I quote the first entry dated 13 February 1940:

“Have learned from Admiral Canaris that the Rewel Squadron is to

be employed in full force going from Bulgaria toward the

Caucasus. The Air Force must explain with whom this false idea

originated.”

The second entry of May 1940 reads as follows, and I quote verbatim:

“Führer rejects request of the Air Force to set up a listening

post in the Caucasus.”

I would like you to tell me what the thoughts were which guided you in

these plans as Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, and what facts were

the basis of those thoughts.

GÖRING: If these entries were made on the basis of a report by Admiral

Canaris, who was the chief of foreign intelligence, and if they were

entered by Jodl in connection with the special long reconnaissance Rewel

Squadron, it is because of the former’s connection with this

squadron—to which he himself frequently assigned intelligence or

espionage tasks—that he had heard of my intention to use it—which was

something which I wanted to have kept especially secret. He apparently

informed the High Command of the Armed Forces, where this action, or the

intended action, met with complete misapprehension and could not be

understood.

My intention in this connection—and I had personally ordered it—was

entirely clear. The statement that it was to do reconnaissance work in

or in the direction of the Caucasus is not quite correct. It would have

been more correct to say in the direction of the Caucasus, Syria, and

Turkey. But this mistake may have occurred in the report transmitted by

Canaris.

I had received more and more intelligence reports to the effect that

from Asia Minor actions were to be undertaken against the Russian

oilfields of the Caucasus—Baku—and likewise actions for the purpose of

gravely disrupting the oil supply from Romania to Germany.

As Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force I was the one chiefly interested

in obtaining Romanian oil as well as Caucasian oil, more precisely

petroleum and gasoline, on the basis of a trade agreement with Russia,

because at that time the refineries were not completed and not working

to capacity. A disturbance in either one of these supplying regions

would have affected my Air Force very badly. Therefore I had to watch

this closely. I anticipated disruption of the oil regions in the

Caucasus.

I had the agents’ report checked by very reliable people and found that

in Syria an army was actually formed under General Weygand which had the

name of “Orient Army.” I was more interested, however, in the

concentration of squadrons of aircraft in the Syrian area, not only of

French but also English squadrons. As far as I remember I received these

reports about the intentions of the French-British air squadrons through

agents in Turkey, that is to say, from Turks, because there had been

negotiations with Turkey regarding permission to fly over her territory

in order to carry out the intention of the English-French air squadrons

of suddenly bombing the Baku area and thereby severely damaging the

Russian oil fields and eliminating deliveries to Germany.

I therefore had to, or rather I was obliged to find out constantly,

through long-range reconnaissance flights, the extent to which the

airfields in Syria were becoming more active than before. There could be

no other reason for massing aircraft there exactly at this time, for it

was not a theater of war nor was any threat there on the part of Germany

at that moment. On the contrary, it would have been understandable if

all British and French aircraft had been needed in England and France

themselves.

If, therefore, my long-range reconnaissance flights established the fact

that the airdromes in Syria were being used more than ever, and further

confirmed that possibly the airfields in the east of Turkey were being

increased, this would have been, and actually was, a confirmation of the

alleged intentions. In this case, as soon as I was fully convinced of

this, I should have to point out to the Führer that Germany should draw

Russia’s attention to the danger threatening her.

The establishing of listening posts, not in the Caucasus but before the

Caucasus, naturally served the same purpose, namely that of setting up

secret radio stations along the general line of flight, Syria-Caucasus,

Syria-Baku, East Turkey-Baku, one, two or three, in order to find out

whether preparatory flights by the French and English Air Forces were

taking place; that is to say, reconnaissance on the oilfields, _et

cetera_, in order to get more information that way also.

Since at the time I did not yet have conclusive and final proof in my

hands, I kept these things to myself and dealt with them only in the

offices responsible to my sector of the Air Force until I could obtain a

clear picture. Only later, after the termination of the French campaign,

absolute confirmation of these intentions was obtained by the discovery

of the secret reports of the French General Staff and of the meetings of

the combined Supreme Military Council of England and France, which

proved that my information was entirely correct and that a plan for a

surprise bombing attack on all the Russian oilfields had been prepared.

In the meantime the confirmation of the plan to eliminate the Romanian

oilfields, already known to us, was communicated to the Romanian

Government and this attack on neutral Romania was then prevented.

DR. SIEMERS: I understood you correctly, did I not, that these plans

were made by both England and France?

GÖRING: Yes.

DR. SIEMERS: And that the intelligence you received was to the effect

that the attacks on the oilfields were directly aimed at the then

neutral Russia and also indirectly at Germany by the cutting off of her

oil supply?

GÖRING: Of course.

DR. SIEMERS: Thank you.

HERR BOEHM: Witness, is it true, as the Prosecution maintains, that you

were Reichsführer of the SA?

GÖRING: I was not Reichsführer of the SA, there never was such a title.

In 1923, on 9 November, I was a commander of the SA, which at that time

existed only in Bavaria and to a small extent in Württemberg.

HERR BOEHM: According to that, how long were you commander of the SA?

GÖRING: I have just told you, until November 1923.

HERR BOEHM: From 1921 on?

GÖRING: From the beginning of 1923.

HERR BOEHM: What was your influence before and after 1923 respectively

in regard to the leadership of the SA, the indoctrination of the people,

and the giving of orders?

GÖRING: Please repeat the question.

HERR BOEHM: What was your influence before and after 1923 as far as the

leadership of the SA, the indoctrination of the SA men, and the issuing

of orders were concerned?

GÖRING: From the beginning of 1923 until 9 November 1923 my influence

was complete and absolute, that is, I commanded the SA directly. After

1923 I was no longer entitled to have anything to do with the SA itself,

nor did I.

HERR BOEHM: How was it before 1923, the relationship before 1923 as well

as after 1923?

GÖRING: I beg your pardon?

HERR BOEHM: Was your relationship to the SA the same before 1923 as

afterwards?

GÖRING: I have explained this very precisely. Until November 1923 I was

commander of the SA with full power and authority to give orders. After

1923 I had nothing more to do with the SA as far as giving orders was

concerned, but I was only—I do not know what year it was, perhaps 1936

or so—connected with the SA in an honorary capacity, but without

exercising any authority. Besides, I had no occasion to do so.

HERR BOEHM: In the course of your testimony during the last week in

connection with the SA people, you said that they were always ready to

make great sacrifices. Now I would like you to tell me what kind of

sacrifices these were.

GÖRING: The sacrifices of the SA men were these: they gave nearly all

their leisure time to the movement without being reimbursed; they did

without family life or recreation, so that in difficult times of our

struggle for power they were always at the disposal of the Party, for

election campaigns, continuous parades, protection of meetings, _et

cetera_. In my eyes this is a considerable sacrifice, if one considers

that most members of the SA were workers and minor employees who needed

the few hours of their leisure more for rest, but who were always ready

to be fully at the disposal of the Party and to work for their political

ideals according to their political beliefs.

HERR BOEHM: Were these people promised material advantages?

GÖRING: None at all.

HERR BOEHM: Is it correct that particularly after the seizure of power a

great number of communist agitators crept into the SA?

GÖRING: Please repeat the question.

HERR BOEHM: Is it correct that especially after the seizure of power, a

great number of communist agitators were able to creep into the SA?

GÖRING: That was a very noticeable and vital matter. As after the

seizure of power action was taken against the Communist Party, which was

something they had logically expected, a number of members of the Red

Front battle organization joined the SA, especially in large cities

where this was easier. This was all the easier because the then head of

the SA, Röhm, indiscriminately admitted SA men, or rather men into the

SA, who did not need to be members of the Party, as was formerly

required. Anyone could therefore become an SA man without belonging to

the Party.

At the same time Hugenberg’s German National Party also started a

political battle organization which he called the “Green Shirts.” These

were also to be taken into the SA now, just as the Stahlhelm, as by

themselves they seemed purposeless.

I personally remember one day when 400 to 500 of these people assembled

at the Wilhelmstrasse to be enrolled in the SA. I saw these people from

my window and definitely noticed that elements were involved which did

not belong there. I immediately summoned the police and had a check

made. Ninety-eight percent of these men had their communist Red Front

membership cards in their pockets.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Boehm, the Tribunal considers that this is all

cumulative to what the defendant has already said in his examination in

chief. He has given us a long account of the SA in his examination in

chief. He has added nothing in the course of what he is now saying.

