territories did you take into consideration whether these measures were
in keeping with the Hague Convention on land warfare?
GÖRING: I scanned through the regulations for land warfare of the Hague
Convention for the first time just before the outbreak of the Polish
conflict. As I read them at that time I regretted that I had not studied
them much more thoroughly at an earlier date. If so I would have told
the Führer that, in view of these Hague Convention regulations for land
warfare, set down paragraph for paragraph, a modern war could not be
waged under any circumstances. One would perforce come into conflict
with conditions laid down in 1906 or 1907, because of the technological
expansion of modern war. Either they would have to be cancelled, or else
modern new viewpoints corresponding to technical developments would have
to be introduced. My reasoning is as follows:
The regulations on land warfare of the Hague Convention, as they now
existed, I had in my opinion studied quite correctly and logically as
regulations for land warfare in 1907. But from 1939 to 1945 there was no
longer merely land warfare but also air warfare, which had not been
taken into consideration here and which in part created an entirely new
situation, and changed the regulations on land warfare of the Hague
Convention in many respects. But that is not so much the decisive point;
rather, modern and total war develops, as I see it, along three lines:
the war of weapons on land, at sea, and in the air; economic war, which
has become an integral part of every modern war; and, third, propaganda
war, which is also an essential part of this warfare.
If one recognizes these principles on the basis of logic, certain
deviations will then result which, according to the letter, may be a
violation of logic, but not according to the spirit. If the regulations
on land warfare of the Hague Convention provide that weapons of the
opponent are to be regarded as booty, as a matter of course, then I must
say that today in a modern war the weapons of the opponent under certain
circumstances have value only as scrap, but that economic goods however,
raw materials, high grade steel, aluminum, copper, lead, and tin, seem
and are much more essential as war booty than obsolete weapons which I
might take from an opponent. But beyond that it is not only a matter of
raw materials, no matter whose property they are. The regulations on
land warfare of the Hague Convention provided at one point—I do not
remember it now—that those things which are necessary can be
confiscated, but against compensation, of course. That is also not the
decisive factor, as one can readily believe. Decisive is, however, the
fact that in this modern war, and in an economic war, which forms the
basis for any further conduct of war, supplies, first of all food, must
be regarded as absolutely necessary for war and must be made available
for use in war, and beyond that raw materials for industry. Moreover
production plants and machinery are also part of economic warfare. If
they have until now served the opponent—be they industries directly or
indirectly contributing to armaments and the conduct of war—they must
now also serve whoever has come into the possession of these means of
production through military decision, even if only temporarily, during
an armistice in occupied territories. In this connection the labor
question naturally also plays a far greater role in economic war than it
did in those former wars which served as examples in the regulations on
land warfare of the Hague Convention. In 1907 the most recent wars, the
Russo-Japanese War, and perhaps the English Boer War, which were,
however, conducted under entirely different circumstances—wars which
practically lay only one decade behind at that time—could serve as an
example of warfare. A war at that time between one army and another, in
which the population was more or less not involved, cannot be compared
with today’s total war, in which everyone, even the child, is drawn into
the experience of war through the introduction of air warfare.
According to my opinion, manpower and thereby the workers and their use
at the moment, are also an integral part of economic war. By that it is
not meant that a worker should be so exploited that he suffers physical
injury, but only that his labor should be fully used.
One of the witnesses mentioned recently what it means to be in an
occupied territory where fighting is still going on, and where one
remains for years, while one, two, three, four, or five new military age
groups are growing up, and if they have no work in their home country
. . .
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, is there any chance that the defendant will
finish by tonight?
DR. STAHMER: This is the last question.
THE PRESIDENT: Please continue.
GÖRING: The question of the deportation of workers had therefore also to
be regarded from this point of view of security. We were obliged to
feed, as far as possible, the entire occupied territory. We also had to
dispose of manpower and, at the same time had to consider the removal
especially of those who had no work in their own country and represented
a danger in the growth of the underground resistance arising against us.
If these age groups were drafted into Germany for work, it was because
of basic considerations of security, in order that they should not be
left idle in their own country—and thus be made available for the work
and the struggle against us—but should be used to our advantage in
economic war.
Thirdly—I want to mention these things just very briefly—in
conclusion, the war of propaganda. At one point in the Indictment it is
also mentioned that we requisitioned radios, which is, to be sure, a
matter of course. For the great importance in propaganda warfare enemy
propaganda had, which extended by way of radio far into the hinterland,
no one has felt more strongly than Germany. All the great dangers of
underground movements, partisan war, the resistance movements and
sabotage, and everything connected with it, and finally also in this
war, this embitterment and this atmosphere, have been called forth to
the extreme by this mutual fight over the radio.
Also whatever happened in the way of atrocities and similar acts, which
should not be tolerated, are in the last analysis, if one thinks about
it calmly, to be attributed primarily to the war of propaganda.
Therefore the regulations on land warfare of the Hague Convention are in
my opinion not an instrument which can be used as a basis for a modern
war, because they do not take into consideration the essential
principles of this war; the war in the air, the economic war, and the
war of propaganda.
And at this point I should like to say the same words which one of our
greatest, most important, and toughest opponents, the British Prime
Minister, Winston Churchill, used: “In the struggle for life and death
there is in the end no legality.”
THE PRESIDENT: The Court will adjourn.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 16 March 1946 at 1000 hours._]
EIGHTY-THIRD DAY
Saturday, 16 March 1946
_Morning Session_
DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, I have purposely deferred one single
question and not yet dealt with it, that is, Göring’s efforts to
maintain peace in the months of July and August 1939, before the
outbreak of the war. I have deferred the question for the following
reasons: Originally, I had intended to call Göring to the witness stand
only after the interrogation of the witness Dahlerus. But because
Dahlerus had not yet arrived, and I wanted to avoid an interruption of
the proceedings, I called Göring first.
I now ask for a decision as to whether I may call Göring back to the
witness stand after the examination of the witness Dahlerus, who in the
meantime has arrived—I consider it expedient in the interest of saving
time, because in my opinion quite a number of questions would thereby
become unnecessary−or, whether I may question him again on this point
after the cross-examination. If that is not possible, I shall deal with
this matter immediately. It seems to me advisable, however, to put this
question after the examination of Dahlerus.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Your Honor, I can help on this point. If the
Tribunal could consider this application without its establishing a
precedent for other cases, I should have no objection, because in the
case of Dahlerus we are to understand that some one will have to go into
the matter in detail as to the events that happened within the last
fortnight. It might well mean a saving of time if that detail were gone
into only once, and it would be rather difficult for Dr. Stahmer to
examine the witness Dahlerus without going into the details. While I
feel strongly with the Tribunal that a defendant should not be recalled
except in the most exceptional circumstances, I think in this case it
might conceivably bring about a shortening of time.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you mean that if the witness Dahlerus were called, it
might obviate the necessity of calling the Defendant Göring in reference
to those events?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It might obviate that necessity, and it would in
any case mean, I should think, that the Defendant Göring would have to
answer only very few questions; but if it were opened up now, it would
be difficult to avoid both witnesses covering the same ground.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal is only concerned with the saving of time,
and as the Tribunal is informed by the defendant’s counsel, Dr. Stahmer,
that it may save time, the Tribunal is prepared to adopt that course,
and to allow the witness Dahlerus to be called before these questions
are put to the Defendant Göring; but it must not be taken as a precedent
for the recalling of any other witnesses.
DR. STAHMER: Thank you, Sirs. Then I have no further questions to ask
the defendant at this time.
DR. NELTE: The Prosecution, in their presentation, have frequently
mentioned the Defendant Keitel in connection with orders, directives,
and so forth. They were always quoted as Keitel orders, Keitel decrees,
and upon this, the Prosecution have based, among other things, their
indictment of the Defendant Keitel. I am anxious to clear up through
questioning you what the position of Field Marshal Keitel was, what
powers and what responsibility he had as Chief of the OKW or in other
official functions. Are you familiar with the decree of 4 February 1938
by which the High Command of the Armed Forces, the OKW, was created and
Field Marshal Keitel appointed Chief of the OKW?
GÖRING: Of course, I am familiar with that decree because I assisted in
the making of the decree in that the Führer discussed with me the entire
reshuffling of 8 February, and the resulting consequences and
organizational changes of his entire staff.
DR. NELTE: Can you remember the diagram which was submitted by the
Prosecution concerning the organization of the German Armed Forces?
GÖRING: Yes, I remember that it was here on the board.
DR. NELTE: I shall have it shown to you.
Do you think the OKW is placed correctly on this diagram?
GÖRING: No, it is not correct. It says on top, “Commander-in-Chief of
the Armed Forces,” then there is a line, and below it says “Chief of the
High Command of the Armed Forces.” From there, indicating a
subordination, lines lead directly to the Commanders-in-Chief of the
Army, the Navy, and the Air Force. That is wrong.
The High Command of the Armed Forces, and also the Chief of the High
Command of the Armed Forces, should not be placed in that manner, but
set separately to one side, that is to say, the three
Commanders-in-Chief of the three branches of the Armed Forces were
immediately subordinate to the Führer, as the Supreme Commander of the
Armed Forces, and in no subordination whatsoever to the High Command of
the Armed Forces, or to the Chief of the High Command of the Armed
Forces.
The Führer at that time, in February, reorganized his entire staff, for
he had in his capacity as head of State the State Chancellery. He made
Meissner, who was then State Secretary, State Minister, and established
the State Chancellery as his administrative office. Thus he, in
collaboration with the records department of the Foreign Office, was in
charge of matters that concerned only the head of State. In his capacity
as Reich Chancellor and chief of the Government, he ruled that his
administrative organism should be the Reich Chancellery, and the State
Secretary of the Reich Chancellery became on the same day Reich Minister
and Chief of the Reich Chancellery. It was the function of this office
to maintain liaison with the ministries and the entire machinery of the
government of the Reich. The function of this minister as an organ of
the Führer, was not the issuing, but the execution of the Führer’s
orders and decrees.
Thirdly, the Führer, as leader of the Party, had the Party Chancellery
of which the Deputy of the Führer, Rudolf Hess, was in charge at that
time and occupied a high position within that organization. After his
leaving, Bormann did not become Deputy of the Führer but Chief of the
Party Chancellery.
Fourthly, there was the Private Chancellery of the Führer, with a
Reichsleiter as Chief.
