THE PRESIDENT: The fact that he met Sir George Ogilvie-Forbes in Oslo on
24 September does not at present appear to have anything to do with
Göring.
DR. STAHMER: It appears significant in that it was the occasion for Mr.
Dahlerus to get in touch with Berlin and Göring again in order to try
once more, at this stage of events, to bring about peace.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, go on with your next question then.
DAHLERUS: The conditions were: “To save Europe from continued German
aggressions and to enable the peoples of Europe . . .”
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. What has the letter that Sir George
Ogilvie-Forbes wrote got to do with Göring?
DR. STAHMER: Dahlerus discussed this letter, the contents of this letter
on 26 September with Göring, and tried on this basis to reach an
agreement.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Your Honor, may I enter a further objection?
It has nothing to do with the Indictment. We have not charged that the
war against England was an aggressive war. The charge is that the war
against Poland was an aggressive war. All of this negotiation to keep
England out of the war while they took Poland is utterly irrelevant to
the Indictment. I respectfully submit that because it has nothing to do
with the Indictment, with the charge, it should be rejected.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, if the witness had an interview with Göring
afterwards, you can come to that, but not to preliminary conferences
with Sir George Ogilvie-Forbes.
DR. STAHMER: But that will not be comprehensible; he really must state
what Forbes told him. He saw Forbes, Forbes made certain suggestions to
him and with these suggestions Mr. Dahlerus went to Berlin and, of
course, informed Göring what Forbes said to him. Thus, it will not
otherwise be possible at all . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Let the witness give the account of his meeting with
Göring.
DR. STAHMER: Very well.
[_Turning to the witness._] Mr. Dahlerus, you then on 26 September
looked up Göring in Berlin, did you not?
DAHLERUS: Yes, I met both Göring and Hitler on 26 September.
DR. STAHMER: Did you inform Göring of the proposals Forbes had made to
you?
DAHLERUS: I discussed with Hitler on what conditions he would be
prepared to make good the harm he had done to Poland, and make peace. To
my great disappointment he then definitely declared that he was not
prepared at all to discuss the question of Poland. Poland was occupied
and that was no business any longer of Great Britain. I then realized
that his aim had been to split Poland and Britain and thus, with the
consent of Great Britain, to have the opportunity of occupying Poland
without running the risk of being involved in a war with Great Britain
and France.
DR. STAHMER: In July 1940 did you again meet Göring?
DAHLERUS: Yes, Göring suggested in July, 1940 that His Majesty, the King
of Sweden, should endeavor to bring the various powers together for
peace negotiations.
DR. STAHMER: I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn until 2:10 p.m.
[_The Tribunal recessed until 1410 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
THE PRESIDENT: Do the defendants’ counsel wish to ask any questions?
DR. HORN: Witness, can you tell us the reason why the conference between
Hitler and Henderson on 29 August took an unfavorable course?
DAHLERUS: No, I heard only the report that they disagreed and a quarrel
started.
DR. HORN: Do you know on which of the six points the quarrel started?
DAHLERUS: As far as I recollect, it was on the wording of the German
reply saying that they expected representatives from Poland during the
next 24 hours.
DR. HORN: Did Hitler not explain to you then in the presence of Göring
why he made this demand and that was because the two armies, the Polish
and the German, were already facing each other in readiness, and at any
moment a serious conflict was to be expected. Therefore Hitler did not
want to present an ultimatum as to the sending of a negotiator from
Poland, and thereby wanted solely to avoid the outbreak of a conflict?
DAHLERUS: Yes, explanations to that effect were given.
DR. HORN: Is it correct, Witness, as you state in your book, that at the
Polish Embassy the Polish Ambassador Lipski told you that in case of war
the Polish Army would march to Berlin in triumph?
DAHLERUS: No, he did not say that to me, but he made remarks to that
effect to Forbes.
DR. HORN: And Forbes transmitted these remarks then to you.
DAHLERUS: Yes.
DR. HORN: How did your meeting with Mr. Forbes in Oslo on 24 September
come about?
DAHLERUS: I took the initiative and went to Oslo to see him.
DR. HORN: Can you please tell us briefly the contents of the letter from
Forbes?
DAHLERUS: I read that before.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has already said that it does not want to
hear that. And I do not see what it has to do with Von Ribbentrop.
DR. HORN: The former Foreign Minister, Von Ribbentrop, is under
indictment for the leadership of the entire German foreign policy. I
therefore consider it important that this letter, which will give
decisive information about the further course of foreign policy, as
Ribbentrop saw it—about his later attempt in the direction of peace,
for instance—be read to the Tribunal.
DAHLERUS: To redeem Europe from the perpetually recurring fear of German
aggression . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Was this letter ever shown to Von Ribbentrop?
DAHLERUS: No.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has already ruled that it will not have the
letter read.
DR. HORN: You had then on 26 September 1939 a discussion with Hitler. Is
it correct that Hitler told you at that time he could not negotiate with
England concerning Poland because the major part of Poland was occupied
by Russia, and Russia, to his knowledge, would certainly not give it up?
DAHLERUS: He declared that he was not prepared to discuss the question
of Poland, and added afterwards that, apart from his decision, he did
not think Russia was prepared to discuss the territory occupied by
Russia.
DR. HORN: Were you politically independent at the time you were
conducting your negotiation?
DAHLERUS: Absolutely.
DR. HORN: Thank you, I have no further questions.
DR. LATERNSER: I have only one question for the witness: [_Turning to
the witness._] Witness, did high military leaders at any time
participate actively in the numerous negotiations which you had with
German authorities at that time?
DAHLERUS: Never.
DR. LATERNSER: Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: Do other defendants’ counsel wish to ask any questions?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Mr. Dahlerus, will you tell me whether I
understood your last answer to Dr. Stahmer correctly? Did you say “I
then realized that it was on the 26th of September, that his”—that is
Göring’s—“aim had been to split Poland and Great Britain and to occupy
Poland with the consent of Great Britain”? Is that right?
DAHLERUS: Yes, it is correct, but I should like to say it was the German
Government, including Göring.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Wait . . . the German Government. Thank you.
Now, I just want you to tell the Tribunal quite shortly why you did not
realize that aim earlier.
DR. STAHMER: As far as I understood the witness’ answer before, he said
in answer to my question that that was Hitler’s opinion. The witness did
not speak of Göring at all.
THE PRESIDENT: You will be able to re-examine him.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I want you just to explain to the
Tribunal—and listen to the question I put to you—why did you not
understand that aim at the time? Your original object in seeing Göring
at the beginning of July was to inform him that British public opinion
had hardened and would not stand another act of aggression; that is
right, is it not?