HERR BOEHM: According to the Prosecution, it is asserted that the SA was

composed of terror-gangsters. I feel in duty bound to correct or clarify

this statement in this respect by asking . . .

THE PRESIDENT: That has nothing to do with what I said. It may be that

the Prosecution have said that. Probably they have. What I was pointing

out to you was that the Defendant Göring has been all over this ground

in the evidence he has already given. The Tribunal does not wish to hear

the same evidence twice.

HERR BOEHM: Yes, that may apply to my first three questions in a way.

[_Turning to the witness._] I should like to ask further in what way you

influenced the SA in connection with the Versailles Treaty? Did you tell

the people that the Versailles Treaty should be annulled by diplomatic

means or by war?

GÖRING: This question is extremely difficult to answer. If I made a

speech to my SA men in 1923 I could not very well say much about

diplomacy. They would not have understood that. Rather the question was

quite simply to be rid of Versailles. The ordinary SA man was not at all

concerned with the “how” or the “what.” That is the task of the

leadership. I did not say, “I promise that you will never have war”; or

that we were only a purely pacific organization and that we should try

by protests only to rid the world of Versailles. But neither did I say

to them, “In the next few years we will march out and make war.” In

reality I did not tell them anything. I said that they would have to be

obedient and have confidence in the leadership, and leave what was to be

done to the leadership—that that was proper, and a basic

attitude—every SA man knew that from our speeches and from the Party

program. Among all the people the wish was—of every decent German, I

hope—to be rid of Versailles.

HERR BOEHM: According to your knowledge, and apart from the period of

1923, from 1921 to 1945, was the SA and also the organ of the SA, that

is, the leadership of the SA as well as the individual member, informed

that the NSDAP intended after the seizure of power to dominate other

states and to make war with that purpose in mind, even in disregard of

the rules of war and the laws of humanity if need be?

GÖRING: I do not quite know just what one imagines the SA leadership and

the entire SA to be. It is quite impossible that anyone should stand up

and say, Listen, we wish: (1) to overthrow and subjugate and dominate

all other states; (2) to wage war continuously; (3) to destroy

everything and act as inhumanly as possible; and (4) to pay thereby no

attention to any law of war.

I cannot imagine that anyone but an insane person would have made such

statements before the SA or anyone else. The SA was never instructed

politically in any way. It was told: “You will march tomorrow, and the

day after leaflets will be distributed and then . . .” as I have already

explained.

HERR BOEHM: During the time of the seizure of power there were various

excesses on the part of the SA. Was this a matter of measures undertaken

by individual members, or were these measures in accordance with

instructions of the SA leadership?

GÖRING: In no case, I believe, in accordance with instructions from the

middle or even the higher SA leadership offices. In an organization of a

million young people there will always be a certain percentage of

rowdies, especially in the large cities. As I have already mentioned,

there was a considerable number of agitators in the organization; that

thereby individual excesses on the part of individuals or groups of

like-minded persons will occur, is entirely inevitable.

HERR BOEHM: Did the SA leadership in principle ever sanction individual

actions on the part of its members?

GÖRING: I have already stated that I had very little to do with the

leadership of the SA, but I do not think so.

HERR BOEHM: Is it correct that the police were forbidden to take steps

against excesses on the part of individual members of the SA?

GÖRING: In the beginning that was not the case at all. By that I mean

that, on the contrary, the police had orders to take most decisive

action in such cases, and particularly the Police Commissioner of

Berlin, who was not of the Party, Admiral Von Levetzow, retired, acted

very vigorously here. That may even have been the reason for his being

removed by the Führer, 2 years later, I believe, owing to continued

complaints by the Berlin Gauleiter Goebbels.

HERR BOEHM: How was it later on? If I understood you correctly, you said

that in the beginning that was not the case; later the police must have

been forbidden to intervene in the case of excesses by members of the

SA?

GÖRING: No, it is not to be understood that way. At all times the police

intervened against excesses by individual SA men, as far as I remember.

A number of SA men were even convicted.

HERR BOEHM: In the Prussian police system, and in the police system of

the other states, were only SA members used, or was it rather that all

Germans who at that time volunteered to enter the police service were

examined and according to the results of this examination were then used

or not used?

GÖRING: There was a purging of the police according to our ideas, that

is, an investigation was made to see which elements were so strongly

bound to the party of the opponents, that is, to hostile parties, that

their use no longer seemed possible. These people were eliminated. But

that was a very small percentage in comparison with the actual total

number of police. They were replaced, and municipal police in

particular, who wore uniforms, were increased. Voluntary applications

for this came from all sides. Of course, members of our own

organizations were in part favored; but a number of people were also

taken who were not in these organizations, and those who came from the

organizations had to take tests of aptitude for the police services.

Many of them did not pass the test and were not taken. That is how

things were as long as I was concerned with the police. What happened

later I cannot tell you exactly.

HERR BOEHM: Is it correct that the SA after 1934, besides training for

sports, was used mainly for emergencies, to line the route on the

occasion of marches, to shovel snow, to clean up bomb damage, and so

forth?

GÖRING: After 1934 the importance of the SA declined tremendously. This

is understandable, for their chief task no longer existed after the

seizure of power. They were used to the fullest extent for the purposes

just mentioned by you. Then during the war they had pre-military duties;

and after the war they were to have formed a pool for the former

military clubs, so that they could be joined to the SA as veterans

associations. That was the intention, in order to give the SA a further

sphere of activities.

HERR BOEHM: Do you know that the Stahlhelm, by virtue of an agreement

between the Führer and Seldte, were taken into the SA reserves in a

body?

GÖRING: Yes.

HERR BOEHM: Is it correct that after 1933, like the Stahlhelm, the

riding clubs of that time were also taken into the SA through the

so-called conformity measures?

GÖRING: I believe that is correct.

HERR BOEHM: Was the SA leadership and its members before or after 1933

at any time informed of the results of cabinet consultations, or of the

decisions taken by the Cabinet?

GÖRING: I have already said in my general remarks just how the

leadership of the SA should be regarded. No, of course not.

HERR BOEHM: The Indictment states in connection with the presentation of

the charge of aggressive war and the participation of the SA in such a

war, that the SA took part in its preparation in that before the war it

annually trained about 25,000 officers in special schools. You must

surely have known something about that?

GÖRING: The training of officers of the Armed Forces was carried out

solely in the Armed Forces’ own military schools, and I could never

understand how the SA could be in a position from the purely technical

point of view, and as regards organization, to train officers for the

Armed Forces. In addition, it seems to me that the training of 25,000

officers a year is far in excess of the number of officers needed for

the Armed Forces. It would have been very nice if we had had so many,

but this number, at all events for several years, is just as incorrect

as the statement that the SA had to train officers. The training of

officers was done by the Armed Forces entirely and exclusively.

HERR BOEHM: But men do seem to have been trained. Do you know where

these men were trained and for what purpose? Do you know anything about

Führer Schools?

GÖRING: Yes, there were Führer Schools for every organization. Every

organization had its schools where it taught and trained those who in

its own cadres were to have some sort of leading position. I can only

imagine that the Prosecution confused things perhaps, or perhaps wanted

to say that some of the SA leaders had received a certain preliminary

pre-military training, in the reading of maps or something similar.

That, however, is beyond the scope of my knowledge.

HERR BOEHM: May I ask you to explain the relation of the Feldherrnhalle

to the SA or the Armed Forces? Was there a formation, or a regiment by

the name of Feldherrnhalle? What was particular about this?

GÖRING: After the SS had been allowed several companies by the Führer as

armed units—and these actually represented military formations, as, for

instance, the Leibstandarte, Grossdeutschland and others−the SA

leadership requested that it be granted at least one unit which it might

arm with rifles and small arms, as a parade unit, I might say, and this

unit was called Feldherrnhalle. Lutze, the then SA leader, suggested to

the Führer that I should be made the head of this unit. It is a position

of honor to be the head of a regiment or a unit. When I saw this unit

for the first time—I believe in a body at a Party rally at

Nuremberg—it pleased me immensely because it was composed of only

outstanding, especially selected young men.

