement had been concluded between

Russia and Germany. On the following day this was extended to an

agreement covering other political questions. On 23 August I was

requested by Göring, who telephoned me in the morning at 10:30 to come

to Berlin, if possible, at once.

DR. STAHMER: Did he, during this conversation, point out the gravity of

the situation?

DAHLERUS: Yes. Göring stated that the situation had in the meantime

become very serious.

DR. STAHMER: When did you meet Göring then?

DAHLERUS: I arrived in Berlin on the 24th and saw Göring at 2 o’clock in

the afternoon.

DR. STAHMER: What was the subject of your discussion?

DAHLERUS: He told me that the situation had become very serious owing to

the fact that no agreement had been reached between Poland and Germany.

He asked me whether I could not go to London and explain the situation

there.

DR. STAHMER: Were you to point out there in particular that Germany was

prepared to come to an understanding with England?

DAHLERUS: Yes. Göring stated that Germany wanted to come to an

understanding with England.

DR. STAHMER: Then when did you leave for London?

DAHLERUS: The following morning, on the 25th, a Friday.

DR. STAHMER: Did this trip take place with Hitler’s agreement?

DAHLERUS: That I cannot say.

DR. STAHMER: With whom then did you have a discussion in London on the

evening of the 25th?

DAHLERUS: The important meeting took place late in the afternoon at 6:30

with Lord Halifax.

DR. STAHMER: What did Halifax tell you on this occasion?

DAHLERUS: He informed me that on the same day Henderson had spoken with

Hitler, and that Henderson was expected in London on Saturday, the 26th.

He expressed the hope then that now the official channels were open an

agreement might really become possible. He thanked me for my efforts,

and assured me that he did not think my services would be required any

longer.

DR. STAHMER: Did you on the same evening have a telephone conversation

with Göring?

DAHLERUS: Yes.

DR. STAHMER: What was discussed?

DAHLERUS: At 8 o’clock in the evening I tried to reach him on the

telephone, but only after I had obtained help from the Foreign Office

was I able to establish the connection. Göring revealed to me then that

the situation had become extremely serious and asked me to do everything

in my power to arrange a conference between representatives of England

and Germany.

DR. STAHMER: Did you inform Lord Halifax of this conversation?

DAHLERUS: Yes. Mr. Roberts of the Foreign Office received the exact

wording of our conversation, and before midnight Lord Halifax had the

report in his hands.

DR. STAHMER: Did you then on the next morning, that is on Saturday, 26

August, have another conversation with Lord Halifax? What was the nature

of that conversation?

DAHLERUS: I met Lord Halifax on Saturday, the 26th at 11 o’clock. I told

him that I had learned that the German Government was trying to bring

about a decision with all haste. And I stressed the importance of such

an attempt in order to make it clear to him that in such a serious

situation it was necessary to proceed with greatest sense of

responsibility and care. I asked him to emphasize to the German

Government that the British Government wanted an understanding.

DR. STAHMER: Did anyone state that Göring was the only man on the German

side who could prevent war?

DAHLERUS: Well, I personally had the impression that Göring was the

member of the German Government who was most probably working for peace.

I had this impression from the conversations that I had with him.

DR. STAHMER: What suggestion did you make then to Lord Halifax?

DAHLERUS: I suggested to Lord Halifax that he should write a letter to

Göring. I would go at once to Berlin and deliver it to him personally.

DR. STAHMER: Was your suggestion taken?

DAHLERUS: Yes, Lord Halifax conferred with Chamberlain, and afterwards

wrote an excellent letter in which he indicated in very clear and

distinct words the desire of his Majesty’s Government to bring about a

peaceful settlement.

DR. STAHMER: Did you then fly back to Berlin with this letter?

DAHLERUS: Yes. I arrived in Berlin in the evening, and met Göring at

about 10 o’clock that evening.

DR. STAHMER: Describe to the Tribunal the purport of this conversation

that you had as a consequence of your talk with Halifax.

