DR. STAHMER: For what reason were officers interned in France again,

even after the war was over?

GÖRING: First I would like to correct an expression in regard to this

question. In France the war as such was not terminated at all. An

armistice had been concluded. This armistice was a very generous one.

Even the preamble of this armistice showed a tendency to coming

conciliation, in contrast to that armistice which had been signed in

1918 on the same spot.

When, at the time, Marshal Pétain asked for an armistice, the first

answer he received was that capitulation would have to be unconditional.

Later, however, we gave him to understand that quite a number of wishes

concerning the fleet, certain parts of the unoccupied territory, and the

respecting of the colonies would be considered. The situation was such

that Germany at that moment could have insisted on an absolutely

unconditional surrender, since no French forces of any consequence, or

any help that might come from England, were available to prevent a

complete military catastrophe in France.

No line, no French formation, could have stopped the breakthrough of

German troops to the Mediterranean. No reserves were available in

England. All the available forces were in the expeditionary force which

had been routed in the Belgian and northern French area and finally at

Dunkirk.

In this armistice those conditions were respected for which a wish had

been expressed. The Führer also, apart from that, had hinted at a

certain generous solution, especially in regard to the question of

captured officers. When, contrary to far-reaching satisfaction which we

had hoped for, and which we really got at the beginning, the resistance

movement within France began to develop gradually by means of propaganda

from across the Channel, and the establishment there of a new center of

resistance under General de Gaulle, it was perfectly understandable,

from my point of view, that French officers would offer their services

as patriots. But at the same time it was just as natural for Germany,

recognizing that danger and in trying to overcome it, again to take as

prisoners of war those elements who would be the leaders and experts in

such military resistance movements, that is to say all those officers

who were still moving freely in France. That was a necessary basic

condition in order to avoid the danger of a war in our back and of a

renewed flare-up in France. I believe that it is quite unique, that,

while war was still raging on all fronts, officers of a country with

whom one had only an armistice were permitted to move around freely when

war was at its height. As far as I know, that was the first time in the

history of warfare that such a thing had happened.

DR. STAHMER: Can you give us specific facts to explain why the struggle

in France, which was apparently carried out in a mutually honorable

manner in 1940, later took on such a bitter character?

GÖRING: One must consider the two phases of the war with France

completely separately. The first phase was the great military conflict,

that is to say, the attack of the German forces against the French Army.

This struggle was executed quickly. One cannot say that it was a

chivalrous fight throughout, because from that period we know of several

acts on the part of the French against our prisoners, which were

recorded in the White Books and later presented to the International Red

Cross in Geneva. But all in all, it kept within the usual bounds of a

military war with the excesses that always occur here and there in such

a struggle.

After that had been terminated, appeasement and quiet set in for the

time being. Only later, when the struggle continued and expanded,

especially when the fight against Russia was added, and, as I said

before, when on the opposite side a new French center of leadership had

been created, then in the countries of the West, which had been quiet

until then and where no serious incidents had taken place, a definite

intensification of the resistance movement became evident. There were

attacks on German officers and soldiers; hand grenades and bombs were

thrown into restaurants where German officers or soldiers were present.

Bombs were even thrown in places where there were women, members of the

Women’s Auxiliary Signal Service and Red Cross nurses. Cars were

attacked, communications cut, trains blown up, and this on a growing

scale.

A war behind the front during a period of land warfare represented

difficulty enough but when aerial warfare was added, entirely new

possibilities and methods were developed. Night after night a large

number of planes came and dropped a tremendous quantity of explosives

and arms, instructions, _et cetera_ for this resistance movement, in

order to strengthen and enlarge it. The German counterintelligence

succeeded, by means of aerial deception and code keys dropped by enemy

planes, in getting into their hands a large part of these materials; but

a sufficient amount was left which fell into the hands of the resistance

movement. The atrocities committed in this connection were also

widespread. As to this, documents can be submitted. Of course . . .

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: If the Tribunal please, I am very reluctant to

interrupt this examination, but I should like to ask if the Tribunal

will avail itself of the Charter provision to require from Counsel a

statement as to how this is relevant to the charges which we are engaged

in trying.

It raises a rather large and important question, and that question is

this, as I see it: It raises a question which involves a great deal of

time, if time is an important element in this proceeding.

For the purposes of this statement, I may admit that there were actions

taken by partisan groups within occupied territories which were very

annoying and very objectionable and very injurious to the would-be

conqueror. If it is sought to introduce testimony as to what partisans

did toward the German occupying forces, on the theory of reprisal, then

I respectfully submit that Counsel is proceeding in reverse order, that

is to say, if the Defense says “Yes, we did commit certain atrocities;

we did violate international law,” then it may be that the motive—I

shall argue that it is not—is relevant under the Hague Convention, but

then at least we might have that question presented.

But unless this evidence is offered on the theory that reprisals would

be justified, it has no place, I submit, in the case. If it is offered

on the basis of establishing a theory of reprisal, our first inquiry is,

what is it that reprisals were for? In other words, the doctrine of

reprisal can only be invoked when you first admit that you committed

certain definite acts in violation of international law. Then your

question is whether you were justified. I submit that it might shorten

and certainly would clarify this proceeding, if counsel will definitely

state as to what acts on the part of the German occupying force he is

directing this testimony, as I suppose, to excuse it; and that, unless

there is some theory of reprisal pointed out with sufficient

definiteness, so that we may identify the violations on Germany’s part

for which she is seeking excuse by way of reprisal, this testimony is

not helpful in deciding the ultimate question.

The question here is not whether the occupying countries resisted. Of

course they resisted. The question is whether acts of the character we

have shown can be excused by way of reprisal; and, if so, there must be

an admission of those acts, and the doctrine of reprisal must be set

forth, it seems to me, much more specifically.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Stahmer.

DR. STAHMER: I have not been able to get all of the statement, because

the translation did not quite keep up with it, but I believe that for

the following reasons what we have discussed up to now is relevant:

The defendants are accused of the fact that hostages were taken in large

numbers and shot and it is maintained that this was not justified; at

any rate, the motives which led to the taking of hostages have not, up

to now, been discussed, at least not sufficiently. To clarify this

question, which is so important for the decisions in this Trial, it is

in my opinion absolutely necessary to make it clear that these decrees

concerning the arrest and the treatment of hostages were called for by

the attitude of the resistance movements. Therefore, in my opinion it

could be said with justification that the actions of the resistance

movement were the cause for the measures which had to be taken later by

the German military authorities, much to their regret.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: May I say one word in answer to Dr. Stahmer’s

offer, if it be an offer.

The suggestion of Dr. Stahmer that the motives here are to be tried

seems to me to lead us very far afield. If he is invoking the

international law doctrine of reprisal, then he has to meet the

conditions of that doctrine. Article 2 of the Geneva Convention of the

27th of July 1929 provides specifically that measures of reprisal

against prisoners of war are prohibited. He therefore must relate it to

someone other than prisoners of war. Under the doctrine of reprisal, as

we understand it, any act which is claimed to be justified as a reprisal

must be related to a specific and continuing violation of international

law on the other side. That is, it is not every casual and incidental

violation which justifies wholesale reprisals. If it were, then

international law could have no foundation, for a breach on one side,

however unimportant, would completely absolve the other from any rules

of warfare.

Secondly, anything which is claimed to be justified as a reprisal must

follow within a reasonable time and it must be related reasonably to the

offense which it is sought to prevent. That is, you cannot by way of

reprisal engage in wholesale slaughter in order to vindicate a single

murder. Next it must be shown as to the reprisals that a protest was

made, as a basis for invoking reprisals. You cannot engage in reprisals

without notice. The reprisal must be noticed and there must be

notification by a responsible party of the government.

And next, and most important, a deliberate course of violation of

international law cannot be shielded as a reprisal. Specific acts must

be reprisals for specific acts under the conditions I have pointed out.

You cannot vindicate a reign of terror under the doctrine of reprisals;

and so I respectfully submit that the offer of Dr. Stahmer to inquire

into the motives of Göring individually, or of all defendants

collectively, or of Germany, does not meet any legal test. It might be

pointed out to the Tribunal by way of mitigation of sentence after

conviction, but is not a proper consideration on the question of guilt

or innocence of the charges which we have brought to the bar.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Justice Jackson, I understood you to agree that this

sort of evidence might be relevant in mitigation of sentence?

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think if Your Honors find the defendants guilty,

then it comes to the question of sentence, as is our practice. You might

find almost anything that a defendant saw fit to urge relevant to the

sentence, but I do not take it that Dr. Stahmer is now dealing with the

question of offers relevant to that subject. If it is, I should consent

that any plea for leniency be heard, of course. It is offered, as I

understand it, on the question of guilt.

THE PRESIDENT: That may be so, but the Tribunal may consider it more

convenient to hear the evidence now. The Charter, as far as I see, has

not provided for any evidence to be given after conviction, if a

defendant is convicted. Therefore any evidence which would have to be

given in mitigation would be given now.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The difficulty with that, I should think, would be

this: that a defendant may very well be found guilty on some counts but

not on others. That would require at this time the litigation of the

question of sentence, two-thirds of which might be irrelevant because he

might not be found guilty on more than one count.

I may be biased in favor of the practice that I know, or at least may be

presumed to have some knowledge of. In our procedure the question of

guilt is tried first. The question of sentence is a separate subject, to

be determined after the verdict. I should think that would be the

logical way to proceed here. And I understand that this—and I think Dr.

Stahmer confirms my view—that this is not offered on the question of

sentence. I do not think he concedes he has reached that point yet.

DR. STAHMER: May I briefly comment on the legal question? It is

maintained, or at least this side asserts, that violations of

international law were committed in France to a large extent by

organizing guerrilla warfare. The struggle against these actions, which

do not conform to international law, could be carried out by reprisals,

as has just been expounded by Mr. Justice Jackson. It is correct that

there were certain reasons for the application of reprisals, but in my

opinion it is questionable if such . . .

THE PRESIDENT: May I ask whether you agree that the conditions which Mr.

Justice Jackson stated are accurately stated?

DR. STAHMER: Yes, but we have to deal here, in my opinion, with the fact

of an emergency, caused by conduct violating international law, that is

by unleashing guerrilla warfare. This fact justified the army commanders

to take general measures in order to remove these conditions brought

about illegally. Therefore, at any rate, these facts are of importance

for determining the verdict.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal does not propose to hear an unlimited number

of the defendants’ counsel, but I observe that Dr. Exner is there, and

they are prepared to hear one other counsel—if counsel wish, Dr.

Exner—upon the subject.

DR. FRANZ EXNER (Counsel for Defendant Jodl): May it please the

Tribunal. We are indeed, all interested in the question of reprisals,

and I would like to say a few words.