Really I thanked the SA rather badly for this special honor, for after

seeing this excellent unit I dissolved it a few weeks later and took it

over in a body into the Air Force and made of it my first paratroop

regiment. So, after a brief existence, this unit became simply an Armed

Forces formation, a regiment of the Air Force. Because of this

procedure, which was unpleasant for the SA, it was quite some time, I

believe, before the SA leader Lutze decided to form a similar unit with

the name of Feldherrnhalle and he kept this unit very much smaller; it

did sentry duty for the supreme SA leadership, and he did not make me

the head of this unit a second time.

HERR BOEHM: According to my information, as well as information I

personally received from SA-Gruppenführer and Obergruppenführer, and

other information which I obtained myself through reading, the

Feldherrnhalle was not armed until it passed into the Air Force. Is that

correct?

GÖRING: No, that is not correct. I think, but I cannot say so under oath

with certainty, that they received rifles shortly before, but only

rifles. But as I said before, I do not know exactly.

In this connection, as the Prosecution has referred to this point, I

should like to emphasize that this regiment was already provided for as

a paratroop regiment in Case Green. After Case Green had been peacefully

settled, that is, after the Sudetenland question had been solved

peacefully, and long after the occupation of the Sudetenland, I made

this regiment bail out and land there, as originally intended, but

purely for purposes of practice and maneuvers. This was the landing at

Freudenthal which the Prosecution has mentioned. By this time they were

already in blue uniforms when they landed and were therefore already a

regiment of the Air Force. Merely as a matter of courtesy I had invited

the SA leader Lutze to watch this demonstration.

HERR BOEHM: In this war did the SA ever play a strategic or tactical

role in connection with the deployment of forces?

GÖRING: No, the SA as such was never used in combat within the Armed

Forces as the SA or as an SA unit, either tactically or otherwise. It

may be that toward the end there were certain SA units in the

Volkssturm.

HERR BOEHM: Is it correct that the SA as a body co-operated with the

Armed Forces in the occupation of Austria, the Sudetenland, and the

Czech State?

GÖRING: In the case of Austria, the Austrian SA, which was there on the

spot, did not take part in the occupation for it had been called up

there in a few places as auxiliary police. Actually the so-called

Austrian Legion, which was in the Reich, was at my express command and

at the express wish of Seyss-Inquart, held back for a long time and was

not allowed to go home until after the absolute consolidation of the

Austrian situation. It did come from Austria originally. How far units

of the SA marched into the Sudetenland after the zone was given over to

Germany, I do not know. I heard that there were also Sudeten Germans

involved here who had had to flee prior to that time and who were now

returning. In connection with the occupation of the rest of

Czechoslovakia, I cannot possibly imagine that SA formations played any

part in the entry of our troops.

HERR BOEHM: Could the members of the SA have known that possibly,

according to the intention of the SA leadership, they would or could be

used for the carrying out of punishable acts?

GÖRING: I did not quite get the substance of that question.

HERR BOEHM: Could the members of the SA have known that according to the

intention of the SA leadership they might possibly be used to commit

crimes?

GÖRING: Crimes, never.

HERR BOEHM: Now, I have a last question, but I believe that in a certain

sense you have already answered it. Did the members of the SA know, or

could they know, or ought they to have known, the aims and purposes of

the SA at any time, so that they could recognize the intention of the SA

leadership, or of the staff leadership, to commit crimes against peace,

war crimes, and crimes against humanity as stated in the Indictment?

GÖRING: I have already answered this.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn for 10 minutes.

[_A recess was taken._]

HERR BOEHM: Mr. President, I should like to ask you to permit me to put

one more basic question, namely, the question of honorary leadership.

[_Turning to the witness._] There were honorary leaders in the SA, for

instance, the Obergruppenführer, Gruppenführer, Brigadeführer,

Standartenführer, and Sturmführer. Witness, I should like you to explain

to me what the significance of the honorary leader in the organization

of the SA was as far as the training of the SA and the issuing of orders

to the SA was concerned—what kind of influence he might have had.

GÖRING: The honorary leaders of the SA were appointed for all sorts of

reasons and motives. They had an exclusively representative function,

that is to say, they took part in party ceremonies wearing the SA

uniform. They were by no means active members of the SA, and were not

informed of any internal activities of the SA, or of operations and

other tasks. Their function was purely decorative.

DR. RUDOLF MERKEL (Counsel for Gestapo): Witness, can one say that the

Gestapo in the year 1933, when it was created by you, was a National

Socialist combat unit, or was it rather a state organization such as,

for example, the criminal police or other state and Reich authorities?

GÖRING: I have already emphasized that this was a purely state

organization built around the already existing political police force,

which was merely being reorganized and brought into line with the new

state principles. At this time it had not even the slightest connection

with the Party. The Party had no influence, or authority to give orders

or directives of any sort; it was exclusively a state institution. The

members who were in it already, or who came into it, were at this time

officials with all the rights and duties of such.

DR. MERKEL: To your knowledge, did the position change in any way

between the time the State Police was taken over by Himmler and 1945?

GÖRING: Until 1934 it was exactly as I described it. Then with the

further expansion, the SS element did certainly become stronger and

perhaps more people from this sector were brought in, but even these—at

that time they all had to pass an examination—became and remained

officials. I heard later that nothing changed as far as this official

character was concerned, but gradually in the course of years all

officials, whether they wanted to or not, had, I believe, to take on

some rank in the SS, so that a Gestapo official, who perhaps until the

year 1939 or 1940 had had nothing to do with the SS, and whose

employment dated from the old days—that is, he had been a police

official of the Weimar Republic—was automatically given some rank or

other in the SS. But he remained an official, that is, the Gestapo was

an apparatus for officials in the German police force.

DR. MERKEL: Do you know whether it is true that after the seizure of

power Himmler, in his capacity as Police Commissioner of Munich, was at

the same time the head of the political police and the criminal police

in Bavaria?

GÖRING: As far as I know, and as I have already explained, Himmler was

first of all Police Commissioner of Munich. Very shortly afterwards, it

may perhaps have been one or two weeks, he called himself Police

Commander of Bavaria. Then in the course of one and one half months—it

all took place very quickly—he became—what he called himself I do not

know exactly—in fact the supreme police chief of all German provinces

and free cities, with the exception of Prussia.

DR. MERKEL: You said before that the officials of the Gestapo were taken

into the SS. Did this happen voluntarily, or was there some coercion on

the part of the administrative authorities to make these officials part

of the SS?

GÖRING: I believe—I heard this only from individual officials whom I

had known before—that they had to do this. They were not taken into the

SS, but they received an official rank in the SS. It was probably

Himmler’s idea that the SS and the police, both of which were under his

leadership, should be amalgamated. How he contemplated that and how it

worked out in detail I cannot say. Therefore, I may perhaps have stated

some things incorrectly here, but I did it to the best of my knowledge.

DR. MERKEL: You said before that the 1933 officials of the political

police existing at that time were taken into the state police. Was this

done on the basis of a voluntary application by these officials, or were

they commanded or transferred in individual cases without their

concurrence?

GÖRING: You are not correct when you say that the officials of the

former political police were simply incorporated into the Gestapo; on

the contrary, in this sector the weeding out was very drastic, because

it was a political police force, and up to then had contained

representatives of those parties which were hostile and opposed to us.

They had to be removed. Consequently new people came in, especially as

its strength was considerably increased. These new officials were taken

from the other police departments, from the criminal police and

elsewhere, and, as I have already stated, were in some cases brought in

from outside as new recruits, and our people were naturally given

special consideration. To what extent normal transfers took

place—whether Herr Müller was transferred from the criminal police to

the Secret State Police, and whether he was asked about this, I really

do not know. I believe not. I left that to the head of the Secret State

Police. After I had set up the general directives, I could not be

bothered with every single official in the criminal police.

DR. MERKEL: Do you know Obergruppenführer Müller, the Chief of Division

IV in the Reich Main Security Office?

GÖRING: I knew him.

DR. MERKEL: Did you know that he and his immediate associates came from

the Bavarian Political Police, as it existed before 1933?

GÖRING: I did not know that; I knew only that he came from Bavaria.

DR. MERKEL: Do you know that the Secret State Police did not take part

in the disturbances on 9 November 1938?

GÖRING: It has always been my conviction that they did not take part in

them. I saw a document here which instructed them not to intervene. I do

not believe that they took part.

DR. MERKEL: If I understood you correctly, you said recently that on

this 9th of November, after your return to Berlin, you at once called up

the chief of the Gestapo. Did you make this call only because you wanted

more precise information, or did you make it because you thought the

Gestapo had taken an active part in these disturbances, had organized

them and carried them out?

