DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I fully understand the position of the

individual generals. I just wished to prevent the generals being called

defendants now, which they are not. For that I wanted to have evidence.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

DR. STAHMER: If the High Tribunal agree, I wish to call the former Reich

Marshal, Defendant Hermann Göring, to the witness stand.

[_The Defendant Göring took the stand._]

THE PRESIDENT: Will you give your name please?

HERMANN WILHELM GÖRING (Defendant): Hermann Göring.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the

Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will

withhold and add nothing.

[_The witness repeated the oath in German._]

THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down if you wish.

DR. STAHMER: When were you born and where?

GÖRING: I was born on 12 January 1893 in Rosenheim, Bavaria.

DR. STAHMER: Give the Tribunal a short account of your life up to the

outbreak of the first World War, but briefly, please.

GÖRING: Normal education, first a tutor at home; then cadet corps, then

an active officer. A few points which are significant with relation to

my later development: The position of my father as first Governor of

Southwest Africa; his connections at that time, especially with two

British statesmen, Cecil Rhodes and the elder Chamberlain. Then the

strong attachment of my father to Bismarck; the experiences of my youth,

half of which was spent in Austria to which I already felt a close

attachment, as to a kindred people. At the beginning of the first World

War I was a lieutenant in an infantry regiment.

DR. STAHMER: With what rank did you participate in the first World War?

GÖRING: As I just mentioned, at first as a lieutenant in an infantry

regiment in the so-called border battles. From October 1914 on I was an

aircraft observer. In June 1915 I became a pilot, at first with a

reconnaissance plane, then for a short time with a bomber and in the

autumn of 1915 I became a fighter pilot. I was seriously wounded in

aerial combat. After recovery I became the leader of a fighter squadron,

and after Richthofen was killed I became the commander of the then

well-known “Richthofen Squadron.”

DR. STAHMER: What war decorations did you receive?

GÖRING: First the Iron Cross Second Class, then Iron Cross First Class,

then the Zähring Lion with Swords, the Karl Friedrich Order, the

Hohenzollern with Swords Third Class, and finally the Order Pour le

Mérite, which was the highest decoration possible.

DR. STAHMER: Tell the Tribunal when and under what circumstances you

came to know Hitler.

GÖRING: I should like to mention one basic fact in advance. After the

collapse in the first World War I had to demobilize my squadron. I

rejected the invitation to enter the Reichswehr because from the very

beginning I was opposed in every way to the republic which had come to

power through the revolution; I could not bring it into harmony with my

convictions. Shortly afterwards I went abroad to find a position there.

But after a few years I longed to get back to my own country. First, I

spent quite some time at a hunting lodge in the mountains and studied

there. In some way I wanted to participate in the fate of my country.

Since I could not and would not do that as an officer for the reasons

mentioned above, I had first of all to build up the necessary

foundation, and I attended the University of Munich in order to study

history and political science. I settled down in the neighborhood of

Munich and bought a house there for my wife. Then one day, on a Sunday

in November or October of 1922, the demand having been made again by the

Entente for the extradition of our military leaders, at a protest

demonstration in Munich—I went to this protest demonstration as a

spectator, without having any connection with it. Various speakers from

parties and organizations spoke there. At the end Hitler, too, was

called for. I had heard his name once before briefly and wanted to hear

what he had to say. He declined to speak and it was pure coincidence

that I stood nearby and heard the reasons for his refusal. He did not

want to disturb the unanimity of the demonstration; he could not see

himself speaking, as he put it, to these tame, bourgeois pirates. He

considered it senseless to launch protests with no weight behind them.

This made a deep impression on me; I was of the same opinion.

I inquired and found that on the following Monday evening I could hear

Hitler speak, as he held a meeting every Monday evening. I went there,

and there Hitler spoke in connection with that demonstration, about

Versailles, the treaty of Versailles, and the repudiation of Versailles.

He said that such empty protests as that of Sunday had no sense at

all—one would just pass on from it to the agenda—that a protest is

successful only if backed by power to give it weight. Until Germany had

become strong, this kind of thing was of no purpose.

This conviction was spoken word for word as if from my own soul. On one

of the following days I went to the office of the NSDAP. At that time I

knew nothing of the program of the NSDAP, and nothing further than that

it was a small party. I had also investigated other parties. When the

National Assembly was elected, with a then completely unpolitical

attitude I had even voted democratic. Then, when I saw whom I had

elected, I avoided politics for some time. Now, finally I saw a man here

who had a clear and definite aim. I just wanted to speak to him at first

to see if I could assist him in any way. He received me at once and

after I had introduced myself he said it was an extraordinary turn of

fate that we should meet. We spoke at once about the things which were

close to our hearts—the defeat of the fatherland, and that one could

not let it rest with that.

The chief theme of this conversation was again Versailles. I told him

that I myself to the fullest extent, and all I was, and all I possessed,

were completely at his disposal for this, in my opinion, most essential

and decisive matter: the fight against the Treaty of Versailles.