For 10 years I have lectured on international law at the university and

I believe I understand a little about it. Reprisals are among the most

disputed terms of international law. One can say that only on one point

there is absolute certainty, namely that point, which Mr. Justice

Jackson mentioned first—“measures of reprisals against prisoners of war

are prohibited.” Everything else is matter of dispute and not at all

valid as international law. It is not correct that it is the general

practice in all states, and therefore valid international law, that a

protest is a prerequisite for taking reprisals. Neither is it correct

that there has to be a so-called reasonable connection. It was asserted

that there must be a relation as regards time, and above all a

proportionality between the impending and the actually committed

violation of international law. There are scholars of international law

who assert, and it is indeed so, that it would be desirable that there

be proportionality in every case. But in existing international law, in

the sense that some agreement has been made to that effect or that it

has become international legal usage, this is not the case. It will have

to be said therefore, on the basis of violations of international law by

the other side, that we under no circumstances make a war of reprisals

against prisoners of war, every other form of reprisals is, however,

admissible.

I just wanted to state that in general terms; and perhaps I still might

say that it has been asserted that we may not speak about reasons for

mitigation now. I would like to remind the Tribunal that we are

permitted to make only one address, and if in this speech, which takes

place before the decision has been reached on the question of guilt, we

are not permitted to speak about mitigation, then we would not have any

opportunity to speak about it at all.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now.

[_A recess was taken._]

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal rules that the evidence is admissible on the

question of reprisals, and the weight that should be given this or

similar evidence will be reserved for future consideration.

DR. STAHMER: Will you please continue?

GÖRING: I believe that the statement which I am about to make will

fulfill those conditions which Justice Jackson has requested; namely, I

do not in any way deny that things happened which may be hotly debatable

as far as international law is concerned. Also other things occurred

which under any circumstances must be considered as excesses. I wanted

only to explain how it happened, not from the point of view of

international law as regards reprisals, but considering it only from the

feeling of the threatened soldier, who was constantly hindered in the

execution of his task, not by regular troops in open combat, but by

partisans at his back.

Out of all those things which I need not go into any further, this

animosity arose which led spontaneously—or in certain cases was ordered

as a necessity in a national emergency—to these partial excesses

committed here and there by the troops. One must go back to that period

of stormy battles. Today, after the lapse of years, in a quiet

discussion of the legal basis, these things sound very difficult and

even incomprehensible. Expressions made at the moment of embitterment,

today, without an understanding of that situation, sound quite

different. It was solely my intention to depict to the Tribunal for just

one moment that atmosphere in which and out of which such actions, even

if they could not always be excused, would appear understandable, and in

a like situation were also carried out by others. That was and is my

answer to the question why the conditions in France necessitated two

entirely different phases of war—the first, that of the regular

fighting, with which I have finished; the second, that of the fighting

which was not carried out by regular troops, but by those coming out of

hiding, from the underground, which always will and at all times has

entailed cruelties and excesses quite different to those of regular

military fighting. It often happens here that single actions occur, be

it by individuals or by troop units, which the Supreme Command cannot

always control or possibly keep in hand.

DR. STAHMER: What measures were taken by the German occupational

authorities in France to help French agriculture during the occupation?

GÖRING: I can reply very briefly, and I refer to the testimony of the

witness Körner, which I can only confirm. By that I mean that in France

agriculture was tremendously promoted and increased during the period of

occupation. A large number of tracts of fallow land or those which had

not been put to good agricultural use were turned to profitable

cultivation; other tracts, through intensified use of fertilizers or

other means of cultivation, were made considerably more productive.

I am unable to give specific explanations as to just what was done and I

am not conversant with the figures showing the increase in agricultural

production in the course of the occupation years, which could be given

only by the responsible experts.

DR. STAHMER: What were the reasons leading to the introduction of

Reichskreditkasse notes in the occupied countries?

GÖRING: A measure which would probably be introduced by every occupying

power to regulate money circulation, to keep it in its proper limits,

and to keep the country’s currency at a certain level, similar to the

procedure which today takes place in all occupied zones of Germany.

DR. STAHMER: Document Number 141-PS is a decree of yours issued 15

November 1940 in which you effected a regulation regarding art objects

brought to the Louvre. Are you familiar with this decree or shall I hand

it to you?

GÖRING: I remember this document very distinctly as it has played an

important part here. These art objects were taken at first to the Louvre

and later to the exhibition hall called, I believe, “Salle du Jeu de

Paume.” This concerned art objects which were confiscated, being Jewish

property, that is ownerless property as their owners had left the

country. This order was not issued by me, I was not familiar with it; it

was a Führer decree. Then, when I was in Paris I heard of this, and

heard also that it was intended that most of these art objects would—as

far as they had museum value—be put into a Linz museum which the Führer

contemplated building. Personally, I admit this openly, I was interested

that not everything should go to southern Germany. I decided quite

sometime before, and informed the Finance Minister about it, that after

the war, or at some other time which seemed opportune to me, I would

found an art gallery containing the objects of art which I already had

in my possession before the war, either through purchase, through gifts,

or through inheritance, and give it to the German people. Indeed it was

my plan that this gallery should be arranged on quite different lines

from those usually followed in museums. The plans for the construction

of this gallery, which was to be erected as an annex to Karinhall in the

big forest of the Schorfheide, and in which the art objects were to be

exhibited according to their historical background and age in the proper

atmosphere, were ready, only not executed because of the outbreak of

war. Paintings, sculptures, tapestries, handicraft, were to be exhibited

according to period. Then, when I saw the things in the Salle du Jeu de

Paume and heard that the greater part were to go to Linz, that these

objects which were considered to be of museum value were to serve only a

minor purpose, then, I do admit, my collector’s passion got the better

of me; and I said that if these things were confiscated and were to

remain so, I would at least like to acquire a small part of them, so

that I might include them in this North German gallery to be erected by

me.

The Führer agreed to this with one reservation, that he himself should

at least see the photographs of those objects which I intended to

acquire. In many cases, of course, it so happened that he wished to

earmark those particular objects for himself, that is, not for himself

but for his museum in Linz, and I had to give them back. From the

beginning, however, I wanted to have a clear distinction made, as I

meant to pay for those objects which I wanted to have for the gallery I

was going to build. Therefore I ordered an art expert, and not a German

but a Frenchman—it was some professor whose name I do not recall and to

whom I never talked—to value those things. I would then decide whether

the price was too high for me, whether I was no longer interested, or

whether I was willing to pay the price. One part, the first part, was

settled that way, but then the whole thing stopped because some of the

objects were sent back and forth; that is, they went back to the Führer

and they did not remain with me, and not until the matter was decided

could the payment be made. In this decree, which I called a “preliminary

decree” and which the Führer would have had to approve, I emphasized

that part of the things were to be paid for by me, and those things

which were not of museum value were to be sold by auction to French or

German dealers, or to whomever was present at the sale; that the

proceeds of this, as far as the things were not confiscated but were

paid for, was to go to the families of French war victims. I repeatedly

inquired where I was to send this money and said that in collaboration

with the French authorities a bank account would have to be opened. We

were always referring to the opening of such an account. The amount of

money was always available in my bank until the end. One day, when I

inquired again, I received a surprising answer. The answer was the Reich

Treasurer of the Party did not want to have this money paid. I at once

answered, and my secretary can verify this on oath, that I could not at

all understand what the Reich Treasurer of the Party had to do with this

matter and that I wanted to know to which French account I could have

this amount transferred. In this case, the Party, that is, the Reich

Treasurer, could have no authority to exempt me from paying or not,

because I myself had wished to make the payment. Even after France had

been occupied again, I once again requested to know the account to which

I could remit the amount reserved for it.

In summarizing and concluding, I wish to state that according to a

decree I considered these things as confiscated for the Reich. Therefore

I believed myself to be justified in acquiring some of these objects,

especially as I never made a secret of the fact—either to the Reich

Minister for Finance or to anybody else—that these art objects of

museum value, as well as the ones I previously mentioned as already in

my possession, were being collected for the gallery which I described

before.

As far as exchange was concerned, I would like to put this matter

straight also. Among the confiscated paintings there were some of the

most modern sort, paintings which I personally would not accept and

never did, which, however, as I was told, were in demand in the French

art trade. Thereupon I said that as far as I was concerned these

pictures could also be valued and acquired, in order that they might be

exchanged against old masters, in which I am interested. I never exerted

any pressure in that direction. I was concerned only as to whether the

price asked of me was too high; if so I would not enter into

negotiations, but as in every art deal if the offer was suitable I would

inquire into the authenticity of what was offered. This much about the

exchange; under no circumstances did I exert any pressure.

Later, after I had acquired these objects, I naturally used some of them

as well as some of my own for general trading with museums. In other

words, if a certain museum was interested in one of those pictures and I

was interested, for my gallery, in a picture which was in the possession

of that museum, we would make an exchange. This exchange also took place

with art dealers from abroad. This did not concern exclusively pictures

and art objects of these acquisitions, but also those which I had

acquired in the open market, in Germany, Italy, or in other countries or

which were earlier in my possession.

At this point, I would like to add that independent of these

acquisitions—and I am referring to the Salle du Jeu de Paume, where

these confiscated objects were located—I, of course, had acquired works

of art in the open market in France as in other countries before and

after the war, or rather during the war. I might add that usually if I

came to Rome, or Florence, Paris, or Holland, as if people had known in

advance that I was coming, I would always have in the shortest time a

pile of written offers, from all sorts of quarters, art dealers, and

private people. And even though most were not genuine, some of the

things offered were interesting and good, and I acquired a number of art

objects in the open market. Private persons especially made me very

frequent offers in the beginning. I should like to emphasize that,

especially in Paris, I was rather deceived. As soon as it was known that

it was for me the price was raised 50 to 100 percent. That is all I have

to say briefly and in conclusion in regard to this matter.

DR. STAHMER: Did you make provisions for the protection of French art

galleries and monuments?

GÖRING: I should like to refer at first to the state art treasures of

France, that is, those in the possession of the state museums. I did not

confiscate a single object, or in any way remove anything from the state

museums, with the exception of two contracts for an exchange with the

Louvre on an entirely voluntary basis. I traded a statue which is known

in the history of art as La Belle Allemande, a carved wood statue which

originally came from Germany, for another German wood statue which I had

had in my possession for many years before the war, and two pictures—an

exchange such as I used to make before the war with other museums here,

and as is customary among museums. Moreover I have always instructed all

authorities to do their utmost to protect art objects against

destruction by bombs or other war damage. I remember that when the

directors of the Louvre told me that most of the things had just been

put into the rooms of the so-called Loire castles, I said that I would

be willing at their request, and if it seemed necessary with the

increased bombing attacks, to help them put these objects into

safekeeping at places determined by them, as they complained of not

having transportation facilities.