GÖRING: If I had been convinced that the Gestapo had instigated the

disturbances I would certainly not have asked them for information. I

gave the order to my collaborators through the police, and in this case

through the Gestapo, because they had the necessary connections, or to

the criminal police—it was all the same to me. I could address myself

only to the Chief of Police, who was Heydrich, and say that I wanted a

report quickly on what had happened; a report which merely stated the

facts.

DR. MERKEL: It is correct that when you gave up your position as Chief

of the Police to Himmler you made the statement that it was unworthy of

a German official to ill-treat prisoners, and that you would not fail to

deal most severely with any officials who were guilty of such acts?

GÖRING: The speech I made on this occasion is known and it contains such

passages.

DR. MERKEL: Do you know that there was an order from the Reich Security

Main Office—that is, issued after your resignation—which forbade any

official or employee of the state police, under threat of the most

severe punishment, to beat prisoners or ill-treat them?

GÖRING: It is possible. I no longer know what orders were issued after

my resignation.

DR. MERKEL: Putting this question in the negative, is it known to you

that there never was an order to manhandle prisoners or torture them,

either at the time when you were chief of the Secret State Police or

later?

GÖRING: I can only say with absolute certainty that I did not issue or

permit any such order. I no longer know what was or was not issued in

this connection at a later date or in provinces other than Prussia.

DR. MERKEL: Do you know anything to the effect that, contrary to these

orders, such acts regularly took place in the Gestapo; or rather, if

such an act did take place, did it have to do only with individual cases

or individual excesses?

GÖRING: At the time when I was still directly connected with the Gestapo

such excesses did, as I have openly stated, take place. In order to

punish them, one naturally had to find out about them. Punishments were

administered. The officials knew that if they did such things they ran

the risk of being punished. A large number of them were punished. I

cannot say what the practice was later.

DR. MERKEL: I have no more questions.

HERR LUDWIG BABEL (Counsel for SS): Witness, did the same conditions

apply for the appointment of honorary leaders in the SS as in the SA?

GÖRING: Yes, I believe so.

HERR BABEL: Are you familiar with the directives or other regulations

regarding the appointment of honorary leaders?

GÖRING: No.

HERR BABEL: Was it possible to refuse the appointment?

GÖRING: Yes, I believe so.

HERR BABEL: Do you know what the reasons were for the expansion of the

Waffen-SS into the large permanent organization existing after 1939?

GÖRING: The first divisions of the Waffen-SS, which consisted of the

best specially selected human material, fought with outstanding bravery

in combat. Consequently the Führer gladly agreed to Himmler’s suggestion

that still more divisions be set up. The Army and also the Air Force did

make some protest, and quite rightly, because this creaming off of the

best voluntary material meant that men of that type, who would have made

equally good officers, were partly lost to the Army and the Air Force,

and therefore they opposed this expansion. Also, in the beginning, the

Führer was not very keen to have armed formations of any appreciable

size outside the ranks of the Armed Forces, but he gave way more and

more. When replacement difficulties became even more acute as the war

went on, Himmler more or less deceived the Führer with the statement

that he was in a position to provide a large number of SS divisions,

that this would create a greater attraction for recruiting, and so on.

This, of course, was welcome news to the Führer since he needed troops

badly. But in point of fact already at that time Himmler was using

altogether different methods which had not much in common with purely

voluntary recruiting, and he created first of all on paper a number of

new SS divisions and cadres. At that time he had not the men for this.

He then told the Führer, “I have transferred my best Unterführer from

the other SS divisions to these new ones.” For this and other reasons

replacements in men did not flow in and the Army and the Air Force,

especially the Air Force, were those who bore the brunt of this. I now

had to help fill these SS divisions with men from the ground staffs and

from the anti-aircraft batteries. This aroused much dissatisfaction

among the men in the Air Force, because none of them wanted to volunteer

for these formations. But in the end the Führer ordered that men be

taken from the reserve units of the Army and, as far as I remember, from

naval reserves also. I can speak only for that contingent which was

taken from the Air Force by coercion and by command. I should estimate,

without reference to official records, that there were at least about

50,000 men and officers. Then, because this aroused such strong feeling,

I arranged that all men from the Air Force who were to be used for land

fighting in the future should no longer go to the SS, but to the new

parachute divisions which were to be formed. The Führer agreed, because

in the last phase of the war the parachute divisions proved to be the

most trusty and the most distinguished in the whole Armed Forces, and

superior to the SS in fighting spirit and power of resistance. From then

on no further contingents of the Air Force were incorporated into the

SS, and, as far as I know, no more SS divisions were created.

HERR BABEL: I have no further questions.

DR. HANS LATERNSER: Witness, what was the attitude of the General Staff

of the Army towards the possibility of being involved in a war with

other powers?

GÖRING: Their attitude was, if I may say so, purely professional, that

is to say, the General Staff had to study theoretically and practically

all the possibilities and contingencies of a war. Its attitude toward

its own tasks and conceptions was—I must say this openly—a very

reticent and timid one for a general staff. This is probably to be

attributed to the fact that most of the General Staff officers had come

from the Reichswehr. The whole attitude of mind in this small Reichswehr

during the last decade and a half was such that they could hardly

imagine that a military clash might come, and consequently a much more

pacific attitude than is normally the case with soldiers was to be found

among the General Staff of the Army.

DR. LATERNSER: Do you know generals or admirals who urged and incited

war?

GÖRING: No.

DR. LATERNSER: I have no further questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Do the Chief Prosecutors wish to cross-examine?

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You are perhaps aware that you are the only living

man who can expound to us the true purposes of the Nazi Party and the

inner workings of its leadership?

GÖRING: I am perfectly aware of that.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You, from the very beginning, together with those

who were associated with you, intended to overthrow, and later did

overthrow, the Weimar Republic?

GÖRING: That was, as far as I am concerned, my firm intention.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And, upon coming to power, you immediately

abolished parliamentary government in Germany?

GÖRING: We found it to be no longer necessary. Also I should like to

emphasize the fact that we were moreover the strongest parliamentary

party, and had the majority. But you are correct, when you say that

parliamentary procedure was done away with, because the various parties

were disbanded and forbidden.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You established the Leadership Principle, which you

have described as a system under which authority existed only at the

top, and is passed downwards and is imposed on the people below; is that

correct?

GÖRING: In order to avoid any misunderstanding, I should like once more

to explain the idea briefly, as I understand it. In German parliamentary

procedure in the past responsibility rested with the highest officials,

who were responsible for carrying out the anonymous wishes of the

majorities, and it was they who exercised the authority. In the

Leadership Principle we sought to reverse the direction, that is, the

authority existed at the top and passed downwards, while the

responsibility began at the bottom and passed upwards.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In other words, you did not believe in and did not

permit government, as we call it, by consent of the governed, in which

the people, through their representatives, were the source of power and

authority?

GÖRING: That is not entirely correct. We repeatedly called on the people

to express unequivocally and clearly what they thought of our system,

only it was in a different way from that previously adopted and from the

system in practice in other countries. We chose the way of a so-called

plebiscite. We also took the point of view that even a government

founded on the Leadership Principle could maintain itself only if it was

based in some way on the confidence of the people. If it no longer had

such confidence, then it would have to rule with bayonets, and the

Führer was always of the opinion that that was impossible in the long

run—to rule against the will of the people.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But you did not permit the election of those who

should act with authority by the people, but they were designated from

the top downward continuously, were they not?

GÖRING: Quite right. The people were merely to acknowledge the authority

of the Führer, or, let us say, to declare themselves in agreement with

the Führer. If they gave the Führer their confidence, then it was their

concern to exercise the other functions. Thus, not the individual

persons were to be selected according to the will of the people, but

solely the leadership itself.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, was this Leadership Principle supported and

adopted by you in Germany because you believed that no people are

capable of self-government, or because you believed that some may be,

not the German people; or that no matter whether some of us are capable

of using our own system, it should not be allowed in Germany?