DAHLERUS: I met Göring in his train which was just on the way to

headquarters. I told him how matters looked in London and emphasized

that there was no doubt that, if the German Government proceeded against

Danzig, it would immediately be at war with England, but that I was

convinced that the German Government was prepared to do everything in

its power to avert the crisis. After I had said this to him, I handed

him the letter. He tore it open, and after having read it, he placed it

before me and asked me to translate it exactly, because it was of

greatest importance that the contents should be understood correctly. He

sent for his adjutant to come immediately, but the train stopped at the

next station, and he declared that in his opinion Hitler must be

informed immediately of the contents of this letter. I followed him in a

car to Berlin, and exactly at 12 o’clock, midnight, we arrived at the

Reich Chancellery. Göring went in immediately to talk with Hitler, and I

went to my hotel.

DR. STAHMER: That was then on 27 August, in the night, was it not, or

early in the morning on 28 August?

DAHLERUS: Yes.

DR. STAHMER: Did you then have a further conversation with Hitler?

DAHLERUS: I was visited by two officers at a quarter past twelve,

midnight, who requested me to go with them immediately to Hitler. I was

received by him immediately upon my arrival. He was alone with Göring.

DR. STAHMER: Will you describe this conversation somewhat more exactly

in detail.

DAHLERUS: Hitler began, in his usual way to describe German policy to me

at length. That lasted about 20 minutes, and I thought that my visit

would not prove useful. When he inveighed against the English and

England, I interrupted him and stated that I had worked in Great

Britain, as a workman, as an engineer, and as a manager of industrial

enterprises, that I knew the English people well, and that I could not

agree with his statements. A long discussion resulted. He asked many

questions about England and the English people. Thereafter, he began to

explain to me how well equipped the German fighting forces were. Then he

seemed very excited, walked up and down the room, and in the end got

himself into a very agitated condition and told me that, if it came to a

war, he would build U-boats, U-boats, and more U-boats. He seemed really

to speak as though he were not aware that there was still anybody in the

room. After a while he shouted that he would build airplanes, airplanes,

and still more airplanes, and that he would win the war. Then he calmed

down again and talked again about England and said, “Herr Dahlerus, tell

me please, why I have not been able to arrive at an agreement with the

British Government. You seem really to know England so well. Perhaps you

can solve the riddle for me?” I hesitated at first, but then I told him

that, with my intimate knowledge of the English people, I was personally

of the opinion that their lack of confidence in him and his Government

was the reason.

The conversation continued. He gave me a long report on his discussions

on Friday with Henderson, and finally he asked me to go to London at

once and explain his viewpoint. I refused, naturally, and told him that

I could not go there as an emissary of Germany. If, however, the British

Government expressed the wish that I should come, I would, of course, be

prepared to do this. The condition was such, however, that I must know

definitely what conditions and proposals he had to make. We spent an

hour and a half, during which he explained the various points in greater

detail than he had been able to do with Henderson.

DR. STAHMER: What proposals were you specifically to make?

DAHLERUS: In condensed form, they were as follows:

(1) Germany wanted an agreement or an alliance with England.

(2) England was to help Germany in the annexation of Danzig and the

Corridor.

(3) Germany gave the assurance that it would guarantee Poland’s

boundaries.

(4) An agreement should be reached on Germany’s colonies.

(5) Adequate guarantees should be given for the treatment of German

minorities.

(6) Germany gave its word to defend the British Empire with the German

Wehrmacht wherever it should be attacked.

DR. STAHMER: Mr. Dahlerus, regarding Point 2, was not Poland assured of

a free harbor in Danzig? You may want to add something as to what

assurance Poland was to receive. That was Point 2?

DAHLERUS: Yes. This was, of course, only an outline. These proposals

were naturally far more extensive.

DR. STAHMER: Is it correct that Poland was to receive a free harbor in

Danzig, that it was to receive a corridor to Gdynia, according to the

proposals?

DAHLERUS: That was what Hitler said.