The second point which impressed me very strongly at the time and which

I felt very deeply and really considered to be a basic condition, was

the fact that he explained to me at length that it was not possible

under the conditions then prevailing to bring about, in co-operation

with only that element which at that time considered itself

national—whether it be the political so-called nationalist parties or

those which still called themselves national, or the then existing

clubs, fighter organizations, the Free Corps, _et cetera_—with these

people alone it was not possible to bring about a reconstruction with

the aim of creating a strong national will among the German people, as

long as the masses of German labor opposed this idea. One could only

rebuild Germany again if one could enlist the masses of German labor.

This could be achieved only if the will to become free from the

unbearable shackles of the Treaty of Versailles were really felt by the

broad masses of the people, and that would be possible only by combining

the national conception with a social goal.

He gave me on that occasion for the first time a very wonderful and

profound explanation of the concept of National Socialism; the unity of

the two concepts of nationalism on the one hand and socialism on the

other, which should prove themselves the absolute supporters of

nationalism as well as of socialism—the nationalism, if I may say so,

of the bourgeois world and the socialism of the Marxist world. We must

clarify these concepts again and through this union of the two ideas

create a new vehicle for these new thoughts.

Then we proceeded to the practical side, in regard to which he asked me

above all to support him in one point. Within the Party, as small as it

was, he had made a special selection of these people who were convinced

followers, and who were ready at any moment to devote themselves

completely and unreservedly to the dissemination of our idea.

He said that I knew myself how strong Marxism and communism were

everywhere at the time, and that actually he had been able to make

himself heard at meetings only after he had opposed one physical force

disturbing the meeting with another physical force protecting the

meeting; for this purpose he had created the SA. The leaders at that

time were too young, and he had long been on the lookout for a leader

who had distinguished himself in some way in the last war, which was

only a few years ago, so that there would be the necessary authority. He

had always tried to find a “Pour le Mérite” aviator or a “Pour le

Mérite” submarine man for this purpose, and now it seemed to him

especially fortunate that I in particular, the last commander of the

“Richthofen Squadron,” should place myself at his disposal.

I told him that in itself it would not be very pleasant for me to have a

leading part from the very beginning, since it might appear that I had

come merely because of this position. We finally reached an agreement

that for 1 to 2 months I was to remain officially in the background and

take over leadership only after that, but actually I was to make my

influence felt immediately. I agreed to this, and in that way I came

together with Adolf Hitler.

DR. STAHMER: And when was that?

GÖRING: The end of October or the beginning of November 1922.

DR. STAHMER: The end of October?

GÖRING: Either the end of October or the beginning of November 1922.

DR. STAHMER: And then you officially entered the Party?

GÖRING: Yes, that was the same date. Just a few days after that I signed

up.

DR. STAHMER: What tasks did Hitler then give you, that is, say, until

November 1923?

GÖRING: The tasks arose from my position, which at that time had the

title “Commander of the SA.” At first it was important to weld the SA

into a stable organization, to discipline it, and to make of it a

completely reliable unit which had to carry out the orders which I or

Adolf Hitler should give it. Up to that point it had been just a club

which had been very active, but which still lacked the necessary

construction and discipline.

I strove from the beginning to bring into the SA those members of the

Party who were young and idealistic enough to devote their free time and

their entire energies to it. For at that time things were very difficult

for these good men. We were very small in number and our opponents were

far more numerous. Even in those days these men were exposed to very

considerable annoyances and had to suffer all sorts of things.

In the second place I tried to find recruits among workmen, for I knew

that among workmen particularly I should enroll many members for the SA.

At the same time we had naturally to see to it that the meetings of the

Party, which generally were limited at that time to Munich, Upper

Bavaria and Franconia, could actually be carried through in a

satisfactory manner, and disturbances prevented. In most cases we

succeeded. But sometimes we had a strong party of our opponents present.

One side or the other still had weapons from the war and sometimes

critical situations arose, and in some cases we had to send the SA as

reinforcements to other localities.

In the course of the year 1923 the contrast between Bavaria and the

Reich became even stronger. One could see that the Bavarian Government

of that time wanted to go a different way to that of the Reich

Government. The Reich Government was influenced strongly by Marxism, but

the Bavarian Government was free from that, it was bourgeois.

Then suddenly the Bavarian Government was completely transformed when a

governor general—I believe he was called that—or something of the

sort, was appointed for Bavaria. It was Von Kahr, to whom the Bavarian

Government was subordinate and to whom the Bavarian Government delegated

all authority. Shortly after that the Reichswehr conflict developed. The

7th Reichswehr Division, which was stationed in Bavaria, was released

from its oath to the Reich, which it had sworn to the Reich

Constitution—I do not know its name any longer—that is to Von Kahr.

This led to the conflict of the Generals Von Seeckt and Lossow. The same

thing happened with the Bavarian police.

The Bavarian Government at the same time curried favor with the

so-called national associations which were in part organized along

military or semi-military lines and also possessed weapons. The whole

thing was directed against Berlin and, as we expressed it, against the

“November Republic.” We could agree up to that point.

On the Sunday, before the 9th of November, there was a large parade in

Munich. The whole Bavarian Government was there. The Reichswehr, the

police and the fatherland associations, and we too, marched past.