GÖRING: I beg your pardon, I did not quite understand the question, but

I could perhaps answer it as follows:

I consider the Leadership Principle necessary because the system which

previously existed, and which we called parliamentary or democratic, had

brought Germany to the verge of ruin. I might perhaps in this connection

remind you that your own President Roosevelt, as far as I can recall—I

do not want to quote it word for word—declared, “Certain peoples in

Europe have forsaken democracy, not because they did not wish for

democracy as such, but because democracy had brought forth men who were

too weak to give their people work and bread, and to satisfy them. For

this reason the peoples have abandoned this system and the men belonging

to it.” There is much truth in that statement. This system had brought

ruin by mismanagement and according to my own opinion, only an

organization made up of a strong, clearly defined leadership hierarchy

could restore order again. But, let it be understood, not against the

will of the people, but only when the people, having in the course of

time, and by means of a series of elections, grown stronger and

stronger, had expressed their wish to entrust their destiny to the

National Socialist leadership.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The principles of the authoritarian government

which you set up required, as I understand you, that there be tolerated

no opposition by political parties which might defeat or obstruct the

policy of the Nazi Party?

GÖRING: You have understood this quite correctly. By that time we had

lived long enough with opposition and we had had enough of it. Through

opposition we had been completely ruined. It was now time to have done

with it and to start building up.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: After you came to power, you regarded it necessary,

in order to maintain power, to suppress all opposition parties?

GÖRING: We found it necessary not to permit any more opposition, yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you also held it necessary that you should

suppress all individual opposition lest it should develop into a party

of opposition?

GÖRING: Insofar as opposition seriously hampered our work of building

up, this opposition of individual persons was, of course, not tolerated.

Insofar as it was simply a matter of harmless talk, it was considered to

be of no consequence.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, in order to make sure that you suppressed the

parties, and individuals also, you found it necessary to have a secret

political police to detect opposition?

GÖRING: I have already stated that I considered that necessary, just as

previously the political police had existed, but on a firmer basis and

larger scale.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And upon coming to power you also considered it

immediately necessary to establish concentration camps to take care of

your incorrigible opponents?

GÖRING: I have already stated that the reason for the concentration

camps was not because it could be said, “Here are a number of people who

are opposed to us and they must be taken into protective custody.”

Rather they were set up as a lightning measure against the functionaries

of the Communist Party who were attacking us in the thousands, and who,

since they were taken into protective custody, were not put in prison.

But it was necessary, as I said, to erect a camp for them—one, two, or

three camps.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But you are explaining, as the high authority of

this system, to men who do not understand it very well, and I want to

know what was necessary to run the kind of system that you set up in

Germany. The concentration camp was one of the things you found

immediately necessary upon coming into power, was it not? And you set

them up as a matter of necessity, as you saw it?

GÖRING: That was faultily translated—it went too fast. But I believe I

have understood the sense of your remarks. You asked me if I considered

it necessary to establish concentration camps immediately in order to

eliminate opposition. Is that correct?

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Your answer is “yes,” I take it?

GÖRING: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Was it also necessary, in operating this system,

that you must not have persons entitled to public trials in independent

courts? And you immediately issued an order that your political police

would not be subject to court review or to court orders, did you not?

GÖRING: You must differentiate between the two categories; those who had

committed some act of treason against the new state, or those who might

be proved to have committed such an act, were naturally turned over to

the courts. The others, however, of whom one might expect such acts, but

who had not yet committed them, were taken into protective custody, and

these were the people who were taken to concentration camps. I am now

speaking of what happened at the beginning. Later things changed a great

deal. Likewise, if for political reasons—to answer your

question—someone was taken into protective custody, that is, purely for

reasons of state, this could not be reviewed or stopped by any court.

Later, when some people were also taken into protective custody for

nonpolitical reasons, people who had opposed the system in some other

way, I once, as Prussian Prime Minister and Reich Minister of the

Interior, I remember . . .

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Let’s omit that. I have not asked for that. If you

will just answer my question, we shall save a great deal of time. Your

counsel will be permitted to bring out any explanations you want to

make.

You did prohibit all court review and considered it necessary to

prohibit court review of the causes for taking people into what you

called protective custody?

GÖRING: That I answered very clearly, but I should like to make an

explanation in connection with my answer.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Your counsel will see to that. Now, the

concentration camps and the protective custody . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Justice Jackson, the Tribunal thinks the witness

ought to be allowed to make what explanation he thinks right in answer

to this question.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The Tribunal thinks that you should be permitted to

explain your answer now, and it will listen to your answers.

THE PRESIDENT: I did not mean that to apply generally to his answers. I

meant it to apply to this particular answer.

GÖRING: In connection with your question that these cases could not be

reviewed by the court, I want to say that a decree was issued through me

and Frick jointly to the effect that those who were turned over to

concentration camps were to be informed after 24 hours of the reason for

their being turned over, and that after 48 hours, or some short period

of time, they should have the right to an attorney. But this by no means

rescinded my order that a review was not permitted by the courts of a

politically necessary measure of protective custody. These people were

simply to be given an opportunity of making a protest.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Protective custody meant that you were taking

people into custody who had not committed any crimes but who, you

thought, might possibly commit a crime?

GÖRING: Yes. People were arrested and taken into protective custody who

had not yet committed any crime, but who could be expected to do so if

they remained free, just as extensive protective measures are being

taken in Germany today on a tremendous scale.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, it is also a necessity, in the kind of state

that you had, that you have some kind of organization to carry

propaganda down to the people and to get their reaction and inform the

leadership of it, is it not?

GÖRING: The last part of that question has not been intelligibly

translated.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, you had to have organizations to carry out

orders and to carry your propaganda in that kind of state, didn’t you?

GÖRING: Of course, we carried on propaganda, and for this we had a

propaganda organization.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you carried that on through the Leadership

Corps of the Nazi Party, did you not?

GÖRING: The Leadership Corps was there, of course, partly to spread our

ideas among the people. Secondly, its purpose was to lead and organize

the people who made up the Party.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Through your system of Gauleiter and Kreisleiter

down to Blockleiter, commands and information went down from the

authority, and information as to the people’s reactions came back to the

leadership, didn’t it?

GÖRING: That is correct. The orders and commands that were to be given

for propaganda or other purposes were passed down the grades as far as

necessary. On the other hand, it was a matter of course that the

reactions of the broad masses of the people were again transmitted

upwards, through the various offices, in order to keep us informed of

the mood of the people.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you also had to have certain organizations to

carry out orders—executive organizations, organizations to fight for

you if necessary, did you not?

GÖRING: Yes, administrative organizations were, of course, necessary. I

do not quite understand—organizations to fight what?

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, if you wanted certain people killed you had

to have some organization that would kill them, didn’t you? Röhm and the

rest of them were not killed by Hitler’s own hands nor by yours, were

they?

GÖRING: Röhm—the Röhm affair I explained here clearly—that was a

matter of State necessity . . .

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I did not ask you . . .

GÖRING: . . . and was carried out by the police.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But when it was State necessity to kill somebody,

you had to have somebody to do it, didn’t you?

GÖRING: Yes, just as in other countries, whether it is called secret

service or something else, I do not know.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the SA, the SS, and the SD, organizations of

that kind, were the organizations that carried out the orders and dealt

with people on a physical level, were they not?

GÖRING: The SA never received an order to kill anybody, neither did the

SS, not in my time. Anyhow, I had no influence on it. I know that orders

were given for executions, namely in the Röhm Putsch, and these were

carried out by the police, that is, by a State organ.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What police?

GÖRING: As far as I recall, through the Gestapo. At any rate, that was

the organization that received the order. You see, it was a fight

against enemies of the State.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the SS was for the same purpose, was it not?

GÖRING: Not in north Germany at that time; to what extent that was the

case in south Germany, where the Gestapo and the SS were still

separated, and who carried out the action in south Germany, I do not

know.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, the SS carried out arrests and carried out

the transportation of people to concentration camps, didn’t they? You

were arrested by the SS, weren’t you?

GÖRING: Yes, I say, yes; but later.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: At what time did the SS perform this function of

acting as the executor of the Nazi Party?

GÖRING: After the seizure of power, when the police came to be more and

more in the hands of Himmler. It is difficult for me to explain to an

outsider where the SS or where the Gestapo was active. I have already

said that the two of them worked very closely together. It is known that

the SS guarded the camps and later carried out police functions.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And carried out other functions in the camps?

GÖRING: To what functions do you refer?

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: They carried out all of the functions of the camps,

didn’t they?