DR. STAHMER: Yes, thank you. What was the further course of the

conversation?

DAHLERUS: I left on a special plane the next morning, after I had got in

touch with London. I met Mr. Chamberlain, Lord Halifax, Sir Horace

Wilson, and Sir Alexander Cadogan.

DR. STAHMER: This was on 27 August, was it not?

DAHLERUS: On 27 August, yes.

DR. STAHMER: Where?

DAHLERUS: In Downing Street, Number 10.

DR. STAHMER: What transpired in this conference with Lord Halifax and

Mr. Chamberlain?

DAHLERUS: We discussed in full detail the proposals I had brought. On

certain points, as is seen from the British _Blue Book_, these proposals

were not the same as those made to Henderson. I therefore suggested to

the British Government that, if they had full confidence in me as an

intermediary, they should tell me how far they could accept the

proposals and how far not. I would go back to Berlin the same day and

discuss the English views with Hitler and Göring. They should keep

Henderson in London until Monday, so that the answer could be given

after they had been informed how Hitler regarded the English standpoint.

DR. STAHMER: Did you also have a conference that day with Sir Alexander

Cadogan?

DAHLERUS: After the meeting with the members of the Government that I

have mentioned, I had a long conversation with Cadogan.

DR. STAHMER: Did you receive certain proposals from him?

DAHLERUS: Yes.

DR. STAHMER: What were they?

DAHLERUS: I must say that the English made the greatest effort to deal

in a fair and peaceable way with the various points. Naturally, Point 6,

the offer to defend the British Empire, was rejected. Similarly, they

did not want to have any discussion on the colonies as long as Germany

was not demobilized. With regard to the Polish boundaries, they wanted

these boundaries to be guaranteed by the five great powers: Russia,

Germany, England, France, and Italy.

Concerning the Corridor, they proposed that negotiations with Poland be

undertaken immediately.

With reference to the first point, England was willing in principle to

come to an agreement with Germany.

DR. STAHMER: Did you then return to Germany with these proposals?

DAHLERUS: Yes; after I had telephoned Berlin. As the English Government

had promised to send Henderson back the same day, I obtained

confirmation from Berlin that they were agreeable to Henderson’s

returning only on Monday. I left that same evening and shortly before

midnight was back in Berlin.

DR. STAHMER: Did you have a conversation there with Göring?

DAHLERUS: I met Göring about 11:10 on Sunday evening and told him the

results.

DR. STAHMER: Can you describe that conversation somewhat more in detail?

DAHLERUS: He did not consider the reply very favorable. I told him,

however, that in view of the events of the last year he could hardly

expect the English to be satisfied with the guarantees of Poland’s

boundaries by Germany only. With reference to the colonial question, I

made it clear to him that any British Government would be overthrown at

once that tried to force this point in Parliament as long as Germany’s

forces were mobilized.

In reference to the sixth point, I tried to make it clear to him that

England, or the British Empire, preferred to look after their own

affairs themselves. Finally he said that it would probably be better if

he talked with Hitler alone. He went immediately to the Reich

Chancellery and I went to my hotel. At about 1 o’clock on Monday

morning, the 26th, I received a telephone call and heard that Hitler

would accept the English standpoint provided that the reply expected

from Henderson on the next day was, in general, what I had said.

DR. STAHMER: Did you then, that same night, go to the British Embassy?

DAHLERUS: Yes. I went straight to the British Embassy and gave Sir

Ogilvie-Forbes a report of the results of my conversation with Göring,

and he cabled to London at once.

DR. STAHMER: Did you inform Göring of the substance of this conversation

that you had with Forbes?

DAHLERUS: Of course. I acted quite openly, and therefore I told Göring

what I planned to do. The German Government knew, indeed, that I would

have this conversation with Forbes.

DR. STAHMER: When did you see Göring again then?

DAHLERUS: I saw him again on Monday, the 28th, in the morning, at his

headquarters.

DR. STAHMER: It must have been Tuesday morning, was it not?