Now I wish to refer to art monuments, which I would call the buildings,

churches, and other monuments—anything of a stationary character. Here

I can say that perhaps sometimes I issued an order which stood in

contradiction to my strictly military duties, because I strongly

emphasized to my fliers that the magnificent Gothic cathedrals of the

French cities were, under all circumstances, to be protected and not to

be attacked, even if it were a question of troop concentrations in those

places; and that if attacks had to be made, precision bombing Stukas

were to be used primarily. Every Frenchman who was present at the time

will confirm this, that the peculiar situation arose, be it in Amiens,

Rouen, Chartres or in other cities, that the cathedrals—those art

monuments of such great importance and beauty—were saved and purposely

so, in contrast to what later happened in Germany. There was of course

some broken glass in the cathedrals, caused by bomb detonations, but the

most precious windows had been previously removed, thank God. As far as

I remember, the small cathedral in Beauvais had fallen victim to bombing

attacks on the neighboring houses, the large cathedral still is

standing. The French Government repeatedly acknowledged recognition of

this fact to me. I have no other comment on that point.

DR. STAHMER: What reasons made you put Colonel Veltjens in charge of

centralizing the black market in France?

GÖRING: Colonel Veltjens was a retired colonel. He was a flier in the

first World War. He then had entered business. Therefore, he was not

sent there in his capacity as colonel, but as an economist. He was not

only in charge of the black market in France, but also of that in

Holland and Belgium. It came about in the following manner: After a

certain period during the occupation, it was reported to me that various

items, in which I was particularly interested for reasons of war

economy, could be obtained only in the black market. It was then, for

the first time, that I became familiar with the black market, that is

that copper, tin, and other vital materials were still available, but

that some of them lay buried in the canals of Holland, and had also been

carefully hidden in other countries. However, if the necessary money

were paid, these articles would come out of hiding, while, on the basis

of the confiscation order, we would receive only very little of the raw

materials necessary for the conduct of the war. At that time, as during

the entire war, I was guided only by intentions and ideas leading toward

the ultimate war aim, the winning of victory. It was more important to

me to procure copper and tin, just to cite one example, to get them in

any case, no matter how high the price might be, than not to get them

merely because I did not consider such high prices justified. I

therefore told Veltjens in rather general terms, “You know in what

things German war economy is interested. Where and how you get these

things is immaterial to me. If you get them by means of confiscation,

that is all the better. If we have to pay a great deal of money to get

them, then we shall have to do that too.” The unpleasant thing was that

other departments, first without my knowing it—as the French

Prosecution has shown here quite correctly—also tried in the same way

to get the same things, in which they also were interested. The thought

of now having internal competition as well was too much for me. So then

I gave Veltjens the sole authority to be the one and only office in

control as far as the civilian dealers were concerned who insisted they

could procure these things only in that other way, and to be the only

purchasing office for these articles and, with my authority, to

eliminate other offices.

The difficulty of combating the black market is the result of many

factors. Afterwards, at the special request of Premier Laval, I

absolutely prohibited the black market for Veltjens and his organization

as well. But in spite of this it was not thereby eliminated, and the

statement of the French Prosecution confirms my opinion that the black

market lasted even beyond the war. And as far as I know it is again

flourishing here in Germany today to the widest extent. These are

symptoms which always arise during and after a war when there is on the

one hand a tremendous scarcity and holding back and hiding of

merchandise and on the other hand the desire to procure these things.

DR. STAHMER: Shall I stop now?

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, the Tribunal understood from you that the

witness would probably—that the defendant would probably finish his

examination in chief at midday today. Can you now tell me how much

longer you think the defendant will be with his testimony?

DR. STAHMER: I had counted on being able to finish this morning, but

there were several interruptions, and I hope to finish during the course

of the day.

THE PRESIDENT: There was no interruption with the exception of that one

interruption with reference to Mr. Justice Jackson’s objection as to

reprisals. There was no other interruption that I remember.

DR. STAHMER: Yes, there was a technical disturbance earlier.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Then the Tribunal will sit tomorrow morning from 10

to 1.

[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]

_Afternoon Session_

DR. STAHMER: What were the reasons that led to the attack on Yugoslavia?

GÖRING: Germany, during all the years before the beginning of the war,

had the very best of relations with the Yugoslav people and the Yugoslav

Government. It was part of my foreign political task to cultivate these

relations especially. Since the Regent, Prince Paul, and Prime Minister

Stojadinovic were personal friends of mine, I often visited the country

and also spent a long vacation there.

It was our intention to have not only the best economic relations by

each complementing the other, but also beyond that to come to a close

political understanding and friendship. This was successful to the

fullest extent and found its climax in the return visit which the

Regent, Prince Paul, made to Germany.

Since at the same time I also had similar friendly relations with King

Boris of Bulgaria, I was able to exert a stabilizing influence here too,

and at times also in regard to Italy. My intervention in behalf of

Yugoslavia even caused there, for a time, a certain misapprehension

where I was concerned.

After the outbreak of the war everything was likewise avoided which

could cause anything but friendly relations with Yugoslavia.

Unfortunately Prime Minister Stojadinovic resigned, but his successor

followed the same policy.

The entering into the Three Power Pact had the purpose of maintaining

Yugoslavia’s neutrality under all circumstances and of not drawing her

into the war. Even at the time when the pact was signed one recognized

the necessity for sending troops to Romania as a precautionary measure,

and also to Greece because of the English landing there or the impending

English landing. In spite of that agreement it was expressly provided

that no troop transports should go through Yugoslavia, so that the

neutrality of that country after its entry into the Three Power Pact

would be confirmed in every way.

When Premier Cvetkovic came to power, General Simovic’s revolt against

the government of the Prince Regent and the accession to the throne of

the King, who was still a minor, followed shortly after. We very quickly

learned, through our close relations with Yugoslavia, the background of

General Simovic’s revolt. Shortly afterwards it was confirmed that the

information from Yugoslavia was correct, namely, that a strong Russian

political influence existed, as well as extensive financial assistance

for the undertaking on the part of England, of which we later found

proof. It was clear that this venture was directed against the friendly

policy of the previous Yugoslav Government toward Germany. It must be

mentioned here that in later press statements it was pointed out by the

Russian side how strong their influence had been and for what purpose

this undertaking had been executed.

The new Yugoslav Government, quite obviously and beyond doubt, stood

visibly in closest relationship with the enemies we had at that time,

that is to say, England and, in this connection, with our enemy to be,

Russia.

The Simovic affair was definitely the final and decisive factor which

dispelled the very last scruples which the Führer had in regard to

Russia’s attitude, and caused him to take preventive measures in that

direction under all circumstances. Before this Simovic incident it is

probable that, although preparations had been undertaken, doubts as to

the inevitable necessity of an attack against Soviet Russia might have

been pushed into the background. These clear relations between Moscow

and Belgrade, however, dispelled the Führer’s very last doubts. At the

same time it was evident that Yugoslavia, under the new government, was

merely trying to gain time for massing her troops, for the very night

the revolt was undertaken secret and shortly afterwards official orders

for mobilization were issued to the Yugoslav Army.

In spite of the assurances which Simovic gave Berlin, that he would feel

himself bound to the agreement or something like that, the maneuver

could easily be seen through.

The situation was now the following: Italy, our ally, had at the time

attacked Greece, advancing from Albania in October or September 1940, if

I remember correctly. Germany had not been informed of this venture. The

Führer heard of this undertaking through me on the one hand, who had by

chance learned of it, and also through the Foreign Office, and he

immediately rerouted his train, which was on the way from France to

Berlin, in order to speak to the Duce in Florence.

The Italian Government, or Mussolini himself, saw very clearly at this

moment why the Führer wanted to talk to him, and as far as I remember

the order to the Italian Army to march from Albania to Greece was

therefore released 24 or 48 hours before originally scheduled. The fact

is that the Führer, in his concern to prevent under all circumstances an

expansion of the conflict in the Balkans and the eastern Mediterranean,

wanted to urge the Duce to forego such plans, which were not necessary,

but were undertaken only for reasons of prestige.

When the meeting took place at 10 o’clock in the morning and the Führer

had mentioned his misgivings, Mussolini actually declared that since 6

o’clock of that morning the Italian troops had already been advancing

through Greece and, in his opinion, would shortly be in Athens. The

Führer pointed out again that this would mean, that under certain

circumstances relations with Turkey would also be most seriously

endangered and another theater of war would be created, since he well

knew, although he did not mention it at that time, that an Italian

theater of war sooner or later would mean drawing on the German ally for

help.

That actually was the situation at the outbreak of the attack on

Yugoslavia. Italy, stopped and thrown back, was left in a most

unfavorable position strategically and tactically while still facing the

Greek enemy. If only a part of the Yugoslav Army moved against the flank

and the rear of the Italian Skutari position, then not only would Italy

be eliminated there, but also an essential part of the Italian fighting

forces would be destroyed. It was clear that the position of these

Italian fighting forces would soon be hopeless, since because of the

landing of British auxiliary troops in Greece it was to be expected that

as soon as they came to the aid of the Greeks the Italian Army would not

only be thrown out of Greece, where they were standing merely at the

border, but also out of Albania; and the British troops would then be in

dangerous proximity to Italy and the Balkans, which were economically of

decisive importance for us.

By means of the Simovic revolt and the mobilization of Yugoslavia the

elimination of the Italian Balkan armies would have been achieved. Only

the quickest action could prevent a twofold danger: first, a catastrophe

befalling our Italian ally; and second, a British foothold in the

Balkans, which would be detrimental to a future vantage point in the

conflict with Russia.

The German troops which were on the march for “Operation Marita,”

Greece, which were to march against Greece in order to throw back into

the Mediterranean those British divisions which had landed, and to

relieve the rear of the Italian ally, were turned with the spearhead to

the right, and with accelerated, short-notice preparations for attack,

they were thrown into the flank of the massed Yugoslav troops. The Air

Force was called from its airfields in Germany within a very short time

and assembled at the airfields in the southeast area, which was easily

possible, and was also used to support the attack. Only by such quick

action, and due to the fact that the basic conditions had been provided

by Operation Marita, was Germany able to stave off an extraordinary

danger to her entire position in the Balkans and in the southeast area

at that moment. Politically and from a military point of view it would

have been a crime against the State as far as the vital German interests

were concerned, if in that case the Führer had not acted as he did.

DR. STAHMER: What targets did the Air Force attack in Yugoslavia first?

GÖRING: I have just explained the very particular situation of the

German Armed Forces at the outbreak of this war and the problems which

had to be solved with extraordinary speed and the likewise extraordinary

results which had to be attained in order to carry out their original

task, which was the piercing of—I do not remember the name now—the

Metaxas line in northern Greece before English troops, which had already

landed near Athens, could come to the support of the Greek garrisons

along the Metaxas line.

