I proceeded to my apartment and at once had a call put through to the

Gestapo. I demanded a report of the events of that night. That is the

report which has been referred to here and which was made to me by the

Chief of the Gestapo, Heydrich, concerning the events, as much as he

knew about them at that time; that was the evening of the following day,

I believe. The Führer, too, arrived in Berlin in the course of the

morning. Having in the meantime heard that Goebbels had at least played

an important part as instigator, I told the Führer that it was

impossible for me to have such events taking place at this particular

time. I was making every effort, in connection with the Four Year Plan,

to concentrate the entire economic field to the utmost. I had, in the

course of speeches to the nation, been asking for every old toothpaste

tube, every rusty nail, every bit of scrap material to be collected and

utilized. It could not be tolerated that a man who was not responsible

for these things should upset my difficult economic tasks by destroying

so many things of economic value on the one hand and by causing so much

disturbance in economic life on the other hand.

The Führer made some apologies for Goebbels, but on the whole he agreed

that such events were not to take place and must not be allowed to take

place. I also pointed out to him, that such a short time after the

Munich agreement such matters would also have an unfavorable effect on

foreign policy.

In the afternoon I had another discussion with the Führer. In the

meantime Goebbels had been to see him. The latter I had told over the

telephone in unmistakable terms, and in very sharp words, my view of the

matter. I told him then, with emphasis, that I was not inclined to

suffer the consequences of his uncontrolled utterances, as far as

economic matters were concerned.

In the meantime the Führer, influenced by Goebbels, had somewhat changed

his mind. Just what Goebbels told him and to what extent he referred to

the excitement of the crowd, to urgently needed settlements, I do not

know. At any rate, the Führer’s views were not the same as they were on

the occasion of my first complaint.

While we were talking, Goebbels, who was in the house, joined us and

began his usual talk: that such things could not be tolerated; that this

was the second or third murder of a National Socialist committed abroad

by a Jew. It was on that occasion that he first made the suggestion that

a fine should be imposed. Indeed, he wished that each Gau should collect

such a fine and he named an almost incredibly high sum.

I contradicted him and told the Führer that, if there was to be a fine,

then the Reich alone should collect it, for, as I said, Herr Goebbels

had the most Jews right here in Berlin and would therefore not be a

suitable person for this, since he was the most interested party. Apart

from that, if such measures were to be taken, then only the sovereign

State had the right to take them.

After a short discussion, this way and that, about the amount,

1,000,000,000 was agreed upon. I pointed out to the Führer that under

certain circumstances that figure would have repercussions on the tax

returns. The Führer then expressed the wish and ordered that the

economic solution also be carried through now. In order that there

should be no further occasion for such events, businesses obviously

Jewish and known to be Jewish were first of all to be Aryanized, in

particular the department stores. These were often a source of friction,

as the officials and employees from the ministries, who could shop only

between 6 and 7 in the evening, often went to these stores and had

difficulties. He ordered, in general terms, what should be done.

Thereupon I called the meeting of 12 November with those departments

which had jurisdiction over these matters. Unfortunately, the Führer had

demanded that Goebbels should be represented on this

commission—actually a commission was to be appointed. He was, in fact,

present, although I maintained that he had nothing to do with economic

questions. The discussion was very lively. We were all irritated at this

meeting. Then I had the economic laws drafted and later I had them

published.

I rejected other proposals which lay outside the economic sphere, such

as restriction of travel, restriction of residence, restriction in

regard to bathing resorts, _et cetera_, as I was not competent to deal

with these things and had not received any special orders. These were

issued later on by the police authorities, and not by me; but through my

intervention various mitigations and adjustments were made.

I should like to point out that although I received oral and written

orders and commands from the Führer to issue and carry out these laws, I

assume full and absolute responsibility for these laws which bear my

signature; for I issued them and consequently am responsible, and do not

propose to hide in any way behind the Führer’s order.

DR. STAHMER: Another matter. What were the reasons for the refusal to

take part in the Disarmament Conference and for the withdrawal from the

League of Nations?

GÖRING: The chief reasons for that were, first of all, that the other

states who, after the complete disarming of Germany, were also bound to

disarm, did not do so. The second point was that we also found a lack of

willingness to meet in any way Germany’s justified proposals for

revisions; thirdly, there were repeated violations of the Treaty of

Versailles and of the Covenant of the League of Nations by other states,

Poland, Lithuania, _et cetera_, which were at first censured by the

League of Nations, but which were then not brought to an end, but were

rather accepted as accomplished facts; fourthly, all complaints by

Germany regarding questions of minorities were, indeed, discussed, and

well-meaning advice was given to the states against which the complaints

had been brought, but nothing was actually done to relieve the

situation.

Those are the reasons for leaving the League of Nations and the

Disarmament Conference.

DR. STAHMER: Why did Hitler decide to rearm and reintroduce compulsory

service?

GÖRING: When Germany left the League of Nations and the Disarmament

Conference, she simultaneously announced to the leading powers concerned

her definite decision to aim at universal disarmament. The Führer then

made various proposals which, it can be assumed, are historically known:

restriction of active armed forces to a certain number of men;

restriction of weapons to be used; abolishing of certain weapons as, for

example, bombers; and various other points. Each one of these proposals

was rejected, however, and did not reach a general realization, nor were

even discussed.

When we and the Führer recognized clearly that the other parties did not

think of disarming and that, on the contrary, that mighty power to the

east of us in particular, Russia, was carrying out an armament program

as never before, it became necessary for us, in order to safeguard the

most vital interests of the German people, their life and their

security, to free ourselves from all ties and to rearm to such an extent

as was now necessary for the interests and security of the Reich. That

was the first reason for the necessity of reintroducing compulsory

service.

DR. STAHMER: To what extent did the Luftwaffe participate in this

rearmament?

GÖRING: In 1933, when I founded the Air Ministry, we had not yet gone

into the question of rearmament. In spite of that I did arrange for

certain basic conditions. I immediately extended manufacture and

increased air traffic beyond the extent of necessary traffic, so as to

be able to train a larger number of pilots. At that time I took over a

number of young people, lieutenants, cadets, who then had to leave the

Wehrmacht in order to take up commercial flying and there to learn to

fly.

I was aware from the beginning that protection in the air was necessary

as one of the most essential conditions for the security of my nation.

Originally it was my belief that a defensive air force, that is, a

fighter force, might suffice; but upon reflection I realized—and I want

to underline what witness Field Marshal Kesselring said on that

subject—that one would be lost with merely a fighter force for defense

purposes and that even a defensive force must contain bombers in order

that it can be used offensively against the enemy air force on enemy

territory.

Therefore I had bomber aircraft developed from commercial airplanes. In

the beginning rearmament proceeded slowly. Everything had to be created

anew since nothing existed in the way of air armament.

In 1935 I told the Führer that I now considered it proper, since we had

repeatedly received refusals in answer to our proposals, to declare to

the world openly that we were creating an air force, and that I had

already established a certain basis for that. This took place in the

form of an interview which I had with a British correspondent.

Now I could proceed to rearm on a larger scale; but in spite of that we

confined ourselves at first to what we called a “Risk Air Force,” that

is a risk insofar as an enemy coming to attack Germany should know that

he could expect to meet with an air force. But it was by no means strong

enough to be of any real importance.

In 1936 followed the famous report, which was presented to the witness

Bodenschatz, in which I said that we must from this moment on work on

the basis of mobilization, that money mattered nothing, and that, in

short, I should take the responsibility for overdrawing the budget.

Since nothing had existed before, I should be able to catch up quickly

only if aircraft production on one hand were made to work with as many

shifts and as much speed as possible, that is with maximum effort and on

a mobilization basis, and if, on the other hand, extension of the ground

forces and similar matters was carried out at once with the greatest

possible speed.

The situation in 1936 is defined by me, in that report to my co-workers,

as serious. Other states had, to be sure, not disarmed, but here and

there they had perhaps neglected their air force and they were catching

up on lost ground. Violent debates were taking place in England with

regard to modernizing and building up the air force; feverish activities

were taking place in Russia, concerning which we had reliable reports—I

shall refer to the question of Russian rearmament later.

When the Civil War broke out in Spain, Franco sent a call for help to

Germany and asked for support, particularly in the air. One should not

forget that Franco with his troops was stationed in Africa and that he

could not get the troops across, as the fleet was in the hands of the

Communists, or, as they called themselves at the time, the competent

Revolutionary Government in Spain. The decisive factor was, first of

all, to get his troops over to Spain.

The Führer thought the matter over. I urged him to give support under

all circumstances, firstly, in order to prevent the further spread of

communism in that theater and, secondly, to test my young Luftwaffe at

this opportunity in this or that technical respect.

With the permission of the Führer, I sent a large part of my transport

fleet and a number of experimental fighter units, bombers, and

anti-aircraft guns; and in that way I had an opportunity to ascertain,

under combat conditions, whether the material was equal to the task. In

order that the personnel, too, might gather a certain amount of

experience, I saw to it that there was a continuous flow, that is, that

new people were constantly being sent and others recalled.

The rearming of the Air Force required, as a basic condition, the

creation of a large number of new industries. It was no help to me to

build a strong Air Force and not to have any gasoline for it. Here, too,

therefore, I had to speed up the development of the refineries to the

utmost. There were other auxiliary industries, above all, aluminum.

Since I considered the Luftwaffe the most important part of the

Wehrmacht, as far as the security of the Reich was concerned, and, in

view of the modernization of technical science, it was my duty as

Commander-in-Chief to do everything to develop it to the highest peak;

and, too, as nothing was there to begin with, a supreme effort and a

maximum amount of work had to be achieved. That I did.

Much has been said here in a cross-examination about four-engine

bombers, two-engine bombers, _et cetera_. The witnesses made statements

to the best of their knowledge and ability, but they were familiar only

with small sections and they gave their opinions from that point of

view. I alone was responsible and am responsible, for I was

Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe and Minister for Air. I was

responsible for the rearmament, the training and the morale of the

Luftwaffe.

If at the beginning I did not build any four-engine bombers, it was not

because I had qualms that they might be construed as an aggressive

force. That would not have disturbed me for one minute. My only reason

was that the necessary technical and production conditions did not

exist. That kind of bomber simply had not yet been developed by my

industry, at any rate not so that I could use it. Secondly, I was still

short of aluminum, and anyone only half an expert knows how much

aluminum a four-engine bomber swallows up and how many fighters, that

is, two-engine bombers, one can build with the same amount.

To start with, I had to ascertain who were likely to be Germany’s

opponents in a war. Were the technical conditions adequate for meeting

an attack against Germany by such an enemy? Of all possible opponents I

considered Russia the main opponent, but of course England, France, and

Italy also had to be considered. It was my duty to consider all

possibilities.

As far as the European theater of war was concerned, I could, for the

time being, be satisfied with bombers which could operate against the

important centers of enemy armament industry. Thus, for the time being,

I did not need anything more than aircraft which would enable me to do

that, but it was important to have more of that kind.