Suddenly, on that occasion, we saw that the figure in the foreground was

no longer Herr Von Kahr but the Bavarian Crown Prince Rupprecht. We were

very much taken aback by that. The suspicion arose among us that Bavaria

wished to follow a course which would possibly lead to a considerable

disintegration, and Bavaria might secede from the body of the Reich. But

nothing was farther from our intentions than to permit that. We wanted a

strong Reich, a unified Reich; and we wanted to have it cleansed of

certain parties and authorities which were now ruling it.

We had become distrustful of the so-called “March on Berlin.” When this

became a certainty and Herr Von Kahr had called the well-known meeting

in the Bürgerbräukeller, it was high time to frustrate such plans and to

guide the whole undertaking in the direction of the “Greater Germany”

idea. Thus the events of 9 November 1923 materialized in very short

time. But as far as I personally am concerned, I was—and I never made a

secret of this—ready from the beginning to take part in every

revolution against the so-called November Republic, no matter where and

with whom it originated, unless it originated with the Left, and for

these tasks I had always offered my services.

Then I was severely wounded at the Feldherrnhalle—the events are well

known—and with this incident I close this first chapter.

DR. STAHMER: When, after that time, did you come together with Hitler

again?

GÖRING: At first I was in a hospital in Austria. There was a trial

before the Bavarian People’s Court regarding the 9th of November.

DR. STAHMER: Who was indicted?

GÖRING: Hitler was indicted first of all, and naturally all those who

had been present and were apprehended. I had been in Upper Bavaria for

several days in a seriously wounded state and was then brought to the

border, was arrested there, and then the Bavarian police brought me back

to a different place. I asked Hitler at that time, whether I should

appear at the trial. He begged me urgently not to do that, and that was

a good thing. In this way the proceedings could not be held behind

closed doors, because I had made the statement that if that was done I,

for my part, would make an appropriate public statement with regard to

the trial.

Then, after my recuperation, I spent about a year in Italy; then

elsewhere abroad. In the year 1926 or 1927 there was a general amnesty

for all the people involved in the different illegal—if I should call

them that—incidents which had occurred up to then, not only for us but

also for the Leftists and the peasants, and I could return to Germany.

I met Hitler again for the first time in 1927 at a rather brief

conference in Berlin, where he was present. I was not active in the

Party then, rather I wanted first to provide myself with an independent

position once more. Then for months I was not in touch with Hitler

again. Shortly before the May elections of the Reichstag in 1928 Hitler

called me and told me he wanted to put me up as one of the first of the

Reichstag candidates for the National Socialist Party and asked me

whether I were willing and I said “yes,” and also whether my activity in

the Party to a still greater extent . . .

DR. STAHMER: One question. Had you meanwhile joined the SA?

GÖRING: No; at that time I had nothing more to do with the SA. In the

meantime there were new appointments in the SA and the new leader of the

SA, Von Pfeffer, naturally wanted to keep his position and would not

have liked to see me in close touch with the SA.

DR. STAHMER: Then after 1923 you had no office or position in the SA?

GÖRING: After 1923 my active position in the SA ceased. Not until after

the seizure of power, at a later date, when the so-called honorary

offices were created, did I receive, as an honorary post, the highest

rank in the SA. But to come back, in 1928 I was elected to the Reichstag

and from that time on I toured the country as a speaker for the Party.

The SA, I do not recall in what year, had been re-established and was

now no longer limited to Bavaria, but had been extended to the whole

Reich.

DR. STAHMER: Was it prohibited after 1923?

GÖRING: After 1923, it was prohibited for the time being.

DR. STAHMER: When was this prohibition rescinded?

GÖRING: I cannot say exactly, at any rate at a time when I had not yet

returned to Germany. But in any case it had spread over all Germany and

was now urgently necessary. The parties at that time, the larger ones,

all had their so-called fighting units. Especially active, I remember,

was the Red Front, a collection of the fighting units of the Communists,

our greatest opponents, with whom we had repeated clashes and who very

often tried to break up our meetings. In addition, there was the

Reichsbanner, the organization of the Social Democrats, the Democratic

Party. Then there was the Stahlhelm; that was a nationalist organization

of the Right. And then there was our SA, which is to be mentioned in the

same connection.

I should like to emphasize that at that time the SA often had to suffer

heavily. Most of the SA men came from the broad masses; they were minor

employees, workmen, men who took part only for idealistic reasons and

who had to give their services nights and evenings without receiving

anything in payment, and who did so only out of their real faith in the

fatherland. They were often most severely wounded and many of them were

shot in the clashes. They were persecuted by the government. They could

not be officials; an official could not join the SA. They had to endure

terrific pressure. I should like to emphasize that I had the highest

respect and affection for these men, these SA men, who were not

determined as has been pictured here, simply to do something cruel, but

who were rather men who really exposed themselves voluntarily to the

most difficult trials and vexations because of their idealism and their

aims, and renounced many things in order to realize their ideals.

DR. STAHMER: What was your position in the Party during the period from

1928 until the seizure of power?