For military matters, as his military cabinet or military staff—or as
it used to be known in former years, the “Maison Militaire”—the High
Command of the Armed Forces was formed.
This reorganization was necessary, because after the retirement of
Blomberg as Minister of War, no new Minister of War had been appointed,
and the Führer, since as head of State he was in any case
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, was now determined not only
formally to be this Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, but to
execute that function in fact. In consequence, he now needed a staff
organization. This was to be the High Command of the Armed Forces, and
Keitel became Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces.
In Germany the word “chief” in the military sense has a different
meaning from “commander-in-chief.” The responsibility and right to issue
orders rest with the commander or the commander-in-chief. The assistant
in staff administration, in the working out, administering, and
transmitting of orders, and in maintaining liaison, is the actual chief
of the respective staff. Thus, the former Colonel General Keitel, or
General Keitel, was Chief of Staff of the military staff of the
Commander-in-Chief, called the High Command of the Armed Forces. On the
one hand, he had charge of the entire machinery of the staff of the
Commander-in-Chief, as far as military organizational and technical
matters, and military direction, that is to say, strategy, were
concerned, to the extent that the Führer wanted to have his strategic
orders administered from a central point. For this there was established
in the High Command as a purely general staff, strategic department, the
Supreme General Staff.
DR. NELTE: If I understand you correctly, OKW is translated as High
Command of the Armed Forces, but this apparently has been used in
different ways, at one time as the Staff of the High Command of the
Armed Forces—as, for example, when Keitel was called the Chief of the
OKW—and at another time, as the OKW Office of the High Command of the
Armed Forces, in other words, Hitler. Is that right?
GÖRING: That is correct as such, but not very clear. The High Command of
the Armed Forces is the staff of the Supreme Commander of the Armed
Forces, in the same way that I, as Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force
had my General Staff on one hand, and my chief adjutant’s office on the
other—these formed the staff with which I worked. The High Command
constituted for the Führer, as Supreme Commander a similar organization.
The chief of my General Staff likewise could give no direct orders to
the commanders of the air fleets, commanding generals of air corps or
divisions. The orders could only be issued “By command of the
Commander-in-Chief,” signed “I.A.,” that is to say, “Im Auftrag (by
order).”
The chief of a staff, therefore, even the Chief of the High Command of
the Armed Forces, had no command function except to the members of his
immediate office and the few administrative organizations connected with
that staff. An order, command, or directive from the High Command of the
Armed Forces, for instance, to me as Commander-in-Chief of the Air
Force, was only possible when the instruction began in the following
form: “The Führer has ordered . . .” or, “By command of the Führer, I
hereby inform you . . .”
May I express myself quite emphatically: At one time I told Colonel
General Keitel, “I am bound only by orders of the Führer. Only orders in
the original and signed by Adolf Hitler are presented to me personally.
Instructions, directives or orders which start ‘By command of the
Führer,’ or ‘By order of the Führer’ go to my chief of staff who gives
me an oral report indicating the most important points. Whether then—to
put it bluntly—they are signed, ‘By command of the Führer: Keitel,
Colonel General,’ or ‘Meier, Stabsgefreiter’, makes no difference to me.
But if they constitute a direct command from you, an order, which you
want to give me, then save yourself time and paper because both are
meaningless to me. I am Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, and
immediately and exclusively subordinate to the Führer.”
DR. NELTE: Do you know whether Hitler, on the one hand, and the
commanders-in-chief of the branches of the Armed Forces, on the other,
observed these command functions described by you, or whether in other
branches of the Armed Forces the actual procedure was, perhaps,
different?
GÖRING: Whether my two colleagues made it as clear to the Chief of the
High Command as I did, I cannot say; but that the two other
commanders-in-chief did not permit any interference with their rights
and prerogatives is obvious.
DR. NELTE: Does the same apply to Himmler as Chief of the SS?
GÖRING: The SS was never subordinate to the High Command of the Armed
Forces. Within the Armed Forces there was, from the beginning of the
war, the Waffen-SS, divided into divisions and corps. That was purely a
combat unit. Tactically and strategically it was subordinate to those
units of the Army to which it was assigned; in the matter of personnel
and development, it was subordinate to Himmler; and he had nothing to do
with the OKW. Here it might happen that the Chief of the High Command of
the Armed Forces, in questions of armament and organization of the
Waffen-SS, transmitted orders or decrees of the Führer.
On this occasion I should like to correct an error which was made during
Justice Jackson’s examination of Field Marshal Kesselring. Field Marshal
Kesselring spoke of the Waffen-SS, as “Garde Truppe.” Then he was asked,
“Whom did it have to guard?” In applying the word “Garde” we do not
employ it as it has been translated, as “guard,” meaning sentries, but,
as Field Marshal Kesselring intended, a “picked troop”; just as in the
Russian military language there is a “Garde Korps,” and in the old
Imperial Army there was a “Garde Korps,” and also formerly in other
armies. The Waffen-SS during the first years of the war was not to be
regarded as a guard unit, but as a “picked unit” as far as personnel,
_et cetera_, was concerned.
DR. NELTE: I would like to ask you to say something about the official
relationship between Adolf Hitler and Field Marshal Keitel; that is to
say, what official relations had Adolf Hitler in mind when he
established the office of the OKW? I mean, I should like to know what
Keitel was supposed to be and what, subsequently, his official functions
actually were after 1938?
GÖRING: I think that is just what I have been explaining.
DR. NELTE: I wanted to ask you, for instance, was he Hitler’s adviser?
GÖRING: Adviser is a debatable expression. I can let somebody advise me
as to whether or not he thinks it will rain during the coming 3 hours,
when I am riding; but I can also have someone advise me in very
important and decisive questions. That depends on the temperament and
the attitude of the person who wants to be advised, and the one who
wishes to advise.
With the dynamic personality of the Führer, unsolicited advice was not
in order, and one had to be on very good terms with him. That is to say,
one had to have great influence, as I had—and I ask you to understand
me correctly—as I had beyond doubt for many years, in order to come to
him unsolicited, not only with advice, but also with suggestions or even
persistent contradictions. On the other hand, if one were not on these
terms with the Führer, suggestions and advice were curtly brushed aside
whenever he had once made his decisions, or if he would not allow the
would-be adviser to attain that influence or that influential position.
Here I wish to say that the Chief of the High Command of the Armed
Forces, in important and decisive questions certainly was no adviser. In
current, everyday affairs, he was an adviser insofar as he may have
suggested to the Führer here and there that this or that should be said
to the commanders, or that in regard to the movement of troops this or
that should be pointed out. After all, advice from the chief of a
general staff is still more important than advice from the chief of an
organization or a state office. It was this way: In the sphere of
important strategic and tactical decisions the chief responsibility lay
with the adviser on the General Staff, the commanders-in-chief, the
Chief of Staff, and the Führer; in matters of pure strategy and tactics,
more with the chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff; organizational
questions or current developments of the day, with the Chief of the High
Command. Because the Führer himself, as I said before, held several of
the highest offices, he had to limit his signatures. It often took weeks
until one could obtain the necessary signature from the Führer,
especially during the war when he had a tremendous amount of work, so
that the secretaries of the respective state offices were authorized to
sign “by order.” This explains why there was hardly any decree or order
issued by the Führer, that went out signed “By order of” or “By command
of the Führer,” which was not signed by Keitel, who was very
industrious.
DR. NELTE: Wasn’t it a very thankless task that Field Marshal Keitel
had, I mean, thankless insofar as he frequently was in the position of
having to mediate between the various offices which were subordinated to
the Supreme Commander, namely Hitler; to submit their grievances to him,
and to exert himself on behalf of the two parties, helping here and
restraining there?
GÖRING: That again depended very much on the personalities. It goes
without saying that if it came to a clash between the Führer and myself,
or other determined commanders-in-chief, the Chief of the High Command
of the Armed Forces was, I may say, trodden on by both sides. He came
between the millstones of stronger personalities; the one protested that
in speaking to the Führer he had not exerted enough pressure; the
Führer, when Keitel made presentations, turned a deaf ear and said he
would settle matters himself.
The task was certainly a very thankless one and a difficult one. I
remember that once Field Marshal Keitel approached me and asked me
whether I could not arrange for him to be given a front-line command;
that he would be satisfied, though a Field Marshal, with one division if
he could only get away, because he was getting more kicks than ha’pence.
Whether the task was thankless or appreciated was all the same, I
answered him; he had to do his duty where the Führer ordered it.
DR. NELTE: Are you aware that in this connection Field Marshal Keitel
was reproached with not being able to assert himself, as they say, with
the Führer?
GÖRING: This reproach was made against him by quite a number of
commanders-in-chief of armies and army groups. It was easy for them to
make that reproach because they were out of range of Adolf Hitler, and
did not have to submit any proposals themselves. I know that, especially
after the collapse, quite a number of generals adopted the point of view
that Keitel had been a typical “yes-man.” I can only say I personally
should be interested if I could see those who today consider themselves
“no-men.”
DR. NELTE: Was there ever, as far as Hitler was concerned, any
possibility of Field Marshal Keitel getting a release from his office?
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, the Tribunal does not think—at least we
should like to ask you—what relevance does the gossip of the General
Staff or any reproaches which may have been raised against him by it
have to the charges against Keitel? What has that to do with the charges
against Keitel?
DR. NELTE: If one wants to do justice to the Defendant Keitel, that is
to say, if one wants to try to establish what role he has played in this
terrible tragedy, then that is only possible if one establishes clearly
what his function was, and thereby what his legal responsibility was;
and then, if one takes the tactical conditions into consideration . . .
THE PRESIDENT: I know that perfectly well and we have spent
three-quarters of an hour in hearing the Defendant Göring describe what
his relationship was and what Keitel’s function was. What I asked you
was what this had to do with the case, the criticisms or gossip of the
General Staff about Keitel? I say we have spent three-quarters of an
hour in hearing what the Defendant Göring says his function was, and
what his relationships with the Führer were, and nothing else.
DR. NELTE: I began with the organization of the OKW. I wanted to
determine the chain of command between the OKW and the Chief of the OKW,
on the one hand, and the branches of the Armed Forces, on the other; and
then I have tried to clarify the responsibilities which, as Chief of the
OKW, he was to have, according to Hitler’s wishes, and how he carried
these out.