DAHLERUS: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The reason you went to Göring is shown on Page 8
of your book, if you have got the English version.
DAHLERUS: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And, Mr. Dahlerus, I want you to be absolutely
sure that when I quote your book I do not take anything out of its
context. I shall try to make it as short as I can. Just before the break
on Page 8 you say this:
“The essence of National Socialism was bellicose and aggressive
and completely devoid of all moral scruples in its dealings with
other nations. Hitler and his protégé Ribbentrop thirsted after
conquest. It was said that Göring had energetically striven for
a peaceful solution of the Munich crisis and this had lessened
his popularity within the German Government.”
That was the reason you went to Göring?
DAHLERUS: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And when you put your point of view to Göring
his first reaction was that the British Government was bluffing over
Danzig and Poland.
DAHLERUS: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you wanted and succeeded in arranging the
first meeting in order to convince Göring that, according to British
public opinion, the British Government was not bluffing, is that right?
DAHLERUS: Yes, that is correct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I just want you to turn to Page 29 of your
book, at the very top of the page, which describes the end of your
conversation with the Defendant Göring in the train before the meeting
at the beginning of August. Do you remember?
DAHLERUS: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Göring explained what his aim was. And if you
look at the second line: “This was a mutual agreement regarding the
holding of an Anglo-German conference . . .” and note the next words,
Mr. Dahlerus, “with plenipotentiary representatives from both
Governments.” One matter which Göring had always made clear was that he
would demand the return of Danzig and certain rights over the
Corridor—the Polish Corridor—is that not right?
DAHLERUS: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And from the very start he wanted a
plenipotentiary conference at which territory could, if necessary, be
ceded to Germany, did he not?
DAHLERUS: Evidently.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I want you to come straight on to 24
August, when you saw Göring and he asked you to go to London. One of the
points that he wanted you to stress was that he and the German
Government thought that there had been a great improvement in their
military situation because of the German-Soviet treaty.
DAHLERUS: That is correct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And the other—if you turn to the bottom of Page
35 in your book and then look at the top of Page 36: “The reason was his
disbelief that the German Foreign Office would be able or willing to
establish a sufficiently close contact with the British Foreign Office.”
DAHLERUS: That is correct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, you remember that day you had the
conversation with him, and later on he rang you up at 11:30 before your
departure?
DAHLERUS: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I just want you to tell the Tribunal one or two
of the things he did not tell you on that day. He did not tell you, did
he, that 2 days before, on the 22nd of August, at Obersalzberg, Hitler
had told him and other German leaders that he—Hitler—had decided in
the spring that a conflict with Poland was bound to come. He did not
tell you that, did he?
DAHLERUS: I never had any indication or information on the political
intentions, either on the 11th of April, or the 23rd of May, or the 22nd
of August.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You never heard of—that is Document Number
798-PS, the one of the 22nd of August—you told us, you never heard of
the Fall Weiss that had been prepared in April, but I want to get it
quite clear about the other one, Document Number L-75 of the 23rd of
May. He never told you that Hitler had said to him on that day that
Danzig is not the subject of the dispute at all. “It is a question of
expanding our living space in the East.” And I think he also did not
tell you that Hitler had said on that day, “Our task is to isolate
Poland; the success of the isolation will be decisive.” He never spoke
to you about isolating Poland?
DAHLERUS: He never indicated anything in that direction at all.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But I think he did tell you in the earlier
interview that he was going to see M. Lipski, the Polish Ambassador.
DAHLERUS: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: He did not tell you, as I understand you, that
he was going to inform M. Lipski that the main obstacle to any
diminution of the tension between the two countries was Poland’s
alliance with Great Britain. He did not tell you that, did he?
DAHLERUS: No.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is Exhibit Number GB-39, Document Number
72-PS, Page 119. So that, while he was asking you to go to England to
deal with one side of the matter, he was dealing with M. Lipski on the
other. I just want to get a clear picture of the situation on the 24th.
Did he tell you that the decision had been made to attack Poland on the
morning of the 26th?
DAHLERUS: No, in no way whatsoever.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, you were asked to go with these general
purposes, as I put it to you? You know now, Mr. Dahlerus, that on the
next day our _note verbale_ was given to Sir Nevile Henderson by
Hitler—on the 26th.
DAHLERUS: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And that note, as distinguished from what was
said to you later on, stated in general terms that the Polish question
must be solved, so that the effect of the plans, as they stood on the
evening of the 24th, when Göring rang you up, was that you were going
off in the morning with the expression of a general desire for a
peaceful solution. The _note verbale_ was to be given to Sir Nevile
Henderson on the afternoon of the 25th and at that time the plan was
that Poland would be attacked on the morning of the 26th, when you had
delivered your message, and Sir Nevile had sent on the _note verbale_?
That was the position?
DAHLERUS: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, did Göring ever tell you why the plan of
attack was changed from the 26th to the 31st?
DAHLERUS: No, he never mentioned anything about the plan of attack; nor
that it was changed.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: He did not tell you that—this is Document
Number TC-90, Exhibit Number GB-64—I quote Göring’s own words:
“On the day when England gave her official guarantee to
Poland”—that was the 25th—“the Führer called me on the
telephone and told me that he had stopped the planned invasion
of Poland. I asked him then whether this was just temporary or
for good. He said, ‘No, I will have to see whether we can
eliminate British intervention.’ So then I asked him, ‘Do you
think that it will be any different within 4 or 5 days?’”
Göring never told you that, at the time you were being sent to London,
all that was wanted was to eliminate British intervention?
DAHLERUS: Not at all.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, I just want to state again, quite
shortly; you went and came back with Lord Halifax’s letter. I want to
make this quite clear, Mr. Dahlerus: Throughout Lord Halifax made it
clear that Great Britain was going to stand by her obligations to
Poland, did he not?
DAHLERUS: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And then on the 27th of August, the night of the
26th to 27th, at 12:30 midnight, you had this interview with Hitler.
Now, to you, Mr. Dahlerus, Hitler for the first time made it clear that
his terms were, that Great Britain should help Germany in securing
Danzig and the Corridor.
DAHLERUS: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Not “rights in the Corridor,” but “the
Corridor.” Do you remember that when you told that to Mr. Chamberlain he
was surprised at the difference between your account and that given to
Sir Nevile Henderson?
DAHLERUS: That is correct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I am not going to go through it all again,
but I just want you to help me from your own book, which you say was
carefully and objectively written, as to the state of mind of the rulers
of Germany at that time. Now, would you first of all look, with regard
to Hitler, on Page 47? That is the passage you have already told the
Tribunal about, where he was shouting, “Dann werde ich U-Boote bauen.”