Therefore there was first of all an order for a concentrated smaller

part of the German forces to penetrate that line, while the other part,

as planned, had to throw itself upon the Yugoslav Army and, here too

with insufficient forces in the shortest possible time, had to eliminate

this army. That was a necessary condition for the success of the whole

thing. Otherwise not only would the Italian Army surely be destroyed,

but the German Army, thus divided, with a part of its forces advancing

in Yugoslavia−the Bulgarian support came much later—another part

breaking through the strong Metaxas Line in time to prevent the English

deployment there, might get itself into a very difficult and critical,

and perhaps disastrous military position. Therefore the Air Force had,

in this case, to be employed with the greatest effect, in order that the

Yugoslav action of deployment against Germany and her ally should be

stopped as quickly as possible.

Therefore there was first of all an order for a concentrated attack upon

the Yugoslav Ministry of War in Belgrade, and secondly, upon the

railroad station, which in Belgrade particularly, in view of the small

number of Yugoslavian railroad lines, was a special deployment junction.

Then there were several other rather important centers, the General

Staff building, _et cetera_, included in the order because, at that

time, the political and military headquarters were still located in

Belgrade. Everything was still concentrated there, and the bombing of

that nerve center at the very beginning would have an extraordinary

paralyzing effect on the further deployment of the resistance.

A warning to Yugoslavia was not necessary for the following reasons.

Strictly speaking the objection might be raised that we did not send a

declaration of war or a warning. Actually, however, none of the leading

men in Yugoslavia had the least doubt but that Germany would attack.

That was recognized, for they had feverishly busied themselves with

deployment, and not only with mobilization. Moreover the attacks of the

German Army were made before the bombing of Belgrade. But even assuming

that the Air Force had made the first attack and only then the

Army—that is, without warning—Yugoslavia’s actions and the

extraordinary danger of the military situation would have demanded that.

We were already in the midst of the most severe battle. It was a

question of securing the Balkans on both sides and holding them firmly.

The targets—and I emphasize this once more—were, as I remember

exactly, the Ministry of War, the railroad station, the General Staff

building, and one or two other ministries. The city, of course, since

these buildings were spread about within the city, was also affected by

the bombardment.

DR. STAHMER: During the last days we have heard here repeatedly about

the aerial attacks on Warsaw, Coventry, and Rotterdam. Were these

attacks carried out beyond military necessity?

GÖRING: The witnesses, and especially Field Marshal Kesselring, have

reported about part of that. But these statements made me realize once

more, which is of course natural, how a commander of an army, an army

group or an air fleet really views only a certain sector. As

Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, however, I am in a position to view

the whole picture, since I, after all, was the man responsible for

issuing orders, and according to my orders and my point of view the

chiefs of the fleets received their instructions and directives as to

what they had to do.

Warsaw: First of all I should like to make clear the statement that on

the first morning of the attack on Poland, a number of Polish cities, I

believe the British prosecutor mentioned their names, were attacked. I

do not remember their names any more. In my instructions for the first

day of the attack on Poland it says specifically, first target:

destruction and annihilation of the enemy air force. Once that had been

achieved the other targets could be attacked without further delay.

Therefore I gave the order to attack the following airfields—I am

certain, without having the names at hand just now, that 80 percent of

the names mentioned were cities near which there were air bases. The

second main target, which was however to be attacked only to a slight

extent on the first day, or with the first main blow, were railroad

junctions of first importance for the marshaling of larger troop units.

I would point out that shortly before the last and decisive attack on

Warsaw, an air attack, about which I will speak in a minute, the French

military attaché in Poland sent a report to his government which we are

in a position to submit here, which we found later in Paris, from which

it can be seen that even this opponent declared that the German Air

Force, he had to admit, had attacked exclusively military targets in

Poland, “exclusively” particularly emphasized.

At first Warsaw contained only one, two targets, long before—“long

before” is the wrong expression because it took place quickly—in other

words, before the encirclement of Warsaw. That was the Okecie airfield,

where the main enemy Polish air force was concentrated, and the Warsaw

railroad station, one of the main strategic railroad stations of Poland.

However, these attacks discussed were not the decisive ones; after

Warsaw was encircled, it was asked to surrender. That surrender was

refused. On the contrary I remember the appeals which urged the entire

civilian population of Poland as well as the inhabitants of Warsaw to

offer resistance, not only military but also resistance as civilians,

which is contrary to international law, as is known. Still we gave

another warning. We dropped leaflets at first, not bombs, in which we

urged the population not to fight. Secondly, when the commanding officer

persisted in his stand, we urged the evacuation of the civilian

population before the bombing.

When a radio message was received that the commanding officer wanted to

send a truce emissary we agreed, but waited for him in vain. But then we

demanded that at least the diplomatic corps and all neutrals should

leave Warsaw on a road designated by us, which in fact was done.

Then, after it was clearly stated in the last appeal that we would now

be forced to make a heavy attack on the city if no surrender took place,

we proceeded to attack first the forts, then the batteries erected

within the city and the troops. That was the attack on Warsaw.

Rotterdam: In Rotterdam the situation was entirely different. In order

to terminate the campaign in the Netherlands as quickly as possible and

thereby avoid further bloodshed for a people with whom we had no basic

differences, but had to carry through this campaign only for the

previously mentioned reasons, I had suggested the use of the parachute

division in the rear of the entire Dutch forces deployed against

Germany, especially in order to capture the three most important

bridges, one near Moerdijk across the Rhine, the other near Dordrecht,

and the third near Rotterdam. Thereby from the beginning the way would

be paved in the rear of the entire troop deployment and, were we to

succeed, the Dutch Army with all its valor could only hold out for a few

days. This attack or landing of my parachute division on the three

bridges proved entirely successful.

While at Moerdijk and Dordrecht resistance was overcome quickly, the

unit at Rotterdam got into difficulty. First it was surrounded by Dutch

troops. Everything hinged on the fact that the railroad bridge and the

road bridge, which were next to each other, should under all

circumstances fall into our hands without being destroyed, because then

only would the last backdoor to the Dutch stronghold be open. While the

main part of the division was in the southern section of Rotterdam, a

few daring spearheads of the parachutists had crossed both bridges and

stood just north of them, at one point in the railroad station, right

behind the railroad bridges north of the river, and the second point

within a block of houses which was on the immediate north side of the

road bridge, opposite the station and near the well-known butter or

margarine factory which later played an important role. This spearhead

held its position in spite of heavy and superior attacks.

In the meantime a German panzer division approached Rotterdam from the

outside via the Moerdijk and Dordrecht bridges, and here I would like to

correct a misapprehension which arose in the cross-examination of Field

Marshal Kesselring by Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe concerning persons

involved. Lieutenant General Schmidt belonged to this group which came

from the outside and led the panzer troops. General Student led the

parachute division which was in Rotterdam, that is, inside, and that

explains the fact that at one time there were negotiations for

capitulation with the German commander of the troops coming from the

outside, and at another time surrender negotiations with the general

commanding the parachute troops within the city. Both were later

co-ordinated. I do not want to go into details here as to whether clear

agreements were arrived at—examining this chronologically one can trace

it down to the very minute—and whether it could be seen at all that

capitulation would come about or not; this of course, for the time being

concerned Rotterdam alone. At that time the group north of the two

bridges was in a very precarious and difficult position. Bringing

reinforcements across the two bridges was extremely difficult because

they were under heavy machine gun fire. To this day I could still draw

an exact picture of the situation. There was also artillery fire, so

that only a few individual men, swinging from hand to hand under the

bridge, were able to work their way across, in order to get out of the

firing line—I still remember exactly the situation at that bridge later

on.

It had been ordered that the batteries standing north of the station,

and also the Dutch forces on the road leading north between the station

and the butter factory, which presented a great handicap to our shock

troops, were to be bombed. For at that moment the parachute troops had

no artillery, and bombing was the only sort of artillery available for

the parachute troops, and I had assured my parachutists before the

venture that they would under all circumstances receive protection by

bombers against heavy fire. Three groups of a squadron were used. The

call for help came over the radio station of the paratroopers in

Rotterdam, which did not function as well as has been claimed here, and

also from the clearly exhibited and agreed upon ground signals which the

reconnaissance planes brought back. These were signs such as arrows,

indicators, and letters which intimated to the reconnaissance fliers:

“We are pressed by artillery from the north, east, south, _et cetera_.”

Thereupon I ordered the air fleet to use one squadron. The squadron

started in 3 groups, about 25 to 30 or 36 planes. When the first group

arrived, as far as I know, the surrender negotiations were in progress,

but to no clearly defined end. In spite of that red flares were sent up.

The first group did not grasp the significance of these flares but threw

their bombs as agreed upon, exactly in that area, as had been ordered.

If I remember the figures correctly, there were at the most 36

twin-motored planes which released mainly 50-kilo bombs. The second and

third groups which followed understood the red signals, turned around,

and did not drop their bombs.

There was no radio connection between Rotterdam and the planes. The

radio connection went from Rotterdam by way of my headquarters, Air

Fleet 2, to the division, from division to squadron ground station, and

from there there was a radio connection to the planes. That was in May

1940, when in general the radio connection between ground station and

planes was, to be sure, tolerably good but in no way to be compared with

the excellent connections which were developed in the course of the war.

But the main point was that Rotterdam could not communicate directly

with the planes and therefore sent up the signals agreed upon, the red

flares, which were understood by Groups 2 and 3, but not by group 1.

The great amount of destruction was not caused by bombs but, as has been

said, by fire. That can best be seen from the fact that all the

buildings which were built of stone and concrete are still standing in

the ruined part, while the older houses were destroyed. The spread of

this fire was caused by the combustion of large quantities of fats and

oils. Secondly—I want to emphasize this particularly—the spread of

this fire could surely have been prevented by energetic action on the

part of the Rotterdam fire department, in spite of the storm coming up.

The final negotiations for capitulation, as far as I remember, took

place not until about 6 o’clock in the evening. I know that, because

during these surrender negotiations there was still some shooting going

on and the paratroopers’ general, Student, went to the window during the

surrender negotiations and was shot in the head, which resulted in a

brain injury.

That is what I have to say about Rotterdam in explanation of the two

generals and their surrender negotiations, one from within and one from

without.

Coventry: After the period from 6 or 7 September to November, after

repeating warnings to the English Government, and after the Führer had

reserved for himself the right to give the order for reprisal attacks on

London—and had long hesitated to give this order—and after German

cities which were not military objectives had been bombed again and

again, then London was declared a target for attack. From 6 and 7

September—the first attack was on the 6 September in the afternoon—the

German Luftwaffe pounded London continuously. Although this seemed

expedient for reasons of retaliation and for reasons of political

pressure on the part of the political leadership, I did not consider it

of ultimate value.

I do not wish to be misunderstood when I say that I knew from the first

World War that the people of London can take a great deal and that we

could not break their military resistance in this manner. It was

important to me, first of all, to prevent an increase in the defense

power of the British Air Force. As a soldier or, better said, as

Commander-in-Chief of the German Luftwaffe, the weakening and

elimination of the enemy air force was a matter of decisive importance

for me.