But in a speech to the aircraft industrialists I let it be clearly known

that I desired most urgently to have a bomber which, loaded with the

necessary bombs, could fly to America and back. I asked them to work on

that diligently so that, if America should enter into war against

Germany, I could also reach the American armament industry. It was not a

question, therefore, of not wanting them. I even, as far as I remember,

inaugurated a prize competition for bombers capable of flying at great

heights and at great speeds over large distances. Even before the

beginning of the war we had begun to develop propellerless aircraft.

Summing up, I should like to say that I did everything possible under

the technical and production conditions then prevalent, to rebuild and

rearm a strong Air Force. The technical knowledge of that time led us to

believe that, after 5 years of war, new technical and practical advances

would be made. That is a principle based on experience. I wanted to be

prepared to have an Air Force which, however the political situation

might develop, would be strong enough to protect the nation and to deal

blows to Germany’s enemy. It is perfectly correct for Mr. Justice

Jackson to ask whether the speedy elimination of Poland and France was

due to the fact that the German Air Force, acting according to modern

principles, contributed so much. It was the decisive factor. On the

other hand, though this does not concern me, the use of the American air

force was also a decisive factor for the Allied victory.

DR. STAHMER: Has the fact that you were given control of raw materials

already in April 1936 anything to do with this rebuilding of the Air

Force?

GÖRING: I need not repeat what the witness Körner elaborated yesterday,

or the day before yesterday, with regard to my gradual rise in economic

leadership. The starting point was the agricultural crisis in the year

of 1935. In the summer of 1936 the then Minister of War, Von Blomberg,

the Minister of Economy and President of the Reichsbank, Schacht, and

Minister Kerrl came to me and asked me whether I was prepared to back a

suggestion of theirs which they wanted to submit to the Führer, namely,

that I be appointed Commissioner for Raw Materials and Foreign Exchange.

It was agreed that I should not function as an economics expert, which I

was not; but someone was needed to take care of the difficulties due to

shortage of foreign currency, which continuously arose because of our

heavy demands, and at the same time to make available and accumulate raw

materials—someone who was capable of taking measures which would

perhaps not be understood by many people, but would have the weight of

his authority. Secondly, it was decided that in this sphere, though not

as an expert, I should be the driving power and use my energy.

Minister Schacht, who was the expert, had difficulties with the Party.

He was not a member of the Party. He was at that time on excellent terms

with the Führer and me, but not so much with the members of the Party.

The danger arose that the appropriate measures might not be understood

by the latter, and in this connection I would be the right man to make

these things known to the people and the Party.

That is how that came about. But since I, as Minister of Air, was, as I

have explained, interested in raw materials, I played an ever

increasingly important role. Then the differences between agriculture

and economy in regard to foreign currency came more to the fore, so that

I had to make decisions, decisions which became more drastic. Thus I

entered the field of economic leadership. I devoted a great deal of time

and work to this task, particularly to procuring the raw materials

necessary for economy and for rearmament. Out of this the Four Year Plan

arose which gave me far-reaching plenary powers.

DR. STAHMER: What was the aim of the Four Year Plan?

GÖRING: The Four Year Plan had two aims: First, that German economy as

far as possible and particularly in the agricultural sector, should be

made secure against any crisis; secondly, in the event of war, Germany

should be able to withstand a blockade to the greatest extent possible.

Therefore it was necessary, first, to increase agriculture to the

utmost, to control and direct it, to control consumption, and to store

up supplies by means of negotiations with foreign countries; secondly,

to ascertain which raw materials, imported until then, could be found,

produced, and procured in Germany itself, and which raw materials that

were difficult to import could be replaced by others more easily

obtainable. Briefly, as far as the agricultural sphere was concerned:

utilization of every available space; regulation of cultivation

according to the crops needed; control of animal breeding; building up

of reserves for times of need or crop failures; as far as the industrial

sector was concerned, the creation of industries supplying raw

materials: First, coal—although there was sufficient coal, its

production would have to be increased considerably, since coal is the

basic raw material on which so many other things are dependent;

iron—our mining industry had made itself so dependent on foreign

countries that, in the event of a crisis, a most disastrous situation

might arise here. I can quite understand that from the purely financial

and business point of view that was all right but, nevertheless, we

should have to mine and make available the German iron ores which were

at our disposal, even though they were inferior to the Swedish ores; we

should have to compel industry to make alloys and manage with German

ores.

I recklessly allowed industry a year’s time. As industry by then had

still not begun to exploit these ores, I founded the Reich works which

were given my name. They were primarily for opening up iron-ore reserves

in German soil and using them in the mining industry. It was necessary

to set up oil refineries, aluminum works and various other works, and

then to promote the development of the so-called synthetic material

industry in order to replace necessary raw materials which could be

obtained only from abroad and under difficult circumstances. In the

field of textiles this involved the conversion of the textile industry

and of I. G. Farben.

That, roughly, was the task of the Four Year Plan.

Naturally a third question is of importance in this connection: the

question of labor. Co-ordination was necessary here too. The most

important industries had to have workers; less important industries had

to dispense with them. The control of this allocation of labor, which

before the war functioned only within Germany, was another task of the

Four Year Plan and the Department for the Allocation of Labor.

The Four Year Plan as such very quickly assumed too large proportions as

an official organization. Then, after Schacht had left, I took over the

Ministry of Economy for 2 months and fitted the Four Year Plan into it.

I retained only a very small staff of collaborators and carried out the

tasks with the assistance of the ministries competent to deal with these

things.

DR. STAHMER: Was the purpose of carrying out these plans that of

preparing for aggressive war?

GÖRING: No, the aim of the plans was, as I said, to make Germany secure

against economic crises, and to make her secure against a blockade in

the event of war, and, of course, within the Four Year Plan to provide

the necessary conditions for rearmament. That was one of its important

tasks.

DR. STAHMER: How did the occupation of the Rhineland come about?

GÖRING: The occupation of the Rhineland was not, as has been asserted

here, a long-prepared affair. What had been discussed previously did not

deal with the occupation of the Rhineland, but with the question of

mobilization measures in the Rhineland in case of an attack on Germany.

The Rhineland occupation came about for two reasons. The balance which

was created through the Locarno Pact had been disturbed in western

Europe, because a new factor had arisen in France’s system of allies,

namely Russia, who even at that time had an extraordinarily large armed

force. In addition, there was the Russian-Czechoslovakian mutual

assistance pact. Thus, the conditions upon which the Locarno Pact had

been based no longer existed, according to our way of thinking. So,

there was now such a threat to Germany, or the possibility of such a

threat, that it would have been a neglect of duty and honor on the part

of the Government if it had not done everything to ensure, here also,

the security of the Reich. The Government therefore—as a sovereign

state—made use of its sovereign right and freed itself from the

dishonorable obligation not to place a part of the Reich under its

protection, and it did place this important part of the Reich under its

protection by building strong fortifications.

The construction of such strong fortifications, such expensive

fortifications and such extensive fortifications, is justified only if

that frontier is regarded as final and definitive. If I had intended to

extend the frontier in the near future, it would never have been

possible to go through with an undertaking so expensive and such a

burden to the whole nation as was the construction of the West Wall.

This was done—and I want to emphasize this particularly—from the very

beginning only in the interest of defense and as a defensive measure. It

made the western border of the Reich secure against that threat which,

because of the recent shift of power, and the new combination of powers

such as the Franco-Russian mutual assistance pact, had become a threat

to Germany. The actual occupation, the decision to occupy the Rhineland,

was made at very short notice. The troops which marched into the

Rhineland were of such small numbers—and that is an historical

fact—that they provided merely a token occupation. The Luftwaffe itself

could not, for the time being, enter the Rhine territory on the left at

all, since there was no adequate ground organization. It entered the

so-called demilitarized territory on the right of the Rhine, Düsseldorf

and other cities. In other words, it was not as if the Rhineland were

suddenly occupied with a great wave of troops; but, as I said before, it

was merely that a few battalions and a few batteries marched in as a

symbol that the Rhineland was now again under the full sovereignty of

the sovereign German Reich and would in the future be protected

accordingly.

DR. STAHMER: What were Hitler’s aims when he created the Reich Defense

Council and when he issued the Reich Defense Law?

GÖRING: The Reich Defense Council, during the last months, played a very

important role here. I hope I shall not be misunderstood; I believe that

during these months more has been said about it than was ever said since

the moment of its creation. In the first place it is called Reich

Defense Council and not Reich Council for the Offensive. Its existence

is taken for granted. It exists in every other country in some form or

other, even if it has another name. First of all, there was a Reich

Defense Committee already, before our seizure of power. In this

committee there were official experts from all the ministries for the

purpose of carrying out mobilization preparations or, better said,

mobilization measures, which automatically come into consideration in

any kind of development—war, the possibility of war, the facts of war

involving bordering states and the subsequent need to guard one’s

neutrality. These are the usual measures to be taken—to ascertain how

many horses have to be levied in case of mobilization, what factories

have to be converted, whether bread ration cards and fat ration cards

have to be introduced, regulation of traffic, _et cetera_—all these

things need not be dealt with in detail, because they are so obvious.

All such discussions took place in the Reich Defense

Committee—discussions by the official experts presided over by the then

chief of the ministerial office in the Reich Ministry of War, Keitel.

The Reich Defense Council was created, for the time being, as a

precautionary measure, when the armed forces were re-established, but it

existed only on paper. I was, I think, Deputy Chairman or Chairman—I do

not know which—I heard it mentioned here. I assure you under oath that

at no time and at no date did I participate in a meeting at which the

Reich Defense Council as such was called together. These discussions,

which were necessary for the defense of the Reich, were held in a

completely different connection, in a different form and depended on

immediate needs. Naturally, there were discussions about the defense of

the Reich, but not in connection with the Reich Defense Council. This

existed on paper, but it never met. But even if it had met, that would

have been quite logical, since this concerns defense and not attack. The

Reich Defense Law, or rather the Ministerial Council for the Reich

Defense, which is probably what you mean, was created only one day

before the outbreak of the war, since the Reich Defense Council actually

did not exist. This Ministerial Council for Reich Defense is not to be

considered the same as, for instance, the so-called War Cabinet that was

formed in England when the war broke out, and perhaps in other

countries. On the contrary, this Ministerial Council for the Reich

Defense was—by using abbreviated procedure—to issue only the

regulations necessary for wartime, laws dealing with daily issues,

explanations to the people, and it was to relieve the Führer to a

considerable extent, since he had reserved for himself the leadership in

military operations. The Ministerial Council therefore issued, first of

all, all those laws which, as I should like to mention, are to be

expected in any country at the beginning of a war. In the early period

it met three or four times, and after that not at all. I, too, had no

time after that. To abbreviate the procedure, these laws were circulated

and then issued. One, or one and a half years afterwards—I cannot

remember the exact time—the Führer took the direct issuance of laws

more into his own hands. I was the co-signer of many laws in my capacity

as Chairman of this Ministerial Council. But that, too, was practically

discontinued in the latter years. The Ministerial Council did not meet

again at all after 1940, I think.