GÖRING: I had no office in the Party. I was never a political leader in

the Party—that is perhaps strange—either in the Reich Party

Directorate or elsewhere. I was first of all, as I said, a member of the

Reichstag and thereby a member of the Reichstag faction of the Party. At

the same time I was the Party speaker, that is, I travelled from city to

city and tried to do whatever I could to extend the Party, to strengthen

it, to recruit and convince new members, and especially to win over to

our side Communist and Marxist adherents in order to create a broad base

among the people and not to have Rightist circles only, which were

nationalist of themselves.

From the middle of 1932 on, after we had weathered countless elections

and for all of these elections had had to participate in the campaigns

by holding speeches, for example, often three in one evening, often the

whole night long; I, as a member of the Party, or better said, because

our Party had the strongest representation in the Reichstag, was chosen

President of the Reichstag and thereby took over a generally political

task.

Shortly before, at the end of 1931, when I saw that the Party had grown

to an extraordinary extent and was gaining, the Führer said to me that

he would very much like to have a direct representative who was

independent of a Party office and who could carry out political

negotiations. This person was not to be tied down to any particular

Party office. He asked me whether I would take over this function,

especially as I was living in the capital of the Reich anyway.

I took over this commission—it was not an office, but rather a

commission of a general nature. In a few sentences he gave me the

liberty to negotiate with all parties from the Communists to the extreme

Rightists, in order, let us say, to undertake specific joint action in

the Reichstag, or other suitable political steps. Naturally also I was

given in this connection, the task of effecting the dissemination and

the penetration of our ideals in all circles. To these circles belonged,

as has already been mentioned, the industrial and intellectual groups.

Since I had connections with and access to all these circles, it was

quite natural that the Führer considered me specially suited for this

task, as he could depend upon me absolutely in this respect and knew

that I would use all my powers to advance our ideas. When I became

President of the Reichstag my task in this capacity was greatly eased,

for now I was, so to speak, legally authorized and even obliged to

participate in political events. If, for instance, a government resigned

in the Reichstag or fell through a vote of no confidence, it was my duty

as President of the Reichstag, to suggest to the Reich President, after

having negotiated with the parties, what the possibilities were in my

opinion for a new coalition government. Thus the Reich President was

always bound to receive me in this capacity with regard to these

matters. So I was able to create a rather close connection between the

Reich President and myself. But I should like to emphasize that this

connection had already existed before; it was a matter of course that

Field Marshal Von Hindenburg, if I requested it, would always receive

me, because he had known me in the first World War.

DR. STAHMER: What part did you play in the appointment of Hitler as

Reich Chancellor?

GÖRING: I should just like to explain first that when I said that I held

no office in the Party, no political office, my position had

nevertheless naturally become stronger and stronger, especially since

the end of 1931, from which time on I worked more and more closely with

the Führer and was considered his special exponent—but only on the

basis of normal and natural authority which increased greatly after the

seizure of power.

As to my part in the appointment of Hitler: If I am to explain this to

the Tribunal I must first describe the situation briefly. The balance

among the parliamentary parties had been disturbed as early as the end

of 1931 or the beginning of 1932. Things were going badly in Germany and

no proper enduring parliamentary majority could actually be procured,

and already the Enabling Act then in force had come into play to the

exclusion, in part, of the Constitution. I call to mind the Brüning

cabinet which had to work to a large extent with the Enabling Act and

which at the time was also greatly concerned with Article 48 of the

Reich Constitution. Then there followed the Cabinet of Von Papen, which

also could not put itself on a parliamentary basis, on a more lasting or

firmer basis. Herr Von Papen at that time tried to make that possible

and, in order to get a parliamentary basis, he asked the National

Socialists, the strongest party at that time, to establish such a basis

together with the other parties. There was some talk—Von Papen’s name

had been given to the President as a nominee for Reich Chancellor—that

Hitler should become the Vice Chancellor in this Cabinet. I remember

that I told Herr Von Papen at that time that Hitler could become any

number of things, but never Vice. If he were to be made anything, he

would naturally have to be in the highest position and it would be

completely unbearable and unthinkable to place our Führer in any sort of

second position. We would then have had to play the role of governing,

but possibly not all according to our lights, and Hitler as a

representative of the strongest party would have had to be responsible

for these things. This we declined categorically. I do not emphasize

that because Herr Von Papen is in the dock with me. He knows that we

always respected him personally, but I told him then, after this gesture

had come to nought, that we would not only not support him, but would

also oppose his Cabinet in the Reichstag to the utmost, just as we would

consistently fight every succeeding cabinet which did not give us a

leading influence in the Chancellery.

There came then—I do not remember exactly for how many months Herr Von

Papen held the reins—the well-known clash between him and me, he as

Reich Chancellor, I as the President of the Reichstag, in which it was

my intention to bring about the fall of his government, and I knew there

was to be a motion of “no confidence” by the Communists, in which

practically everybody would participate. It was necessary for this vote

of “no confidence” to be expressed under all circumstances in order to

show the Reich President that one could not govern with such cabinets

without some sort of strong reserve. I saw the “red portfolio” and knew

that the order for dissolution was in it, but let the voting be carried

through first. Thirty-two votes were for Von Papen and about five

hundred were against him. The Cabinet of Von Papen resigned.