GÖRING: If an SS unit was guarding a camp and an SS leader happened to

be the camp commander, then this unit carried out all the functions.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, this system was not a secret system. This

entire system was openly avowed, its merits were publicly advocated by

yourself and others, and every person entering into the Nazi Party was

enabled to know the kind of system of government you were going to set

up, wasn’t he?

GÖRING: Every person who entered the Party knew that we embraced the

Leadership Principle and knew the fundamental measures we wanted to

carry out, so far as they were stated in the program. But not everyone

who joined the Party knew down to the last detail what was going to

happen later.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But this system was set up openly and was well

known, was it not, in every one of its details? As to organization,

everybody knew what the Gestapo was, did they not?

GÖRING: Yes, everyone knew what the Gestapo was.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And what its program was in general, not in detail?

GÖRING: I explained that program clearly. At the very beginning I

described that publicly, and I also spoke publicly of the tasks of the

Gestapo, and I even wrote about it for foreign countries.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And there was nothing secret about the

establishment of a Gestapo as a political police, about the fact, that

people were taken into protective custody, about the fact that these

were concentration camps? Nothing secret about those things, was there?

GÖRING: There was at first nothing secret about it at all.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: As a matter of fact, part of the effectiveness of a

secret police and part of the effectiveness of concentration camp

penalties is that the people do know that there are such agencies, isn’t

it?

GÖRING: It is true that everyone knows that if he acts against the state

he will end up in a concentration camp or will be accused, of high

treason before a court, according to the degree of his crime. But the

original reason for creating the concentration camps was to keep there

such people whom we rightfully considered enemies of the State.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, that is the type of government—the government

which we have just been describing—the only type of government which

you think is necessary to govern Germany?

GÖRING: I should not like to say that the basic characteristic of this

government and its most essential feature was the immediate setting up

of the Gestapo and the concentration camps in order to take care of our

opponents, but that over and above that we had set down as our

government program a great many far more important things, and that

those other things were not the basic principles of our government.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But all of these things were necessary things, as I

understood you, for purposes of protection?

GÖRING: Yes, these things were necessary because of the opponents that

existed.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And I assume that that is the only kind of

government that you think can function in Germany under present

conditions?

GÖRING: Under the conditions existing at that time, it was, in my

opinion, the only possible form, and it also demonstrated that Germany

could be raised in a short time from the depths of misery, poverty, and

unemployment to relative prosperity.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, all of this authority of the State was

concentrated—perhaps I am taking up another subject. Is it the intent

to recess at this time?

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.

[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]

_Afternoon Session_

DR. STAHMER: The witness Dahlerus has been in Nuremberg for several days

and is waiting to testify. He has informed me that he must be in

Stockholm again by Thursday without fail. For this reason he requests,

and I am asking the High Tribunal’s permission, that he be called as a

witness tomorrow morning, even if the cross-examination has not been

completed. The Prosecution have all agreed to my proposal.

THE PRESIDENT: Did you say the Prosecution had agreed to your proposal?

DR. STAHMER: Yes, My Lord. I contacted the four gentlemen involved and

they have agreed to this.

THE PRESIDENT: How long do you anticipate that the examination in chief

of the witness will take? You cannot answer for the cross-examination.

DR. STAHMER: I believe that I will need half a day, that is, until

tomorrow noon. I cannot say definitely, but it is quite probable it will

last as long as that.

THE PRESIDENT: His evidence is relevant only to the few days before the

1st of September 1939?

DR. STAHMER: There are two additional questions, but these questions may

be answered very briefly. He seems to have made two further efforts

after September, but those are very brief questions.

THE PRESIDENT: It appears to the Tribunal that half a day is a totally

unnecessary time for the examination in chief of a witness who is going

to speak about events during a few days before the war began.

DR. STAHMER: I would not say that, Mr. President. It is not just a few

days. These negotiations started already at the end of June or the

beginning of July. I should like to add further that I shall naturally

limit myself to such questions as are necessary for the Trial, but these

questions should be asked.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal agrees, if the Prosecution is willing for

this evidence to be interposed. The Tribunal trusts that you will find

it possible to make your examination in chief much shorter than you have

indicated.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Witness, you have related to us the manner in which

you and others co-operated in concentrating all authority in the German

State in the hands of the Führer, is that right?

GÖRING: I was speaking about myself and to what extent I had a part in

it.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Is there any defendant in the box you know of who

did not co-operate toward that end as far as was possible?

GÖRING: That none of the defendants here opposed or obstructed the

Führer in the beginning is clear, but I should like to call your

attention to the fact that we must always distinguish between different

periods of time. Some of the questions that are being put to me are very

general and, after all, we are concerned with a period extending over 24

to 25 years, if a comprehensive survey is to be made.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, I want to call your attention to the fruits of

this system. You, as I understand it, were informed in 1940 of an

impending attack by the German Army on Soviet Russia?

GÖRING: I have explained just how far I was informed of these matters.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You believed an attack not only to be unnecessary,

but also to be unwise from the point of view of Germany itself?

GÖRING: At that particular time I was of the opinion that this attack

should be postponed in order to carry through other tasks which I

considered more important.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You did not see any military necessity for an

attack at that time, even from the point of view of Germany?

GÖRING: Naturally, I was fully aware of Russia’s efforts in the

deployment of her forces, but I hoped first to put into effect the other

strategic measures, described by me, to improve Germany’s position. I

thought that the time required for these would ward off the critical

moment. I well knew, of course, that this critical moment for Germany

might come at any time after that.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I can only repeat my question, which I submit you

have not answered.

Did you at that time see any military necessity for an attack by Germany

on Soviet Russia?

GÖRING: I personally believed that at that time the danger had not yet

reached its climax, and therefore the attack might not yet be necessary.

But that was my personal view.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you were the Number 2 man at that time in all

Germany?

GÖRING: It has nothing to do with my being second in importance. There

were two conflicting points of view as regards strategy. The Führer, the

Number 1 man, saw one danger, and I, as the Number 2 man, if you wish to

express it so, wanted to carry out another strategic measure. If I had

imposed my will every time, then I would probably have become the Number

1 man. But since the Number 1 man was of a different opinion, and I was

only the Number 2 man, his opinion naturally prevailed.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I have understood from your testimony—and I think

you can answer this “yes” or “no,” and I would greatly appreciate it if

you would—I have understood from your testimony that you were opposed,

and told the Führer that you were opposed, to an attack upon Russia at

that time. Am I right or wrong?

GÖRING: That is correct.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, you were opposed to it because you thought

that it was a dangerous move for Germany to make; is that correct?

GÖRING: Yes, I was of the opinion that the moment—and I repeat this

again—had not come for this undertaking, and that measures should be

taken which were more expedient as far as Germany was concerned.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And yet, because of the Führer system, as I

understand you, you could give no warning to the German people; you

could bring no pressure of any kind to bear to prevent that step, and

you could not even resign to protect your own place in history.

GÖRING: These are several questions at once. I should like to answer the

first one.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Separate them, if you wish.

GÖRING: The first question was, I believe, whether I took the

opportunity to tell the German people about this danger. I had no

occasion to do this. We were at war, and such differences of opinion, as

far as strategy was concerned, could not be brought before the public

forum during war. I believe that never has happened in world history.

Secondly, as far as my resignation is concerned, I do not wish even to

discuss that, for during the war I was an officer, a soldier, and I was

not concerned with whether I shared an opinion or not. I had merely to

serve my country as a soldier.

Thirdly, I was not the man to forsake someone, to whom I had given my

oath of loyalty, every time he was not of my way of thinking. If that

had been the case there would have been no need to bind myself to him

from the beginning. It never occurred to me to leave the Führer.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Insofar as you know, the German people were led

into the war, attacking Soviet Russia under the belief that you favored

it?

GÖRING: The German people did not know about the declaration of war

against Russia until after the war with Russia had started. The German

people, therefore, had nothing to do with this. The German people were

not asked; they were told of the fact and of the necessity for it.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: At what time did you know that the war, as regards

achieving the objectives that you had in mind, was a lost war?

GÖRING: It is extremely difficult to say. At any rate, according to my

conviction, relatively late—I mean, it was only towards the end that I

became convinced that the war was lost. Up till then I had always

thought and hoped that it would come to a stalemate.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, in November 1941 the offensive in Russia

broke down?