DR. STAHMER: The Prosecution has presented a document, Number 2261-PS.

In this document a Reich Defense Law of 21 May 1935 is mentioned, which

for the time being was kept in abeyance by order of the Führer. I shall

have that document shown to you and I ask you to give your views on it?

GÖRING: I am familiar with it.

DR. STAHMER: Would you please state your views?

GÖRING: After the Reich Defense Council had begun to exist, a Reich

Defense Law was provided in 1935 for the event of a mobilization. The

agreement or, better said, decision, was made by the Reich Cabinet and

this law was to be applied and became effective in the case of a

mobilization. Actually it was replaced when mobilization did come about,

by the law I have mentioned regarding the Ministerial Council for the

Reich Defense. In this law, before the time of the Four Year Plan, that

is 1935, a Plenipotentiary for Economy was created, at first for the

event of a mobilization, and a Plenipotentiary for Administration; so

that if war occurred, then all the departments of the entire

administration would be concentrated under one minister and all the

departments concerned with economy and armament were likewise to be

concentrated under one minister. The Plenipotentiary for Administration

did not function before mobilization. The Plenipotentiary for Economy,

on the other hand—this title was not to be made known to the

public—was to begin his tasks immediately. That was indeed necessary.

This is perhaps the clearest explanation of the fact that the creation

of the Four Year Plan necessarily led to clashes between the

Plenipotentiary for Economy and the Delegate for the Four Year Plan,

since both of them were more or less working on the same or similar

tasks. When, therefore, in 1936, I was made Delegate for the Four Year

Plan, the activities of the Plenipotentiary for Economy practically

ceased.

DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, ought I to stop now with the questioning?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I think that would be a good time.

[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]

_Afternoon Session_

DR. STAHMER: A word has been repeatedly used here: Reich Research

Council (Reichsforschungsrat). What kind of institution was that?

GÖRING: I believe it was in the year 1943 that I received the order to

concentrate the entire field of German research, particularly insofar as

it was of urgent importance to the conduct of war. Unfortunately, that

was done much too late. The purpose was to avoid parallel research and

useless research, to concentrate all research on problems important for

the war. I myself became President of the Reich Research Council and

established directives for research according to the purpose mentioned.

DR. STAHMER: Did this have any connection with the Research Office of

the Air Force?

GÖRING: No, the Research Office of the Air Force was entirely different,

and it had nothing to do with either research on the one hand or the Air

Force on the other hand. The expression was a sort of camouflage, for,

when we came to power, there was considerable confusion on the technical

side of control of important information. Therefore, I established for

the time being the Research Office, that was an office where all

technical devices for the control of radio, telegraph, telephone, and

all other technical communications could be provided. Since I was then

only Reich Minister for Air I could do this within only my own ministry

and therefore used this camouflaged designation. This machinery served

to exert control above all over foreign missions, and important persons,

who had telephone, telegraph, and radio connections with foreign

countries, as is customary everywhere in all countries, and then to

decipher the information thus extracted and put it at the disposal of

other departments. The office had no agents, no intelligence service,

but was a purely technical office intercepting wireless messages,

telephone conversations, and telegrams, wherever it was ordered, and

passing on the information to the offices concerned. In this connection

I may say that I have also read much about those communications made by

Mr. Messersmith, which figured here. He was at times the main source for

such information.

DR. STAHMER: What was the purpose and importance of the Secret Cabinet

Council which was created a short time after the seizure of power?

GÖRING: In February 1938 there came about the retirement of the War

Minister, Field Marshal Von Blomberg. Simultaneously, because of

particular circumstances, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Colonel

General Von Fritsch, retired, that is to say, the Führer dismissed him.

The coincidence of these retirements or dismissals was, in the eyes of

the Führer, disadvantageous to the prestige of the Wehrmacht. He wanted

to divert attention from this change in the Wehrmacht by means of a

general reshuffling. He said he wanted above all to change the Foreign

Office because only such a change would make a strong impression abroad

and would be likely to divert attention from the military affairs. At

the time I opposed the Führer very strongly about this. In lengthy,

wearisome personal conversations I begged him to refrain from a change

in the Foreign Office. He thought, however, that he would have to insist

upon it.

The question arose as to what should be done after Herr Von Neurath’s

retirement or after the change. The Führer intended to keep Herr Von

Neurath in the Cabinet by all means for he had the greatest personal

esteem for him. I myself have always expressed my respect for Herr Von

Neurath. In order to avoid a lowering of Herr Von Neurath’s prestige

abroad, I myself was the one to make a proposal to the Führer. I told

him that in order to make it appear abroad that Von Neurath had not been

entirely removed from foreign policy, I would propose to appoint him

chairman of the Secret Cabinet Council. There was, to be sure, no such

cabinet in existence, but the expression would sound quite nice, and

everyone would imagine that it meant something. The Führer said we could

not make him chairman if we had no council. Thereupon I said, “Then we

shall make one,” and offhand I marked down names of several persons. How

little importance I attached to this council can be seen in the fact

that I myself was, I think, one of the last on that list.

Then, for the public at large the council was given out to be an

advisory council for foreign policy. When I returned I said to my

friends, “The affair has gone off all right, but if the Führer does not

ask the Foreign Minister for advice, he certainly will not ask a cabinet

council for advice on foreign policy; we will not have anything to do

with it!” I declare under oath that this Cabinet Council never met at

all, not even for a minute; there was not even an initial meeting for

laying down the rules by which it should function. Some members may not

even have been informed that they were members.

DR. STAHMER: When was the Reich Cabinet in session last?

GÖRING: As far as I remember, the last meeting of the Reich Cabinet was

in 1937, and, as far as I can remember, I presided over the last

meeting, the Führer having left shortly after the beginning. The Führer

did not think much of Cabinet meetings; it was too large a circle for

him, and perhaps there was too much discussion of his plans, and he

wanted that changed.

From that time on there were only individual conferences—conferences

with single ministers or with groups of ministers from the ministries

concerned. But since the ministers found, very rightly, that this made

their work difficult, a solution was adopted whereby I, under the title

of the Four Year Plan, called the ministers together more frequently, in

order to discuss general matters with them. But at no time in the

Cabinet or the Ministerial Council was any political decision of

importance mentioned or discussed, as, for instance, those

decisions—the annexation of Austria, the Sudetenland, and

Czechoslovakia—which finally led to war. I know how much importance the

Führer attached to the fact that in all these matters only those

ministers should be informed who absolutely had to be informed, because

of the nature of their work, and that only at the very last minute. Here

too, I can say under oath that quite a number of ministers were not

informed about the beginning of the war or the march into

Czechoslovakia, the Sudetenland, or Austria until the next morning, when

they learned about it by radio or through the press, just as any other

German citizen.

DR. STAHMER: What part did you have in making the Munich Pact of

September 1938?

GÖRING: The incorporation of the Sudeten Germans or, better said, the

solution of the Sudeten German problem I had always emphasized as being

something that was necessary. I also told the Führer after the Anschluss

of Austria that I should regret it if his statements were misunderstood

to mean that with the Anschluss of Austria this question had been

settled.

In November 1937, I stated to Lord Halifax that the Anschluss of

Austria, the solution of the Sudeten German question in the sense of a

return of the Sudeten Germans, and the solution of the problem of Danzig

and the Corridor were integral parts of German policy. Whether they were

tackled by Hitler one day, or by me or somebody else the next day, they

would still remain political aims which under all circumstances would

have to be attained sometime. However, both of us agreed that all

efforts should be made to achieve that without resorting to war.

Furthermore, in my conversations with Mr. Bullitt I had always taken up

the very same position. And I told every other person, publicly and

personally, that these three points had to be settled and that the

settlement of the one would not make the others unimportant.

I also want to stress that, if in connection with this, and also in

connection with other things, the Prosecution accuses us of not having

kept this or that particular promise that Germany had made in the past,

including the Germany that existed just before the seizure of power, I

should like to refer to the many speeches in which both the Führer—this

I no longer remember so well—and I, as I know very well, stated that we

warned foreign countries not to make any plans for the future on the

basis of any promises made by the present government, that we would not

recognize these promises when we acquired power. Thus there was absolute

clarity in respect to this.

When the Sudeten question approached a crisis and a solution was

intended by the Führer, I, as a soldier and Commander-in-Chief of the

Luftwaffe, as was my duty, took the preparatory measures, ordered for

any eventuality. As a politician I was extremely happy at the attempts

which were made to find a peaceful solution. I acknowledge that at that

time I was very glad when I saw that the British Prime Minister was

making every possible effort. Nevertheless, the situation on the day

before the Munich agreement had again become very critical.

It was about 6:30 or 7 o’clock in the morning when the Italian

Ambassador, Attolico, rang me up and said that he had to see me

immediately on orders from Mussolini, that it was about the solution of

the Sudeten problem. I told him he should go and see the Foreign

Minister. He said he had a special order from Mussolini to see me alone

first. I met him, as far as I remember, at 9 o’clock in the morning, and

there he suggested that Mussolini was prepared to mediate; that a

meeting should be called as soon as possible between Germany (Adolf

Hitler), England (Prime Minister Chamberlain), France (Premier

Daladier), and Italy (Mussolini), in order to settle the question

peacefully. He, Mussolini, saw a possibility of that and was prepared to

take all necessary steps and asked me personally to use all my influence

in that direction. I took the Ambassador, and also Herr Von Neurath

although he was not Foreign Minister at that time, at once to the Reich

Chancellery and reported everything to the Führer, tried to persuade

him, explained to him the advantages of such a step and said that this

could be the basis for a general easing of tension. Whether the other

current political and diplomatic endeavors would be successful one could

not yet say, but if four leading statesmen of the four large western

European powers were to meet, then much would be gained by that.

Herr Von Neurath supported my argument, and the Führer agreed and said

we should call the Duce by telephone. Attolico, who waited outside, did

that immediately, whereupon Mussolini called the Führer officially and

matters were agreed and Munich decided upon as the place.

Late in the afternoon I was informed by the Italian Embassy that both

the British Prime Minister and the French Prime Minister had agreed to

arrive at Munich the next day.

I asked the Führer, or rather, I told him, that under all circumstances

I would go along. He agreed. Then I suggested that I could also take

Herr Von Neurath with me in my train. He agreed to that also.

I took part in some of the discussions and, when necessary, contributed

to the settlement of many arguments and, above all, did my best to

create a friendly atmosphere on all sides. I had personal conversations

with M. Daladier and Mr. Chamberlain, and I was sincerely happy

afterwards that everything had gone well.

DR. STAHMER: Before that, the Anschluss of Austria with Germany had

taken place. What reasons did Hitler have for that decision, and to what

extent did you play a part in those measures?

GÖRING: I told the Tribunal yesterday, when I gave a brief outline of my

life, that I personally felt a great affinity for Austria; that I had

spent the greater part of my youth in an Austrian castle; that my

father, even at the time of the old empire, often spoke of a close bond

between the future of the German motherland of Austria and the Reich,

for he was convinced that the Austrian Empire would not hold together

much longer.