DAHLERUS: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, just let me put it to you—it is quite
short—how you described it at the time, and you tell me if it is right,
“If there should be a war,” he said, “Dann werde ich U-Boote bauen,
U-Boote, U-Boote!” and he raised his voice each time?
DAHLERUS: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: “The voice became more indistinct and
finally one could not follow him at all. Then he pulled himself
together, raised his voice as though addressing a large audience
and shrieked—shrieked—‘Ich werde Flugzeuge bauen, Flugzeuge
bauen, Flugzeuge, Flugzeuge, und ich werde meine Feinde
vernichten.’”
And you go on to say:
“Just then he seemed more like a phantom from a story book than
a real person. I stared at him in amazement and turned to see
how Göring reacted, but he did not turn a hair.”
Now, would you mind turning on to Page 53? No, just one sentence before
the bit I read on Page 47, I just want to get that clear. You say: “His
words became blurred and his behavior was that of a completely abnormal
person.”
Now, you turn to Page 53. I want you to tell the Tribunal your
impression of the way he treated the Defendant Göring. The Tribunal has
heard a lot about the relations between them. At the bottom of the page
you say this:
“From the very beginning of our conversation I had resented his
manner toward Göring, his most intimate friend and comrade from
the years of struggle. His desire to dominate was explicable,
but to require such obsequious humility, as Göring now
exhibited, from his closest collaborator seemed to me
excessively repellent and unprepossessing.”
Would you just turn over to Page 54, the fifth line from the end?
“I realized that I was dealing with a person who could not be
considered normal.”
That was your considered view, was it not, Mr. Dahlerus?
DAHLERUS: It was the opinion I formed the first time I met him.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That was the Chancellor of Germany. Now I want
you, for a moment, to deal with the Foreign Minister of Germany,
according to the impressions that you formed. Generally, I think you got
the impression that Von Ribbentrop was doing everything he could to
interrupt and spoil your endeavors?
DAHLERUS: That is correct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But according to Göring, he went further than
that. Will you look at Page 76? This is, you remember, when you were
just saying goodbye to Göring, on, I think, your last visit to London,
after he had drawn the map, which I will come to in a moment. Did you
say this:
“Before we parted, he again went over the German standpoint,
saying finally that if we never met again he would like to take
the opportunity of thanking me for what I have done and for my
tireless energy in the cause of peace. I was somewhat surprised
by this farewell and could not help replying that in all
probability we should meet again soon. His expression changed
and he said solemnly: ‘Perhaps; but certain people are doing
what they can to prevent your getting out of this alive.’”
That was said seriously and solemnly, Mr. Dahlerus?
DAHLERUS: Exactly.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you go on:
“At a meeting in October of the same year Göring told me that
Ribbentrop had tried to arrange for my plane to crash. Hence
Göring’s solemn mien when he bid me farewell.”
DAHLERUS: Well, he had mentioned Ribbentrop’s name just a minute before,
and when he spoke about the plane crashing, he used the word “he.” I
assumed he meant Ribbentrop.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That was the Foreign Minister, according to
Göring.
I want you now to turn to Page 100, because I want to collect these
things. This is a description of the 1st of September, the afternoon of
the day on which Poland had been attacked, and you saw the Defendant
Göring, I think, in the Air Ministry or at one of his offices. Do you
see it? It is just before the second break.
“To him”—that is, to Göring—“everything was lined up according
to a plan which nothing could upset. Finally he called in the
State Secretaries Körner and Gritzbach, gave them a long
harangue, and presented each of them with a sword of honor,
which he hoped they would carry gloriously through the war. It
was as if all these people were in some crazy state of
intoxication.”
Are these your words?
DAHLERUS: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And that is the impression? Of course you mean
that they were mentally intoxicated with the idea of war?
DAHLERUS: They had changed their frame of mind within a short time.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So that, of the three principal people in
Germany, the Chancellor was abnormal; the Reich Marshal, or the Field
Marshal, as he was then, was in a crazy state of intoxication; and,
according to the Defendant Göring, the Foreign Minister was a would-be
murderer who wanted to sabotage your plane?
[_The witness nodded assent._]
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just let us proceed, quite shortly, with what
happened after that.
On the week end of 26 and 27 August you went to England. You have told
me that you did not know about the calling off of the attack on the
morning of the 26th, and you did not know that the intention of Hitler
was to eliminate English intervention. You did not know these points; so
you went back to England on the 27th with these fuller terms, and the
English answer was that, while they maintained their obligations, they
hoped and recommended that the German and Polish Governments might begin
negotiations between themselves with regard to the point?
DAHLERUS: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And that was the answer that you brought back.
Now, I just want you to think for a moment of the interview that you had
at breakfast time with Göring, I think in his train or in his
headquarters, on the 28th of August. You find it at Page 65 of the book,
if you want to refresh your memory. At that time, did Göring not try and
convince you that the return of Danzig and the Corridor would make no
difference to Poland’s military situation?
DAHLERUS: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Because, illustrating it from his own war maps,
he thought that Germany was in a position to defeat the Poles anyhow,
whether they had the Corridor or whether they hadn’t?
DAHLERUS: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And his Air Forces and the troops were all in
position to carry that out?
DAHLERUS: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I want you now to come to the question of
the meeting at which the terms were given to Sir Nevile Henderson. That
was at 7:15 in the evening, on the 29th of August, and the meeting went
on for some time. Do you remember that meeting?
DAHLERUS: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And then, as I think one of the counsel has
elicited from you, the difficulty arose over the demand for a
plenipotentiary to be back in 24 hours, as you have explained.
DAHLERUS: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I think Sir George Ogilvie-Forbes told you
that that meeting had gone very badly, and then at 11:30 you saw Göring,
and Göring said much the same as Sir George Ogilvie-Forbes as to how the
meeting had gone.
DAHLERUS: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And he said, that what had upset the Chancellor
was that Sir Nevile Henderson had characterized or implied that this
demand that the plenipotentiary should come within 24 hours was
equivalent to an ultimatum.
DAHLERUS: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you remember at that time that Göring
underlined certain of the terms?
Will you turn to the preface of your book . . .
DAHLERUS: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You see the facsimile. Have you a copy?