The gossip, Mr. President, was only, I believe, a subject for a few
minutes during the examination of the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: My interruption was made because you asked the defendant
a question about somebody being reproached for something or other by the
members of the General Staff, and that seems to me to be totally
irrelevant.
DR. NELTE: The last question which I put was whether there had been any
possibility of Field Marshal Keitel’s obtaining a release from his
position. May I assume, Mr. President, that this question is relevant?
THE PRESIDENT: You may certainly ask that question as to whether he
asked to be relieved of his command. As a matter of fact, Dr. Nelte,
that question was asked before, the question at which I interrupted you;
and I have the answer written down, that Keitel asked for a command,
even if only of a division.
DR. NELTE: That was the question which he put to Reich Marshal Göring.
He came to him, Göring, and put the question to him. Now I want to ask
whether there existed any possibility of Keitel’s obtaining a release
from his position from Hitler?
GÖRING: The question whether a general could ask for and obtain his
release from the Führer has played an important role in these
proceedings generally. Actually, one has to make a distinction between
two phases, peace and war.
In times of peace a general could ask for his release. Unless he was in
a prominent and definitely important position, and very well known to
the Führer, such a request for release was granted without question. If
he was in an especially important position and well known to the Führer,
then, using all his persuasive powers, with all the means at his
disposal the Führer appealed to him to remain at his post. If, however,
a general had asked the Führer for his release and had given as a reason
that in principle he was of a different political opinion, either
domestic or foreign, then without doubt he was retired, even if not on
that very day. But at the same time it would have given rise to an
extraordinary suspicion on the part of the Führer concerning the person.
During the war, the matter was entirely different. The general, like
every soldier, was obliged to do his duty, to obey orders. The Führer
had issued the statement that he wanted no requests for release, neither
from generals nor any other important state personalities. He himself
would decide if a person were to resign or not. He himself could not
resign if things became unpleasant now, he considered that desertion.
If, in spite of this, a general submitted a request for release in
wartime and this was refused, he certainly could not insist upon it. If
he resigned notwithstanding, he violated the law and from that moment
was guilty of desertion.
Field Marshal Keitel might have asked the Führer, “Have me transferred
to a different office.” But the Führer disliked exceedingly to make any
changes in his immediate circle; and during the war—that I know from
his own words—he would not have agreed to a change, particularly with
regard to Field Marshal Keitel with whom he was used to working, unless
the Field Marshal had become ill and thereby really unable to continue
his duties.
DR. NELTE: Were these considerations of which you have just spoken
likewise the determining factor in the retirement of Field Marshal Von
Brauchitsch?
GÖRING: The case of Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch’s retirement is very
well known to me, because the Führer had discussed it at length with me
beforehand; for at first he was not decided whether he or someone else
should take over the command of the Army. Thus we discussed who should
succeed, and so forth. At that moment the Führer was not satisfied with
the direction of the Army by the commander-in-chief of the Eastern
Front. The commander-in-chief was Brauchitsch; the chief of the Army
General Staff was Halder. I suggested to the Führer that he change the
chief of the Army General Staff, because I thought he was by far the
less capable. The Führer wanted to do that. Then the next morning he had
made up his mind and told me that he, the Führer, would himself assume
this command to bring about order on the Eastern Front, and that
therefore it was more important for him to retire the
Commander-in-Chief, although he agreed with me that the Chief of Staff
was the weaker one. Then I suggested that both be dismissed.
The Führer called Brauchitsch, talked with him for 2 hours and requested
him in a clear way, that is in a way that could not be misunderstood, to
resign.
Thus, in this case, a clear decision was made by the Führer to dismiss
the Commander-in-Chief of the Army in order to assume personally the
command of the Army. From that time on, the Führer was not only Supreme
Commander of the Armed Forces but also _de facto_ Commander-in-Chief of
the Army.
DR. NELTE: The Prosecution has stated and has produced evidence that
Field Marshal Keitel was a member of the Reich Defense Council. You
spoke of this question yesterday. And I can now state that you said that
Field Marshal Keitel was a member of the Reich Defense Council according
to the Reich Defense Law, but that this Reich Defense Council was never
constituted. You ought to know that because you were, according to that
law, chairman of that Reich Defense Council. Is that correct?
GÖRING: I have stated clearly that I never attended a meeting, or called
a meeting.
THE PRESIDENT: You know, do you not, that the Tribunal is directed to
hold an expeditious trial and for that reason they are not going to hear
cumulative evidence? The defendant has already given us an answer to the
question you have just put to him. The Tribunal do not wish to hear the
same answer again.
DR. NELTE: I have not seen yesterday’s transcript yet, and it is of
great importance for the Defendant Keitel . . .
THE PRESIDENT: You were in court and you can take it from me that the
answer was given.
DR. NELTE: The questions and the answers are not always as clear as they
may seem on reading the transcript.
[_Turning to the witness._] Can you tell me whether Field Marshal Keitel
ever was a minister?
GÖRING: He was not a minister. He had only the assimilated rank of a
minister.
DR. NELTE: Was he entitled to participate in Cabinet meetings?
GÖRING: Not by virtue of his positions; but, concerning questions of
interest to him which pertained to his work, he could be invited by the
Führer to attend Cabinet meetings.
DR. NELTE: Keitel was a member of the Ministerial Council for the
Defense of the Reich. Did that make him a minister?
GÖRING: No, he remained the same. He had only the rank of a minister.
Field Marshal Keitel could not attend Cabinet meetings of the Reich
Cabinet because he became Chief of the High Command only in 1938, and
from that time on no Cabinet meetings took place.
DR. NELTE: The Prosecution have also asserted that there was a
triumvirate, consisting of the Plenipotentiary General for Economy, the
Plenipotentiary General for Administration, and the Chief of the OKW.
Can you tell us something about that?
GÖRING: I know nothing about that.
DR. NELTE: The Prosecution have accused Field Marshal Keitel of having
been a political general. Do you know anything about that?
GÖRING: The generals in the Third Reich had no right whatsoever to
participate in any political activity. The only exception in this
respect was myself—and that was due to the peculiar nature of my
position, for I was at the same time a soldier, a general, and on the
other hand, in politics, a politician. The other generals, as the Führer
always very clearly pointed out, had nothing to do with politics.
The general who always most interested himself in politics was the late
Field Marshal Von Reichenau. That was the reason the Führer, in spite of
his personal sympathies and the strongly positive attitude of Reichenau
toward the Nazi Party, refused to make him Commander-in-Chief of the
Army after the resignation of Fritsch; the Führer did not want any
political generals.
DR. NELTE: But it cannot be denied that in the so-called decrees often
the political objective was made known, and that such decrees and orders
were signed by Keitel.
GÖRING: Decrees were principally Führer decrees, because they contained
broad directives. The preamble of an important decree very commonly was
the political premise which explained why the Führer had decided on this
or that military measure. But that has nothing to do with a general
being political.
DR. NELTE: The Prosecution have frequently mentioned that the Defendant
Keitel was present at state receptions, such as that accorded Hacha, and
at other ministerial receptions; from that they have tried to deduce
that he was a political general.
GÖRING: When the Führer, as head of State, received foreign missions,
heads of states, or chiefs of governments, it was customary for the
chiefs of his most important offices to be present; the Chief of the
State Chancellery, frequently of the Reich Chancellery, depending on who
came; and the Chief of the High Command, since, in the conferences,
questions might come up for which the Führer would need military
information of some kind. And then, of course, there was also a certain
amount of ceremony involved. Whenever I had important visitors, my
military staff, or a representative of the staff, were also with me.
DR. NELTE: May I say then that Field Marshal Keitel was present at, but
did not participate in, the conferences?
GÖRING: If he participated, it was not at any rate of any consequence.
DR. NELTE: The Prosecution stated that, on the occasion of the visit of
President Hacha, the Defendant Keitel exerted pressure on President
Hacha by threatening to bomb Prague.
GÖRING: I said yesterday that I made that statement.
DR. NELTE: I just wanted to establish it.
Now I should like further to question you concerning the terror-fliers.
Do you remember that about the middle of June 1944, when negotiations on
this question took place among the various departments, you were waiting
at the Platterhof with Field Marshal Keitel for Hitler, and discussed
this question there?
GÖRING: I cannot say whether that was at the Platterhof. At any rate, I
talked with the Field Marshal many times on the subject.
DR. NELTE: It is important in this connection to establish whether the
Defendant Keitel approached you on this question and stated to you that
he was against the idea of lynch law, which was advocated by the Party.
GÖRING: He said that several times. We were in agreement on this.
DR. NELTE: Did the Defendant Keitel at that time also state to you that
he was in favor of an official warning or a note to the Allied
Governments—in respect to the well-known Dieppe case—rather than
separate court-martial proceedings without legal evidence?
GÖRING: I think we had frequent discussions on this point. I advocated
that in the case of pure terror-fliers—that is to say, those who
violated the orders of their own superiors—there should be legal
proceedings. Keitel said it would be hard to differentiate, and to carry
this out. It would be more practical to send a note to the Allies to the
effect that if it were not stopped, measures would have to be taken. The
view that this course should be adopted was also advocated in other
quarters.
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, when submitting my applications for evidence,
I proposed, among other things, a characterization of Field Marshal
Keitel given to me by Göring. In the session of 25 February an agreement
was reached with the Prosecution that this characterization, which is in
the form of an affidavit, might be submitted in the presence of the
witness, that is, Göring. Am I now permitted to read you this
characterization, of which you have already received the original, or
may I refer to it as evidence and merely put it in? I ask this question
because a part of the description which is contained in the affidavit
has already been given by this witness in this interrogation.
THE PRESIDENT: What is the document that you are referring to? What is
the origin of it? Is it a document drawn up by the Defendant Göring?
DR. NELTE: It is an affidavit signed by Göring, entitled,
“Characteristics of Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel.” It is referred to in
my applications as an affidavit. Much of what is contained in it has
already been said by Reich Marshal Göring.
THE PRESIDENT: The Defendant Göring is giving evidence under oath.
Therefore, nothing in the shape of an affidavit ought to be put in. If
you have any questions to ask him which he has not already answered,
about the Defendant Keitel, you may ask them now. It is inappropriate to
put in a written, sworn statement when you have a defendant giving
evidence under oath.