Up to that point all the parties had drawn up cabinets, apart from the

few small fragmentary parties. All men who were available had already

been presented to the people at some time. Towards the end, Reich

Defense Minister Von Schleicher, the political figure behind the scenes,

had played an increasingly important part. There were therefore only two

possibilities: Either the actual proportion of power would be taken into

account and the leader of the strongest party, as is generally

customary, would be brought into conferences and entrusted with the

power, or else the man who was operating behind the scenes, the only

possibility that was left, would be brought forward. And this happened.

Herr Von Schleicher himself took over the chancellorship in conjunction

with—and this is important—the office of Reich Defense Minister. It

was clear to us, not only to us but also to the other parties, that as

Herr Von Schleicher had far fewer personal sympathizers than Herr Von

Papen and could not bring about a majority, a military dictatorship was

finally aimed at by Von Schleicher. I had discussions with Herr Von

Schleicher and told him that at this moment it was even possible to form

a parliamentary majority. Through conferences I had succeeded in

bringing together the German Nationals, National Socialists, Center,

German People’s Party and smaller supporting groups, to form a majority.

It was clear to me that such a majority could be only temporary because

the conflicting interests were too great. But it was a matter of

indifference to me whether I brought our Party to power this way or

that—if by means of parliamentary negotiations, very good; if by the

Reich President’s summons, all the better.

These negotiations were turned down by Herr Von Schleicher because he

knew that he would then not be able to remain chancellor. Then again

there were Emergency Laws and Enabling Acts. Parliament had thus been

more or less excluded even before our seizure of power.

I immediately issued the same challenge to Herr Von Schleicher in the

Reichstag, much more emphatically than previously to Herr Von Papen. In

the meantime the presidential election had taken place and after that a

Reichstag election, in which, after the dissolution of Von Papen’s

Cabinet we lost several seats. We were reduced from 232 to 196 seats.

Then in January there were further elections, which showed an

extraordinary rise in favor of our Party and proved that the short

crisis had been surmounted and that the Party was on the upgrade more

strongly than ever before.

On Sunday, the 22nd of January 1933—the 30th was a Monday—I was in

Dresden at a large political meeting, when I was summoned in the morning

by the Führer to motor to Berlin immediately. I arrived that afternoon,

and he told me, which I already knew, that the Reich President was no

longer satisfied with Von Schleicher and saw that political matters

could not continue in this way; nothing was ever accomplished; the Reich

President had independently arrived at the conclusion that somehow some

responsibility must now be given to the strongest Party. Before that

time, in a very clever way, a wrong personal impression of the Führer

had been created in the old gentleman’s mind and he was prejudiced—he

probably took offense at the word socialism, because he understood that

in a different way.

Briefly, Hitler revealed to me that day, that that evening I was to

speak to the Field Marshal’s son at the home of Herr Von Ribbentrop. I

believe Herr Von Papen was to be present also and—I am not sure about

this—Meissner, who was the State Secretary of the Reich President. The

Field Marshal’s son wanted to inquire on behalf of his father what the

possibilities were of Hitler as chancellor and the inclusion of the

Party in responsibility. In a rather lengthy conversation I declared to

the son that he should tell his father that, one way or another, Von

Schleicher would lead to shipwreck. I explained to him the new basic

conditions for forming a new government, and how I had heard now of the

Field Marshal’s willingness to entrust Hitler with the chancellorship,

thereby regarding the Party as a main basis for a future government

majority if Adolf Hitler were also able to succeed on this occasion in

drawing in the German Nationals and the Stahlhelm—for he wanted to see

a definite national basis. The Stahlhelm was not a parliamentary party

but it had many followers. The German Nationals under Hugenberg were a

parliamentary party.

We did not discuss very much more that evening. I told Von Hindenburg’s

son that he could tell his father that I would undoubtedly bring that

about, and the Führer gave me orders to undertake negotiations during

the coming week with these parties on the one hand and with the Reich

President on the other. There were difficulties here and there. I found

that our conceding . . .

THE PRESIDENT: I think we will break off now.

[_A recess was taken._]

DR. STAHMER: You were dealing with the question of your participation in

the appointment of Hitler as Reich Chancellor. Would you continue?

GÖRING: I had arrived at the last decisive period. The negotiations had

become somewhat difficult. The Field Marshal, Reich President Von

Hindenburg, who, until then, had come to know the Führer personally only

through two conversations and who had not yet overcome his distrust of

him—a distrust which had been instilled and nourished for many years by

a variety of influences, simply because he did not know him—had at that

time demanded some severe restrictions, so that we, the strongest and

now the leading party, which would have to be responsible to the nation

for future measures, would be relatively very restricted and, in

comparison with our strength, weakly represented in the government.

One must not forget that at this moment Germany had arrived at the

lowest point of her downward trend. There were 8 million unemployed; all

programs had failed; confidence in the parties existed no more; there

was a very strong rise on the part of the revolutionary Leftist side;

and political insecurity. Therefore those measures were necessary which

the people would expect of us, if we were in the government, and for

which we had to stand. So it was a very heavy burden to take over such a

responsibility with such severe political conditions imposed.