DAHLERUS: I have the original here.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, if you will just look at it. Now, it is in
German. If you follow the German, I want just to read the bits which
Göring has underlined, and I will read it in English and you check to
see that I have got the right piece:
“For the rest, in making these proposals the German Government
has never had any intention of touching Poland’s vital interests
or questioning the existence of an independent Polish State. The
German Government, accordingly, in these circumstances, agrees
to accept the British Government’s offer of its good offices in
securing the dispatch to Berlin of a Polish emissary with full
powers. It counts on the arrival of this emissary on Wednesday,
30 August 1939. The German Government will immediately draw up
proposals for a solution acceptable to itself and will, if
possible, place these at the disposal of the British Government
before the arrival of the Polish negotiator.”
That is the bit which the Defendant Göring has underlined, just before
the bit about the sending of the plenipotentiary.
DAHLERUS: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So that there was no doubt that the Defendant
Göring was associating himself with the importance of that point.
DAHLERUS: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, you remember that at that time, during that
interview, that is, the night of the 29th, the Defendant Göring made a
great tirade against the Poles.
DAHLERUS: That is right.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am not going to go into that in detail; but
then he said to you that the Führer was preparing what I think in
English is a “magnanimous offer.”
DAHLERUS: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And to show you the nature of the “magnanimous
offer,” he hedged in a portion of the bits of Poland. That is also in
the preface to your book.
DAHLERUS: Yes.
Sir DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, there are two points about what he hedged
in. In fact, it was much more than had been taken from Germany under the
Treaty of Versailles.
Secondly, it was entirely different from what was cabled over by the
Defendant Von Ribbentrop to Sir Nevile Henderson the next night.
DAHLERUS: That is correct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And, Mr. Dahlerus, I do not think I can put it
better than in your own words, if you will turn to Page 75. Is this how
you record it in your book, the second break:
“This map, a reproduction of which is given in this book, is
extraordinarily interesting because it illustrates the rapidity
and recklessness with which the decisions in this question were
reached. I had the map with me when I left for London a few
hours later, but it turned out that the boundaries drawn up on
it differed very considerably from those given the well-known
‘Project Ribbentrop,’ presented at top speed to Henderson on the
night between the 30th and 31st of August.”
That is rather less than 24 hours later.
DAHLERUS: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And then you go on to describe what it showed.
Well, it showed this quite clearly, that 24 hours before that was cabled
over to Sir Nevile Henderson the German Government had never seriously
considered what portion of the Corridor it was going to claim and what
portion it was not going to claim. Is that so? Göring was putting an
entirely different thing to you the night before, was he not?
DAHLERUS: The first proposal I brought with me on Sunday morning, the
27th. Yes, there it was only the small Corridor, and they extended the
claims according to this last plan.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: They extended the claim, so that the effect of
what was put to you, what you were sent to announce—that a “magnanimous
offer” was coming—was actually an extension of claims, and, equally
actually, quite different from what was suggested the next night by the
Defendant Ribbentrop.
DAHLERUS: That is correct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I just want to ask you one word about an
interview which took place on the 31st of August. You will find it at
Page 87. It is the interview at which Sir George Ogilvie-Forbes gave you
an account of what M. Lipski had said. I want you just to tell me this:
You did meet M. Lipski, did you not?
DAHLERUS: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And, of course—obviously, the same could be
said of everyone, I am sure of yourself also—M. Lipski was suffering
from considerable strain in that most critical time?
DAHLERUS: He was very nervous.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Very nervous. And did not Sir George Forbes tell
you that M. Lipski made his opinion quite clear that the German offer
was a breach of Polish sovereignty; and that, in his view, Poland and
France and England must stand firm and show a united front; and that
Poland, if left alone, would fight and die alone? That was M. Lipski’s
mood, was it not, at the time?
DAHLERUS: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And with regard to the other matter, I am not
going into the details, but there is a considerable and significant
difference between the Polish version of the telegram of instructions to
M. Lipski and the version which the Defendant Göring showed to you?
DAHLERUS: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, on the morning of the 1st of September I
think you saw Göring at 8 o’clock. Would it be a correct description of
the way in which he broke the fact that he had attacked Poland to say
that it was very gradual or slow, with Göring almost walking backwards,
when he broke the news to you that the attack had taken place?
DAHLERUS: Well, so much so that I immediately phoned London and got in
contact with the Foreign Office and informed somebody that, according to
the information I had received, the Poles had been attacked, and they
naturally wondered what was happening to me when I gave that
information.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, but he did eventually admit that they had
attacked Poland, and then you had a further interview with Hitler. There
is just one point I want you to clarify. I do not think you told the
Tribunal about the time when he said he would fight for 10 years. Look
at Page 98.
DAHLERUS: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You see there, after saying: “‘Will ich zehn
Jahre kämpfen,’ he brandished his fist and bent down so that it nearly
touched the floor.”
DAHLERUS: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So I take it, he was in the same state as at the
time of your previous interview.
DAHLERUS: Well, if possible, more nervous.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, there is just one final matter, if you
would look at Page 102, and then I shall leave your book.
You remember you saw the Defendant Göring on the morning of Saturday, 2d
September?
DAHLERUS: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, you say this:
“To my surprise he was more inclined to listen to the viewpoints
which I maintained, for, as soon as we had sat down in his
private drawing-room car, he told me that there was talk of a
mediation sponsored by Mussolini. Mussolini was said to be
fervently trying to stop the war, and especially to prevent it
from spreading.”
The next sentence is:
“Göring said that he wanted to inaugurate a new Munich.”
I do not want to put it unfairly, and therefore I ask you, Mr. Dahlerus,
does the “he” in that sentence refer to Göring or to Mussolini?
DAHLERUS: I think it refers to Mussolini.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You think it refers to Mussolini. That is what I
suspected, and therefore I will not trouble you further about it, except
to ask you this:
I have taken you briefly—I hope you will agree, fairly—through the
points on this matter, and on these facts that I have put to you, and
with which you will agree, are they the basis of your opinion that the
aim of the German Government, including Göring, was to split Poland and
Great Britain and to occupy Poland with the consent of Great Britain?
DAHLERUS: Well, if I had known the facts that I heard later . . .
DR. STAHMER: I believe that this question goes too far. Therefore, I
have to object to this question. It refers in general to the government
and to a definite number of persons. Besides, it is an expression of
opinion and not a fact about which the witness is to testify.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The question was: Are these facts the basis of
your opinion?
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks it is a perfectly proper question and
arises directly out of the examination in chief.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Mr. Dahlerus, you were answering. I had asked
you are these facts . . .