In 1918 while in Austria for 2 days, having come by plane, I saw the

revolution and the collapse of the Hapsburg Empire take place. Those

countries, with a predominantly German population, including Sudeten

Germany, convened at that time in Vienna in the Parliament. They

declared themselves free of the dissolved Hapsburg State and declared,

including the representatives of Sudeten Germany, Austria to be a part

of the German Reich. This happened, as far as I know, under the Social

Democratic Chancellor, Renner. This statement by the representatives of

the Austrian-German people that they wanted to be a part of Germany in

the future was changed by the peace treaty of St. Germain and prohibited

by the dictate of the victorious nations. Neither for myself nor for any

other German was that of importance.

The moment and the basic conditions had of course to be created for a

union of the two brother nations of purely German blood and origin to

take place. When we came to power, as I have said before, this was

naturally an integral part of German policy.

The assurances which Hitler gave at that time regarding the sovereignty

of Austria were no deception; they were meant seriously. At first he

probably did not see any possibility. I myself was much more radical in

this direction and I asked him repeatedly not to make any definite

commitments regarding the Austrian question. He believed, however, that

he had first of all to take Italy into consideration.

It was evident, especially after the National Socialist Party in Germany

had come to power, that the National Socialist Party in Austria was also

growing more and more. This party, however, had existed in Austria even

before the seizure of power in Germany, just as the origin of the

National Socialist Workers Party goes back to Sudeten Germany. The Party

in Austria was therefore not a Fifth Column for the Anschluss, because

the Austrian people themselves originally wanted and always wanted the

Anschluss. If the idea of the Anschluss did not figure so clearly and

strongly in the Austrian Government of that time, it was not because it

did not want to be joined to Germany, but because the National Socialist

form of government was not compatible in any way with the form of

government in Austria at that time.

Thus there resulted that tension, first in Austria itself, which has

repeatedly been mentioned by the Prosecution in its charges. This

tension was bound to come because the National Socialists took the idea

of the Anschluss with Germany more seriously than the Government did.

This resulted in political strife between the two. That we were on the

side of the National Socialists as far as our sympathies were concerned

is obvious, particularly as the Party in Austria was severely

persecuted. Many were put into camps, which were just like concentration

camps but had different names.

At a certain time the leader of the Austrian Party was a man by the name

of Habicht from Wiesbaden. I did not know him before; I saw him only

once there. He falsely led the Führer to believe, before the so-called

Dollfuss case, that the Austrian armed forces were prepared to undertake

something independently in order to force the government to accept the

Anschluss, or else they would overthrow it. If this were the case, that

the Party in Austria was to support whatever the armed forces undertook

along those lines, then, so the Führer thought, it should have the

political support of the Party in Germany in this matter. But the whole

thing was actually a deception, as it was not the Austrian Army which

intended to proceed against the Austrian Government but rather a

so-called “Wehrmacht Standarte,” a unit which consisted of former

members, and released or discharged members, of the Austrian Army who

had gone over to the Party or joined it.

With this deceptive maneuver Habicht then undertook this action in

Vienna. I was in Bayreuth with the Führer at the time. The Führer called

Habicht at once and reproached him most severely and said that he had

falsely informed him, tricked him and deceived him.

He regretted the death of Dollfuss very much because politically that

meant a very serious situation as far as the National Socialists were

concerned, and particularly with regard to Italy. Italy mobilized five

divisions at that time and sent them to the Brenner Pass. The Führer

desired an appeasement which would be quick and as sweeping in its

effect as possible. That was the reason why he asked Herr Von Papen to

go as an extraordinary ambassador to Vienna and to work for an easing of

the atmosphere as quickly as possible.

One must not forget the somewhat absurd situation which had developed in

the course of years, namely, that a purely German country such as

Austria was not most strongly influenced in governmental matters by the

German Reich but by the Italian Government. I remember that statement of

Mr. Churchill’s, that Austria was practically an affiliate of Italy.

After the action against Dollfuss, Italy assumed a very stand-offish

attitude toward Germany and made it clear that Italy would be the

country which would do everything to prevent the Anschluss. Therefore,

besides the internal clearing up of Germany’s relations with Austria by

Herr Von Papen, the Führer also tried to bring about a change in

Mussolini’s attitude to this question. For this reason he went to Venice

shortly afterwards—maybe it was before—at any rate he tried to bring

about a different attitude.

But I was of the opinion that in spite of everything we may have had in

common, let us say in a philosophic sense—fascism and National

Socialism—the Anschluss of our brother people was much more important

to me than this coming to an agreement. And if it were not possible to

do it with Mussolini, we should have to do it against him.

Then came the Italian-Abyssinian war. With regard to the sanctions

against Italy, Germany was given to understand, not openly but quite

clearly, that it would be to her advantage, as far as the Austrian

question was concerned, to take part in these sanctions.

That was a difficult decision for the Führer to make, to declare himself

out and out against Italy and to achieve the Anschluss by these means or

to bind himself by obligation to Italy by means of a pro-Italian or

correct attitude and thus to exclude Italy’s opposition to the

Anschluss. I suggested to him at that time, in view of the somewhat

vague offer regarding Austria made by English-French circles, to try and

find out who was behind this offer and whether both governments were

willing to come to an agreement in regard to this point and to give

assurances to the effect that this would be considered an internal

German affair, and not some vague assurances of general co-operation,

_et cetera_.

My suspicions proved right; we could not get any definite assurances.

Under those circumstances, it was more expedient for us to prevent Italy

being the main opponent to the Anschluss by not joining in any sanctions

against her.

I was still of the opinion that the great national interest of the union

of these German peoples stood above all considerations regarding the

differences between the two present governments. For this to happen it

could not be expected that the government of the great German Reich

should resign and that Germany should perhaps be annexed to Austria;

rather the Anschluss would have to be carried through sooner or later.

Then came the Berchtesgaden agreement. I was not present at this. I did

not even consent to this agreement, because I opposed any definite

statement which lengthened this period of indecision; for me the

complete union of all Germans was the only conceivable solution.

Shortly after Berchtesgaden there was the plebiscite which the then

Chancellor Schuschnigg had called. This plebiscite was of itself an

impossibility, a breach of the Berchtesgaden agreement. This I shall

pass over, but the way in which this plebiscite was supposed to take

place was unique in history. One could vote only by “yes,” every person

could vote as often as he wanted, five times, six times, seven times. If

he tore up the slip of paper, that was counted as “yes,” and so on. It

has no further interest. In this way it could be seen from the very

beginning that if only a few followers of the Schuschnigg system

utilized these opportunities sufficiently the result could be only a

positive majority for Herr Schuschnigg. That whole thing was a farce.

We opposed that. First of all a member of the Austrian Government who

was at that moment in Germany, General Von Glaise-Horstenau, was flown

to Vienna in order to make clear to Schuschnigg or Seyss-Inquart—who,

since Berchtesgaden, was in Schuschnigg’s Cabinet—that Germany would

never tolerate this provocation. At the same time troops which were

stationed near the Austrian border were on the alert. That was on

Friday, I believe, the 11th. On that day I was in the Reich Chancellery,

alone with the Führer in his room. I heard by telephone the news that

Glaise-Horstenau had arrived and made our demands known clearly and

unmistakably, and that these things were now being discussed. Then, as

far as I remember, the answer came that the plebiscite had been called

off and that Schuschnigg had agreed to it. At this moment I had the

instinctive feeling that the situation was now mobile and that now,

finally, that possibility which we had long and ardently awaited was

there—the possibility of bringing about a complete solution. And from

this moment on I must take 100 percent responsibility for all further

happenings, because it was not the Führer so much as I myself who set

the pace and, even overruling the Führer’s misgivings, brought

everything to its final development.

My telephone conversations have been read here. I demanded

spontaneously, without actually having first spoken to the Führer about

it, the immediate retirement of Chancellor Schuschnigg. When this was

granted, I put my next demand, that now everything was ripe for the

Anschluss. And that took place, as is known.

The only thing—and I do not say this because it is important as far as

my responsibility is concerned—which I did not bring about personally,

since I did not know the persons involved, but which has been brought

forward by the Prosecution in the last few days, was the following: I

sent through a list of ministers, that is to say, I named those persons

who would be considered by us desirable as members of an Austrian

Government for the time being. I knew Seyss-Inquart, and it was clear to

me from the very beginning that he should get the Chancellorship. Then I

named Kaltenbrunner for Security. I did not know Kaltenbrunner, and that

is one of the two instances where the Führer took a hand by giving me a

few names. Also, by the way, I gave the name of Fischböck for the

Ministry of Economy without knowing him. The only one whom I personally

brought into this Cabinet was my brother-in-law, Dr. Hueber, as Minister

of Justice, but not because he was my brother-in-law, for he had already

been Austrian Minister of Justice in the Cabinet of Prelate Seipel. He

was not a member of the Party at that time, but he came from the ranks

of the Heimwehr and it was important for me to have in the Cabinet also

a representative of that group, with whom we had at first made common

cause, but then opposed. I wanted to be sure of my influence on this

person, so that everything would now actually develop towards a total

Anschluss. For already plans had again appeared in which the Führer

only, as the head of the German Reich, should be simultaneously the head

of German Austria; there would otherwise be a separation. That I

considered intolerable. The hour had come and we should make the best

use of it.

In the conversation which I had with Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop,

who was in London at that time, I pointed out that the ultimatum had not

been presented by us but by Seyss-Inquart. That was absolutely true _de

jure_; _de facto_, of course it was my wish. But this telephone

conversation was being listened to by the English, and I had to conduct

a diplomatic conversation, and I have never heard yet that diplomats in

such cases say how matters are _de facto_; rather they always stress how

they are _de jure_. And why should I make a possible exception here? In

this telephone conversation I demanded of Herr Von Ribbentrop that he

ask the British Government to name British persons in whom they had the

fullest confidence. I would make all arrangements so that these persons

could travel around Austria everywhere in order to see for themselves

that the Austrian people in an overwhelming majority wanted this

Anschluss and greeted it with enthusiasm. Here, during the discussion of

the Austrian question no mention was made of the fact that already—this

conversation took place on a Friday—the Sunday before in Styria, one of

the most important parts of the hereditary countries, an internal

partial Anschluss had practically taken place, and that the population

there had already declared itself in favor of the Anschluss and had more

or less severed its ties with the Viennese Government.

DR. STAHMER: I have handed to you a record of that conversation. It has

been put in by the Prosecution. One part of it has not been read into

the record yet, but you have given its contents. Would you please look

at it?

GÖRING: Yes; I attach importance to having only those passages in this

document read in which I refer to the fact that I considered it

important that the English Government should send to Austria as soon as

possible people in whom they had confidence, in order that they might

see for themselves the actual state of affairs; and secondly, those

passages in which I refer to the fact that we were going to hold a

plebiscite according to the Charter of the Saar Plebiscite and that,

whatever the result might be, we should acknowledge it. I could promise

that all the more, as it was personally known to me and quite clear that

an overwhelming majority would vote in favor of the Anschluss.