DR. NELTE: In the session of 25 February 1946 this was approved, for the
reason that it would shorten the proceedings if an affidavit were to be
read and the witness were then to state: “That is correct.” I have a
copy here of the transcript of that session, should the Tribunal not
recall.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: May it please the Tribunal, I should not care to
object to this upon the ground that it is written, because I think there
are occasions when the writing out of the testimony of a witness might
be more expeditious than their examination.
I object to it on the ground that it does not get us anywhere when you
include it. It starts off: “Keitel gives the impression of a military
man, an officer of the old school.” That is not testimony that gets us
anywhere. I admit that statement; he always impressed me that way. His
philosophy is dominated in the main by militaristic ideas and concepts.
Let Keitel give us a description of himself, if we must have one. I
think an examination of this affidavit will show that it consists of
matter that has been covered, or of matter on which another witness
never ought to be interrogated. I object to it upon the ground that it
has no probative value.
THE PRESIDENT: As you are aware, Dr. Nelte, any decision which the
Tribunal made about documents was expressly made provisionally and with
the condition that the decision about the relevancy of the document
should be made when the document was produced. If the document had been
produced before the Tribunal, they would have been able to look at it.
They have not seen the document.
The document appears, as Mr. Justice Jackson says, to be not a document
which has any evidential value at all, and as the defendant is at
present giving evidence under oath, the Tribunal will not look at the
document.
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, as the Tribunal have examined this document
and found that it is irrelevant, I accept that decision. But it seems to
me that the Tribunal . . .
THE PRESIDENT: We are not preventing you from asking any questions of
the witness which may be relevant, but we do not desire to read another
document from the same person who is giving testimony.
DR. NELTE: I shall omit this affidavit.
DR. THOMA: Rosenberg was chief of the Office of Foreign Affairs of the
NSDAP until 1940. Did he in this capacity, or otherwise personally, have
an influence on Hitler’s decisions concerning foreign policy?
GÖRING: I believe that the Party’s Central Department for Foreign Policy
after the seizure of power was never once consulted by the Führer on
questions of foreign policy. It was established earlier only so that
certain questions on foreign policy which arose within the Party could
be dealt with centrally. I am not informed in detail about the methods
of that office. As far as I know Rosenberg was certainly not consulted
on questions of foreign policy after the accession to power.
DR. THOMA: Therefore, you do not know any details as to whether
Rosenberg had a certain influence on Hitler in the Norwegian question?
GÖRING: That I do not know. I stated yesterday what I know concerning
the question of Quisling and also of Rosenberg.
DR. THOMA: When you were Prime Minister did Rosenberg become conspicuous
to you as advocating the political or police persecution of the Church?
GÖRING: He could not advocate the persecution of the Church by the
police, because he had nothing to do with the police, and I would not
have permitted any interference by him.
DR. THOMA: Do you know whether Rosenberg urged you to evacuate the Jews
to Lublin, among other places?
GÖRING: Rosenberg did not speak to me about that.
DR. THOMA: Did Hitler express to you his satisfaction that Rosenberg had
not raised any objection to the Non-Aggression Pact with the Soviet
Union, concluded at that time?
GÖRING: One cannot exactly say that Hitler expressed his satisfaction.
If Rosenberg had raised any objection, Hitler would probably have
expressed his dissatisfaction in a very unmistakable manner; but he did
state that Rosenberg, too, had apparently understood this political
step.
DR. THOMA: Did Rosenberg, as Minister for the Occupied Eastern
Territories, have any influence on the allocation of labor? Was he in a
specific position to prevent the employment of the eastern peoples?
GÖRING: A certain co-operation with regard to the employment program
must have existed between the offices of Rosenberg and Sauckel, but
certainly not in the sense that Rosenberg could have prohibited the
recruiting of eastern workers in contradiction to the Führer’s order.
DR. THOMA: It is known to you that Rosenberg repeatedly made
representations to the Führer on behalf of a cultural betterment of the
eastern European peoples, especially the Ukrainians?
GÖRING: I was present once when Rosenberg spoke about the varying
treatment of the Occupied Eastern Territories, of the peoples living
there, and their cultural care. As far as I can recall—or better
said—I especially recall that the conversation dealt with the
establishment or the continuation of a university in Kiev. The Führer
agreed with him in his presence, I believe, but when he had gone, the
Führer said to me: “That man, too, has his particular worries. We have
more important things to take care of now than universities in Kiev.”
That I do remember.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps we had better adjourn now for 10 minutes.
[_A recess was taken._]
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter; one moment. I want to speak to Dr. Nelte
first.
Dr. Nelte, in view of your application with reference to this document
which is called “Characteristics of General Field Marshal Wilhelm
Keitel,” the Tribunal have investigated that matter and have referred to
Page 4987 of the shorthand notes (Volume VIII, Page 233), which possibly
you may have had in mind; but you seem to have failed to notice that
this very document, “Characteristics of Keitel,” was denied in the order
of the Tribunal in Paragraph 2, which contains the decision of the
Tribunal after the argument in court, and which is set out on that page
of the shorthand notes to which I have referred. Therefore, in the
opinion of the Tribunal you have no right to offer that document which
the Tribunal have already denied.
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, I have not the entire notes of the session
before me. But I know that this affidavit was refused with the
explanation that, in case the witness can be called, an affidavit is not
to be submitted, and that is the case here.
Thereupon, Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, in quoting this particular document
number of my document book, stated the following: “The Tribunal may
perhaps remember that in the case of the witness Dr. Blaha, my friend,
Mr. Dodd, adopted the practice of asking the witness. . . .” And this
affidavit belongs to this document.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, I am quite aware of that and I have already
referred you to the exact page of the transcript which I have consulted.
But defendants’ counsel must be perfectly well aware that the Tribunal
have given no decision in open court upon these applications for
witnesses and documents, and the Tribunal made it perfectly clear that
they would afterwards consider the applications that had been made. In
each case a written order, which was perfectly clear, has been issued to
the defendants’ counsel, setting out the witnesses who are allowed, the
witnesses who are denied, interrogatories that are allowed, and the
interrogatories that are denied, the documents that were allowed and the
documents which had been denied. In Paragraph 2 of the order is “The
Characteristics of Keitel.” Therefore, in the opinion of the Tribunal
that document should never have been offered. That is all.
DR. NELTE: I tried to explain why I assumed that, in spite of the
refusal of the affidavit, the material of the affidavit could be used in
the interrogation of the witness.
DR. FRITZ SAUTER (Counsel for Defendants Funk and Schirach): I request
permission to put the following questions, on behalf of the Defendant
Funk.
[_Turning to the witness._] The Defendant Funk joined the Party in the
summer of 1931. At that time, as you know, he was the editor-in-chief of
the _Berliner Börsenzeitung_. Is it known to you that in this capacity
he enjoyed a particular prestige with the press and in German economic
circles?
GÖRING: I know that at that time Funk and his economic articles in the
_Börsenzeitung_ were highly thought of and that he had many connections
in economic circles.
DR. SAUTER: We have heard that the Defendant Funk is accused of having
promoted the coming to power of the Party through his activities, and I
would be interested in hearing from you whether Funk, before the coming
to power of the Party, played any role whatsoever in the Party; or is it
correct to say that after resigning as editor-in-chief of the _Berliner
Börsenzeitung_ he brought out a so-called economic-political information
service, not for the Party, but for all economic circles, including the
German People’s Party?
GÖRING: May I request that the question be put perhaps more precisely;
this is a whole narration. But I can reply briefly. Before the seizure
of power I was acquainted only with Funk’s activity as editor of the
_Börsenzeitung_, which I have already mentioned. And as such I heard him
repeatedly mentioned in economic circles. Only after the seizure did I
hear at all of Funk’s having been in the Party and of his relationship
with it. Thus, his Party activity could not have been of such tremendous
significance or he would have come to my attention in some way. So far
as his information service is concerned, whether he favored the
Democrats or the People’s Party, I know nothing about that.
DR. SAUTER: Then after the seizure of power, Funk became Press Chief of
the Reich Government. That is known to you?
GÖRING: Yes.
DR. SAUTER: Then subsequently he became State Secretary in the Reich
Propaganda Ministry. That is also known to you?
GÖRING: Yes.
DR. SAUTER: Now I would be interested to know what his work was as Press
Chief of the Reich Government. Had Funk in this work any influence on
the decisions of the Reich Cabinet?
GÖRING: I am well acquainted with the circumstances of Funk’s
appointment as Reich Press Chief. After the Reich Cabinet had been sworn
in, the new Reich Press Chief was to be appointed. We were in a room of
the Kaiserhof Hotel, and the Führer did not want anyone from the press
organization who was a full Party member, but someone who had had some
previous press experience yet had not been so prominent in the Party or
bound to it. I do not know exactly who mentioned the name of Funk. But I
do know that he then said, “Good!”
Funk was summoned, and I believe that it was a great surprise for him. I
had that impression. The Reich Press Chief had at the time, when
Hindenburg was still Reich President . . .
[_There was a pause in the proceedings._]
THE PRESIDENT: You may go on now.
DR. SAUTER: I would like to repeat the question because it was not
coming through. My question was to this effect: At the time that the
Defendant Funk was Press Chief in the Reich Government, that is, after
the seizure of power, had he any influence at all on the decisions of
the Reich Cabinet?
GÖRING: The Reich Press Chief had no influence of any sort on the
decisions of the Reich Cabinet, for his task was of a different nature.
DR. SAUTER: Then Funk became State Secretary in the Propaganda Ministry.
Here I am interested to know from you whether he, while exercising this
office, was prominent in any way so far as propaganda or press policies
were concerned and what his tasks were at that time in the ministry,
according to your knowledge of the conditions?
GÖRING: He became State Secretary because the Propaganda Ministry took
over as its main function the press and the handling of press matters.
Purely propaganda activities were carried on from the beginning by
Goebbels himself, who was at the same time Propaganda Chief of the
Party. Funk was appointed chiefly to organize the ministry as such, and
in particular to handle economic matters of the press, that is, the
acquisition of press organs, by purchase, subsidy, _et cetera_. His
specialized knowledge was mainly utilized in this field.
DR. SAUTER: Then, when Dr. Schacht retired from his offices in November
1937, Funk became his successor as Reich Minister for Economics. The
appointment took place in November 1937, but he took over the Ministry
only in February 1938. Can you tell us why that was so, and who directed
the Ministry of Economics in the interim?