DR. SAUTER: But then I should like to ask, Mr. President, that it be
clarified what is to be understood under the term “German Government,”
of which the prosecutor speaks constantly. The German Government
consists of quite a number of ministers, and if one speaks here
continuously of the German Government, without saying who is meant
individually, the impression is created, that each and every one of the
ministers was responsible and had participated in these negotiations,
although, in fact, he knew nothing about it. I am representing one of
these ministers who knew nothing about these negotiations, and therefore
it would be of interest to me if the prosecutor would be kind enough to
clarify who actually is meant by the term “German Government.” That is
to say, whether the Minister of Economics, Funk, for instance, is also
included, or whether it refers only to two or three other gentlemen.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I do not suppose . . .
THE PRESIDENT: We do not agree at all with what Dr. Sauter has said. We
have already heard the Defendant Göring at considerable length about
what the government consisted of, and it will be upon the defendants’
counsel, when the time comes to argue the case, to argue that the
government did not include the members whom they represent.
Defendants’ counsel do not seem to understand that, what they call
clarification is a matter which can be done in re-examination. Dr.
Stahmer will have the opportunity of re-examining, and then can ask any
questions that arise out of the cross-examination.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I will put it, Mr. Dahlerus, in this way: Are
these facts which you have heard and agreed with this afternoon, are
they the basis of the view which you expressed in answer to Dr.
Stahmer’s question this morning?
DAHLERUS: Yes. At the time I thought I could contribute something to
preventing a new war; I could definitely prove that nothing was left
undone by the British, by His Majesty’s Government to prevent war. But
had I known what I know today, I would have realized that my efforts
could not possibly succeed.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, there is one other point. I ask Your
Lordship’s indulgence. Dr. Stahmer asked for the names of these English
industrialists. My Lord, I am very anxious, as representative of the
British Government, that there should be no concealment about this
matter at all, and I should, therefore, ask, with all humility, that
Your Lordship would allow me to ask Mr. Dahlerus to give the names,
simply for that reason.
THE PRESIDENT: Certainly, if you wish to.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Mr. Dahlerus, will you tell us the names of the
gentlemen that you met on your wife’s estate in Schleswig-Holstein?
DAHLERUS: Shall I read them or hand them in?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Read them if you will.
DAHLERUS: The Honorable Charles McLarn, S. W. Rossen, A. Holden, Sir
Robert Renig, Bryon S. Mountain, C. F. Spencer, T. Menceford.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Thank you very much.
THE PRESIDENT: Does any other member of the Prosecution wish to
cross-examine?
Dr. Stahmer, do you not wish to re-examine?
DR. HORN: Mr. President, I should like to put a question. May I ask,
without being misunderstood, why these names could not be read this
morning when Dr. Stahmer asked for them?
THE PRESIDENT: Why do you ask that question? What has it to do with the
case of Von Ribbentrop?
DR. HORN: The witness Dahlerus was also approved for the Defendant Von
Ribbentrop, and I had reached an agreement with Dr. Stahmer as to
certain questions. I, too, was interested in these questions this
morning and also in the question about the people who had been there.
THE PRESIDENT: The reason why the names were not given this morning was
because we wished to get on with this Trial, and we thought that the
names of these gentlemen were irrelevant. But as Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe
asked that they might be introduced in order that there could be no
suggestion of concealment, the Tribunal has allowed them to be given.
DR. HORN: Thank you.
DR. STAHMER: Mr. Dahlerus, you said this morning that on 23 August you
were called up by Göring in Stockholm and that he told you that the
situation had become serious, and that, therefore, he was absolutely
obliged to talk to you. Did he tell you for what reasons he considered
the situation at that moment serious?
DAHLERUS: No.
DR. STAHMER: And you did not ask him about it?
DAHLERUS: No.
DR. STAHMER: You came then to Berlin on the 24th and conferred at once
with Göring. Did Göring tell you on this occasion what had made the
situation more serious in the meantime?
DAHLERUS: Not clearly.
DR. STAHMER: What did he tell you about the danger? In what did the
seriousness of the situation consist?
DAHLERUS: He indicated that the fact that the Polish question was not
yet solved, and that there was no indication that it would be solved,
made the situation serious. He also said that it depended entirely on
the British attitude and initiative whether a solution could be found.
DR. STAHMER: From this answer then you learned that Poland was the point
of danger?
DAHLERUS: Yes.
DR. STAHMER: You did transmit proposals then on 27 August which had as
their main object the solution of the Polish question?
DAHLERUS: Yes.
DR. STAHMER: In reply to my question with reference to the events of 26
September, you said this morning, according to my notes, that you were
of the opinion at that time that Hitler’s plans were not quite clear.
Then this afternoon you spoke of Göring. How do you account for that
difference in your answer?
DAHLERUS: At the time I had to assume that the leading members of the
German Government worked in close collaboration.
DR. STAHMER: Then you concluded that from this fact? You also said
before, if you had known what you know today, you would not have
intervened. What has brought about your change of opinion?
DAHLERUS: The facts disclosed, chiefly during the proceedings in this
court, and as published.
DR. STAHMER: Which facts are these?
DAHLERUS: The incidents I quoted, the declaration of 11 April, 23 May,
and 22 August.
DR. STAHMER: You have no further facts, have you?
DAHLERUS: Yes, but those are the main points.
DR. STAHMER: What are the minor points? What are your other misgivings?
DAHLERUS: One is the experience on 26 September 1939, the speech by
Hitler on 6 October 1939, and a number of declarations made since.
DR. STAHMER: You mentioned before a plane crash, if I understood you
correctly, which was to have been brought about by Ribbentrop. Were you
really serious about that?
DAHLERUS: Well, I corrected my statement to say that I assumed that it
was Ribbentrop, because his name had just been mentioned about a minute
before.
DR. STAHMER: I have one more question for the witness. What about the
map of Poland which had just been shown and which allegedly was drawn by
Göring?
DAHLERUS: I have the original of that map in my possession.
DR. STAHMER: And what was the explanation given to you?
DAHLERUS: That it was a territory that held a majority of Germans, and
not Poles.
DR. STAHMER: How do you explain, then, the difference between the later
offer and that map?
DAHLERUS: I can only assume that the question had not been thoroughly
discussed and various proposals had been made before the definite
proposal was submitted.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire; and the Tribunal will adjourn.
[_The witness left the stand._]
[_A recess was taken._]
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Justice Jackson, you will continue your
cross-examination, will you not?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I have assumed, Your Honor, that, since Göring’s
testimony was suspended in order to hear Dahlerus, on the ground that it
might change some of his examination, Dr. Stahmer would complete any
direct examination he may have on this subject with the Witness Dahlerus
before I finish my cross-examination.