Now I come to the decisive part concerning the entry of the troops. That

was the second point where the Führer interfered and we were not of the

same opinion. The Führer wanted the reasons for the march into Austria

to be a request by the new Government of Seyss-Inquart, that is the

government desired by us—that they should ask for the troops in order

to maintain order in the country. I was against this, not against the

march into Austria—I was for the march under all circumstances—against

only the reasons to be given. Here there was a difference of opinion.

Certainly there might be disturbances at one place, namely Vienna and

Wiener-Neustadt, because some of the Austrian Marxists, who once before

had started an armed uprising, were actually armed. That, however, was

not of such decisive importance. It was rather of the greatest

importance that German troops should march into Austria immediately in

sufficient numbers to stave off any desire on the part of a neighboring

country to inherit even a single Austrian village on this occasion.

I should like to emphasize that at that time Mussolini’s attitude to the

Austrian question had not yet crystallized, although I had worked on him

the year before to that end. The Italians were still looking with

longing eyes at eastern Tyrol. The five divisions along the Brenner Pass

I had not forgotten. The Hungarians talked too much about the

Burgenland. The Yugoslavs once mentioned something about Carinthia, but

I believe that I made it clear to them at the time that that was absurd.

So to prevent the fulfillment of these hopes once and for all, which

might easily happen in such circumstances, I very definitely wanted the

German troops to march into Austria proclaiming: “The Anschluss has

taken place; Austria is a part of Germany and therefore in its entirety

automatically and completely under the protection of the German Reich

and its Armed Forces.”

The Führer did not want to have such a striking demonstration of foreign

policy, and finally asked me to inform Seyss-Inquart to send a telegram

to that effect. The fact that we were in agreement about the decisive

point, the march into Austria, helps explain the telephone conversation

in which I told Seyss-Inquart that he need not send a telegram, that he

could do it by telephone; that would be sufficient. That was the reason.

Mussolini’s consent did not come until 11:30 at night. It is well known

what a relief that was for the Führer.

In the evening of the same day, after everything had become clear, and

the outcome could be seen in advance, I went to the Flieger Club, where

I had been invited several weeks before, to a ball. I mention this

because here that too has been described as a deceptive maneuver. But

that invitation had been sent out, I believe, even before the

Berchtesgaden conference took place. There I met almost all the

diplomats. I immediately took Sir Nevile Henderson, the British

Ambassador, aside. I spoke to him for 2 hours and gave him all the

reasons and explained everything, and also asked him to tell me—the

same question which I later asked Ribbentrop—what nation in the whole

world was damaged in any way by our union with Austria? From whom had we

taken anything, and whom had we harmed? I said that this was an absolute

restitution, that both parts had belonged together in the German Empire

for centuries and that they had been separated only because of political

developments, the later monarchy and Austria’s secession.

When the Führer flew to Austria the next morning, I took over all the

business of the Reich in his absence, as is known. At that time I also

prohibited for the time being the return of the so-called Austrian

Legion—that was a group of people who had left Austria during the early

time of the fighting period—because I did not want to have any

disturbances. Secondly, however, I also made sure that north of the

Danube, that is between the Czechoslovak border and the Danube, only one

battalion should march through the villages, so that Czechoslovakia

would see very clearly that this was merely an Austro-German affair.

That battalion had to march through so that the towns north of the

Danube could also take part in the jubilation.

In this connection I want to stress two points in concluding: If Mr.

Messersmith says in his long affidavit that before the Anschluss I had

made various visits to Yugoslavia and Hungary in order to win over both

these nations for the Anschluss, and that I had promised to Yugoslavia a

part of Carinthia, I can only say in answer to these statements that I

do not understand them at all. My visits in Yugoslavia and the other

Balkan countries were designed to improve relations, particularly trade

relations, which were very important to me with respect to the Four Year

Plan. If at any time Yugoslavia had demanded one single village in

Carinthia, I would have said that I would not even answer such a point,

because, if any country is German to the core, it was and is Carinthia.

The second point: Here in the Indictment mention is made of an

aggressive war against Austria. Aggressive war is carried out by

shooting, throwing bombs, and so on; but there only one thing was

thrown—and that was flowers. But maybe the Prosecution meant something

else, and there I could agree. I personally have always stated that I

would do everything to make sure that the Anschluss should not disturb

the peace, but that in the long run, if this should be denied us

forever, I personally might resort to war in order to reach this goal;

that these Germans return to their fatherland—a war for Austria, not

against Austria.

I believe, I have given in brief a picture of the Austrian events. And I

close with the statement that in this matter not so much the Führer as

I, personally, bear the full and entire responsibility for everything

that has happened.

DR. STAHMER: On the evening before the march of the troops into Austria

you also had a conversation with Dr. Mastny, the Czechoslovak

Ambassador. On this occasion you are supposed to have given a

declaration on your word of honor. What about that conversation?

GÖRING: I am especially grateful that I can at last make a clear

statement about this “word of honor,” which has been mentioned so often

during the last months and which has been so incriminating for me.

I mentioned that on that evening almost all the diplomats were present

at that ball. After I had spoken to Sir Nevile Henderson and returned to

the ballroom, the Czechoslovak Ambassador, Dr. Mastny, came to me, very

excited and trembling, and asked me what was happening that night and

whether we intended to march into Czechoslovakia also. I gave him a

short explanation and said, “No, it is only a question of the Anschluss

of Austria; it has absolutely nothing to do with your country,

especially if you keep out of things altogether.”

He thanked me and went, apparently, to the telephone. But after a short

time he came back even more excited, and I had the impression that in

his excitement he could hardly understand me. I said to him then in the

presence of others: “Your Excellency, listen carefully. I give you my

personal word of honor that this is a question of the Anschluss of

Austria only, and that not a single German soldier will come anywhere

near the Czechoslovak border. See to it that there is no mobilization on

the part of Czechoslovakia which might lead to difficulties.” He then

agreed.

At no time did I say to him, “I give you my word of honor that we never

want to have anything to do with Czechoslovakia for all time.” All he

wanted was an explanation for this particular event, for this particular

time. I gave him this particular explanation, because I had already

clearly stated before that that the solution of the Sudeten German

problem would be necessary at some time and in some way. I would never

have given him a declaration on my word of honor in regard to a final

solution, and it would not have been possible for me, because before

that, I had already made a statement to a different effect. An

explanation was desired for the moment and in connection with the

Austrian events. I could conscientiously assure him on my word of honor

that Czechoslovakia would not be touched then, because at that time no

decisions had been made by us, as far as a definite time was concerned

with respect to Czechoslovakia or the solution of the Sudeten problem.

DR. STAHMER: On the 15 March 1939 a conversation took place between

Hitler and President Hacha. Were you present during that conversation?

And what was your part in it?

GÖRING: That was the beginning of the establishment of the Protectorate

in Czechoslovakia. After Munich—that is, after the Munich Agreement and

the solution of the Sudeten German problem—a military decision had been

reached by the Führer and some of his collaborators to the effect that,

if there should be new difficulties after the Munich agreement, or

arising from the occupation of the zones, certain measures of precaution

would have to be taken by the military authorities, for, after the

occupation of the zones, the troops which had been in readiness for

“Case Green” (Schmundt File) had been demobilized. But a development

might easily take place which at any moment could become extremely

dangerous for Germany. One needs only to remember what an interpretation

was given at that time by the Russian press and the Russian radio to the

Munich agreement and to the occupation of the Sudetenland. One could

hardly use stronger language. There had been a liaison between Prague

and Moscow for a long time. Prague, disappointed by the Munich

agreement, could now strengthen its ties with Moscow. Signs of that were

seen particularly in the Czech officers’ corps and we were informed. And

in the event of this proving dangerous to Germany, instructions had been

issued to the various military offices to take preventive measures, as

was their duty. But that order has nothing to do with any intention of

occupying the rest of Czechoslovakia after a short time.

I myself went to the Riviera at the end of January for my first long

vacation and during that time I dropped all business affairs. At the

beginning of March, much to my surprise, a courier came from the Führer

with a letter in which the Führer informed me that developments in

Czechoslovakia were such that he could not let things go on as they were

with impunity. They were becoming an increasing menace to Germany, and

he was determined to solve the question now by eliminating

Czechoslovakia as a source of danger right in the center of Germany, and

he therefore was thinking of an occupation.

During that time I had met many Englishmen in San Remo. I had realized

that they had made the best of Munich and even found it satisfactory,

but that any other incidents, or demands on Czechoslovakia would cause

considerable excitement.

I sent a letter back by courier. Maybe it is among the many tons of

documents in the possession of the Prosecution. I could also understand

if they do not submit it, for it would be a document of an extenuating

character as far as I am concerned. In this letter I communicated these

views to the Führer and wrote to him somewhat as follows: That if this

were to take place now, it would be a very serious loss of prestige for

the British Prime Minister, Chamberlain, and I hardly believed that he

would survive it. Then probably Mr. Churchill would come in, and the

Führer knew Churchill’s attitude toward Germany. Secondly, it would not

be understood, since just a short time previously we had settled these

things to general satisfaction. Thirdly, I thought I could calm him by

telling him the following: I believed that what he wanted to eliminate

at the moment in the way of danger, by the occupation of Czechoslovakia,

could be achieved in a somewhat lengthier manner, at the same time

avoiding anything which might excite Czechoslovakia as well as other

countries. I was convinced that since the Sudetenland had been separated

and Austria was a part of Germany an economic penetration of

Czechoslovakia would be only a matter of time. That is to say, I hoped

by strong economic ties to reach a communications, customs, and currency

union, which would serve the economic interests of both countries. If

this took place, then a sovereign Czechoslovakia would be politically so

closely bound to Germany and German interests that I did not believe

that any danger could arise again. However, if Slovakia expressed her

desire for independence very definitely we should not have to counteract

that in any way. On the contrary, we could support it, as then economic

co-operation would naturally become even much closer than otherwise;

for, if Slovakia were to secede, both countries would have to look to

Germany in economic matters, and in such matters both countries could be

made interested in Germany and could be most closely bound to Germany.

This letter—I have just given the gist of it—the courier took back.

Then I heard nothing for some days.

THE PRESIDENT: Would that be a convenient time for us to break off?

[_A recess was taken._]

DR. STAHMER: Will you continue, please?

GÖRING: I was then called to Berlin on very short notice. I arrived in

Berlin in the morning and President Hacha arrived in the evening of the

same day. I presented orally to the Führer the views which I had already

expressed in my letter. The Führer pointed out to me certain evidence in

his possession to the effect that the situation in Czechoslovakia had

developed more seriously. This state had, for one thing, disintegrated

because of the detachment of Slovakia, but that was not the decisive

question. He showed me documents from the Intelligence Service which

indicated that Russian aviation commissions were present at the

airfields of Czechoslovakia, or certain of them, undertaking training,

and that such things were not in keeping with the Munich agreement. He

said that he feared that Czechoslovakia, especially if Slovakia were

detached, would be used as a Russian air base against Germany.