GÖRING: In discussing the Four Year Plan I explained that after the
resignation of Schacht, I personally directed the Ministry from November
1937 to February 1938, as far as I remember, although Funk had already
been designated. I did this in order to integrate again into the
Ministry of Economics the economic agencies outside the Ministry which
were involved in the Four Year Plan. By freeing myself of this burden I
was able to administer my directives with the Ministry as such.
DR. SAUTER: A similar situation seems to have existed for the
Plenipotentiary General for Economics, Dr. Schacht, if I may again point
this out, retired from this office at the same time as from the Ministry
of Economics, in November 1937. Funk was appointed his successor, as
Plenipotentiary for Economics, however, only in 1938. What is the reason
for that?
GÖRING: He was appointed Plenipotentiary General only in 1938 due to the
fact that it was only in 1938 that he actually took over the Ministry of
Economics. According to an old regulation, the Plenipotentiary General
for Economics was identical with the Reich Minister of Economics. But at
this time, during the last part of Schacht’s term of office, that was
just a matter of form, as I have already said; for I explained that from
the minute when I actually took over the Four Year Plan, I personally
was _de facto_ the Plenipotentiary General for Economics.
I suggested that this office be abolished, but, as is often the case,
some things remain purely for reasons of prestige, things which no
longer have any real significance. The Delegate for the Four Year Plan
was the sole Plenipotentiary General for the entire German economy.
Since there could not be two such men, the other existed only on paper.
DR. SAUTER: The consequence was, if I may draw this conclusion—and I
ask you to reply to this—that Dr. Funk in his capacity of
Plenipotentiary General for Economics as well as President of the Reich
Bank was entirely subordinate to your directives as head of the Four
Year Plan. Is that correct?
GÖRING: Naturally, according to the plenary powers that were given me,
he had to comply with my economic directives as far as the Ministry of
Economics and the Reich Bank were concerned. That was a reason for the
change, because I could not follow this procedure with Schacht, but from
the beginning, Funk adopted an irreproachable attitude toward me in this
respect. The directions or the economic policy which the Reich Minister
of Economics and Reich Bank President Funk carried out are fully and
entirely my exclusive responsibility.
DR. SAUTER: Perhaps you remember a birthday letter which the Defendant
Funk wrote to Hitler about a week before the Polish campaign, I believe
on 25 August, in which he thanked the Führer for something or other. In
this letter Funk stated that he had prepared and executed certain
measures which, in the case of a war, would be necessary in the field of
civilian economy and finance. You will remember this letter, and it has
been read already.
GÖRING: Yes.
DR. SAUTER: Do you remember when you gave Funk these special duties? The
letter is dated, I believe 25 August 1939, if I may mention this again.
And when did you give this task and these directions to the Defendant
Funk?
GÖRING: Just as military mobilization, or rather mobilization
preparations have to be kept up to date and have to keep pace with the
political situation—whether it be tense or relaxed, or when it
changes—economic matters also, as I mentioned in my concluding remarks
yesterday, have to keep pace in the same way.
Thus, I ordered thorough preparations for mobilization in this field
also. In the matters of foreign exchange and finance it was the duty of
the president of the Reich Bank, as of the Reich Economics Ministry, in
economic matters to make all preparations which would put me in the
position, in the event of war, of having the utmost security for the
German people in the economic field as well. At what time exactly I
ordered this I cannot tell you, for it was a general basic directive
which was always in effect.
DR. SAUTER: What powers did Funk have in the issuing of regulations, _et
cetera_, for the economic administration in the occupied territories?
GÖRING: I can no longer remember in detail now. The general directive he
received from me. How far and to whom he, proceeding from this
directive, issued departmental instructions in his special field in the
occupied territory, I cannot say in detail; but they always resulted
from my personal responsibility.
DR. SAUTER: Is it correct that the Four Year Plan in the occupied
territories had special plenipotentiaries and departments, to the
exclusion of Funk, for carrying out your directives?
GÖRING: In some areas of the occupied territory this was the case. In
other areas I made use of the departments existing there; and if I
considered it necessary I gave directives to the Economics Ministry also
to have this or that done with regard to the occupied territories.
DR. SAUTER: Then during the war the Ministry of Armaments was created, I
believe in the spring of 1940. Is it correct that in the course of the
war to an ever increasing degree, the authority of the Reich Ministry of
Economics and, in the end, the entire civilian production also were
transferred to that ministry, so that finally the Ministry of Economics
remained as a commerce ministry only?
GÖRING: At my suggestion, my urgent suggestion, the Führer created a
Ministry of Munitions under the then Minister Todt. This strictly
munitions ministry became, in the course of further developments, the
Armaments Ministry under Minister Speer, and gradually more and more
tasks were transferred to it. As armament was the focus of the whole
economy and everything else in economy had to be brought exclusively
into this focus, a number of tasks of the Ministry of Economics were
transferred to the Ministry of Armaments, in particular the whole of
production. It is correct that in the end the Ministry of Economics, by
and large, was left a hollow shell retaining only very subordinate
departments.
DR. SAUTER: Now, I have a final question regarding the Defendant Funk.
It is a question in connection with the matter of the Central Planning
Board, that is, concerning the matter of foreign workers. I would be
interested to learn whether you know, Witness, that Funk was called to
attend the meetings of this Central Planning Board for the first time at
the end of November 1943, and never before that time? Is that known to
you?
GÖRING: I know of the Central Planning Board. I never interfered in
their internal matters. I cannot state exactly when Funk was called to
this board. With the recruiting of foreign workers, however, he had
nothing to do.
DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, if you will permit me, I have a few brief
questions on behalf of the Defendant Schirach.
[_Turning to the witness._] Do you know whether the so-called “Flying
HJ,” a subdivision of the Hitler Youth, ever received flying training?
GÖRING: The Flying HJ pursued the sport of gliding exclusively. After
this training was completed, these men were taken into the National
Socialist Flier Corps, the former Reich Air Sports League, and there
continued their training in aircraft flying.
DR. SAUTER: Then another question: Did any conferences take place
between you and the Defendant Schirach, especially while he was Reich
Youth Leader, which were concerned with the question of military
training, or pre-military training of youth in flying? Did such
conferences take place or not?
GÖRING: Whether we discussed these matters occasionally I do not know.
There was no need for official conferences, because the situation was
entirely clear. The Flying Hitler Youth were interested in gliding, and
after they had received preliminary training they were taken into the
flying corps.
DR. SAUTER: Do you recall the chart we were shown on the wall
representing the organization of the Reich Cabinet? In the lower part,
below the remark “other participants in Cabinet meetings,” this chart
showed the name of the Defendant Schirach along with Bohle, Popitz,
Dietrich, and Gerecke. For that reason I would like now to put the
following question to you: Was Schirach ever a member of the Reich
Cabinet, or what functions or rights did he have in this connection?
GÖRING: The Reich Cabinet as such consisted solely of the Reich
Ministers. We differentiated between two kinds of sessions, Cabinet
sessions and Ministerial Council sessions.
The Cabinet sessions were normally attended by the ministers and their
state secretaries. In some cases when special subjects were to be
discussed, ministerial directors, or higher officials of the ministries
concerned, could be called in for a short report. Then there were the
so-called highest Reich posts. The Reich Youth Leadership was also one
of these. If, therefore, legislation affecting the Reich Youth
Leadership was to be discussed by the Cabinet, and Schirach learned
about it, he could, by virtue of his position as Reich Youth Leader,
request to be called to this meeting. On the same basis the Chief of the
Reich Chancellery could order him to attend such a meeting. These
representatives never attended the other regular Cabinet sessions. I
believe I attended almost all sessions and, as far as I know, Schirach
was never present.
In contrast to that were the Ministerial Council sessions to which only
Reich ministers were admitted and no one else.
DR. SAUTER: I come now to the period after the fall of Mussolini, when
Badoglio took over the government in Italy. Do you recall, Witness, that
at that time the Defendant Von Schirach sent a wire with certain
suggestions to you?
GÖRING: Yes.
DR. SAUTER: What did he suggest and what did he want to accomplish?
GÖRING: He suggested that I should tell the Führer to make a change in
the Foreign Office immediately and to replace Ribbentrop with Von Papen.
DR. SAUTER: Then, a last question on behalf of the Defendant Schirach.
Do you recall another letter which the Defendant Schirach wrote, as far
as I know, in the spring of 1943? This was a letter occasioned by one
from Bormann and, so that you will know just which letter I mean, I
shall briefly explain the connection. Bormann at that time dispatched
letters, as a formality, to all Gauleiter, according to which the
Gauleiter were to report whether they had any ties with foreign
countries. Schirach was well aware at the time that this letter was
meant solely for him, for the other Gauleiter had no relatives in
foreign countries. Schirach wrote a letter which, as far as I know, you
read. And thereupon you are supposed to have intervened on behalf of
Schirach. Please tell us what kind of letter it was, what was the danger
threatening Schirach, and what you and others did to avert this danger?
GÖRING: I must correct that, and I am fully acquainted with this
incident. This letter of Bormann’s was not directed to the Gauleiter to
establish whether they personally had connections abroad. Bormann sent,
by order of the Führer, a letter to all Gauleiter, and it was not a _pro
forma_ letter intended solely for Gauleiter Schirach, but was intended
for all. They were to check the political leaders within their
jurisdiction to establish whether any of their co-workers or any
political leader subordinate to them had family ties or connections
abroad, especially in enemy countries, whereby the individual affected
might, in some circumstances, have a conflict of conscience or might be
of questionable reliability. That was a general directive of the Führer,
which also applied to the Officer Corps and not solely to the case of
Schirach. I was at headquarters when Schirach’s letter arrived and
Bormann gave it to the Führer. Schirach replied that, before he could
take any steps in this matter with regard to his collaborators or
subordinates, he needed some clarification by the Führer as far as his
own person was concerned. He went on to describe in brief, in his
letter, his family ties in the United States of America, on his mother’s
side, and also mentioned in this letter that his connection with his
relatives abroad was a very cordial one and asked whether, under these
circumstances, it was still possible for the Führer to retain him in his
position as Gauleiter. At that time the Führer had not been kindly
disposed to Von Schirach for several months and had repeatedly
considered withdrawing him from office. He said on this occasion—and
that is how I came into possession of this letter, for he handed it to
me: “Schirach seems to plan for his future protection. I have a certain
suspicion.” Then, in the presence of Bormann, I told the Führer very
clearly and definitely that this was entirely unfounded; that I could
not understand his attitude toward Schirach, and that Schirach had done
the only possible and decent thing when, before dismissing any of his
collaborators or subordinates for such reasons, he demanded the
clarification of his own position, since his connections were known; and
that, in my opinion, this letter had no other purpose.