THE PRESIDENT: I beg your pardon, yes. Dr. Stahmer, will you ask any
questions of the Defendant Göring that you wish to ask, arising out of
the evidence of the Witness Dahlerus.
DR. STAHMER: I can ask him these questions only after I have spoken with
him. I therefore consider it appropriate for Mr. Justice Jackson to
continue his cross-examination, and after the cross-examination I can
deal with these questions as well.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, the Tribunal considers that you ought to be
prepared to go on now. It is you who asked for the evidence of Dahlerus
to be interposed, and Dahlerus was your witness, not the Prosecution’s
witness, and therefore presumably you knew what Dahlerus was going to
say.
DR. STAHMER: Then I ask for the opportunity to discuss the matter with
the defendant.
THE PRESIDENT: The Court has just been adjourned for 10 minutes.
DR. STAHMER: I was not able to finish the matter in that short period of
time.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal is of the opinion that you must ask these
questions now and go on with the examination. If you wish to examine the
Defendant Göring on these matters you must do it now.
DR. STAHMER: Very well.
[_The Defendant Göring resumed the stand._]
DR. STAHMER: [_Turning to the defendant._] A map was mentioned
previously which is supposed to have been drawn up by you and which is
contained in Mr. Dahlerus’ book, the authenticity of which he confirmed
this morning in answer to my question. I am having this map, which is to
be found on Page 53 of his book, shown to you and I ask for your
explanation of it.
GÖRING: In the discussion that took place in the night of 29-30 August
between Dahlerus and me, I believe at the Führer’s, I tore a map from an
atlas on the spur of the moment and outlined with a red pencil, and I
believe a blue or green pencil, those regions—not the regions which we
would demand, as declared here before by the Prosecution—but those
regions of Poland in which Germans live. That the witness Dahlerus was
also of this opinion can be seen most clearly from the fact that he
repeated the same markings on another map and then wrote as follows,
next to the marked section: “German population according to Göring;” and
next to the dotted section: “Polish inhabitants according to Göring.”
He then goes on writing and draws boundaries: “Göring’s first proposal
for the boundary” which agrees with the markings of the regions of
German and Polish populations. That was not a boundary proposal, but a
separation of the two populations. And then he writes: “Hitler’s
proposal;” that is the final, the correct, and the only proposal
transmitted to the Polish as well as to the British Government. If one
compares my map one sees that here quite spontaneously and in a great
hurry, with a two-color pencil, a quite superficial marking off of the
approximate zones of population is made, that is, one in which the
majority are Germans and one in which there are exclusively Poles. From
the beginning Mr. Dahlerus was given only the broad outlines of the
boundary proposal, which was later made more exact. That is the only one
in question, the same one which was published, which was read to
Ambassador Henderson, and which, as Henderson did not understand it, I
had telephoned to the Embassy by Dahlerus during the night, and checked
the next day.
DR. STAHMER: Will you please repeat the last sentence? I believe it did
not come through.
GÖRING: I said, the boundaries of the Corridor, as outlined here at
Hitler’s suggestion, were the official proposal which the Führer, as the
only person entitled to make final proposals, had worked out. It is the
same proposal that was read to Ambassador Henderson, and as he did not
understand it, I turned the note which was read to Henderson, over to
Dahlerus for him to dictate it so that I could be sure that the English
Ambassador was informed of it in its entirety.
To do this was, as I have already said, actually an enormous risk, since
the Führer had forbidden this information being made public at the
moment, and, as I have stated already, only I could take that risk. But
for the rest, as far as my markings are concerned, they show clearly on
the map: “German population according to Göring; Polish population
according to Göring.” But that was only approximate and done in a great
hurry during the night, merely for his information, and on a map torn
from an atlas.
DR. STAHMER: Mr. Dahlerus said that you called him up on the 23rd of
August and asked him to come to Berlin immediately because in the
meantime the situation had become serious. What made you consider the
situation serious?
GÖRING: Through the statements of the Führer at the Obersalzberg on that
22d of August it was clear to me that the tension had reached its peak.
The Führer had stated that he would have to bring about a solution of
the problem, if it were not possible to obtain one diplomatically. On
that occasion, since it was simply an address, without discussion,
before the higher officers of troop formations which would be used in
case of war, I, as senior officer present, confined myself to saying to
the Führer at the end: “The Wehrmacht will do its duty.” Of course it
has to do its duty, if it is called upon. At the same time, however, I
wanted to exert every effort in order to make as soon as possible—it
was now a matter of days; a definite date, the 25th or 26th, as decided
at first, had not yet been set on this day—to make one more attempt at
negotiations. I wanted to be able to say to the Führer, if such
negotiations were successfully underway, that there were still prospects
of and chances for a diplomatic solution.
Hence, the concurrence of events on the afternoon of the 22d: the
Führer’s speech and my immediate reaction of sending for Dahlerus from
Stockholm. I, of course, did not tell him, and I could not, of course,
as a German, tell him, a foreigner—and especially not as an
officer—that my reason lay in these factors which I have explained.
Things are now being represented as if there could never have existed in
Germany such an idea as “secret military matter,” or “secret,” or “top
secret,” in German politics and in military life at all; as though we
were obligated to make known every military and political step to the
foreign press in advance. I therefore point out that we, of course, had
the same procedures as those adopted in every other country of the
world.
DR. STAHMER: How was it that you handled the negotiations personally and
that the negotiations were not handled through the Foreign Office?
GÖRING: I was bent on having this question settled peacefully as far as
it was at all possible. The work of the Foreign Office is official. Here
we were working at it anyhow, and according to the guiding principles
laid down by the Führer. I could make my influence felt only in a way
which was as direct as possible but not expressly official, because for
official action I did not hold the official position of Minister for
Foreign Affairs as far as foreign countries were concerned. And at this
time it was clear to me that it was not a question of formalities, but
rather a question of the most practical and the quickest way of
accomplishing something. If I wanted to influence the Führer, that was
possible only if I had something in my hand, that is, if I could say to
him: “On my own responsibility, but with your knowledge and without
committing you and your Reich policy, I am conducting negotiations in
order, circumstances permitting, to create an atmosphere which will
facilitate official negotiations in the direction of a peaceful
solution.”
In addition, it would be faster.
DR. STAHMER: This clear fact, that it was a personal step on your part
that was being taken alongside official diplomatic negotiations—was
that clear also to the British Government?