GÖRING: That is not at all correct. We had reverses because of weather

conditions, or rather, the goal which we had set was not reached. The

push of 1942 proved well enough that there was no question of a military

collapse. Some corps, which had pushed forward, were merely thrown back,

and some were withdrawn. The totally unexpected early frost that set in

was the cause of this.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You said, “relatively late.” The expression that

you used does not tell me anything, because I do not know what you

regard as relatively late. Will you fix in terms, either of events or

time, when it was that the conviction came to you that the war was lost?

GÖRING: When, after 12 January 1945, the Russian offensive pushed

forward to the Oder and at the same time the Ardennes offensive had not

penetrated, it was then that I was forced to realize that defeat would

probably set in slowly. Up to that time I had always hoped that, on the

one side, the position at the Vistula toward the East and, on the other

side, the position at the West Wall towards the West, could be held

until the flow of the new mass produced weapons should bring about a

slackening of the Anglo-American air war.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, will you fix that by date; you told us when it

was by events.

GÖRING: I just said January 1945; middle, or end of January 1945. After

that there was no more hope.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Do you want it understood that, as a military man,

you did not realize until January of 1945 that Germany could not be

successful in the war?

GÖRING: As I have already said, we must draw a sharp distinction between

two possibilities: First, the successful conclusion of a war, and

second, a war which ends by neither side being the victor. As regards a

successful outcome, the moment when it was realized that that was no

longer possible was much earlier, whereas the realization of the fact

that defeat would set in did not come until the time I have just

mentioned.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: For some period before that, you knew that a

successful termination of the war could only be accomplished if you

could come to some kind of terms with the enemy; was that not true?

GÖRING: Of course, a successful termination of a war can only be

considered successful if I either conquer the enemy or, through

negotiations with the enemy, come to a conclusion which guarantees me

success. That is what I call a successful termination. I call it a draw,

when I come to terms with the enemy. This does not bring me the success

which victory would have brought but, on the other hand, it precludes a

defeat. This is a conclusion without victors or vanquished.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But you knew that it was Hitler’s policy never to

negotiate and you knew that as long as he was the head of the Government

the enemy would not negotiate with Germany, did you not?

GÖRING: I knew that enemy propaganda emphasized that under no

circumstances would there be negotiations with Hitler. That Hitler did

not want to negotiate under any circumstances, I also knew, but not in

this connection. Hitler wanted to negotiate if there were some prospect

of results; but he was absolutely opposed to hopeless and futile

negotiations. Because of the declaration of the enemy in the West after

the landing in Africa, as far as I remember, that under no circumstances

would they negotiate with Germany but would force on her unconditional

surrender, Germany’s resistance was stiffened to the utmost and measures

had to be taken accordingly. If I have no chance of concluding a war

through negotiations, then it is useless to negotiate, and I must strain

every nerve to bring about a change by a call to arms.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: By the time of January 1945 you also knew that you

were unable to defend the German cities against the air attacks of the

Allies, did you not?

GÖRING: Concerning the defense of German cities against Allied air

attacks, I should like to describe the possibility of doing this as

follows: Of itself . . .

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Can you answer my question? Time may not mean quite

as much to you as it does to the rest of us. Can you not answer “yes” or

“no”? Did you then know, at the same time that you knew that the war was

lost, that the German cities could not successfully be defended against

air attack by the enemy? Can you not tell us “yes” or “no”?

GÖRING: I can say that I knew that, at that time, it was not possible.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And after that time it was well known to you that

the air attacks which were continued against England could not turn the

tide of war, and were designed solely to effect a prolongation of what

you then knew was a hopeless conflict?

GÖRING: I believe you are mistaken. After January 1945 there were no

more attacks on England, except perhaps a few single planes, because at

that time I needed all my petrol for the fighter planes for defense. If

I had had bombers and oil at my disposal, then, of course, I should have

continued such attacks up to the last minute as retaliation for the

attacks which were being carried out on German cities, whatever our

chances might have been.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What about robot attacks? Were there any robot

attacks after January 1945?

GÖRING: Thank God, we still had one weapon that we could use. I have

just said that, as long as the fight was on, we had to hit back; and as

a soldier I can only regret that we did not have enough of these V-1 and

V-2 bombs, for an easing of the attacks on German cities could be

brought about only if we could inflict equally heavy losses on the

enemy.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And there was no way to prevent the war going on as

long as Hitler was the head of the German Government, was there?

GÖRING: As long as Hitler was the Führer of the German people, he alone

decided whether the war was to go on. As long as my enemy threatens me

and demands absolutely unconditional surrender, I fight to my last

breath, because there is nothing left for me except perhaps a chance

that in some way fate may change, even though it seems hopeless.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, the people of Germany who thought it was time

that the slaughter should stop had no means to stop it except revolution

or assassination of Hitler, had they?

GÖRING: A revolution always changes a situation, if it succeeds. That is

a foregone conclusion. The murder of Hitler at this time, say January

1945, would have brought about my succession. If the enemy had given me

the same answer, that is, unconditional surrender, and had held out

those terrible conditions which had been intimated, I would have

continued fighting whatever the circumstances.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: There was an attack on Hitler’s life on 20 July

1944?

GÖRING: Unfortunately, yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And there came a time in 1945 when Hitler made a

will in Berlin whereby he turned over the presidency of the Reich to

your co-defendant, Admiral Dönitz. You know about that?

GÖRING: That is correct. I read of this will here.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And in making his will and turning over the

Government of Germany to Admiral Dönitz, I call your attention to this

statement:

“Göring and Himmler, quite apart from their disloyalty to my

person, have done immeasurable harm to the country and the whole

nation by secret negotiations with the enemy which they

conducted without my knowledge and against my wishes, and by

illegally attempting to seize power in the State for

themselves.”

And by that will he expelled you and Himmler from the Party and from all

offices of the State.

GÖRING: I can only answer for myself. What Himmler did I do not know.

I neither betrayed the Führer, nor did I at that time negotiate with a

single foreign soldier. This will, or this final act of the Führer’s, is

based on an extremely regrettable mistake, and one which grieves me

deeply—that the Führer could believe in his last hours that I could

ever be disloyal to him. It was all due to an error in the transmission

of a radio report and perhaps to a misrepresentation which Bormann gave

the Führer. I myself never thought for a minute of taking over power

illegally or of acting against the Führer in any way.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In any event you were arrested and expected to be

shot?

GÖRING: That is correct.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, in tracing the rise of power of the Party you

have omitted some such things as, for example, the Reichstag fire of 27

February 1933. There was a great purge following that fire, was there

not, in which many people were arrested and many people were killed?

GÖRING: I do not know of a single case where a man was killed because of

the Reichstag fire, except that of the incendiary, Van der Lubbe, who

was sentenced by the court. The other two defendants in this trial were

acquitted. Herr Thälmann was not, as you recently erroneously believed,

accused; it was the communist representative, Torgler. He was acquitted,

as was also the Bulgarian, Dimitroff. Relatively few arrests were made

in connection with the Reichstag fire. The arrests which you attribute

to the Reichstag fire are the arrests of communist functionaries. These

arrests, as I have repeatedly stated and wish to emphasize once more,

had nothing to do with this fire. The fire merely precipitated their

arrest and upset our carefully planned action, thus allowing several of

the functionaries to escape.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In other words, you had lists of Communists already

prepared at the time of the Reichstag fire, of persons who should be

arrested, did you not?

GÖRING: We had always drawn up, beforehand, fairly complete lists of

communist functionaries who were to be arrested. That had nothing to do

with the fire in the German Reichstag.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: They were immediately put into execution—the

arrests, I mean—after the Reichstag fire?

GÖRING: Contrary to my intention of postponing this action for a few

days and letting it take place according to plan, thereby perfecting the

arrangements, the Führer ordered that same night that the arrests should

follow immediately. This had the disadvantage, as I said, of

precipitating matters.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You and the Führer met at the fire, did you not?

GÖRING: That is right.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And then and there you decided to arrest all the

Communists that you had listed?

GÖRING: I repeat again that the decision for their arrests had been

reached some days before this; it simply meant that on that night they

were immediately arrested. I would rather have waited a few days

according to plan; then some of the important men would not have

escaped.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the next morning the decree was presented to

President Von Hindenburg, suspending the provisions of the constitution

which we have discussed here, was it not?

GÖRING: I believe so, yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Who was Karl Ernst?

GÖRING: Karl Ernst—whether his first name was Karl I do not know—was

the SA leader of Berlin.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And who was Helldorf?