DAHLERUS: No, Monday morning. It was Monday morning, the 28th.

DR. STAHMER: What was said during this conversation with Göring?

DAHLERUS: In general, we discussed the situation. He seemed to be

satisfied that Forbes had cabled London.

DR. STAHMER: Did you visit Forbes again then?

DAHLERUS: Yes, I saw Forbes later. But that was of no significance any

longer.

DR. STAHMER: And you met Göring again on Tuesday, did you not, on

Tuesday morning?

DAHLERUS: Well, the most important development was that on Tuesday

morning, or at 1:15, that is, shortly after midnight, on the 29th, I

received a telephone call from the Reich Chancellery, made at Göring’s

request by Lieutenant Colonel Konrad. He told me that Henderson had

submitted his reply in writing, that it was highly satisfactory, and

there was every hope that the threat of a war was past.

I met Göring again then and he told me that he was highly pleased that

the matter had developed so well.

DR. STAHMER: Did he not make a statement of this kind: “We shall have

peace; peace is assured?”

DAHLERUS: Yes. He said something similar to that.

DR. STAHMER: Then sometime on 29 August you were called up again by

Göring, were you not? What occasioned this?

DAHLERUS: I was in my hotel, late in the evening, about 10:30. Forbes

called me up and said he had to see me at once. He came to my hotel and

said that Henderson and Hitler had had a meeting on Tuesday evening

which had taken a very unsatisfactory course. They had parted after a

big quarrel. He asked me what I could suggest under these circumstances.

During our conversation I was called on the phone by Göring, and he

asked me to come to his house immediately. He told me the same story and

seemed very upset at the development. He showed me the German reply to

the British note and went through it point by point. He tried to explain

to me the reasons for the contents of this note. Finally he told me I

should go back to London again immediately and make every effort to

explain this unfortunate incident to the British Government. He

concluded then by saying that Hitler was busy, and that he was working

out a proposal for Poland which should probably be ready the next day.

After a talk with Sir Kingsley Wood, the Air Minister, about another

visit to England, I left again by plane on Wednesday morning at 5

o’clock. Immediately after my arrival in London I met the same members

of the British Government.

DR. STAHMER: Who were they?

DAHLERUS: The same personages, Mr. Chamberlain, Lord Halifax, Sir Horace

Wilson, Sir Alexander Cadogan.

DR. STAHMER: What was said in this discussion?

DAHLERUS: It was obvious that by that time the British Government had

become highly mistrustful, and rather inclined to assume that whatever

efforts they might make, nothing would now prevent Hitler from declaring

war on Poland. The British Government had made the greatest effort. They

had expressed the wish through their ambassador in Warsaw that the

Polish Government should exert the greatest effort to avoid any border

incidents. They explained to me at the same time that it was hardly fair

to expect the Polish Government to send delegates to Berlin to

negotiate, when it was known what experience other countries had had in

the past years when they had been in Berlin on similar missions.

I telephoned Berlin, and asked to be connected with Göring, in order to

persuade him to arrange a meeting of the delegates outside Germany. He

merely said, however, that this was impossible; that Hitler was in

Berlin, and the meeting would have to take place in Berlin. It was said,

too, that proposals had been made to Poland, and that the members of the

British Government viewed these proposals with the greatest suspicion.

The entire Polish Government was to meet in the afternoon, and would

cable the result of the session to Berlin. In the meantime I returned to

Berlin.

DR. STAHMER: When did you meet Göring there?

DAHLERUS: I met Göring . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Can you not make this a little bit shorter, Dr. Stahmer?

DR. STAHMER: I believe this testimony is quite short, considering that

it deals with the essential circumstances leading to war. However, I

think that we shall not take too much more of the Tribunal’s time.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dahlerus, the Tribunal wish you to come to the

crucial matter as soon as possible.