GÖRING: It must have been clear from the entire action that this was a
nonofficial negotiation which only at one or two points touched the
official negotiations, or overlapped them. For instance, the phase where
Ambassador Henderson, instead of returning immediately to Berlin,
remained 1 or 2 days in London in order, first of all, through the
unofficial negotiator, Dahlerus, to explain to the British Government
the basis of these intentions, or for the negotiations, or to explain
the note, as I shall call it; and when that had been done, the
preparation for entering into these conferences was thereby considerably
improved. And that not I alone was of the honest conviction on that day
that a considerable step had been taken in the direction of a peaceful
solution at that time—I believe it was the 28th—is demonstrated by the
fact that the same view was held at the British Embassy at that moment,
as the Embassy Councillor, Sir Ogilvie-Forbes, has very clearly stated.
The situation did not become worse until the 29th.
During all these negotiations it was not a question, as far as I was
concerned, of isolating Poland and keeping England out of the matter,
but rather it was a question, since the problem of the Corridor and
Danzig had come up, of solving it peaceably, as far as possible along
the lines of the Munich solution. That was my endeavor until the last
moment. If it had been only a question of eliminating England from the
matter, then, first of all, English diplomacy would surely have
recognized that immediately—it certainly has enough training for that.
However, it did enter into these negotiations. And, secondly, I probably
would have used entirely different tactics.
It is not that I am reconstructing things in retrospect; I am speaking
of what actually happened in those days, of what I thought and wanted.
The descriptions given by the Witness Dahlerus today, and in his book
regarding his talks with the Führer, by no means represent the way these
talks took place. His descriptions are rather subjective, for the Führer
probably would not long have been party to such talks.
There are also other subjective interpretations in the book, which
perhaps are purely unessential, but which have been brought forward by
the Prosecutor, Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, that I, in a theatrical fashion,
had handed to two collaborators two swords so that they might accomplish
bold actions with them. One of those who allegedly received a sword from
me was my civilian State Secretary Körner, not a soldier. The most I
could have given him was a pen, since he had to draft decrees for the
Four Year Plan. The second person was the chief of my office staff, a
ministerial director, who also was no soldier and was not to earn any
war laurels, but whose main task during the war was exclusively that of
keeping my civilian, not my military, staff in order, and of insuring
the functioning and progress of that work. For both these matters these
gentlemen needed neither a sword nor any incitement, to behave in a
military way.
DR. STAHMER: Is it correct that it was first intended to undertake
aggressive action against Poland on the 26th of August, and that this
date was later postponed?
GÖRING: It was provided that if by this time—official negotiations were
being carried on before this, that must not be forgotten—if by then
these negotiations had not led to a solution of the problem, as a
consequence of the general mobilization of Poland and the deployment of
troops which had likewise taken place, and as a consequence of very
serious border incidents that had actually occurred—I remind you of the
bloody Sunday of Bromberg, of the more than 70,000 Germans who had fled,
and of the Germans slain—in other words, the atmosphere at this time
was such that the Führer would have wanted to bring about a solution by
means of war. Then this delay came about, precisely because one believed
that a diplomatic solution could still be found, and thus I took it as a
matter of course that I should intensify to the utmost the unofficial
course which I had already pursued in my previous efforts and see it
through. This explains Dahlerus’ frequent conferences in London and in
Berlin, the frequent changes in those conferences, and the frequent
flying to and fro.
When the last attempt was suggested by me on the 3rd of September, the
situation was as follows, and it also has not been described quite
correctly. The British Government at first did not send any ultimatum
after the 1st of September, but it sent a note in which it demanded the
withdrawal . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Will the interpreter please tell the Tribunal what the
last question asked by counsel was? Perhaps the interpreter would not
know it. Does the shorthand writer know what the last question was?—It
does not seem to me that any answer has been given; it related to the
26th of August.
[_The interpreter repeated the question._]
DR. STAHMER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, that was the question, and as far as I have heard
there has been no answer to it yet.
DR. STAHMER: I did not understand that, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: The question that you asked was whether the date of the
26th of August was arranged for the action to take place against Poland,
and the Defendant Göring has been speaking for some considerable time
and has not answered that question yet as far as I have heard.
GÖRING: The question—my answer to this question was that actually the
26th of August was at first planned by the Führer as the date for the
invasion, since he considered this date necessary, in view of the
situation that I have described. It was then possible, however, to
persuade him once more to postpone this date, in order to carry on
further negotiations.
DR. STAHMER: How is it to be explained that Hitler’s proposal failed?
GÖRING: Which proposal?
DR. STAHMER: The last proposal of 27 August, that Dahlerus delivered to
London.
GÖRING: This proposal was, of course, an unofficial one and was followed
by an official proposal that was read to the British Ambassador in the
form of a note; that is, the British Government was informed what
demands Germany would make on Poland. This proposal was not entirely
understood, and was then unofficially—but _de facto_—made known not
only to the British Government but also, to the Polish Ambassador,
exactly and precisely, in the unofficial way that Dahlerus has
described. It came to naught because the Polish Government did not agree
to discuss this proposal. First there was a prolongation for a
plenipotentiary to be appointed—I believe until the 30th or the 31st;
but nevertheless we waited even longer for a plenipotentiary. On the
intimation that the Polish Ambassador might be this plenipotentiary,
circumstances permitting, we waited for a conference with him; when he
declared that he was not authorized to accept any terms, the Führer
decided on invasion the next day. This telegram I also sent to the
British Ambassador via Dahlerus—the telegram of the Polish Government
to their Ambassador, in which they forbade him, in a postscript, to
conduct any negotiations regarding proposals, or to accept any proposal,
or any note on the subject.
I immediately gave Dahlerus the decoded telegram, which I received from
the investigation office mentioned the day before yesterday, so that he
could hand it to Henderson, and I told him in addition, despite any
scruples I might have had, that, since it was a matter of extraordinary
importance, the British Government should find out as quickly as
possible how intransigent the Polish attitude was, so that it might,
circumstances permitting, influence the Polish Government in the
direction of a conference. I thus gave away the key, that is, I showed
that we had the Polish diplomatic code key and thus spoiled for Germany
a real and important source of information. This was a unique step, that
I could justify only by my absolute wish and determination to avert the
conflict at the last moment. I should, therefore, like to read the
appendix to the official dispatch; it is brief and runs: “From the
Polish Government to the Polish Ambassador Lipski in Berlin.” I skip the
first part and read only the following:
“As a particular secret instruction for the Ambassador, he is in
addition informed that he should refrain from conducting
official negotiations under any circumstances. In the event of
oral or written proposals being made by the Reich Government,
please state that you have no plenipotentiary powers to respond
to or discuss them, and that you are empowered only to convey
the above message to that Government and that you must have
further instructions first.”