Although the Führer wanted, now as before, to see London attacked, I,

acting on my own initiative, made exact preparations for the target of

Coventry because, according to my information, there was located in and

around Coventry an important part of the aircraft and aircraft

accessories industry. Birmingham and Coventry were targets of most

decisive importance for me. I decided on Coventry because there the most

targets could be hit within the smallest area.

I prepared that attack myself with both air fleets, which regularly

checked the target information—and then with the first favorable

weather, that is, a moonlit night, I ordered the attack and gave

directions for it to be carried out as long and as repeatedly as was

necessary to achieve decisive effects on the British aircraft industry

there. Then to switch to the next targets in Birmingham and to a large

motor factory south of Weston, after the aircraft industry, partly near

Bristol and south of London, had been attacked.

That was the attack on Coventry. That here the city itself was greatly

affected resulted likewise from the fact that the industry there was

widely spread over the city, with the exception of two new plants which

were outside the city, and again in this case the damage was increased

by the spreading of fire. If we look at German cities today, we know how

destructive the influence of fire is. That was the attack on Coventry.

DR. STAHMER: In the year 1941, negotiations took place about

collaboration with Japan. Were you present at these negotiations?

GÖRING: I myself did not take part in the negotiations. I can say very

little about negotiations with Japan because from a military point of

view I had very little to do with Japan and seldom met the Japanese.

During the entire war only once, and for a short time, I received a

delegation of Japanese officers and attachés. Therefore, I cannot say

anything about collaboration with Japan. We were instructed to exchange

experiences, war experiences, with the Japanese, but that went through

the various offices. Personally I had nothing to do with the Japanese.

DR. STAHMER: When were you first informed that Hitler thought a war

against Russia necessary?

GÖRING: It was not until the late fall of 1940, in Berchtesgaden, that I

was informed about the intentions of the Führer to enter into conflict

with Russia under certain circumstances.

DR. STAHMER: Were you present at the conversation, which took place in

Berlin in November 1940 with the Russian Foreign Minister, Molotov?

GÖRING: I personally was not present at the conversation between Hitler

and Molotov. Mr. Molotov, however, also paid me a visit, and we

discussed the general situation. I know, of course, about the

conversation with Molotov, because the Führer informed me about it in

detail. It was just this conversation which very much increased the

Führer’s suspicion that Russia was getting ready for an attack upon

Germany, and this was brought out during this discussion by the remarks

and demands which Mr. Molotov made.

These were, firstly, a guarantee to Bulgaria, and a pact of assistance

with Bulgaria, such as Russia had made with the three Baltic states.

Secondly, it involved the complete abandonment of Finland by Germany, to

such an extent that Russia, who had signed a peace with Finland a short

time ago, thought herself justified in attacking Finland again in order

not to have to acquiesce in the results of the previous agreements,

Hangö, _et cetera_.

Thirdly, it dealt with discussions about the Dardanelles and the

Bosporus; and the fourth point was the possibility of penetration into

Romania beyond Bessarabia.

These were the points which were discussed with the Führer. There was

also a hint to the Foreign Minister about an occupation, or securing of

interests, at the exit of the Baltic.

The Führer viewed these demands in a different light. Although Russia

might have been justified in making demands to Germany concerning

Finland, he believed, that in connection with other reports which he had

received about Russian preparations and deployment of troops, Russia

wanted to strengthen her position in Finland, in order to outflank

Germany in the north and to be in immediate proximity to the Swedish ore

mines, which were of vital or at least very decisive importance to

Germany in this war. Secondly, as to the advance, as demanded, into the

Romanian and Bulgarian area, the Führer was not at all sure that this

pressure would continue in the south, that is, the Dardanelles, or in a

near-easterly direction, but rather in a westerly direction; that is to

say, that here also Russia might push into the southern flank of Germany

and, by getting control of the Romanian oilfields, make Germany

absolutely dependent on Russia for deliveries of oil. In these demands

he saw the camouflaged attempts to deploy troops and obtain troop

positions against Germany. The suggestion of securing an outlet to the

Baltic did not even come up for discussion, as far as Germany was

concerned, at that time. Altogether that conversation caused the Führer

to feel that further relations were being menaced by Russia.

Already in his discussion with me the Führer told me why he was thinking

about anticipating the Russian drive under certain circumstances. The

information about feverish work on deployment preparations in the area

newly acquired by Russia, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and

Bessarabia, made him extremely suspicious. Until then we had sometimes

only 8, later 20 and 25 divisions along the entire eastern border.

Further reports came that Russia might be expected to attack us from the

rear as soon as Germany had gone to war in the West, either because of

an invasion by Britain or because Germany on her part had decided to

invade England. His arguments were strengthened even more by the fact

that shortly before, contrary to anything practiced in Russia before

this, engineers, and, I believe, also officers of ours, that is,

Germans, were suddenly shown the tremendous Russian armament works of

the aviation and tank industry. These reports about the surprisingly

high production capacity of these armament works further strengthened

the Führer’s conviction. He was so firmly convinced because, he

said—and this was his political reflection—if England still will not

consider coming to an agreement with us, although she now stands alone

against us, she must have something at the back of her mind. He had

information that Prime Minister Churchill had pointed out two things to

worried elements in England.

First, that increased support by the United States could be expected,

first of all in the technical field, that is, with respect to armaments,

and then extending to other fields; and, secondly, which he considered

even more probable, that Churchill had already come to an understanding

with Russia in that direction, and he pointed out that here sooner or

later there would be a clash. His calculations were the following:

Before the United States could be ready with her armaments and the

mobilization of her army, he would have to smash the Russian troop

concentrations, and break down and weaken the Russian forces to such an

extent by strong concentrated attacks, that they would not represent a

danger in the rear if he had to enter into an English-American conflict

on the Continent. These were the explanations of the Führer.

Then came the visit of Molotov, which I just mentioned and which

enhanced this point of view considerably.

DR. STAHMER: What was your attitude toward an attack on Russia at that

time?

GÖRING: At first I was very much surprised at the time and asked the

Führer to give me a few hours to state my view. It came entirely as a

surprise to me. Then in the evening, after this conversation had taken

place in the afternoon, I told the Führer the following:

I urged him most particularly not to start a war against Russia at that

moment, or even a short time after; not that I was moved by

considerations of international law or similar reasons; my point of view

was decided by political and military reasons only. First, at all times

since the seizure of power I, perhaps of all the leading men in Germany,

was the only one who always considered conflict with Russia as a

threatening menace to Germany. I knew—and many others with me—that for

over 10 years an exceedingly strong rearmament and training program had

been in effect in Russia, that the standard of living had been lowered

in all other fields in favor of one single tremendous rearmament. The

deliveries made by German industry and examination of the deliveries

made by the American, British, and other industries always showed

clearly that they consisted only of such machines as were directly or

immediately necessary for a gigantic industrial rearmament program. One

could thereby estimate the speed and the size of the Russian rearmament.

If Germany had now developed in the way of communism, then of course the

Russian rearmament, in my opinion, would have been directed against

other danger. But since we had come to power, the inner political and

ideological contrast naturally played, in my opinion, a menacing part. I

have come to understand that such contrasts do not necessarily have to

lead to conflicts between countries, because the political interests of

nation and state will always be stronger and greater than all

ideological contrasts or agreements. But here also I saw a menace,

because what did this tremendous Russian rearmament signify at a time

when Germany before the seizure of power, was impotent? I now told the

Führer that in spite of this basic attitude I always feared this danger

from Russia and had always recognized it, but that I was asking him

rather to leave this danger in abeyance and, if at all possible, to

direct Russia’s interests against England.

And indeed I said to him:

“We are at present fighting against one of the greatest world

powers, the British Empire. If you, my Führer, are not of

exactly the same opinion, then I have to contradict you, because

I am definitely of the opinion that sooner or later the second

great world power, the United States, will march against us.

This will not depend on the election of President Roosevelt; the

other candidate will also not be able to prevent this. Then we

shall be at war against two of the largest world powers. It was

your masterstroke at the beginning of the war to make possible a

one-front war; you have always pointed that out in your _Kampf_.

In the case of a clash with Russia at this time, the third great

world power would be thrown into the struggle against Germany.

We would again stand alone, against practically the entire

world; the other nations do not count. And again we would have

two fronts.”

And he replied,

“I fully appreciate your arguments. I appreciate the Russian

menace more than anybody else, but if we should succeed in

executing our plans as prepared in the fight against the British

Empire, and if these were only half-way successful, Russia would

not launch her attack. Only if we should become deeply involved

in a serious conflict in the West, would I be of your opinion,

that the Russian menace would increase enormously.”

I was even of the opinion that the quick assent of the Russians to the

settlement of the Polish crisis was given in order that Germany, free

from that side, would be all the more likely to get into this conflict,

because the German-French-British conflict would come about thereby, and

it would be entirely understandable, as far as Russian interests were

concerned, to bring about this conflict and come out of it as well as

before. I furthermore told the Führer that, according to my reports and

evidence, Russian rearmament would reach its climax in the year 1942-43,

or perhaps even in 1944. Before then we should, however, succeed, if not

in achieving a peace by victory on our part, at least in coming to an

arrangement with England. This, however, would be possible only if

decisive successes were achieved against England. At that time the

German Air Force with all its weight was being employed in the attack on

England. If now a new front should be formed for an attack on Russia, a

considerable part of these air forces, more than half, two-thirds, would

have to be diverted to the East. For practical purposes an energetic air

attack on England would thereby cease. All the sacrifices up to that

time would be in vain; England would be given a chance to reorganize and

build up her shattered aircraft industry undisturbed.

Much more decisive than these considerations was the fact that with a

deployment of that kind against Russia, my plan, which I had submitted

to the Führer, to attack England at Gibraltar and Suez, would have to be

dropped more or less finally. The attack on Gibraltar was so

methodically prepared by the Air Force that, according to all human

expectations, there could be no failure. The British air force stationed

there on the small airfield north of the Rock of Gibraltar was of no

importance. The attack of my paratroopers on the Rock would have been a

success. The simultaneous occupation of the other side, the African

side, and a subsequent march on Casablanca and Dakar would at least have

been a safeguard against America’s intervention—a campaign, such as

later took place in North Africa. To what extent beyond this, by

agreement, the Cape Verde Islands could still be used, was an open

question. It is obvious what it would have meant to be established with

aircraft and submarines at North African bases and to attack all the

convoys coming up from Capetown and South America from such favorable

positions. Even if the Mediterranean had been closed in the west, it

would not have been difficult, by pushing across Tripoli, to bring the

Suez project to a conclusion, the time and success of which could be

calculated in advance.