DAHLERUS: I met Göring shortly after midnight on Wednesday, and he told

me the nature of the proposals made to Poland. He showed me the note. I

called up Forbes to give him this information. He then told me that

Ribbentrop had refused to give him the note, after he had read it

through very quickly. I went to Göring immediately and told him it was

impossible to treat the ambassador of an empire like Great Britain in

this way. I suggested to him that he should allow me to telephone Forbes

and give Forbes the contents of the note on the telephone. I did this at

about 1 o’clock on Thursday morning.

DR. STAHMER: Did Göring not emphasize that he was taking a great

responsibility on himself in giving you this permission?

DAHLERUS: Yes. Göring emphasized that he was doing this on his own

responsibility.

DR. STAHMER: Did you then on the next morning go to the British Embassy

in order to convince yourself as to whether your telephonic

communication had been understood correctly?

DAHLERUS: Yes, I saw Henderson on Thursday morning, the 31st, at 10

o’clock, discussed the note with him, and he requested me then to go at

once to the Polish Ambassador, M. Lipski, and give him a copy.

DR. STAHMER: Was that done?

DAHLERUS: He sent Forbes with me to Lipski, and I read the note to

Lipski, but he did not seem to grasp its purport. I, therefore, left the

room, dictated a note to the secretary, and handed it to him. In the

meantime, Lipski stated to Forbes that he would not be interested in

discussing this note with the German Government.

DR. STAHMER: Would you reconstruct this conversation as far as you are

able? It seems to me particularly important.

DAHLERUS: He said that he had no reason to negotiate with the German

Government. If it came to war between Poland and Germany, he knew—since

he had lived 5½ years in Germany—that a revolution would break out in

Germany, and that they would march on Berlin.

DR. STAHMER: Did you then inform London of your conversation by

telephone?

DAHLERUS: I telephoned at once from the British Embassy and informed Sir

Horace Wilson of the conference that we had had.

DR. STAHMER: Was there then another discussion in the afternoon with

Göring?

DAHLERUS: I saw Göring at 1 o’clock in the afternoon. He received then a

copy of the cablegram from the Polish Government to Lipski, to the

effect that Lipski should not, without special instruction from Warsaw,

negotiate with the German Government. It was obvious that the Poles

under those circumstances were afraid to take any action. The German

Government was, however, much disturbed at this telegram.

DR. STAHMER: On that afternoon did you again meet Göring, together with

the British Ambassador?

DAHLERUS: The situation already seemed to have become impossible. Hitler

had quarreled with Henderson. Ribbentrop, too, had quarreled with him.

Therefore, I was of the opinion that the only possibility lay in Göring

coming to an understanding with Henderson. I suggested a meeting between

them. This took place at 4:50 in the afternoon, at Göring’s house.

Forbes was present, and I too.

DR. STAHMER: What was said during this meeting?

DAHLERUS: Even before the meeting, Henderson expressed his suspicion

that the German Government would try to arrange a settlement with

Britain and cause a break between England and Poland. Henderson was

therefore very cautious during the 2-hour session, and the result of the

conversation was only that both parties agreed that a meeting of

delegates from both countries would be necessary if war were possibly to

be avoided.

DR. STAHMER: Did you on this occasion likewise suggest that Göring

should meet the British delegates immediately?

DAHLERUS: I suggested that a meeting in Holland should be arranged at

once, at which Göring should represent Germany.

DR. STAHMER: How did Henderson react to this proposal?

DAHLERUS: Henderson promised to submit this proposal to his Government.

However, I had the impression that he already knew that German military

forces were on the march, and it did not seem to me that he had much

confidence in any fortunate outcome.

DR. STAHMER: Are you acquainted with a statement of Göring to the effect

that if the Poles did not give in, Germany would kill them like lice;

and if Britain should decide to declare war, he would regret it very

much but it would be very unwise of Britain?

DAHLERUS: I cannot recollect these words, but it is possible that during

the 2-hour conversation they were uttered.

DR. STAHMER: How did this conference end then?

DAHLERUS: At 7 o’clock in the evening it broke up and both parties were

agreed that they would endeavor to arrange for a meeting in Holland.