It is clearly seen from this that the Ambassador was not, as we had been
told, authorized to do anything at all in the other direction, and this
telegram, which the Führer also read, probably indicated to him very
clearly the hopelessness of arriving at an understanding with Poland.
DR. STAHMER: Were these negotiations begun and carried out by you with
the earnest intention of maintaining peace?
GÖRING: If one reads these writings in their context, that can be seen
from this document; but I should not like to rely on the evidence of
this book but on what I have to say here under oath. It was my firm
determination to do everything to settle in a peaceful way this problem
that had arisen. I did not want war; consequently I did everything I
possibly could to avoid it. That has nothing to do with the preparations
which I carried out as a matter of duty in my capacity as a high-ranking
soldier.
DR. STAHMER: A matter was brought up here concerning a flying accident
which might possibly have befallen Mr. Dahlerus. What about this remark?
GÖRING: The witness Dahlerus said at the conclusion of his testimony
that he must correct himself, that he had not received this absurd
information from me, but that this was a conclusion of his because I had
mentioned Ribbentrop’s name shortly before in an entirely different
connection. I had only one concern and that I indicated: Dahlerus flew
in my own plane to London at that time; the tension was already very
acute, and in all states mobilization and a threatened state of war had
been proclaimed. Official air communications had been cut off long
before. So it was possible that under certain circumstances a German
plane flying to London with a courier or, vice versa, a British plane
flying to Berlin at that time might incur danger from our anti-aircraft
batteries or the like, and I wanted to obviate this danger as far as
possible by telephoning Dutch and English authorities, as far as I
remember. This was the only reason for my telling Dahlerus that I hoped
he would arrive and return safely, because in those times an accident
might easily have taken place.
Herr Von Ribbentrop knew nothing whatsoever about the fact that Dahlerus
was being sent. During the whole time I never discussed the matter of
Dahlerus with Herr Von Ribbentrop. Thus he did not know at all that he
was flying, that he went back and forth between me and the British
Government. All that is an absolute concoction.
DR. STAHMER: On 26 September 1939 were you present at the conference
between Dahlerus and Hitler?
GÖRING: Yes.
DR. STAHMER: What did Hitler say then about Poland?
GÖRING: It is correct that he made statements to the effect that a
restoration of Poland as she existed before the outbreak of war could no
longer be considered after the course taken by the battle, but that he
would now, of course, keep the old German provinces that had been taken
in 1918. But even at that time he indicated that the Government General
in Warsaw would not interest him and pointed out very emphatically to
Dahlerus that this was a question which was to be settled chiefly and
decisively by Germany and Russia, and that there could thus be no
question of a unilateral settlement with England because the greater
part of Poland was already occupied by Russia. And these were agreements
that he could no longer make unilaterally with England. That was the
gist of the Führer’s statements.
DR. STAHMER: I have no further questions.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I call your attention to the testimony which you
gave yesterday and ask you if it is correct.
“I think I was Deputy Chairman”—referring to the Reich Defense
Council—“I do not even know, I heard about that, but I assure
you under my oath, that at no time and at no date did I
participate in a single meeting when the Council for the Defense
of the Reich was called together as such.”
Is that a correct transcription of your testimony?
GÖRING: Yes, I said that in no single . . .
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is all. That is all I asked you.
GÖRING: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I ask to have your attention called to Document
Number 3575-PS (Exhibit Number USA-781) which is the minutes of the
Reich Defense Council of 18 November 1938, with you presiding.
I call your attention to the statement that the “meeting consisted
solely of a 3-hour lecture by the Field Marshal. No discussion took
place.”
Is that correct?
[_Document 3575-PS was submitted to the defendant._]
GÖRING: I have to read it first, this is the first time I have seen the
document.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You did not know when you testified yesterday that
we had this document, did you? Would you kindly answer that question?
GÖRING: I have not seen this document before. I have to look at it
first. It says here: “Notes on the session of the Reich Defense Council
on 18 November 1938.”
The Reich Defense Council, as it was described here, comprised few
people. Here there were present, however, all Reich ministers and state
secretaries, also the commanders-in-chief of the Army and the Navy, the
chiefs of the General Staff, of the three branches of the Armed Forces,
Reichsleiter Bormann for the Deputy of the Führer, General Daluege, SS
Gruppenführer Heydrich, the Reich Labor Führer, the Price Commissioner,
the President of the Reich Labor Office, and others.
When I gave my testimony I was thinking only of the Reich Defense
Council as such. This is dealing with the Reich Defense Council within
the framework of a large assembly. Nevertheless, I was not thinking of
that; this concerns, over and beyond the Reich Defense Council, an
assembly that was much larger than that provided for under the Reich
Defense Council.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I call your attention to the fact that the “Field
Marshal stated it to be the task of the Reich Defense Council to
correlate all the forces of the nation for accelerated building up of
German armament.”
Do you find that?
GÖRING: Yes, I have it now.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The second paragraph?
GÖRING: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Under II, “The Physical Task: The assignment is to
raise the level of armament from a current index of 100 to one of 300.”
GÖRING: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: I cannot quite see the reason why it repeatedly happens
that the Defense does not receive documents that are discussed in Court
and that are submitted to the Court. The document now discussed is also
not known to us, at least not to me.
During the last few days I have noticed that several times documents
were suddenly presented by the Prosecution without any effort having
been made to inform us of their existence.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is perfectly true, and I think every lawyer
knows that one of the great questions in this case is credibility, and
that if we have, in cross-examination, to submit every document before
we can refer to it in cross-examination, after we hear their testimony,
the possibilities of useful cross-examination are destroyed.
Now, of course, he did not know; and we have had the experience of
calling document after document to their attention, always to be met
with some explanation, carefully arranged and read here from notes. No
defendant has ever had better opportunity to prepare his case than these
defendants, and I submit that cross-examination of them should not be
destroyed by any requirement that we submit documents in advance.
THE PRESIDENT: Did you wish to say something?
DR. SIEMERS: Yes. I should like to make two points. First, I am entirely
agreed if Mr. Justice Jackson wants to make use of the element of
surprise. I should merely be thankful if the Defense then were also
permitted to use the element of surprise. Yet we have been told
heretofore that we must show every document we want to submit weeks
ahead of time, so that the Prosecution has several weeks to form an
opinion on it.
Secondly, if the element of surprise is being used, I believe that at
least we, as Defense Counsel, should not be given this surprise at the
moment when the document is submitted to the Court and to the witness. I
have at this moment neither today’s documents nor the documents of the
previous days.