He said he was determined to eliminate this danger. President Hacha had

requested an interview, so he told me at the time, and would arrive in

the evening; and he wished that I too should be present at the Reich

Chancellery.

President Hacha arrived and talked first with the Reich Foreign

Minister. At night he came to see the Führer; we greeted him coldly.

First he conversed with the Führer alone; then we were called in. Then I

talked to him in the presence of his ambassador and urged him to meet as

quickly as possible the Führer’s demand that troops be kept back when

the Germans marched in, in order that there might be no bloodshed. I

told him that nothing could be done about it; the Führer had made his

decision and considered it necessary, and there would be only

unnecessary bloodshed as resistance for any length of time was quite

impossible. And in that connection I made the statement that I should be

sorry if I had to bomb beautiful Prague. The intention of bombing Prague

did not exist, nor had any order been given to that effect, for even in

the case of resistance that would not have been necessary—resistance

could always be broken more easily without such bombing. But a point

like that might, I thought, serve as an argument and accelerate the

whole matter.

I succeeded then in getting a telephone connection between him and his

Government in Prague, he gave the order, and the occupation and the

march, into Prague took place the next day.

DR. STAHMER: Did you accompany the Führer to Prague?

GÖRING: No, I did not accompany him to Prague. I was rather annoyed. I

did not enter Czechoslovakia or Sudeten Germany at any time after that

incident, with the exception of 21 April 1945 when I passed through a

part of Czechoslovakia.

DR. STAHMER: Why were you annoyed?

GÖRING: Because the whole matter had been carried out more or less over

my head.

DR. STAHMER: Did other powers take a part in the occupation of

Czechoslovakia?

GÖRING: Yes. Poland took the Olsa territory at that time.

DR. STAHMER: The Prosecution have presented a document from which the

conclusion is drawn that the murder of the German Ambassador was to take

place in connection with anti-German demonstrations in Prague. It has

been interpreted as if this assassination of the German Ambassador were

to be carried out in order to provide a motive for the annexation.

GÖRING: That comes before the solution of the Sudeten German problem,

and I listened very carefully when that point came up. I also remember

what the facts really were. It was not discussed in that way and should

not be interpreted, that we wanted to murder our own Ambassadors, or had

even considered this possibility, in order to find a motive for settling

this problem. But we considered the possibilities which might lead to an

immediate clash. In view of the tension which existed between

Czechoslovakia and Germany in regard to Sudeten Germany, the possibility

was also considered that the German Ambassador in Prague might actually

be assassinated by the Czechs, and that this would necessitate immediate

action on Germany’s part under all circumstances, quite apart from any

other political actions.

This possibility arose from the fact that outside the German Embassy in

Prague there had been a number of demonstrations, which cannot be

denied, for which reason Germany had sent arms to the Embassy for its

defense, so threatening was the situation. For these reasons we talked

of that possibility. That has been wrongly understood here. We did not

want to have the Ambassador assassinated as a provocation, or a possible

provocation, but we saw the possibility of such an assassination being

committed by the other side; and then the Führer would have acted

immediately.

DR. STAHMER: To what extent were confiscations carried out in

Czechoslovakia?

GÖRING: Before the war no confiscation took place in Czechoslovakia,

that is, no economic goods were taken away. On the contrary,

Czechoslovakia’s large and vigorous economic capacity was aligned in its

full extent with the economic capacity of Germany. That is to say, we

attached importance above all to the fact that, now that we had declared

the Protectorate and thus concluded an action, the Skoda Works and the

Brünn Armament Works, that is important armament works, would naturally

be included in the armament potential of Germany. That means that orders

were sent there for the time being to a considerable extent. Over and

above that we even created new industries there and gave our support in

respect to this.

The accusation had been raised that among other things we dismantled new

rails there and replaced them with old rails from Germany. I believe

that to be a complete error, for the transportation system in

Czechoslovakia, the Protectorate, was one of the most important for

Germany. The entire southeastern transportation from the Balkans went

through the Protectorate, first, in the direction of Vienna, Prague,

Dresden, and Berlin; and secondly, the main line of

Vienna-Lundenburg-Oderberg-Breslau. And, since the canal had not been

completed, the entire transportation of all economic goods no longer

made a detour around the border, but took the shortest way. We would

have been mad if we had weakened this transportation system. I can think

of only one explanation, and that is that during the extension of the

existing transportation system perhaps, many rails from German stock

were also used which later appeared in the government report as “old.”

But that we dismantled new for old is absolute nonsense.

Furthermore, it is obvious that as Sudetenland was included in the

Reich, the accusation that state property and forests were taken over

into German State possession has no bearing; for naturally if a country

is taken over, then its state property must also become the property of

the new state.

Likewise the accusation, as far as Sudetenland is concerned, that the

banks there were affiliated with German banks is obviously not

justified, as German currency was introduced for the country, and

therefore the branch banks also had to be converted to that.

As far as the later Protectorate is concerned, I have already emphasized

that even before the creation of that Protectorate a strong economic

penetration of Czechoslovakia had been prepared by me, on the one hand

by our acquiring shares from other owners which gave us a voice in Czech

and Slovak enterprises, and further I believe, by our replacing certain

loans originally made by Western powers.

In this connection the Hermann Göring Werke came to the fore, as they

had acquired large number of shares in the Skoda Works, in order to use

the latter as a finishing industry for the products of their own rolling

mills and steel works, just as they used other industries in Germany.

Moreover, after, the creation of the Protectorate, the total economic

capacity of the Protectorate was of course amalgamated with Germany’s

total economic capacity.

DR. STAHMER: On 15 November 1937 a discussion with the Führer took place

at the Reich Chancellery, a record of which was prepared by a certain

Colonel Hossbach, and that has been referred to as Hitler’s last will.

It has repeatedly been the subject of the proceedings here. May I ask

you for a short explanation as to what significance this conference had.

I am going to have that document shown to you. It is Document Number

386-PS.

GÖRING: This document has already been shown to me here, and I am fairly

familiar with the contents. This document played an important role in

the Indictment, since it appears under the heading “Testament of the

Führer.” This word “testament” is, in fact, used in one place by

Hossbach.

As far as the technical aspect of this record is concerned, I want to

say the following: Hossbach was the adjutant of the Führer, the chief

adjutant. As such, he was present at the meeting and took notes. Five

days later, as I have ascertained, he prepared this record on the basis

of his notes. This is, therefore, a record which contains all the

mistakes which easily occur in a record, which is not taken down on the

spot by alternating stenographers, and which under certain circumstances

contains the subjective opinions of the recorder or his own

interpretations.

It contains a number of points, as I said at the time, which correspond

exactly to what the Führer had repeatedly said; but there are other

points and expressions which I may say do not seem like the Führer’s

words.

During the last months I have seen too many records and interrogations

which in part had nothing to do with it nor with the interpretation

which had been given to it; for that reason I must here too point out

the sources of mistakes.

As far as the word “testament” is concerned, the use of this word

contradicts the Führer’s views completely. If anybody at all knows

anything about these views, it is I.

The decision that I was to be the successor was not made first on 1

September 1939, but as early as the late autumn of 1934. I have often

had the opportunity of discussing the question of a so-called political

testament with the Führer. He turned it down, giving as his reason the

fact that one could never appoint a successor by means of a political

testament, for developments and political events must allow him complete

freedom of action at all times. Quite possibly one could set down

political wishes or views, but never binding statements in the shape of

a will. That was his view then and as long as I stood in his confidence.

Now, what did he aim at in this discussion? The Minister of War, the

Commander-in-Chief of the Army, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy and

the Luftwaffe and the then Reich Foreign Minister were called together.

Shortly before the Führer had informed me, as I was there earlier, that

he was going to call this meeting mainly in order, as he called it, to

put pressure on General Von Fritsch, since he was dissatisfied with the

rearmament of the Army. He said it would not do any harm if Herr Von

Blomberg would also exercise a certain amount of pressure on Von

Fritsch.

I asked why Von Neurath was to be present. He said he did not want the

thing to look too military, that as far as the commanders-in-chief were

concerned it was not so important, but that he wanted to make it very

clear to Commander-in-Chief Fritsch that the foreign political situation

required a forced speed in armament and that for that reason he had

asked the Foreign Minister, who knew nothing about the details, to come

along.

The statements were then made in the way the Führer preferred on such

occasions. He went to great lengths to picture things within a large

political framework and he talked about the whole world situation from

all angles; and for anybody who knew him as well as I did the purpose

which he pursued was obvious. He was quite clearly aiming at saying that

he had great plans, that the political situation was such and such, and

the whole thing ended in the direction of a stronger armament program. I

should like to say that, if the Führer, a couple of hours later, had

talked to another group, for instance, diplomats of the Foreign Office,

or Party functionaries, then he probably would have represented matters

quite differently.

Nevertheless, some of these statements naturally do reflect the basic

attitude of the Führer, but with the best intentions I cannot attach the

same measure of significance to the document as is being attached to it

here.

DR. STAHMER: You said you had been considered as the Führer’s successor.

Were you in this capacity initiated in all political problems by Hitler?

GÖRING: I am now talking of the period of my good relations, which

lasted until long into the war. Of course he informed me of all

important political and military problems. He initiated me into these

problems for the most part in many long discussions, which would take

place for many hours, day after day. Sometimes I was certainly surprised

concerning foreign political questions, but whenever possible I found

things out for myself, and on one occasion he said, in fact, that I had

a decided opinion of my own on foreign matters and that he did not

always find it easy to agree with me. But I want to emphasize that on

all important political questions I was, of course, always informed.

DR. STAHMER: On 23 May 1939 a conference took place with the Führer,

which was briefly discussed in connection with the examination of the

witness Milch.

A report of that was also made, Document Number L-79. According to the

wording of that report, you participated in this meeting, but the

witness Milch stated that you were not present.

GÖRING: Actually I was not present. Milch was called in at the last

moment to represent me. But, of course, if the witness says that he had

not received any permission from the Führer to inform me, then you must

understand that the Führer did not want to have me informed of this

matter by way of my state secretary, but wanted rather to inform me

himself. But no, I was actually present at this meeting—I see that now

from another clue. But even if I had not been present, I think Milch

must have been thinking of another meeting. That would not be one of any

importance, for it is out of the question that the Führer would have had

a conference with such gentlemen without notifying me either before, or

afterwards if I myself were absent. It is, therefore, not at all

important. It is quite obvious that in such cases I was informed either

previously or, if I was not present, afterwards in great detail by the

Führer. But I see now that Milch must have made a mistake here, and he

is probably thinking of another meeting, for at the very end I asked

some questions with respect to the armament program which I now recall

very well.

DR. STAHMER: What was the significance of this meeting?