DR. STAHMER: Did you then on 1 September meet Göring again?

DAHLERUS: On 1 September I met Göring at 8 o’clock at his headquarters.

After some hesitation he told me that the war had broken out because the

Poles had attacked the radio station of Gleiwitz and blown up a bridge

near Dirschau. Later he gave me more details from which I concluded that

the full force of the German Army was employed in the attack on Poland.

DR. STAHMER: Did you then on 3 September meet Göring again, and did you

on this occasion, make the suggestion that Göring should fly to London

immediately for a personal conference?

DAHLERUS: Well, before I mention what happened then, I should like to

mention that I met Hitler on 1 September, immediately after his

Reichstag speech in the Kroll Opera House. He was at that time

exceedingly nervous and very agitated. He told me he had all along

suspected that England wanted the war. He told me further that he would

crush Poland and annex the whole country. Göring interrupted, and

pointed out that they would advance as far as certain given points. But

Hitler was in an uncontrollable frame of mind. He began to shout he

would fight for 1 year, 2 years, and ended up in great agitation that he

would, in fact, fight 10 years.

Then, on Sunday, 3 September, I was informed early in the morning by

Forbes that at 9 o’clock that morning an ultimatum would be given. The

conditions were that the hostilities must cease immediately and the

German forces must be withdrawn to the German border. I went immediately

to Göring’s headquarters near Potsdam. He was there and not with Hitler.

I appealed to him to try at least to arrange for a reasonable reply to

the ultimatum. I had the impression that certain members of the German

Government were in favor of war and I was afraid if a written reply were

given it would not be worded so as to avoid war with England. I

therefore suggested that Göring should declare himself prepared to go to

England, at once, before 11 o’clock, to negotiate there.

DR. STAHMER: How did Göring react to this suggestion?

DAHLERUS: He accepted this suggestion and telephoned Hitler, who

likewise concurred with it.

DR. STAHMER: Did you then telephone London?

DAHLERUS: Yes. I telephoned London and got in touch with the Foreign

Office. They gave the reply that they could not consider this proposal

before they had received a written reply to the ultimatum.

DR. STAHMER: Did you forward this communication to Göring?

DAHLERUS: Yes, I told Göring this.

DR. STAHMER: What impression did your communication make on Göring?

DAHLERUS: Göring seemed to be sorry that the proposal was not accepted.

DR. STAHMER: Then on 4 September did you speak once more with Göring?

DAHLERUS: Yes, I had a short conversation with Göring on 4 September,

but it was not of great importance.

DR. STAHMER: On this occasion did Göring say to you that, come what

might, he would endeavor to carry on the war as humanely as possible?

That Germany would under no circumstances begin hostilities against

England first, but if England should attack Germany then the answer

would be forthcoming?

DAHLERUS: Yes, that is correct.

DR. STAHMER: Did you publish a book entitled _Last Attempt_?

DAHLERUS: Yes.

DR. STAHMER: Is the account given in this book in accordance with the

truth?

DAHLERUS: Yes, it was written with greatest care. The contents are

absolutely accurate and correct.

DR. STAHMER: Is this account based on notes that you took on these

events?

DAHLERUS: Yes.

DR. STAHMER: When did you write these notes?

DAHLERUS: I wrote them immediately after my return to Sweden on 5

September 1939.

DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, I have three more brief questions—should I

stop now?—they pertain to the subsequent period.

THE PRESIDENT: I think you could ask them now.

DR. STAHMER: [_Turning to the witness._] On 24 September 1939, did you

speak to Forbes in Stockholm?

DAHLERUS: No, I met Forbes on 24 September in Oslo. That was after the

occupation of Poland. It was an endeavor to ascertain if there was still

a possibility of averting a world war. He gave me in writing the

viewpoint of the British Government. It was briefly as follows: “The

British and French Governments . . .”

THE PRESIDENT: Wait a moment. What has this got to do with the Defendant

Göring?

DR. STAHMER: This is evidence that he made efforts even later to bring

about peace.