The exclusion of the Mediterranean as a theater of war, the key point

Gibraltar—North Africa down to Dakar—Suez, and possibly extended

further south, would have required only a few forces, a number of

divisions on the one side and a number of divisions on the other, to

eliminate the entire insecurity of the long Italian coast line against

the possibility of attack.

I urged him to put these decisive considerations in the foreground and

only after the conclusion of such an undertaking to examine further the

military and political situation with regard to Russia. For, if these

conditions were brought about, we would be in a favorable position in

the case of an intervention by the United States, a flanking position. I

explained to him all these reasons in great detail and pointed out to

him again and again that here we would be giving up something relatively

secure for something still insecure, and that, after securing such a

position, there would be much more of a prospect of coming, under

certain circumstances, to an arrangement with England at a time when the

two, both armed, would be standing opposite each other, the one on this,

the other on that side of the Channel. These were my reasons for

delaying the date, and I also told him that increased successes in this

direction might enable us to steer Russian preparations politically,

where possible, into other channels, against our enemies of the moment.

I emphasize, however, that the Führer, restrained by considerations of

caution, at first made only general preparations and was going to hold

in reserve, as he told me at the time, the actual attack; and the final

decision was not taken until after the Simovic revolt in Yugoslavia.

THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.

[_A recess was taken._]

DR. STAHMER: The Prosecution has submitted Document Number 376-PS, notes

of 29 October 1940, Paragraph 5 of which states the following: “The

Führer concerns himself with the question of a later war with America

and with an examination of the occupation of the Atlantic islands.”

What can you say about this?

GÖRING: I am very well acquainted with this document because it has been

submitted to me here. It concerns a letter which the representative of

the Luftwaffe in the OKW, the then Lieutenant Colonel Von Falkenstein,

wrote to the chief of the General Staff of my Air Force. It is a study

of, it refers to those points which I have just set forth, namely the

occupation of Gibraltar, North Africa, and perhaps also the Atlantic

Islands—first as a combat base against England, our enemy at that time,

and, secondly, in case America entered the war, to have a better

flanking position against her convoys. But this was just a General Staff

note. At that time I had already of my own accord, without having spoken

to the Führer beforehand, made my military investigation of the

possibility of carrying out such an undertaking. It is, therefore, of no

consequence.

DR. STAHMER: In this connection I have a further question. An

organization plan for the year 1950 prepared by a Major Kammhuber has

been submitted here.

GÖRING: This question also may be answered briefly. I am familiar with

this document, for on two or three occasions it has been mentioned by

the Prosecution. Consultation with an expert general staff officer of

any one of the powers represented would prove immediately that this

document is of secondary value. It is simply a General Staff study, by

the subordinate Organization Section, in order to work out the best

scheme for a leadership organization. It was a question of whether one

should concentrate on air fleets or land fortifications. It was a

question of whether mixed squadrons consisting of bombers and fighters,

or squadrons consisting only of bombers, or of fighters, should be used,

and other such questions which are always being dealt with by the

offices of a general staff, independent of war and peace. That such

studies must of course be based on certain assumptions which are in the

realm of strategic possibility, must be taken for granted. In this case

the Major took as a basis the situation around or until 1950, a

two-front war, which was not entirely beyond all probability, namely, a

war on the one side with England and France in the west, and on the

other side with Russia in the east. The basic assumption was that

Austria and Poland were in our own hands, and so on. This study never

reached me. I have just become acquainted with it here. But that is of

no significance because it was made in my ministry and in my general

staff and was therefore also made on my orders. For I placed such tasks

within the general framework of having organization, leadership, and

composition constantly tested by maneuvers and examples. This is

completely irrelevant to the political evaluation and completely out of

place in the framework of this Trial.

DR. STAHMER: Several days ago reference was made to a speech which you

are said to have made to Air Force officers, in which you said that you

proposed to have such an air force that, once the hour had struck, it

would fall like an avenging host on the enemy. The opponent must have

the feeling of having lost before he ever started fighting with you. I

shall have this speech submitted to you and I would like you to tell us

whether this speech was known to you and what its purpose was?

GÖRING: This quotation has been used by the Prosecution twice. Once in

the beginning and the second time, the other day, in the

cross-examination of Field Marshal Milch. This concerns a speech which

appeared in a book by me called _Speeches and Compositions_ which has

already been submitted to the Tribunal as evidence. The speech is called

“Comradeship, Fulfillment of Duty, and Willingness to Sacrifice,” an

address to 1,000 flight lieutenants on the day they took their oath in

Berlin on 20 May 1936.

Here I was explaining at length to thousands of young flyers, the day

they became commissioned officers, the concepts of comradeship,

fulfillment of duty, and willingness to sacrifice. This quotation had

been completely removed from its context. I therefore take the liberty

of asking the Tribunal’s permission, to read a short preceding

paragraph, so that it will be seen in the right context, and I also

request to be allowed to portray the atmosphere. Before me stand 1,000

young flight lieutenants full of hope, whom I now had to imbue with the

appropriate fighting spirit. That has nothing to do with an offensive

war, but the important thing was that my boys, should it come to war,

this way or that, should be brave fellows and men with a will to act.

The short quotation before this one is as follows:

“I demand of you nothing impossible. I do not demand that you

should be model boys. I like to be generous. I understand that

youth must have its follies, otherwise it would not be youth.

You may have your pranks, and you will get your ears boxed for

it. But that is not the decisive factor. The decisive factor is

rather that you should be honorable, decent fellows, that you

should be men. You can have your fun as much as you wish, but

once you get into the plane you must be men, determined to smash

all resistance. That is what I demand of you, brave, daring

fellows.”

Then comes the paragraph which has just been read. “I have visions”

. . . “of possessing a weapon” . . . “which shall come like an avenging

host against the foe.” That has nothing to do with vengeance, for “an

avenging host” is a _terminus technicus_, a usual term, in Germany. I

might just as well have said that the opponent would use another word to

express the same thing. I shall not read any further here, for these

words, if I were to read them, would be readily understandable; one has

to realize to whom I was speaking.

DR. STAHMER: To what extent did you assist in the economic and military

preparation of Case Barbarossa?

GÖRING: As Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force I naturally took all the

measures which were necessary in the purely military field for the

preparation of such a campaign. Consent or refusal, as I have already

recently explained. . . . I took the obvious military preparations which

are always necessary in connection with a new strategic deployment, and

which every officer was in duty bound to carry out, and for which the

officers of the Air Corps received their command from me. I do not

believe that the Tribunal would be interested in the details as to how I

carried out the deployment of my air fleet. The decisive thing at the

time of the first attacks was, as before, to smash the enemy air arm as

the main objective. Independent of the purely military preparations,

which were a matter of duty, economic preparations seemed necessary

according to our experiences in the previous war with Poland, and in the

war in the West; and doubly necessary in the case of Russia, for here we

encountered a completely different form of economic life from that in

the other countries of the Continent. Here it was a matter of state

economy and state ownership; there was no private economy or private

ownership worth mentioning. That I was charged with this was again a

matter of course resulting from the fact that I, as Delegate for the

Four Year Plan, directed the whole economy and had to provide the

necessary instructions. I had therefore instructed the War Economy Staff

to formulate a general economic plan for the invasion, in consultation

with economic experts on Russia, especially as we had to expect that

with our advance, Russia, according to long-established procedure, would

destroy large parts of its economy. The result of these prepared

economic mobilization studies was the so-called “Green File.” I am of

the opinion that in every future war, as in past wars on other sides,

there must always be an economic mobilization besides a military and

political mobilization; otherwise one would get into very unpleasant

situations.

The Green File has been cited repeatedly, and also here some of the

quotations have been torn from their context. In order to save time I do

not wish to read further passages from this Green File. That can perhaps

be done when documentary evidence is given. But if I were to read the

whole Green File from beginning to end, from A to Z, the Tribunal would

see that this is a very useful and suitable work for armed forces which

have to advance into a territory with a completely different economic

structure; the Court will also realize that it could be worked out only

that way. This Green File contains much positive material, and here and

there a sentence which, cited alone, as has been done, gives a false

picture. It provides for everything, among other things for

compensation. If an economy exists in a state, when one enters into war

with that state, and if one then gains possession of that economy, it is

to one’s interest to carry out this economy only insofar, of course, as

the interests of one’s own war needs are concerned—that goes without

saying. But in order to save time I shall dispense with the reading of

those pages which would exonerate me considerably for, I am stating, as

a whole as it is, that our making claims on the Russian state economy

for German purposes, after the conquest of those territories, was just

as natural and just as much a matter of duty for us as it was for Russia

when she occupied German territories, but with this difference, that we

did not dismantle and transport away the entire Russian economy down to

the last bolt and screw, as is being done here. These are measures which

result from the conduct of war. I naturally take complete responsibility

for them.

DR. STAHMER: A document has been submitted as Document Number 2718-PS,

and this reads as follows:

“Memorandum concerning the result of today’s conference with the

state secretaries in regard to Barbarossa.

“1. The war can be continued further only if the entire Armed

Forces can be supplied with food by Russia in the third year of

war.

“2. Millions of people will hereby doubtless starve if we take

from this country that which is needed by us.”

Were you informed of the subject of this conference with the state

secretaries and of this document.

GÖRING: I became familiar with this document only when it was submitted

to me here. This is a rather unreliable document. We can not tell

clearly just who was present, where this was discussed, and who was

responsible for the nonsense that is expressed in it. It is a matter of

course that, within the framework of all the conferences of official

experts, many things were discussed which proved to be absolute

nonsense.

First of all the German Armed Forces would have been fed, even if there

had been no war with Russia. Therefore it was not the case, as one might

conclude from this, that, in order to feed the German Armed Forces, we

had to attack Russia. Before the attack on Russia the German Army was

fed, and it would have been fed thereafter. But if we had to march and

advance into Russia it was a matter of course that the army would always

and everywhere be fed from that territory.

The feeding of several millions of people, that is, two or three, if I

figure the entire troop deployment in Russia with all its staff, cannot

possibly result in the starvation of many, many millions on the other

side. It is impossible for one soldier on the one side to eat so much

that on the other side there is not enough left for three times that

number. The fact is moreover that the population did not starve.

However, famine had become a possibility, not because the German Army

was to be fed from Russia, but because of the destruction or the sending

back by the Russians of all agricultural implements, and of the entire

seed stocks. It was first of all impossible to bring the harvest, which

had been partly destroyed by the retreating Russian troops, in from the

fields to an extent even approaching what was necessary, because of

inadequate implements; and, secondly, the spring and autumn crops were

greatly endangered owing to the lack of implements and seed.

If this crisis was met, it was not because the Russian troops had not

destroyed or removed everything, but because Germany had to draw heavily

on her own stocks. Tractors, agricultural machines, scythes, and other

things had to be procured, even seed, so that for the time being the

troops were not fed by the country, but food had to be sent from

Germany—even straw and hay. Only through the greatest efforts of

organization and administration, and in co-operation with the local

population could a balance gradually be achieved in the agricultural

sector, and also a surplus for the German territories.