First condition: The Reich President wanted, under all circumstances,

that Herr Von Papen should become Vice Chancellor in this Cabinet. Apart

from his sympathetic personality Herr Von Papen did not bring us

anything, because there was no party behind him. But the Reich President

demanded, beyond that, that Herr Von Papen should attend the

presentation of the reports which the Führer, after being appointed

Reich Chancellor, would have to make to the Reich President. But this

was abandoned very quickly, and by the Reich President himself.

Secondly, the Reich President desired that the Foreign Office,

independent of all parties, should be in the hands of Herr Von Neurath.

Herr Von Neurath also brought us nothing in the way of political power,

apart from his knowledge and ability.

Thirdly, the position of Prussian Prime Minister which, next to that of

the Reich Chancellor was always the most important in Germany during the

period after the World War, was likewise to be filled by the person of

Herr Von Papen. Before the World War, as it is known, the offices of

Reich Chancellor and Prussian Prime Minister were for these reasons

always combined in one person.

Fourthly, the Reich President demanded that the office of Reich Defense

Minister should also be in the hands of an independent person, a

soldier; and he himself chose him, without our having anything to do

with it, namely, General Von Blomberg, who at that time was at the

Disarmament Conference in Geneva. Herr Von Blomberg was not known

personally either to the Führer or to me at that time.

Even though the essential and definitely most important posts in the

Cabinet were thus already filled by persons in whose choice we had had

no influence, still further demands developed in the course of the week.

It was demanded that the Finance Ministry should be in the hands of

Count Schwerin von Krosigk, again a man backed by no political party.

The Ministry of Transportation was to be under Herr Von Eltz, to whom

the same applied. The leader of the Stahlhelm, Seldte, was to be taken

into the Cabinet. Certainly the Stahlhelm was a large and extensive

movement, but not politically, and it was not represented by a single

delegate in the Reichstag.

There was left, as a really political party, only the German National

Party, with 36 seats—our only parliamentary ally, so to speak. Here

too, extraordinary demands were made, which were in no correct

proportion to the smallness of that party.

In the end we, as the strongest party at that time with 232 seats, were

given only the following, as far as I remember: The office of Reich

Chancellor of course; then Dr. Frick as Reich Minister of the Interior,

in the Cabinet; and I third in the Reich Cabinet, with an assignment as

Reich Commissioner for Aviation, a very small subordinate division, an

insignificant branch of a small Aviation Department in the Ministry of

Transport, but no department otherwise. But then I succeeded in

becoming, without conditions attached, Prussian Minister of the Interior

and thereby a political minister of the largest German state, for in the

end Prussia was actually the place where the rise to internal power

started.

It was so far an extraordinarily difficult affair. At the last moment

the forming of the Cabinet threatened to fail because of two factors.

The Führer had made the unconditional demand that shortly after the

appointment of the new Cabinet a new Reichstag election should take

place, knowing correctly that the Party would be greatly strengthened

thereby and possibly could represent a majority by itself, and thus be

in a position to form the government platform by parliamentary means.

Hugenberg, as leader of the German National Party, absolutely opposed

this, knowing that his party would probably disappear more or less in

this election. Even 5 minutes before the meeting of the Cabinet there

was still danger that it would break up because of this. It was pure

chance that at this moment the Reich President undertook to administer

the oath to the new ministers; and so the Cabinet was formed.

The second danger threatened from Schleicher who, through his confidant,

on the Sunday made the following offer to the Führer and me: He wanted

to emphasize that the Reich President was not a sure factor as far as

the new government was concerned; it would serve the purpose better if

he—even though he had withdrawn the day before—were to join us to form

a government now quite definitely not on a parliamentary basis of any

kind, but rather on the basis of an entirely new situation, a coalition

of the Reichswehr and the NSDAP.

The Führer refused, recognizing that this would be impossible and that

the intentions were not honest.

When Herr Von Blomberg arrived at the railroad station from Geneva on

the Monday morning, he was given two orders, one from Herr Von

Hammerstein, Chief of the Army Command and his superior, to come to him

immediately; the other from Hindenburg, his commander-in-chief, to come

to him immediately. There was at that time, known only to a few, the

threat of a Putsch by Schleicher and Hammerstein with the Potsdam

Garrison.

On the Sunday evening I mentioned that to Reich President Von

Hindenburg, and that is the reason why, 2 hours before the rest of the

Cabinet, Herr Von Blomberg was appointed Minister of War, or at that

time Reich Defense Minister, in order to prevent any wrong move by the

Reichswehr.

At 11 o’clock on the morning of the 30th the Cabinet was formed and

Hitler appointed Reich Chancellor.

DR. STAHMER: Had the Party come to power in a legal way, in your

opinion?

GÖRING: Of course the Party had come to power in an entirely legal way,

because the Party had been called upon by the Reich President according

to the Constitution, and according to the principles in force the Party

should have been called upon much earlier than that. The Party gained

strength and came to power only by way of normal elections and the

franchise law then valid.

DR. STAHMER: What measures were now taken to strengthen this power after

Hitler’s appointment?