DR. SAUTER: Then, however, in connection with this letter, a rather
strange suggestion seems to have been made by someone for further action
against Schirach?
GÖRING: I know that Bormann and Himmler were opposed to Schirach.
Whether they wanted to give this letter an entirely different
interpretation in order to induce the Führer to recall Schirach and
eliminate him, and how far Himmler’s suggestion went, whether protective
custody was considered, I do not know. But I heard about these things
from other sources later on.
DR. SAUTER: Your Honor, I have no further questions.
FLOTTENRICHTER OTTO KRANZBÜHLER (Counsel for Defendant Dönitz): Reich
Marshal, when did you become acquainted with Admiral Dönitz?
GÖRING: I met Admiral Dönitz for the first time in his capacity as
Admiral and Commander of U-boats during the war, as far as I remember in
1940, at a conference in my special train, in France, I believe.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was the conference concerned with military
or political questions?
GÖRING: Purely military questions, namely, as to how far now and in the
future the Air Force could provide reconnaissance for U-boats in the
Atlantic. The then Admiral Dönitz complained that the reconnaissance was
too weak and urgently requested me to strengthen it and, as far as I
remember, to have it extended to as far as 30 degrees.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did you have further conferences with
Admiral Dönitz before his promotion to Commander-in-Chief in 1943?
GÖRING: No.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did you as Commander-in-Chief of the Air
Force use so-called emergency seaplanes for the rescue of fliers shot
down in the Channel?
GÖRING: There were several squadrons of emergency seaplanes assigned to
the Channel for the rescue of fliers shot down, both German and enemy
fliers, as the order clearly proves.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What did these planes look like?
GÖRING: These planes were, as far as I remember, marked with the Red
Cross.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Were they armed?
GÖRING: Not at first.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: And how were these emergency planes treated
by the British?
GÖRING: There were some instances where they were not molested, but
there were a number of cases in which they were shot down while they
were engaged in rescue actions. Since these cases became predominant, I
said it would be more expedient not to use the Red Cross markings any
longer, to have these planes armed and thus try to rescue our comrades
from the sea. We had tremendous losses in these emergency sea squadrons.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did you have lifebuoys anchored in the
Channel for shot-down fliers?
GÖRING: Quite a number of lifebuoys were anchored, to which ropes were
attached and to which fliers who had been shot down could cling. The
lifebuoys were also equipped with foodstuff, drinking water, life-saving
jackets, lifebelts, and the like. Besides these small lifebuoys there
were larger ones in the form of small rafts which the fliers could
board. There also food, drink, first-aid kits, blankets, and the like,
were to be found.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: How were these lifebuoys treated by the
British?
GÖRING: In different ways. Some remained, others were destroyed.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I have no further questions.
DR. EXNER: Is it known to you that particularly in 1942 a severe
conflict arose between the Führer and Colonel General Jodl?
GÖRING: Yes.
DR. EXNER: Is it known to you that at that time Jodl was even to be
relieved?
GÖRING: The conflict arose from the Caucasus crisis. The Führer blamed
General Jodl for the fact that no concentrated forces had been used to
press forward in the direction of Tuapse; but that battalions of
mountain troops had been marched from the valleys over the mountain
chain of the Elbrus, which the Führer thought was senseless. At that
time, as far as I remember, Jodl pointed out to him that this matter had
been discussed with, and approved by him. The Führer severely criticized
the commander who was in charge of this sector. Jodl defended him on
those grounds, and this led to extremely strained relations. The Führer
mentioned to me that he wanted to relieve Jodl. The tension was so
strong that from this moment on, as far as I remember, the Führer
withdrew from the Officers Club jointly used by both his Operations
Staff and High Command, and even took his meals alone. For quite some
time, for several months, he refused to shake hands with this gentleman.
This illustration is just to show you how great the tension was at that
time.
As successor to Jodl, Paulus was already selected; the Führer had
special confidence in him. Just why this change did not materialize, I
do not know exactly. I assume that here again, despite all tension, the
decisive factor for the Führer was that it was extremely hard for him to
get used to new faces, and that he did not like to make any changes in
his entourage. He preferred to continue working with men of his
entourage whom he did not like rather than change them.
In the course of the years, however, his confidence in Jodl’s tactical
ability increased again considerably; he had complete confidence in his
tactical capacity. The personal relations of both gentlemen were never
very close.
DR. EXNER: Is it known to you that, particularly in 1945, withdrawal
from the Geneva Convention was being considered? Do you know what
attitude Jodl took at that time?
GÖRING: It may have been February 1945, when Minister Goebbels made this
proposal to the Führer. This proposal met with the utmost opposition by
all of us. In spite of that the Führer reverted to it again and again,
and for days was inclined to withdraw from this Convention. The reason
given was, oddly enough, that there were too many deserters in the west
and that the troops were inclined to surrender too easily. The Führer
was of the opinion that if the troops knew that in captivity they were
no longer protected by the Geneva Convention, they would fight harder
and would not react to the extensive enemy propaganda telling them how
well they would be treated if they stopped fighting. The united efforts,
in which, of course, Jodl participated, succeeded in dissuading the
Führer with the argument that this action would cause great disturbance
among the German people and anxiety for their relatives in captivity.
DR. EXNER: One more question. Before the Norwegian campaign, Jodl
entered in his diary—it has been mentioned here before: “The Führer is
looking for a pretense.” But that is incorrect. The original reads: “for
a basis.” Now, to what extent did the Führer look for a basis at that
time?
GÖRING: I remember this point also very well and therefore, I can state
under oath that the use of the word “basis” or “pretense” is entirely
out of place here. The case was as follows:
The Führer knew exactly, and we knew as well, and had rather extensive
intelligence and reliable reports to the effect that Norway was to be
occupied by the Allies, England and France. I mentioned this the other
day. In order to prevent this, the Führer wanted to act first. He spoke
about the fact, that for us the basis of an Anglo-French attack was
clear, but that we had not sufficient proof for the outside world.
Hitler explained that he was still trying to get evidence. It would have
been better if Jodl had written, not that the Führer was still looking
for a basis, but—according to what the Führer meant—that the Führer
was still looking for conclusive evidence for the outside world.
Evidence as such we had. This was one thing. The second was that
generally, for such steps the Foreign Office had to execute the
necessary preparatory work including the drafting of notes. In the case
of Norway, however, the Führer advised the Foreign Office only, I
believe, 24 or 48 hours in advance. He did not want to inform it at all
at that time because he kept the entire plan extremely secret. I
remember that I, as Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, was informed of
this plan at a very late date. This secrecy was the second reason why he
himself was concerned with finding a basis for the attack. These were
the two reasons. I would like to state again that it would have been
expressed much more clearly if he had said that the Führer was looking
for evidence, rather than for a basis.
DR. EXNER: If I understand correctly, you mean evidence showing that the
British had the intention of occupying Norway?
GÖRING: We had the report, but the final written evidence we received
only later.
DR. EXNER: The Führer had no doubt about this?
GÖRING: Not for a moment, none of us had any doubt about it. We received
the evidence later.
DR. EGON KUBUSCHOK (Counsel for Defendant Von Papen): Is it correct that
Hitler authorized you to conduct all negotiations for the purpose of
forming a government under Hitler as it emerged on 30 January 1933, that
is, that you alone were commissioned to do this?
GÖRING: That is correct. I stated this the other day.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Is it correct that you talked about the formation of a
government with Von Papen for the first time in January 1933?
GÖRING: I talked with Papen for the first time on a Sunday, 8 days prior
to the formation of the Government, in Ribbentrop’s home.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: If then, Papen had carried on negotiations concerning the
formation of a government between 4 January, the day of the meeting with
Hitler in the home of Baron Schröder, and 22 January, he would have had
to do this through you, and you would have known it.
GÖRING: That is correct, because the Führer was in Munich at that time
and I was the sole authority in Berlin for the formation of this
government. Besides, it was not at all obvious at the beginning of
January that within a reasonable length of time we should have to form
such a government. Other negotiations were taking place which had
nothing to do with Herr Von Papen.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did the formation of a new government in the middle of
January become inevitable for Hindenburg because Schleicher had no
parliamentary backing and his efforts to receive such backing, by
negotiations with Gregor Strasser to split the NSDAP were frustrated?
GÖRING: I believe I have said already in a general way that Schleicher
did not receive a parliamentary majority and his attempt at splitting
the parties failed for the reason that the Führer immediately eliminated
Strasser, who actually had no following among the deputies. Since
Schleicher’s attempts to get a majority failed, he had to govern without
parliament, and that he could do only with extraordinary powers from
Hindenburg. Since he had told him previously that he would be able to
get a majority, the Reich President refused his demand for extraordinary
powers, such as held by the previous Cabinet of Papen, and then decided
to do what I stated here the other day.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Is it correct that Von Papen gave up to you the prime
ministership of Prussia on 20 April 1933, because in the elections for
the Prussian Landtag of March 1933 the NSDAP had obtained a clear
majority in Prussia, and the Landtag therefore intended to elect you
prime minister?
GÖRING: It is not entirely correct, for the Prussian Landtag did not
have to elect a prime minister at that time. But the fact that the NSDAP
had the absolute majority, induced Von Papen, in connection with my
conferences in Munich, to approach the Führer on his own initiative,
stating that he would agree to turn over to me the Prussian prime
ministership.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: One last question: You mentioned yesterday that you as
the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force granted many reprieves to people
in Belgium and France who were sentenced for their resistance. Is it
correct that Von Papen on various occasions conveyed to you wishes of
relatives of those who had been sentenced; and that he did this for the
reason that, in the interest of a later solidarity of the peoples, he
did not wish that in such sentences, even if they were militarily
justified, an impersonal attitude should develop, and that you complied
with the wishes of Von Papen?