As far as I know, famine occurred only in Leningrad, as has also been

mentioned here.

But Leningrad was a fortress which was being besieged. In the history of

war I have until now found no evidence that the besieger generously

supplies the besieged with food in order that they can resist longer;

rather I know only of evidence in the history of wars that the besiegers

do everything to force the surrender of the fortress by cutting off the

food supply. Neither from the point of view of international law nor

from the point of view of the military conduct of war were we under any

obligation to provide besieged fortresses or cities with food.

DR. STAHMER: And what part did the Air Force play in the attacks on

Leningrad?

GÖRING: The air force at Leningrad was very weak. The most northern

sector of our position had the poorest air protection, so that the air

force there had to carry out very many tasks simultaneously. At no time

was there a concentrated attack by the Air Force on Leningrad, such as

we have made on other cities or as have been carried out on German

cities on the largest scale. The Führer not once but repeatedly, in the

presence of other gentlemen at briefing sessions, reproachfully said

that apparently the German Luftwaffe dared not venture into Leningrad. I

replied:

“As long as my Air Force is ready to fly into the hell of London

it will be equally prepared to attack the much less defended

city of Leningrad. However I lack the necessary forces, and

besides you must not give me so many tasks for my Air Force

north of the front, such as preventing reinforcements from

coming over Lake Ladoga and other tasks.”

Attacks were therefore made only on Kronstadt and on the fleet which was

left in the outer bay of Leningrad, and other targets such as heavy

batteries.

I was interested to hear from the sworn testimony of the Russian

professor for museums, that he was under the impression that the German

Air Force was mainly out to destroy museums, and then from the

testimony—not sworn to—by I believe he called himself a metropolitan,

who had the impression that my Air Force had mainly chosen his

cathedrals as targets. I would like to call your attention to this

contradiction—perhaps understandable for people who are not experts.

St. Petersburg was in fact at the very front of the fighting, and it was

not necessary to attack by air, for medium and heavy artillery was

sufficient to reach the center of the city.

DR. STAHMER: Was confiscation by the occupying power in Russia limited

to state property?

GÖRING: In connection with the last question I forgot to mention

something briefly.

There has been a great deal of talk here about the great destruction in

Russia. Pictures and films were shown, impressive in themselves, but not

so impressive to a German, for they showed only a modest proportion of

the destruction which we personally experienced in our own cities. But I

would like to point out that much of this destruction took place in the

course of battle, in other words, that destruction was not intended, by

the Air Force or by the artillery, but that cities, historical cities or

art monuments were very frequently destroyed by battle action.

Also, in Germany men of the rank of the musician and composer

Tschaikovsky, and the poets Tolstoy and Pushkin are too highly revered

for deliberate destruction of the graves of these great and creative men

of culture to have been intended.

Now to the question whether only state property was confiscated; as far

as I know, yes. Private property, as has been mentioned here from state

documents—I can easily imagine that in the cold winter of 1941-42

German soldiers took fur shoes, felt boots, and sheep furs here and

there from the population—that is possible; but by and large there was

no private property, therefore it could not be confiscated. I personally

can speak only of a small section, namely of the surroundings of the

city of Vinnitza and the city of Vinnitza itself. When I stopped there

with my special train as headquarters, I repeatedly visited the peasant

huts, the villages, and the town of Vinnitza, because life there

interested me.

I saw such abject poverty there that I cannot possibly imagine what one

could have taken. As an insignificant but informative example I would

like to mention that for empty marmalade jars, tin cans, or even empty

cigar boxes or cigarette boxes, the people would offer remarkable

quantities of eggs and butter because they considered these primitive

articles very desirable.

In this connection I would also like to emphasize that no theaters or

the like were ever consciously destroyed either with my knowledge or

that of any other German person. I know only the theater in Vinnitza

that I visited. I saw the actors and actresses there and the ballet. The

first thing I did was to get material, dresses, and all sorts of things

for these people because they had nothing.

As the second example, the destruction of churches. This is also a

personal experience of mine in Vinnitza. I was there when the dedication

took place of the largest church which for years had been a powder

magazine, and now, under the German administration, was reinstated as a

church. The clergy requested me to be present at this dedication.

Everything was decorated with flowers. I declined because I do not

belong to the Greek Orthodox Church.

As far as the looting of stores was concerned, I could see only one

store in Vinnitza that was completely empty.

DR. STAHMER: What was the significance for the Air Force of the work

camp Dora, which has been mentioned by the French Prosecution?

GÖRING: Before I go on to that I must add that the accusation that we

destroyed industry everywhere is incorrect, but rather for our own

purposes we had to reconstruct a great part of industry. Thus I would

like to recall the famous dam of Dniepropetrovsk which was destroyed and

which was important for the electricity supply of the entire Ukraine,

and even for the Donetz area.

As far as industry and agriculture are concerned, I have spoken of that

before and mentioned the scorched earth policy as it was described in

the Russian order and as it was carried out. This scorched earth policy,

the destruction of all stock, of everything, created a very difficult

situation which was hard to overcome. Therefore, from the economic point

of view, we also had much reconstruction to do.

As far as destruction of cities is concerned, I would like to add that

over and beyond that which was shot to pieces in the course of battle,

during the advance or retreat, there were considerable parts and

important buildings of cities that had been mined and at the proper time

went up in the air, involving, of course, many German victims. I can

cite Odessa and Kiev as two main examples.

Now I come to the question of Camp Dora. I also heard about Camp Dora

here for the first time. Of course, I knew of the subterranean works

which were near Nordhausen, though I never was there myself. But they

had been established at a rather early period. Nordhausen produced

mainly V-1’s and V-2’s. With the conditions in Camp Dora, as they have

been described, I am not familiar. I also believe that they are

exaggerated. Of course, I knew that subterranean factories were being

built. I was also interested in the construction of further plants for

the Luftwaffe. I cannot see why the construction of subterranean works

should be something particularly wicked or destructive. I had ordered

construction of an important subterranean work at Kahla in Thuringia for

airplane production in which, to a large extent, German workers and, for

the rest, Russian workers and prisoners of war were employed. I

personally went there to look over the work being done and on that day

found everyone in good spirits. On the occasion of my visit I brought

the people some additional rations of beverages, cigarettes, and other

things, for Germans and foreigners alike.

The other subterranean works for which I requested concentration camp

internees were not built any more. That I requested inmates of

concentration camps for the aviation industry is correct, and it is in

my opinion quite natural because I was, at that time, not familiar with

the details of the concentration camps. I knew only that many Germans

also were in concentration camps—people who had refused to join the

Army, who were politically unreliable, or who had been punished for

other things, as also happens in other countries in time of war. At that

time everyone had to work in Germany. Women were taken into the ranks of

labor, including those who had never worked before. In my own home

parachute production was started, in which everyone had to participate.

I could not see why, if the entire people had to take part in work, the

inmates of prisons, concentration camps, or wherever they might be,

should not also be put to use for work essential to the war.

Moreover I am of the opinion, from what I know today, that it certainly

was better for them to work and to be billeted in some plane factory

than in their concentration camps. The fact _per se_ that they worked,

is to be taken as a matter of course, and also that they worked for war

production. But that work meant destruction is a new idea. It is

possible that it was strenuous here or there. I for my part was

interested that these people should not be destroyed, but that they

should work and thereby produce. The work itself was the same as done by

German workers—that is, plane and motor production—no destruction was

intended thereby.

DR. STAHMER: Under what conditions were prisoners of war used in

anti-aircraft operations?

GÖRING: Prisoners of war were used for anti-aircraft operations mainly

for those stationary batteries at home which were for the protection of

factories and cities. And indeed these were auxiliary volunteers. They

were chiefly Russian prisoners of war, but not entirely as far as I

remember. One must not forget that in Russia there were various racial

groups who did not think alike and did not all have the same attitude to

the system there. Just as there were so-called East Battalions made up

of volunteers, so there were also a great number of volunteers who,

after the announcement in the camps, reported for service in the

anti-aircraft batteries. We also had an entire company of Russian

prisoners of war who volunteered to fight against their own country. I

did not think much of these people, but in time of war one takes what

one can get. The other side did the same thing.

The volunteer auxiliaries liked to go to the anti-aircraft because they

had considerably less work there and their food was better as it was

soldiers’ rations; whatever other reasons they may have had I do not

know. However, if one did look at a local German anti-aircraft battery

in the year 1944 or 1945 it made, I admit, a rather strange impression.

There were German youths from 15 to 16 and old men from 55 to 60, some

women and some auxiliary volunteers of all nationalities, I always

called them my “gypsy batteries.” But they shot, and that was what

mattered.

DR. STAHMER: What was Sauckel’s official relation to you?

GÖRING: I mentioned that in the Four Year Plan in 1936 there was already

a Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor. In the year 1942,

after he had become ill and was being represented by somebody else, I

was taken aback by the direct appointment of a new Plenipotentiary

General for the Allocation of Labor—an appointment made directly by the

Führer, and without my being consulted.

But at that time the Führer had already begun to intervene much more

strongly and directly in such problems. If he did it here too, he did so

because the labor problem became more acute from day to day. It had been

suggested to him that he should appoint a new deputy for the time being,

perhaps a Gauleiter of a different name, the one from Silesia. But the

Führer decided on the Gauleiter from Thuringia, Sauckel, and made him

plenipotentiary. This order was countersigned by Lammers, not by me, but

that is of no significance; and it was formally included in the Four

Year Plan, for the Four Year Plan had general plenary authority for all

matters concerning economy. For this reason, up to the end even the

appointment of Goebbels as Plenipotentiary General for the total war,

which had nothing at all to do with me, was also included in the plenary

power of the Four Year Plan, since otherwise the entire legislative work

of the Four Year Plan, which I had gradually built up with its plenary

powers, would have collapsed and we should have had to create entirely

new conditions.

If Sauckel from that time on received his orders mainly from the Führer,

it was because the Führer now intervened more effectively in all these

matters; but I welcomed the appointment of Sauckel, for I considered him

one of the calmest and most reliable Gauleiters and was also convinced

that he would fully dedicate himself to this new task. The connection

with the offices of the Four Year Plan was of course maintained, and in

the case of important legislative decrees Sauckel and my offices of the

Four Year Plan worked together, as far as I know.

Sauckel himself spoke to me on several occasions after he had been with

the Führer, and sent me also a few of the reports which he sent to the

Führer. Even if not in full detail I was, on the whole, informed.

DR. STAHMER: In March of 1944, 75 English Air Force officers escaped

from the prisoner-of-war camp Stalag Luft III. As you probably know from

the proceedings, 50 of these officers after their recapture were shot by

the SD. Did this order for shooting come from you, and did you know of

this intention?