GÖRING: It was a matter of course for us that once we had come into

power we were determined to keep that power under all circumstances. We

did not want power and governmental authority for power’s sake, but we

needed power and governmental authority in order to make Germany free

and great. We did not want to leave this any longer to chance, to

elections, and parliamentary majorities, but we wanted to carry out the

task to which we considered ourselves called.

In order to consolidate this power now, it was necessary to reorganize

the political relationship of power. That was carried out in such a

manner that, shortly after the seizure of governmental authority in the

Reich and in Prussia, the other states followed automatically and more

or less strong National Socialist governments were formed everywhere.

Secondly, the so-called political officials who according to the Reich

Constitution could be recalled at any time, or could be dismissed, would

naturally have to be replaced now, according to custom, by people from

the strongest party.

As far as legality, that is, the opinion that we came to power legally,

is concerned, I should like to emphasize two considerations in

particular.

Firstly: in the years 1925 to 1932 no fewer than 30 Reichstag, Landtag,

and presidential elections took place in Germany. The very fact that 37

parties had candidates in one Reichstag election alone gives a clear

picture of how it happened that one strong coalition formed the

so-called government majority, and another strong grouping formed the

opposition, each with an entirely different point of view. Just think of

an opposition formed in common by Communists and National Socialists for

example, and the fact that one small party which had eight

representatives altogether was now the decisive factor, and in two

readings of a law, especially of a decisive law—every law had to have

three readings—voted against the government and then secured sufficient

political and material advantages to force the law through for the

government at its third, final reading. This may give a picture of the

conditions.

The second point which I want to emphasize especially in regard to the

legality of our coming to power, is the following:

Had the democratic election system of England or the United States of

America existed in Germany, then the National Socialist German Workers

Party would, at the end of 1931 already, have legally possessed all

seats in the Reichstag, without exception. For in every electoral

district in Germany at that time, or at the beginning of 1932 at the

latest, in every one—I emphasize this once more—the NSDAP was the

strongest party; that is to say, given an electoral system as it is in

Great Britain or in the United States all these weaker parties would

have failed to gain any seats and from this time on we would have had

only National Socialists in the Reich, in a perfectly legal way

according to the democratic principles of these two great democracies.

For the further seizure of power the main political offices were now

filled by new holders, as is the case in other lands when there has been

a change-over of power among the political parties. Besides the

ministers there were first of all—taking Prussia as an example—the

administrative heads of the provinces, the official heads of

administrative districts, the police commissioners, county heads

(Landräte). In addition there was a certain further grade—I believe

down to ministerial directors—who were considered political officials.

District attorneys were considered political officials. This on the

whole describes the range of offices which were filled anew when a shift

in political power took place and had previously been bargained out

among the parties having the majority. It did not go so far as in other

countries—all the way down to the letter carrier. There was a change of

office holders, but only of the most important posts.

In spite of that we did very little in this direction at first. First of

all, I requested Herr Von Papen to relinquish to me the position of

Prussian Prime Minister, as he, having no party behind him, could not

very well undertake this reshuffling, but rather I, that is, one of us,

should undertake it. We agreed at once. Thereupon I filled some, a

relatively small part, of the highest administrative Prussian offices

with National Socialists. At the same time I generously allowed Social

Democrats to remain in these posts for many weeks. I filled a few

important provincial offices with leading Catholic persons who were much

closer to the Center Party than to us. But slowly, by degrees, in the

course of time these offices, to the extent that they were key

administrative positions, were, of course, filled with National

Socialists—it could hardly be otherwise in the further course of the

change-over, since these offices at the same time corresponded to the

political districts. Even until the very end district heads remained in

part National Socialists, in part, however, simply officials. The same

was true of the Landräte. In the case of police commissioners, I should

like to emphasize for the information of the Tribunal that the police

commissioners at first had nothing to do with the Gestapo. A police

commissioner in the bigger cities had the same function as a Landrat in

the country, in part at least. These police commissioner posts had

always been filled by the largest political parties until the seizure of

power. Thus I found Social Democrats in these positions who could not,

with the best of intentions, remain, as they had always been our

opponents up to that date. That would have been absurd. I filled these

police commissioner posts partly with National Socialists but partly,

however, with people who had nothing to do with the Party. I remember

that to the most important police commissioner post in the whole German

Reich, the one in Berlin, I appointed Admiral Von Levetzow, retired, who

was not a member of the Party. In some of these offices I put former SA

leaders.

For the purpose of consolidation of power, which seemed very important

not only to me but all of us because that was to form the basic

condition for our further work, a still stronger influence came into the

Reich Cabinet. New National Socialists received positions as ministers.

New ministries were created. In addition came a number of new basic

laws.

It was indeed clear to everyone who had concerned himself with German

conditions, either abroad or especially in Germany, that we would put an

end to the Communist Party as quickly as possible. It was an absolutely

necessary consequence that it should be prohibited. We were convinced

that if the Communist Party, which was the strongest next to us, had

succeeded in coming to power, it would certainly not have taken any

National Socialists into its cabinet or tolerated them elsewhere. We

were aware that we would have been eliminated in an entirely different

manner.