GÖRING: I merely remember that on occasions—I remember one case
especially, for a prominent name was involved—I received a request from
Herr Von Papen, as to whether the person concerned could not be granted
a reprieve. It concerned people sentenced because they had assisted
enemy airmen to escape. In this case I complied to a large extent with
the request of Herr Von Papen. I am no longer quite conversant with the
reasons.
DR. WALTER BALLAS (Counsel for Defendant Seyss-Inquart): I ask the
Tribunal to permit me to put a few questions to the witness Göring. They
concern the well-known telephone conversations of 11 March 1938, between
Berlin and Vienna.
[_Turning to the witness._] Is it correct, that Dr. Seyss-Inquart, when
he was appointed Austrian State Councillor in June of 1937, visited you
in Berlin accompanied by State Secretary Keppler?
GÖRING: The date, I do not remember; the visit, yes.
DR. BALLAS: Did Dr. Seyss-Inquart, at that time, express the idea that
the Austrian National Socialists should be made entirely independent of
the Reich Party?
GÖRING: Wishes of that nature were discussed by him because he wanted as
little friction as possible in his work in the cabinet.
DR. BALLAS: At that time he further mentioned—and I would like you to
answer, whether it is correct—that the National Socialists were to be
given permission to be active in Austria, in order to establish as close
a relationship between Austria and Germany as possible within the
framework of an independent Austria.
GÖRING: As far as Party matters are concerned, I do not remember exactly
what was discussed. The scheme of keeping Austria independent in its
collaboration with Germany was repeatedly advocated by Seyss-Inquart,
and I have recently outlined it. It seemed to me personally not
extensive enough. Just because I knew this attitude of Seyss-Inquart, I
must say frankly that I was a little distrustful of his attitude on the
11th and 12th of March, and therefore on the late afternoon that these
telephone conversations took place, I sent Keppler to Vienna, so that,
as regards the annexation, matters would take their proper course. I
would rather have sent someone else, because Herr Keppler was too weak
for me; but the Führer’s desire in this case was that, if anyone was to
be sent, it should be Keppler.
DR. BALLAS: Is it correct that Dr. Seyss-Inquart explained his attitude
by pointing out the advantage of having German interests represented by
two States?
GÖRING: It is absolutely correct that he said that. I answered that I
was of a completely different opinion; that I would prefer having German
interests represented by one state, which could act more energetically
than two, as the second might not synchronize.
DR. BALLAS: Did you on 11 March 1938, or on the previous day, have
another telephonic or other communication with Seyss-Inquart?
GÖRING: As far as I recall, but I cannot say with certainty, I believe I
did, on the previous Sunday. That is, these telephone conversations were
on the 11th, a Friday; on the Monday or Tuesday before I questioned him,
or one of his men, on the impression they had had in Graz and Styria. I
vaguely remember this but I cannot say so under oath.
DR. BALLAS: Document Number 2949-PS submitted by the Prosecution
regarding the conversations between Berlin and Vienna in the critical
time of March 1938 shows that only at the time of the conversation
between Dr. Dietrich and State Secretary Keppler, who was in Vienna then
on your behalf, which took place at 2154 hours—that only on that day
was Dr. Seyss-Inquart’s agreement to the telegram, which you had
dictated in advance, conveyed by Keppler. Had the order to march into
Austria already been given at that time?
GÖRING: I explained this recently. The order to march in had been given
and had nothing to do with the telegram as such. It was immaterial
whether or not he was in agreement. The responsibility for the marching
in rested with the Führer and me.
DR. BALLAS: Then it is correct that the marching in would have occurred
even without the telegram?
GÖRING: Yes. Of course.
DR. BALLAS: What was the purpose then of this telegram? Had it perhaps
something to do with foreign policy?
GÖRING: I have explained that here in greatest detail.
DR. BALLAS: Do you remember, Witness, that in the night from 11 to 12
March, State Secretary Keppler, in the name of Dr. Seyss-Inquart,
telephoned Berlin with the request not to carry out the entry into
Austria?
GÖRING: I remember this very distinctly for I was extremely enraged that
such a senseless telegram—after everything was ready—should have
disturbed the Führer’s rest when he was worn out and was to go to
Austria the next day. I therefore severely reprimanded the Führer’s
adjutant and told him that such a telegram should have been given to me.
Because of this I remember the telegram distinctly, and its
pointlessness.
DR. BALLAS: With the result then, that the Führer, if I have understood
you correctly, gave a flat refusal to this telegram?
GÖRING: He no longer was able to give a refusal because the entire troop
movement was already underway. Such a movement cannot be halted in an
hour. Once a troop movement is underway it takes days to halt it. At
best we could have halted the movement at a certain point on the march.
That was not at all in our interest, as I stated. From this moment on,
not Seyss-Inquart, but the Führer and I held the fate of Austria in our
hands.
DR. BALLAS: I have only two more questions regarding the Netherlands. Is
it correct that, in addition to the order of the Führer which was
promulgated on 18 May 1940 naming Dr. Seyss-Inquart Reich Commissioner
of the Netherlands, there was an order, not promulgated, which, made
Seyss-Inquart directly subordinate to you?
GÖRING: Of this secret order, I know nothing.
THE PRESIDENT: Put your questions more slowly. You can see that the
light is flashing.
DR. BALLAS: Had the Four Year Plan its own independent office in the
Netherlands?
GÖRING: I have not yet answered your first question, I understood that
you were to put this question once more, because it did not come
through.
DR. BALLAS: I understood the Court to mean . . .
GÖRING: I shall answer you now on this. Of this secret order, I know
nothing. It would have been senseless, for a Reich Commissioner in the
occupied territories could not have been subordinate to me separately.
But if it is a question of subordination in economic matter, then it is
clear that the Reich Commissioner was, of course, under my orders and
directions in this field as all other major Reich positions were.
To your second question, I can say that I do not know today in detail
whether in the occupied territories, that is also in the Netherlands,
there was here and there a direct representative of the Four Year Plan,
or whether I used the military commander or the economic department of
the Reich Commissioner of the territory concerned. As far as I remember
now, without referring to documents, in the Netherlands the situation
was that the economic counsellor, or the representative of the Reich
Commissioner—Fischböck at that time—which was logical, executed the
economic directions of the Four Year Plan. The Reich Commissioner would
never have been in a position not to have carried out orders given by
me. He could have protested against them only to me or, in extreme
cases, to the Führer, but in itself this did not lead to any suspension.
DR. BALLAS: I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 18 March 1946 at 1000 hours._]
EIGHTY-FOURTH DAY
Monday, 18 March 1946
_Morning Session_
THE PRESIDENT: Had Dr. Kubuschok finished his cross-examination?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yes, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Then would any other of the defendants’
counsel wish to examine or cross-examine?
PROFESSOR DOCTOR HERBERT KRAUS (Counsel for Defendant Schacht):
Professor Kraus for Dr. Lüdinghausen on behalf of the Defendant Von
Neurath. I ask your permission to put several questions to the witness.
[_Turning to the witness._] Witness, at the Munich conferences Hitler,
it is alleged, put the following question: “What is to happen if the
Czechs are not in agreement with our occupation of the Sudetenland?”
Thereupon Daladier answered, “Then we will force them.” Is that correct?
GÖRING: This question was actually broached by the Führer during the
discussion. Premier Daladier said, in substance, whether with the same
words or not, something which corresponds to the sense of this
statement. As far as I can still remember fairly exactly, he emphasized
that now a decision in that direction had been reached by the great
powers for the purpose of maintaining peace, and this peace must not be
threatened anew by Czechoslovakia’s refusal, otherwise neither England
nor France would feel themselves in any way in duty bound to help, if
Czechoslovakia did not follow this advice.
DR. KRAUS: Witness, how long have you known Herr Von Neurath?
GÖRING: As far as I recall I saw Herr Von Neurath very briefly when he
was the German Ambassador to Denmark in 1919, but only for a short time.
Later I met him again just before the seizure of power and spoke to him
very briefly, I believe; my closer relationship and acquaintance begins
from the time after the seizure of power.
DR. KRAUS: Did you have any closer knowledge of his activities as
Ambassador in London?
GÖRING: That is correct. I did know about his work before, because even
in former times, that is in 1931 and 1932, before Herr Von Neurath
became Foreign Minister, in discussions about the possible formation of
a cabinet, we also considered the name of Herr Von Neurath as a
candidate, even though he did not belong to the Party. As a basic
consideration in this connection his very position as Ambassador to
England played the main role, since we, that is, Hitler as well as I,
were of the opinion that Herr Von Neurath’s relations as Ambassador to
the English Government were very good and that Herr Von Neurath could be
an important factor in this field—that of good relations with
England—which was a basic consideration in the Führer’s foreign policy.
DR. KRAUS: Then I may assume that Herr Von Neurath had pursued a policy
of peace and understanding in London?
GÖRING: Yes, you can assume that exactly.
DR. KRAUS: Yes; and can you tell me if, beyond that, Herr Von Neurath
made efforts in his capacity as Foreign Minister as well, to continue
this policy of peace and understanding?
GÖRING: When Reich President Von Hindenburg made it a condition, which I
have already mentioned, that Herr Von Neurath should become Foreign
Minister, the Führer was in full agreement with this condition, because
he saw that the task of establishing good relations with England and the
West was in good hands. Herr Von Neurath always made every effort in
this direction.
DR. KRAUS: I should like to deal with another series of questions.
Were you present at the meeting of the Reich Cabinet on 30 January 1937,
during which Hitler gave the Golden Party Emblem to those members of the
Cabinet who were not members of the Party, among them also Herr Von
Neurath?
GÖRING: Yes, I was present.
DR. KRAUS: And do you know that Hitler declared on this occasion that it
was purely a distinction such as the conferring of an order, and that
the gentlemen concerned did not thereby become Party members and had no
obligations toward the Party?
GÖRING: I would not put it just that way. The Führer was speaking
spontaneously, since it was the anniversary of the seizure of power, and
he said it was his intention in this way to show his confidence in those
members of the Reich Cabinet who did not belong to the Party. I believe
he used the words, “I should like to ask them to accept this Party
Emblem.” He said at the time that in his opinion this was a decoration
and that he intended, as he actually did later, to develop additional
grades of this decoration. The first grade of this decoration was to be
the Golden Party Emblem. Then, on the spur of the moment, he stepped up
to the various ministers and handed them this emblem. In doing so he
neither emphasized that they were thereby to consider themselves members
of the Party, nor did he emphasize that they were not Party members.