GÖRING: It was a conference held by the Führer at which he once more

stated his views with regard to the situation and the tasks demanded of

the Wehrmacht as a result of this situation. Once more the main point

was to inform the Armed Forces concerning armament and preparedness,

that he was considering all possible developments, political and

otherwise, and that he himself wanted to have complete freedom of

decision.

Looking back, in regard to the events which have occurred up to this

moment—and I need not emphasize how easily matters viewed in

retrospect, in the light of their development, are seen and presented

differently to what they actually were when they occurred—but I can now

easily say that even at that time I wanted this or that, since I have in

the meantime achieved it. I can easily say also—this involuntarily

suggests itself—that this or that was always my intention, even though

one knows perfectly well that one was originally very dependent on other

factors, and that under certain circumstances one’s intentions at that

time might have been quite different.

Generally speaking, this is another case where there are misconceptions

on the part of the adjutant; but, on the whole, it is typical of the

conferences which the Führer used to hold when he had some particular

purpose in mind which he wanted to achieve and wanted to give this aim

the necessary emphasis.

DR. STAHMER: During the period from 1935 to 1938 you made many state

visits to Poland. What was the purpose of these visits?

GÖRING: After German-Polish relations had been clarified in 1934, the

Führer wished a strengthening of that pact and the creation of a better

atmosphere. He requested me to take over this task because he believed

that I would find it easy to talk to these Polish gentlemen, which was

indeed the case.

The President of the Polish State had invited me. That was in 1935, and

from then on—in 1935, 1936 and 1937—I spent about 1 or 2 weeks in

Poland each year. I had a long discussion with the then Marshal

Pilsudski, and afterwards always with the Foreign Minister, and Marshal

Rydz-Smygly.

At that time the Führer had given me the serious task—not a task of

deception—while improving relations, to tell Poland that he was

interested in a strong Poland, because a strong Poland would be an

excellent barrier between Germany and Russia. The Führer had laid stress

on the solution of the Danzig question and the Corridor question in

speaking to me at that time, and had said that the opportunity for this

would come, but that, until then, there might be some sort of

opportunity to come to an agreement with Poland about that problem. The

Lithuanian problem played a part in this. But the decisive factor is

that he did not say, “Lull Poland to sleep. I am going to attack Poland

afterwards.” It was never the case, that from the very beginning, as has

often been represented here, we got together and, conspiring, laid down

every point of our plans for decades to come. Rather, everything arose

out of the play of political forces and interests, as has always been

everywhere the case, the whole world over, in matters of state policy. I

had this task, and I consciously considered it a serious task and

carried it out with an honest belief in it. Consequently, when the clash

with Poland came about it was not a very pleasant situation for me.

DR. STAHMER: What was your attitude toward the Memel, Danzig, and Polish

Corridor question?

GÖRING: My attitude was always unequivocal. It was that Danzig and the

Free State, as purely German territory, should at some date in the near

future return to Germany. On the other hand, we certainly recognized

that Poland should have access to the sea, and also a port.

Consequently, our first thought was that the Free State and Danzig

should be returned to us and that through the Polish Corridor there

should be a German traffic lane. That was a very small and most modest

demand which for a long time was considered absolutely necessary, and

seemed to us quite possible.

DR. STAHMER: Another conference with the Führer took place on 23

November 1939. The record of that conference is Document Number 789-PS,

which was submitted to the Tribunal. I ask you to look at this document

and then to tell me briefly what your attitude is toward the subject of

this conference.

GÖRING: About that I can be comparatively brief. This is an address

before the commanders-in-chief and commanders of the formations and

armies which were to be made ready for the attack in the West after

Poland’s defeat. This is quite understandable to me and indeed requires

no explanation if the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, who is

actually leading these forces, decides to undertake a strategic and

extensive tactical operation, as in this case, after the end of the

Polish Campaign. The Führer wanted under all circumstances, and was

perfectly correct, to transfer the troops in the late autumn and carry

out the blow against France, so that in the autumn and winter of 1939

the end of that operation could be achieved. What prevented him was the

weather, since without using the Air Force he could not carry out this

operation, particularly the penetration of the Maginot Line at Sedan. He

needed good flying weather for at least 4 or 5 days at the beginning of

the attack. Merely because we could not assure him of such weather

conditions for weeks and weeks, the matter dragged on into the winter

and was eventually postponed, after Christmas and New Year, until the

beginning of the spring.

But this was at a time when he still believed that he could carry it

through. Therefore he called the commanders-in-chief together and

informed them about the orders for attack. It was one of the speeches

customarily made in such cases. Naturally, since the Führer was not only

a military man but above all a politician, it always happened that these

military speeches, which a soldier would have confined exclusively to

the military-strategical field, were always to a large extent filled

with references to his political views and his political tendencies or

intentions. It must never be forgotten that he gave such speeches not

only as the Commander-in-Chief or the Supreme Commander of the Armed

Forces, but also as the head of the German State; and that is why so

frequently there was such a strong political tendency even to the

military speeches.

But no general was asked on such occasions what his opinions were or

whether he approved of the principal tendencies of the policy or not. At

such speeches he was not even asked whether he approved of the military

plan or not; that happened at another time. If a matter was concluded

and purely strategical-tactical matters had been discussed with the

single commanders, then came a summary, also definitely political, in

which the last final concluding thoughts of the Führer were presented to

the generals. And if—this I emphasize since it has often played a role

here—if a general had been able to say, “My Führer, I consider your

statements wrong and not in keeping with the agreements we have made,”

or “This is not a policy of which we can approve,” it would have defied

understanding. Not because that particular general would have been shot;

but I would have doubted the sanity of that man, because how does one

imagine that a state can be led if, during a war, or before a war, which

the political leaders have decided upon, whether wrongly or rightly, the

individual general could vote whether he was going to fight or not,

whether his army corps was going to stay at home or not, or could say,

“I must first ask my division.” Perhaps one of them would go along, and

the other stay at home! That privilege in this case would have to be

afforded the ordinary soldier too. Perhaps this would be the way to

avoid wars in the future, if one were to ask every soldier whether he

wanted to go home! Possibly, but not in a Führer State. This I should

like to emphasize, that in every state of the world the military formula

is clearly defined. When there is a war, or when the state leadership

decides upon war, the military leaders receive their military tasks.

With respect to these they can voice an opinion, can make proposals as

to whether they want to press the attack on the left or the right or in

the center. But whether they thereby march through a neutral state or

not, is not the business of military leadership. That is entirely the

responsibility of the political leadership of the state. Therefore there

could be no possibility that a general discussion as to right or wrong

would ensue; rather the generals had already received their orders. The

Supreme Commander had decided and therefore there was nothing left for a

soldier to discuss; and that applies to a field marshal as well as to

the ordinary soldier.

DR. STAHMER: A Führer Decree of 7 October 1939 bears your signature. In

this decree Himmler is given the task of germanizing. This decree is

presented as Document Number 686-PS. Please look at this and say what

the significance of this decree is?

GÖRING: This decree of 7 October 1939 was issued after the Polish

campaign had ended. Poland at that time had been conquered and the

Polish State as such had ceased to exist. I draw your attention to the

note of the then People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs in Russia,

Molotov, who states his opinion about this, according to which that

injustice which Germany had felt, when in the Treaty of Versailles

German provinces were detached and given over to Poland, had been

compensated by the victory of arms. It was therefore a matter of course

for us that that part of Poland, which until 1918 had been German,

should again be given back, that is, returned to Germany. But in that

territory, in the course of years, more than one million Germans who had

formerly lived there, who had had property there, particularly farms,

estates, _et cetera_, had been thrown out, expelled and dispossessed.

That is quite clear from numerous complaints which during the years

after 1919 had been made to the League of Nations about this matter; and

a study of all these complaints and of all the events which had been

reported there, which must still be in the archives at Geneva, will

prove to what an enormous extent the Polonization of these German

territories was carried out. This decree aimed to put an end to that and

to make these territories German once more, that is, that those farms

and estates from which Germans had been driven, should once more come

into the hands of Germans. The fact that this task was given to Himmler

did not meet with my full agreement; but at the moment that was not of

decisive importance. He was given this task, not in his capacity as

Chief of the Police, but because, as is known, he was always

particularly and keenly interested in the question of the new

development of the German people, and therefore this office of “Folkdom”

or whatever it was called—just a moment, it does not make any

difference—anyhow Himmler was given this task. The Führer issued the

law. I naturally was also a signatory, since I was the Chairman of the

Ministerial Council at the time, and then it was also signed by the

Chief of the Chancellery, Lammers. These signatures are a matter of

course. I take a very positive attitude to this; it was quite in

accordance with my views, that where the Germans had been driven out

from what were German territories, they should return. But I want to

draw your attention to the fact that this, to be exact, is a question of

former German provinces.

DR. STAHMER: You mean the occupied western Polish provinces?

GÖRING: Yes. The Government, for instance, was not appointed for

purposes of Germanization. If Germans later were settled there—and I am

not certain of that—that was not done on the basis of this decree. You

asked about my attitude to the Memel question, I believe. Danzig and the

Polish Corridor, I have emphasized. Memel was a comparatively small

matter. In Memel, according to the Treaty of Versailles or the League of

Nations, there was to be a plebiscite. Shortly before, the Lithuanians

occupied Memel and the Memel territory. In order to prevent the

plebiscite Lithuania incorporated Memel and thereby produced a _fait

accompli_. Complaints of the German Government at that time naturally

were as futile as all previous complaints to the League of Nations. What

the Lithuanians had done was regretted, it was considered false and

wrong, but there could be no talk about returning it, or going through

with the prescribed plebiscite. After the Lithuanians, in violation of

all agreements, had occupied Memel, it was naturally our absolute

national right to rectify this encroachment and now to occupy Memel

ourselves.

DR. STAHMER: On 19 October 1939 you published a decree which ordered the

removal of economic goods from Poland. This decree has been submitted in

Document Number EC-410. I should like to have your opinion on this

decree.

GÖRING: This is a decree which represents general instructions as to

what economic procedure should be adopted in the whole of the Polish

territory occupied by us. It regulates the seizure and administration of

property of the Polish State within the territories occupied by German

troops, money and credit matters, the taking of economic measures, the

preparation for a settlement with foreign creditors which would become

necessary, _et cetera_. Confiscation was to be carried out only by the

Main Trustee Office East, _et cetera_. It is not so much a question of

the removal of economic goods. That was not the case. On the contrary,

even in the Government General, the economy in existence there, that

economy of course which could be used for purposes of war at that time,

was strengthened and extended. Such economy as was not absolutely

essential was cut down, just as in the rest of Germany and in all other

states in the event of war. As far as those raw materials are concerned

which were available and were important for the conduct of the war, such

as steel or copper or tin, it was my view, or better said my intention,

that these raw materials should be converted into manufactured products

there where they could most quickly be used for manufacture. If the

locality and its transportation facilities permitted it, they should

remain and be used for manufacture there. If it was not possible to use

them for manufacture on the spot, I would of course not let raw

materials of importance for the war lie there, but would have them

brought to wherever they could most quickly be used to serve the needs

of the war. That is in general, what this decree says. That was my basic

attitude and my basic instruction. The object was the quickest and most

purposeful use for manufacture wherever it was possible.