GÖRING: Count Helldorf was the subsequent SA leader of Berlin.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And Heines?

GÖRING: Heines was the SA leader of Silesia at that time.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, it is known to you, is it not, that Ernst made

a statement confessing that these three burned the Reichstag and that

you and Goebbels planned and furnished the incendiary materials of

liquid phosphorus and petroleum which were deposited by you in a

subterranean passage for them to get, which passage led from your house

to the Reichstag building? You knew of such a statement, did you not?

GÖRING: I do not know of any statement by the SA leader Ernst. But I do

know of some fairytale published shortly after in the foreign press by

Röhm’s chauffeur. This was after 1934.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But there was such a passage from the Reichstag

building to your house, was there not?

GÖRING: On one side of the street is the Reichstag building, and

opposite is the palace of the Reichstag president. The two are connected

by a passage along which the wagons run which carry the coke for the

central heating.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And, in any event, shortly after this, Ernst was

killed without a trial and without a chance to tell his story, was he

not?

GÖRING: That is not correct. The Reichstag fire was in February 1933.

Ernst was shot on 30 June 1934, because together with Röhm he had

planned to overthrow the Government and had plotted against the Führer.

He, therefore, had a year and a quarter in which he could have made

statements regarding the Reichstag fire, if he had wished to do so.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, he had begun to make statements, had he not,

and you were generally being accused of burning the Reichstag building?

You knew that, did you not? That was the . . .

GÖRING: That accusation that I had set fire to the Reichstag came from a

certain foreign press. That could not bother me because it was not

consistent with the facts. I had no reason or motive for setting fire to

the Reichstag. From the artistic point of view I did not at all regret

that the assembly chamber was burned; I hoped to build a better one. But

I did regret very much that I was forced to find a new meeting place for

the Reichstag and, not being able to find one, I had to give up my Kroll

Opera House, that is, the second State Opera House, for that purpose.

The opera seemed to me much more important than the Reichstag.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Have you ever boasted of burning the Reichstag

building, even by way of joking?

GÖRING: No. I made a joke, if that is the one you are referring to, when

I said that, after this, I should be competing with Nero and that

probably people would soon be saying that, dressed in a red toga and

holding a lyre in my hand, I looked on at the fire and played while the

Reichstag was burning. That was the joke. But the fact was that I almost

perished in the flames, which would have been very unfortunate for the

German people, but very fortunate for their enemies.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You never stated then that you burned the

Reichstag?

GÖRING: No. I know that Herr Rauschning said in the book which he wrote,

and which has often been referred to here, that I had discussed this

with him. I saw Herr Rauschning only twice in my life and only for a

short time on each occasion. If I had set fire to the Reichstag, I would

presumably have let that be known only to my closest circle of

confidants, if at all. I would not have told it to a man whom I did not

know and whose appearance I could not describe at all today. That is an

absolute distortion of the truth.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Do you remember the luncheon on Hitler’s birthday

in 1942 at the Kasino, the officers’ mess, at the headquarters of the

Führer in East Prussia?

GÖRING: No.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You do not remember that? I will ask that you be

shown the affidavit of General Franz Halder, and I call your attention

to his statements which may refresh your recollection. I read it.

“On the occasion of a luncheon on the Führer’s birthday in 1942,

the people around the Führer turned the conversation to the

Reichstag building and its artistic value. I heard with my own

ears how Göring broke into the conversation and shouted: ‘The

only one who really knows the Reichstag is I, for I set fire to

it.’ And saying this he slapped his thigh.”

GÖRING: This conversation did not take place and I request that I be

confronted with Herr Halder. First of all I want to emphasize that what

is written here is utter nonsense. It says, “The only one who really

knows the Reichstag is I.” The Reichstag was known to every

representative in the Reichstag. The fire took place only in the general

assembly room, and many hundreds or thousands of people knew this room

as well as I did. A statement of this type is utter nonsense. How Herr

Halder came to make that statement I do not know. Apparently that bad

memory, which also let him down in military matters, is the only

explanation.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You know who Halder is?

GÖRING: Only too well.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Can you tell us what position he held in the German

Army?

GÖRING: He was Chief of the General Staff of the Army, and I repeatedly

pointed out to the Führer, after the war started, that he would at least

have to find a chief who knew something about such matters.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, the Röhm purge you have left a little

indefinite. What was it that Röhm did that he was shot? What acts did he

commit?

GÖRING: Röhm planned to overthrow the Government, and it was intended to

kill the Führer also. He wanted to follow it up by a revolution,

directed in the first place against the Army, the officers’ corps—those

groups which he considered to be reactionary.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you had evidence of that fact?

GÖRING: We had sufficient evidence of that fact.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But he was never tried in any court where he would

have a chance to tell his story as you are telling yours, was he?

GÖRING: That is correct. He wanted to bring about a Putsch and therefore

the Führer considered it right that this thing should be nipped in the

bud—not by a court procedure, but by smashing the revolt immediately.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Were the names of the people who were killed in

that purge, following the arrest of Röhm, ever published?

GÖRING: Some of the names, yes; but not all of them, I believe.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Who actually killed Röhm? Do you know?

GÖRING: I do not know who personally carried out this action.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: To what organization was the order given?

GÖRING: That I do not know either, because the shooting of Röhm was

decreed by the Führer and not by me, for I was competent in north

Germany.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And who took into custody those who were destined

for concentration camps, and how many were there?

GÖRING: The police carried out the arrest of those who were, first of

all, to be interrogated, those who were not so seriously incriminated

and of whom it was not known whether they were incriminated or not. A

number of these people were released very soon, others not until

somewhat later. Just how many were arrested in this connection I cannot

tell you. The arrests were made by the police.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The Gestapo, you mean?

GÖRING: I assume so.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And if Milch testified that he saw 700 or 800 in

Dachau in 1935, there must have been a very much larger number arrested,

since you say many were released. Do you know the number that were

arrested?

GÖRING: I state again, I do not know exactly how many were arrested

because the necessary arrests, or the arrest of those who were

considered as having a part in this, did not go through me. My action

ended, so to speak, on the date when the revolt was smashed. I

understood Milch a little differently and I sent a note to my counsel in

order that it be made clear, through a question whether Milch meant by

these 700 people those concerned with the Röhm Putsch or whether he

meant to say that he saw altogether 700 arrested persons there. That is

the way I understood it. But to clarify this statement we should have to

question Milch again, for I believe this number of 500, 600, or 700, to

be far too high for the total number of people arrested in connection

with the Röhm Putsch.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Among those who were killed were Von Schleicher and

his wife. He was one of your political opponents, was he not?

GÖRING: That is right.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And also Erich Klausner, who had been Chief of the

Catholic Action of Germany?

GÖRING: Klausner was likewise among those who were shot. Actually, it

was Klausner’s case which caused me, as I stated recently, to ask the

Führer to give immediate orders to cease any further action, since, in

my opinion, Klausner was quite wrongfully shot.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And Strasser, who had been the former Number 2 man

to Hitler and had disagreed with him in December 1932—Strasser was

killed, was he not?

GÖRING: Of Strasser it cannot be said that he was Number 2 man after

Hitler. He played an extremely important role within the Party before

the seizure of power, but he was banned from the Party already before

the seizure of power. Strasser participated in this revolt and he was

also shot.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And when it got down to a point where there were

only two left on the list yet to be killed, you intervened and asked to

have it stopped; is that correct?

GÖRING: No, that is not entirely correct. I made it fairly clear and

should like to repeat briefly that not when there were only two left on

the list did I intervene; I intervened when I saw that many were shot

who were not concerned with this matter. And when I did so, two persons

were left who had taken a very active part, and the Führer himself had

ordered that they be shot. The Führer was particularly furious with one

of them, the chief instigator of the action. What I wanted to make clear

was that I said to the Führer, “It is better for you to give up the idea

of having these two main perpetrators executed, and put an end to the

whole thing immediately.” That is what I meant.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What date was that? Did you fix the time?

GÖRING: Yes, I can give you a definite time. As far as I recall, the

decisive day was Saturday; on Saturday evening between 6 and 7 o’clock

the Führer arrived by plane from Munich. My request to stop the action

was made on Sunday, some time between 2 and 3 o’clock in the afternoon.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And what happened to the two men who were left on

the list—were they ever brought to trial?