When he came to Herr Von Eltz-Rübenach, this gentleman asked whether he
was thereby obliged to stand for the partly anti-clerical tendency of
certain Party circles, or something to that effect. The Führer hesitated
for a minute and said, “Then you do not wish to accept it?” Whereupon
Herr Von Eltz said, “I do not wish to say that. I just wish to make a
certain reservation.” The Führer was taken aback; immediately he turned
around and left the cabinet room.
In this connection it is not correct, as has been maintained, that Herr
Von Eltz resigned voluntarily because of this. I followed the Führer
immediately and felt, as did all the other gentlemen, that this incident
was an insult to the Führer, since membership in the Party had not been
mentioned at all. In addition, and this is very important, the Führer
was already considering a plan to divide the Ministry of Transport and
to re-establish the old Post Ministry and to put the railroad expert
Dorpmüller into the Ministry of Transport. The Führer had told me this
previously and, as he had left it to me to tell Von Eltz about it
gradually, in a diplomatic way, I took this opportunity and went to Herr
Von Eltz and said: “Your behavior was impossible, and I think the only
thing for you to do is to resign at once.” He said, “I did not mean it
like that,” and he was not willing to hand in his resignation right
away. I then asked him abruptly to do so by that evening. I also sent
State Secretary Meissner to him to say it would be advisable for him to
leave the Cabinet and hand in his resignation immediately, especially in
view of—and then I gave the explanations concerning the post and
railroads as I have just given them.
That was what happened at that conference with regard to the Golden
Party Emblem.
DR. KRAUS: Witness, were you present when Hitler, in the evening of 11
March 1938, told Herr Von Neurath in the Reich Chancellery about the
entry of the troops into Austria, and informed him of the reasons for
this move, and asked him to inform the Foreign Office accordingly,
because he himself had to leave?
GÖRING: I have already mentioned in my remarks about Austria that
Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop was not present. Since the Führer had
delegated the representation of the Reich to me, I had asked him to ask
Herr Von Neurath to put his experience in foreign affairs at my disposal
during this time. Thereupon Herr Von Neurath was asked to come to the
Reich Chancellery that evening, I believe, and the Führer told him in
broad outlines what you have just said. It was to the effect that, if I
needed it and requested it, he was to advise me on matters of foreign
policy, since the Foreign Minister was not present and I had no
experience in answering diplomatic notes, and since it was to be
expected that some foreign political action, such as protests and notes,
at least, would be taken during the Führer’s absence.
DR. KRAUS: Then one is to conclude that Herr Von Neurath was not the
deputy of the Foreign Minister but only in his absence was to serve as
sort of an adviser to you?
GÖRING: He was not the deputy of the Foreign Minister; that would not at
all have been in keeping with his position and his rank. The deputy of
the Foreign Minister was the acting State Secretary.
DR. KRAUS: Von Weizsäcker?
GÖRING: I believe it was Herr Von Mackensen at that time; he also signed
the current correspondence in the absence of the Foreign Minister. Herr
Von Neurath was only my adviser in such matters of foreign policy as
were expected to come up in connection with the Austrian case.
DR. KRAUS: Do you know of the protest which came from the British
Ambassador on 11 March 1938, which was addressed, strangely enough, to
Herr Von Neurath and in which the British Ambassador protested against
the marching in of German troops?
GÖRING: That is not at all so strange, for on the evening of the
marching in of the troops I personally, as I have explained, spoke to
the British Ambassador for 2 hours and told him that the Führer was
going to Austria the next day; that I would administer the Reich and had
for this purpose requested Herr Von Neurath as my foreign political
adviser, as Sir Nevile Henderson had already hinted that this would not
be tolerated without protests. Thus the British Ambassador had already
received this information from me the evening before. This explains the
fact that he turned to Herr Von Neurath, because I had said to him, “If
you come around with your old notes of protest, I personally cannot do
very much about them.”
DR. KRAUS: Did Herr Von Neurath, after the Foreign Minister had
formulated the answer to the protest, notify you by telephone of that
answer, and did he ask you whether you would sign it as Hitler’s deputy?
GÖRING: Yes, of course; I was deputy head of State. He had to inform me
of the reply and it was also a matter of course that I should say to
him, “You sign,” for as deputy head of State I could not sign diplomatic
notes.
DR. KRAUS: Thank you.
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, how far were the political leaders informed
beforehand of the Führer’s foreign political intentions?
GÖRING: “Political leaders” is a very comprehensive term. It includes
everyone from the Reichsleiter to the Blockleiter or Zellenleiter.
Instruction of the entire body of political leaders with regard to
matters of foreign policy quite naturally and understandably never took
place, and could not take place unless the Führer publicly made known
his general foreign political intentions to the entire nation either in
the Reichstag or over the radio. The higher officers of the political
leaders, for instance, the Reichsleiter or the Gauleiter, were likewise
never called together as a group in order to be informed of political
intentions which the Führer did not want to announce publicly.
He may personally have mentioned his intentions to one or other of the
political leaders, who at the same time held another state office, or
who was for some other reason in his confidence—I should first have to
think where that might have been the case. He certainly did not do it to
any unit or sub-unit. In his speeches to Gauleiter after the events had
taken place, he merely referred to these things each time in retrospect
and explained and unfolded his political intentions, which he had,
however, already realized by then.
DR. SERVATIUS: I have no further questions.
DR. MARTIN HORN (Counsel for Defendant Von Ribbentrop): Witness, do you
know to what extent Von Ribbentrop was informed about military plans and
intentions in his capacity as Foreign Minister?
GÖRING: I do not know the exact details. In general the same principle
applies here too, that only such authorities as were competent, as far
as these intentions were concerned, were kept informed, particularly so
in the case of military intentions. Just how much the Führer told Herr
Von Ribbentrop now and again in conversations about his military plans,
I did not know.
DR. HORN: Is it correct that Hitler set down the guiding principles for
all policies, including foreign policy?
GÖRING: That is a matter of course. Foreign policy above all was the
Führer’s very own realm. By that I mean to say that foreign policy on
the one hand and the leadership of the Armed Forces on the other hand
enlisted the Führer’s greatest interest and were his main activity.
DR. HORN: Should I conclude from that that he was interested in the
details of foreign policy as well?
GÖRING: He busied himself exceptionally with these details, as I have
just stated, and with particularly great interest in both of these
fields.
DR. HORN: Did Hitler expressly instruct you to keep secret the
memorandum on Poland of 30 August 1939?
GÖRING: He did not expressly instruct me. I do not know whether he knew
that I had it in my pocket. But in general he had given such
instructions since he had instructed the one who would have had to hand
it over, namely, Herr Von Ribbentrop, not to hand it over, so that I
actually handed over this memorandum against the express order of the
Führer, which constitutes a risk that probably only I—please do not
misunderstand me—indeed I alone could take and afford.
DR. HORN: You mentioned a few days ago the diversified influence which
the various personages had on Hitler. Do you know any facts from which
we might conclude that Ribbentrop had not enough influence on Hitler to
induce him to change decisions once he had made them?
GÖRING: As far as influence on Hitler, on the Führer, is concerned, that
is a problematical subject. I should like first to confine myself to the
question of Herr Von Ribbentrop’s influence. Herr Von Ribbentrop
definitely had no influence in the sense that he could have steered
Hitler in any one direction. To what extent arguments of an objective
nature may perhaps have definitely influenced the Führer sometimes to do
this or that in respect to foreign political affairs, or to refrain from
doing it, or to change it, would have depended entirely on the strength
of the arguments and the facts. To what extent that may sometimes have
played a role I cannot say, for I was not present at 99 percent of the
Führer’s conferences with Herr Von Ribbentrop. But Herr Von Ribbentrop
had at no time such influence that he could have said, “Do this” or “Do
not do it; I consider it a mistake,” when the Führer was convinced of
the correctness of any matter.
DR. HORN: Do you know facts or observations which might point to the
existence of a conspiracy in the highest circles of the government?
GÖRING: Conspiracy may be variously interpreted. Conspiracies naturally
never took place in the sense that men secretly came together and
discussed extensive plans in darkness and seclusion. As to conspiracy in
the sense that the Führer had comprehensive conferences and as a result
of these conferences decided upon joint undertakings, one can only talk
of conspiracy here to the extent—and I beg of you again not to
misunderstand me—that this took place between the Führer and me until,
say, 1941. There was no one who could even approach working as closely
with the Führer, who was as essentially familiar with his thoughts and
who had the same influence as I. Therefore at best only the Führer and I
could have conspired. There is definitely no question of the others.
DR. HORN: American war propaganda consistently spoke of Germany’s
aggressive intentions toward the Western Hemisphere. What do you know
about this?
GÖRING: The Western Hemisphere? Do you mean America?
DR. HORN: Yes.
GÖRING: Even if Germany had completely dominated the nations of Europe,
between Germany and the American continent there are, as far as I still
recall from my geographic knowledge, about 6,000 kilometers of water, I
believe. In view of the smallness of the German fleet and the
regrettable lack of bombers to cover this distance, which I have already
mentioned, there was never any question of a threat against the American
continent; on the contrary, we were always afraid of that danger in
reverse, and we would have been very glad if it had not been necessary
to consider this at all.
As far as South America is concerned, I know that we were always
accused, by propaganda at least, of economic penetration and attempted
domination there. If one considers the financial and commercial
possibilities which Germany had before and during the war, and if one
compares them with those of Great Britain or America, one can see the
untenability of such a statement. With the very little foreign exchange
and the tremendous export difficulties which we had, we could never
constitute a real danger or be in competition. If that had been the
case, the attitude of the South American countries would presumably have
been a different one. Not the mark, but only the dollar ruled there.
DR. HORN: Thank you.
DR. SIEMERS: The Prosecution have submitted the diary of General Jodl
under Document Number 1809-PS. In this diary there are two entries from
the first half of 1940, in regard to which I should like to have your
opinion. These two entries concern Russia at a time when Germany and
Russia were on friendly terms.
I should like to say in advance that the substance of the intentions
which are contained in these entries sounds rather fantastic, and that
is why I would like to have your opinion as Commander-in-Chief of the
Air Force.