DR. STAHMER: On 19 November 1945 a Dr. Kajetan Mühlmann made an

affidavit, which has been presented by the Prosecution under Document

Number 3042-PS. In this it says the following in three short sentences:

“I was the Special Deputy of the Governor General of Poland,

Hans Frank, for the safeguarding of art treasures in the

Government General from October 1939 to September 1943. This

task was given to me by Göring in his capacity as the Chairman

of the Committee for Reich Defense. I confirm that it was the

official policy of the Governor General, Hans Frank, to take in

custody all important works of art which belonged to Polish

public institutions, private collections and the church. I

confirm that the mentioned works of art were actually

confiscated and I am aware that, in the event of a German

victory, they would not have remained in Poland but would have

been used to complete German art collections.”

GÖRING: Actually I had nothing directly to do with the safeguarding of

art treasures in Poland, absolutely nothing, in my capacity as Chairman

of the Ministerial Council for the Reich Defense. However, Mühlmann,

whom I knew, did come to see me and told me that he was to take steps

for the safeguarding of art treasures there. It was my view too that

these art treasures should be safeguarded during the war, regardless of

what was to be done with them later, so that no destruction would be

possible through fire, bombing, _et cetera_. I want to emphasize now—I

shall refer to this matter again later in connection with France—that

nothing was taken from these art treasures for my so-called collection.

I mention that just incidentally. That these art treasures were actually

safeguarded is correct, and was also intended, partly for the reason

that the owners were not there. Wherever the owners were present,

however—I remember Count Potocki of Lincut, for instance—the art

collections were left where they were. The Führer had not yet finally

decided what was to be done with these art treasures. He had given an

order—and I communicated that by letter to Mühlmann and also, as far as

I remember, to Frank—that these art treasures were for the time being

to be brought to Königsberg. Four pictures were to be taken to the

safety “bunker” or the safety room of the German Museum in Berlin or to

the Kaiser Friedrich Museum in Berlin. The Dürer drawings in Lemberg

also figured here. In this connection I want to mention them now, since

the Prosecution has already concerned itself with them. The Dürer

drawings in Lemberg were not confiscated by us at that time, because

Lemberg had become Russian. Not until the march against Russia were

these Lemberg drawings—as far as I can remember from Mühlmann’s

story—rescued from the burning city in the battle by a Polish

professor, who had hidden from the Russians until that time, and he gave

them over to him. They were drawings and he came with them to visit me.

Although I am usually very interested in such things I unfortunately did

not have time to look at them properly, as I was on my way to the Führer

at the moment. I took them along with me and, as Mühlmann has confirmed,

delivered them there immediately. Where they went after that I do not

know. I believe I have now answered the question about the Polish art

treasures. Apart from that there is still the Veit Stoss altar, which

was originally made here in Nuremberg, a purely German work. The Führer

wished that this altar should come to the Germanisches Museum here in

Nuremberg—with that I personally had nothing to do. I merely know about

it. What was intended to be done with it finally had not yet been

stated. But it is certain that it also would have been mentioned in

negotiations for peace.

DR. STAHMER: What connection did you have with Quisling?

GÖRING: I met Quisling for the first time long after the occupation of

Norway, for the first and only time. He was in Berlin, visited me, and

we had a short, unimportant conversation. Before that, that is before

the outbreak of war, one of his men whom I did not know personally sent

a letter to me, which has been shown to me here but which I myself

cannot remember, as such letters, according to our practice, were hardly

ever submitted to me—that is immaterial. In that letter he expressed

himself in Quisling’s name to the effect that we should give financial

support to Quisling’s movement, and he described to what extent

political money contributions, on the one side from Russia—the

Communist Party there—and on the other from England, would flow into

the political office concerned. Then I—later on someone discussed with

me whether some sort of contribution could be given to Quisling by way

of coal deliveries. My point of view was that, because of the foreign

exchange situation and other factors—we were not so rich, we naturally

could not compete with the Russian or English money contributions—those

authorities should be consulted who could judge whether it was expedient

to give the Quisling movement financial support or not. If they answered

in the affirmative, then it would be perfectly clear to me that Quisling

should receive money. The amount concerned, which I also would have

given, was very much higher than the amount which was, I believe, paid

later on by the Führer by way of the Foreign Office.

I never thought much of such small money contributions; if one was going

to give, then one should give properly, so that an end could really be

gained thereby. From the last World War I had experience enough in

connection with the money which went to the Romanian Parliament, but

which was unfortunately too little. On the basis of these experiences it

was my advice that if we were to contribute, then we should give the

proper amount. Apart from this, as I said, I did not become acquainted

with Quisling until much later, and had a very unimportant conversation

with him, which I do not remember.

DR. STAHMER: What was your attitude towards the Norway project?

GÖRING: The Norwegian project surprised me rather, since strangely

enough for a rather long time I was not informed about it. The Führer

went very far in his basic decree, which I already mentioned at the

beginning, and did not call in the Air Force until very late. But since

the most important part of this undertaking fell to the Air Force, I

expressed my views in regard to this in an unmistakable and unfriendly

fashion. From a military point of view I was definitely against this

undertaking as such, since as Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, quite

independent of political considerations, I had first of all to think

exclusively of strategic considerations. That it would considerably

improve my position as far as the Air Force was concerned if my

squadrons could operate against England from Norwegian bases was

obvious, and would be obvious to any prudent military expert. From the

strategic point of view I, as Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe, could

take only a very definite stand against this undertaking. My objection

was, firstly, that I had been informed too late and, secondly, that the

plans did not seem quite correct to me.

DR. STAHMER: Was Hitler afraid of complications with Sweden, because of

this occupation?

GÖRING: Yes, not because of occupation by German forces as such; but

when we, that is, the Führer, decided to occupy Norway, we already had

considerable and detailed information regarding the intended occupation

by the English and French, which was later also confirmed by the papers

of the English and French General Staff which we captured. In this

connection we also knew that the intention was not merely of occupying

Norway, but, above all, of cutting off the Swedish ore deliveries to

Germany by way of Narvik, and, over and above that, of intervening on

the side of Finland in the Russian-Finnish conflict, which was still

taking place at the time. The Führer feared that Sweden would yield

entirely to English pressure, that is, under the pretext of coming to

Finland’s aid, a march through would be allowed, thereby effecting the

complete cutting off of the Swedish iron ore basin and the ore

deliveries to us. I took a very heavy responsibility upon myself at that

time by assuring Hitler that I knew Sweden and her people and her King

so well that I knew that, whoever might want to exert pressure on

Sweden, regardless of which power—whether our power or another—Sweden

under all circumstances would defend her neutrality, with arms against

any power that tried to violate it, no matter what reasons there might

be for this violation. And I said that I personally and consciously

would take the responsibility for this, and that we could rest assured

in this respect. Therewith the question was settled.

THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.

[_The Tribunal adjourned until 15 March 1946 at 1000 hours._]

EIGHTY-SECOND DAY

Friday, 15 March 1946

_Morning Session_

DR. STAHMER: What reasons were decisive for the invasion of Holland and

Belgium?

GÖRING: This question had first been investigated from the purely

military and strategic point of view. To begin with it had been examined

whether the neutrality of the two States would be guaranteed absolutely.

THE PRESIDENT: There is some difficulty with the equipment. The Tribunal

will adjourn.

[_A recess was taken._]

DR. STAHMER: Would you please continue.

GÖRING: I repeat. At first, we had to determine whether the neutrality

of Holland and Belgium would, under all circumstances, be assured in

case of a conflict and a war in the West. In the beginning it seemed as

if it would. Then information came that negotiations had taken place not

only between Belgium and France but also between Holland and England.

There was an incident at Venlo, where a Dutch officer of the general

staff had been caught on German territory, and I believe another one was

shot by the frontier post during this occurrence, which made it clear

that this neutrality could not be maintained under certain conditions

and under increased pressure from the enemy side.

Now if neutrality was not assured under all circumstances, a tremendous

danger would exist in battle, in that the right flank was menaced and

exposed. The purely military authorities, who were concerned only with

the strategic point of view, when being asked for their opinion had to

give it from a purely military angle; that is, to point out that by

occupying both countries, the purely military and strategic situation

would of course be different from what it would be if this were not

done, and such an occupation were undertaken by the enemy.

An additional element which gave rise to doubt as to the absolute

neutrality of these countries was the fact that nearly all flights from

Great Britain into Germany, which took place at that time, went over

Dutch or Belgian territory. Reliable information reached us that the

Belgian Army, which at the beginning of the war had been reinforced on

its southwestern frontier, was being regrouped and drawn up along the

German border with all its full fighting force.

Further information indicated that an interchange of views between the

French and Belgian General Staffs had taken place, and that, under

pressure from the French General Staff, Belgium had promised to

intensify the work on the fortification line of the Maas against

Germany.

Other information indicated that the chief of the French General Staff,

Gamelin, as well as Admiral Darlan and the chief of the Air Force,

Vuillemin, insisted on the occupation of Belgium under all

circumstances, for the security of France, and that considerable

negotiations were taking place on this subject between the French and

the British governments. The information at the time was highly

reliable. How correct and absolutely clear it was became evident later

when, after marching into France, we found the secret documents of the

French General Staff, and also minutes of conferences which had taken

place between the French and British Governments in the so-called

Supreme Military Council.

It was the opinion of the Führer that the incapability of these

countries to maintain their neutrality in the face of increased French

and British pressure would in consequence expose to extreme danger the

Ruhr area, which was particularly vital to us. How justified this

opinion was can also be seen from reports in which the British chief of

government suggested, and had also fully explained by the experts in the

Military Council, how best the Ruhr Valley could be attacked by

low-flying British aircraft, which would approach over Belgium and then,

at the last moment, in a short flight from Belgium could attack the Ruhr

Valley and destroy the most important industries there.

If that was not carried out at first, it was due to the concern of the

French Premier, for he, on his part, was worried about French industry

and wanted to leave it to the other side to make the first attacks

against industrial areas. England insisted, however, that she would be

able to carry out this attack on the Ruhr Valley via Belgium at any

time.

If one takes into consideration how short the flying distance is from

the Belgian border to the most important industries of the Ruhr Valley,

only a few minutes, one can then fully realize the danger which would

arise if the neutrality of Belgium was not respected by our enemies. On

the other hand, if it were respected, an attack by the British Air Force

on the Ruhr Valley would have necessitated a relatively long flight over

the Helgoländer Bucht from the north, and at that time it would easily

have been possible for us to avoid and to repel such an attack. If,

however, they came via Belgium, it would have been almost impossible.

In this hard struggle it was necessary in the first place, to think of

our own war interests and our own existence, and not to leave the

advantage to the enemy. At the very moment one was sincerely convinced

of the reality of the danger threatening our people, and above all our

Armed Forces; that danger had to be eliminated, in advance, and we had

to secure for ourselves those advantages which the adversary had

expected.