GÖRING: I came to know of the course of events, but unfortunately not

until a later period. When these 75 or 80 English Air Force officers

attempted to escape during the last 10 days of March, I was at the

moment on leave, as I can prove. I heard 1 or 2 days later about this

escape. As, however, prior to that, a few large escapes had already

taken place and each time a few days later most of the escaped prisoners

had been brought back to camp, I assumed that would happen in this case

also.

On my return from my leave, the chief of my general staff told me that a

part, but he could not give me the figure at the time, of these escaped

officers had been shot. This had to a certain extent caused talk and

excitement in our Luftwaffe; one also feared reprisals. I asked from

whom he had his information and what had really happened. He said he

knew only that part of the escaped men had been recaptured by the camp

guards in the vicinity of the camp, and by the police authorities in the

immediate neighborhood, and had been brought back to camp. Nothing had

happened to these men. On the other hand, of the fate of those who had

been recaptured at a greater distance from the camp he knew only that

some of them had been shot.

I then went to Himmler and asked him. He confirmed this without

mentioning a definite figure, and told me that he had received the order

from the Führer. I called his attention to the fact that such a thing

was utterly impossible, and that the English officers in particular were

bound to make at least one or two attempts to escape and that we knew

this. He said, I believe, that he had at least opposed the Führer in

this matter at first, but that the Führer had absolutely insisted on it,

since he maintained that escapes to such an extent represented an

extreme danger to security.

I told him then that this would lead to the most severe agitation among

my forces, for no one would understand this action, and that if he were

to give such orders, he could at least inform me before carrying them

out so that I might have the opportunity of countermanding them if

possible.

After giving these instructions I talked to the Führer personally about

the matter, and the Führer confirmed the fact that he had given the

order and told me why—the reasons just mentioned. I explained to him

why this order, according to our opinion, was completely impossible and

what repercussions it would cause with regard to my airmen employed

against the enemy in the West.

The Führer—our relations were already extremely bad and

strained—answered rather violently that the airmen who were flying

against Russia have to reckon with the possibility of being immediately

beaten to death in case of an emergency landing, and that airmen going

to the West should not want to claim a special privilege in this

respect. I then told him that these two things really had no connection

with each other.

Then I talked with the Chief of my General Staff and asked him—I

believe he was the Quartermaster General—to write to the OKW and say

that I was now requesting, that the Air Force was requesting, that these

camps be taken from our control. I did not want to have anything more to

do with prisoner-of-war camps in case such things should happen again.

This letter was closely connected with those events, a few weeks after

those events. That is what I know about this matter.

DR. STAHMER: Witness Von Brauchitsch testified the other day that in May

of 1944 the Führer decreed the strictest measures against the so-called

terror-fliers. Did you, in compliance with this Führer decree, issue

instructions to shoot enemy terror-fliers or to have them handed over to

the SD?

GÖRING: The definition of “terror-fliers” was very confused. A part of

the population, and also of the press, called everything which attacked

cities “terror-fliers,” more or less. Tremendous excitement had arisen

among the German population because of the very heavy and continued

attacks on German cities, in the course of which the population saw to a

certain extent that the really important industrial targets were less

frequently hit than houses and nonmilitary targets. Some German cities

had thus suffered most severely in their residential districts, while

the industries in these same cities remained on the whole untouched.

Then with the further flights of enemy forces to Germany there came

so-called low-flying aircraft which attacked both military and

nonmilitary targets. Reports came repeatedly to the Führer, and I too

heard of these reports, that the civilian population was being attacked

with machine guns and cannons; that single vehicles, which could be

recognized as civilian vehicles, and also ambulances which were marked

with a red cross, had been attacked. One report came in—I remember it

distinctly because the Führer became especially excited about it—which

said that a group of children had been shot at. Men and women standing

in front of stores had also been shot at. And these activities were now

called those of terror-fliers. The Führer was extremely excited.

The populace in its fury resorted at first to lynching, and we tried at

first to take measures to prevent this. I heard then that instructions

had been given through the police and Bormann not to take measures

against this. These reports multiplied, and the Führer then decreed, or

made a statement to the effect that these terror-fliers should be shot

on the spot.

The belief that these fliers had been forbidden by their superiors to

make such attacks, and that really they were to attack with their

weapons only targets which could be recognized as military, I had

confirmed beforehand through an interrogation of the airmen.

Now, as is often the case in matters of this kind, all offices which had

anything to do with this were called in and we were aware, as

Brauchitsch has already declared—not only those of us in the Air Force,

but also those in the OKW and other military offices—that it would be

very hard to formulate and to support an order in regard to this matter.

First of all the term “terror-flier” would have to be defined once and

for all. In this connection four points were set down, and these points

have already been read here.

Debate on this matter went to and fro. In general I expressed the

opinion that these fliers, since they were prohibited by their own

superiors to do these things, could be legally prosecuted by a military

court every time. At any rate we arrived at no definite order after long

bickering; and no office of the Air Force was ever instructed to

undertake any steps in this direction.

The document in which it is said on 6 June 1944 that a conference

between Himmler, Ribbentrop, and me took place in Klessheim and which is

signed by Warlimont, states that Warlimont said that Kaltenbrunner had

told him he had learned that such a conference had taken place. It does

not say it actually took place. Now this day, 6 June 1944, is a very

significant day, as Brauchitsch has already explained, for it is the day

of the invasion in France. I no longer know exactly who came to

Klessheim. Klessheim is a castle near Berchtesgaden and was used when

allied or foreign missions came to visit.

For a long time already it had been customary that when such allied

visits took place I, as Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, was not

present for each of these visitors naturally wanted above all, on the

occasion of these conversations, to obtain help from the German Air

Force and always asked for German fighters and machines no matter

whether it was Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Finland, or Italy or someone

else. I made a point of not being there on such occasions, so that the

Führer might have an opportunity to be evasive and to say, “I must first

consult with the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Forces.”

Therefore I had already left Berchtesgaden on the 4th or the 3rd, as far

as I remember, and was on my estate near Nuremberg. The General Staff

officer who accompanied me, the physician and various others will be

able to testify to this if necessary. In the morning hours I learned

here of the invasion. Brauchitsch is wrong in one point, that this had

already been reported as an invasion. On the contrary, in response to my

further inquiry it was said that one could not yet tell whether it was a

diversion maneuver or the actual invasion. Thereupon I returned to

Berchtesgaden in the late evening or in the afternoon—I remember

exactly. I left after lunch and it takes about 4-1/2 hours from here. I

therefore did not take part in the conference on this matter with

Ribbentrop or Himmler in Klessheim or anywhere else, and I want to

emphasize this especially. This conference was held by my adjutant, Von

Brauchitsch, that is, my General Staff officer, and he was the one who

told the OKW, without consulting me once more, that it was my opinion

that it was right to have court proceedings in such cases. The decisive

thing, however, is that no such order as a Führer order, or as an order

of mine, was issued to any office of the Luftwaffe or to the transit

camp or interrogation camp in Oberursel, or to any part of the troops.

A document which has been read here concerns a report from Luftgau XI,

which mentions the shooting of American fliers. I believe they were

Americans, and this is mentioned in this connection because it says

Luftgau XI. I looked through the document—there are two very detailed

appendices. It is stated very definitely and clearly here that Luftgau

XI reported that a crew which had bailed out and been rescued from the

lake by some troops which did not belong to the Air Force, were shot by

the police while on the way to the airfield—the exact name of the

police office is given—that they therefore did not reach the airfield,

but had been shot beforehand by the police. Luftgau XI duly reports

these events as required. In the attached report each of the men is

mentioned by name and also what happened to him. Some were taken to

hospitals, others, as said before, were shot. And all these reports and

each individual report sheet can be explained by the fact that the

Luftgau offices, as the competent offices at home, were instructed

automatically to make reports on a printed form as to whether it was a

crash or a forced landing of our own or of enemy aircraft; at what time;

whether the crew bailed out; whether the crew was killed, or half of it

killed; whether they were brought to the camp or to the hospital. And in

this case it is correctly reported, “Shot by the police while trying to

escape; buried at such and such a place.”

Records of this type ran into hundreds; I mean records of our own and of

hostile craft, which had been shot down with their crews, in the heavy

air fighting. The records were channeled from the Luftgau to the

competent offices. The Air Force itself had nothing to do with this; it

is very clear from the German original document that this was merely a

report.

In this connection there were heated discussions. All of the gentlemen

who had to take part in the Führer’s daily briefing sessions will recall

exactly that the Führer repeatedly told me in a very unfriendly manner

that he definitely wished to know the names and the punishment of those

officers who again and again had protected fliers from the population. I

did not have these people searched for or arrested, nor did I have them

punished. I always pointed out to the Führer that it had already

happened that even our own fliers who had bailed out had been most

severely mishandled by our own people, who at first were completely

confused, and I therefore repeatedly emphasized on behalf of the Air

Force that such things must be stopped.

There was one last sharp controversy, again in the presence of many

gentlemen, at a briefing session in which, when again I referred to

these things, the Führer cut me short with the words, “I well know that

both air forces have come to a mutual agreement of cowardice.” Whereupon

I told him, “We have not come to an agreement of cowardice, but somehow

we airmen have always remained comrades, no matter how much we fight

each other.” All the gentlemen present will remember this.

DR. STAHMER: What was your attitude as the highest judicial authority of

the Luftwaffe with regard to punishable acts committed by the soldiers

under you in occupied territory?

GÖRING: As highest judicial authority I had all the bad cases referred

to me and spent many hours examining them. That is why I attach

particular importance to the highest legal counsel of the Air Force by

being heard here on this point. In many cases I rescinded sentences

because they were too mild, especially if it was a matter of rape. In

these cases I always confirmed the death sentence which had been handed

down by the court, unless an appeal for mercy was made by the injured

party in exceptional cases. I thus confirmed the death sentence of a

number of members of the Air Force who took part in the murder of

inhabitants of the occupied territories in the East as well as in the

West.

I do not wish to take up the time of the Tribunal by citing a number of

detailed cases which would prove this. Beyond this I was the judicial

authority with regard to such inhabitants of occupied territories as

were brought before an Air Force court. For instance, when in France,

Holland, or Russia or another country, the native civilian population

had helped enemy fliers to escape, or had been guilty of acts of

sabotage on airplanes, or had engaged in espionage in connection with

the Air Force, that is to say, all punishable acts which had taken place

in connection with the Air Force. The war situation demanded, of course,

that in general we should enforce strict measures here.

I should like to say in this connection that death sentences were, of

course, also duly pronounced by the courts on women. In all these cases

involving women, during the entire war years, I did not once confirm

with my signature a single death sentence on a woman, not even in the

case of fatal attacks, or participation in such on members of my

Luftwaffe; even in the most severe cases I did not fail to give a

reprieve.