A further point in the consolidation of power was to eliminate to a

certain extent the Reichstag as a parliament, at least for a period of

time during the reorganization, because its influence was increasing

until then. That, however, had happened owing to the fact that we had an

absolute majority in the Reichstag after the new election. In some cases

we suggested to the former parties that they should dissolve themselves,

because they no longer had any purpose, and those which could not

dissolve themselves were dissolved by us. I was speaking of the

Communist Party and the Social Democratic Party. Beyond that, we wanted

finally to fulfill an old, old longing of the German people and now not

only appear to have the structure of a Reich, but at last, really become

a unified German Reich. This purpose was served by firmly establishing

the Reich idea and the Reich’s power throughout the countless states and

provinces. If it had been difficult for a fervent German patriot before

the first World War to get along with a heap of petty princes, it was

even worse with those who took their places, for in the place of one

small will there now appeared the most various, party-bound officials.

In the Reich there was a majority based on one thing; in Prussia, on

another; in Bavaria, on yet another; and in Hesse, on something quite

different. It was impossible in this manner to establish Reich

sovereignty and a Reich which could be great again.

Therefore I suggested to the Führer that the state parliaments should be

dissolved and done away with as a matter of principle. In Prussia I

began with the elimination of state parliaments, which I considered

entirely superfluous, for the simple reason that the principle “Reich

dominion, not state authority” was already in force. I saw no reason why

so many different authorities should exist which, with their unnecessary

frictions and discussions merely hindered constructive work. Yet,

however much I wanted to see and make the Reich structurally unified, I,

and the Führer above all, always supported the idea that within the

German states and provinces cultural life should remain many-sided and

bound to local traditions; that is to say, all the old centers of

culture, which, as is well known, had formed around Munich, Dresden,

Weimar, and so on, should continue to exist in that way and be

supported.

For the further consolidation of power those laws were created which

would first of all eliminate any further obstacle to progress, that is

to say, on the basis of Paragraph 48, the law did away with the

so-called freedoms. The conception of these freedoms is a matter of

controversy. The “Law for the Protection of People and State” was

created, a law which was most urgently needed. In the past years much

had been prohibited which could have stimulated patriotic activity, yet

a senseless defamation had been allowed of the German people, its

history, the German State, and those symbols and objects which are,

after all, very holy things to a patriot; and they were not protected in

any way.

It is a matter of course that in connection with the concept of

“conformity” which arose at this time, very many unnecessary and

excessive things were done, for after the seizure of power the whole

movement developed along revolutionary lines, although not in the way of

revolutions as they had been known in history until then, such as the

French Revolution, or the great Bolshevist Revolution—that is to say,

not by way of great conflicts and cruel changes, revolutionary tribunals

that executed people by hundreds of thousands—but still with a strong

revolutionary aim in the direction of unity of State, Party, and

National Socialism as the basis of leadership and of ideology.

This “conformity” which I have just mentioned was then effected in

detail; but, as I have said, on the occasion of such drastic political

transformations people will always overstep the mark here and there.

Personally I did not consider it necessary that every organization

should now become National Socialist or that—if I am to express myself

quite drastically—every club or similar organization should absolutely

have to have a National Socialist chairman. But in decisive political

matters, and in matters of principle, our ideas and our ideology had to

be recognized more and more; for that was the basic condition for the

rebuilding, establishing, and strengthening of the Reich.

An additional strengthening, which occurred only after the death of

Reich President Von Hindenburg in 1934, was the confirmation of the head

of the state and the Reich Chancellor in one person. To this I should

like to add that on this occasion I had a long conversation with the

Führer. Right from the beginning we had discussed whether Hitler would

and should take over the position of head of the State, and whether I

should take over the chancellorship. In view of the Führer’s temperament

and attitude it was unthinkable that the Führer, sitting on a throne

above the political clouds, so to speak, should appear only as head of

the State. He was definitely a political leader and hence a leader of

the government. Also the thought of putting in some other person as a

puppet head of the State we considered unworthy of the situation.

The Führer told me then that the simplest thing to do would be to take

as example the United States of America, where the head of the state is

at the same time also the head of the government. Thus, following the

example of the United States, we combined the position of the head of

the State with the head of the government, and he called himself “Führer

of the German People and Reich Chancellor of the German Reich.”

That he thereby automatically became also the Commander-in-Chief of the

German Armed Forces followed as a matter of course, according to the

Constitution, and also according to the previous Constitution, just as

is the case in other countries also.

That was the position, broadly speaking, apart from a number of other

developments which probably will have to be mentioned later in my

testimony—as, for instance, the establishment of police power, the

basic element of the consolidation of power, and so on.

In conclusion I wish to say: 1) It is correct that I—and I can speak

only for myself—have done everything which was at all within my

personal power to strengthen the National Socialist movement, to

increase it, and have worked unceasingly to bring it to power under all

circumstances and as the one and only authority. 2) I have done

everything to secure for the Führer the place as Reich Chancellor which

rightfully belonged to him. 3) When I look back, I believe I have not

failed to do anything to consolidate our power to such an extent that it

would not have to yield to the chances of the political game or to

violent actions, but would rather in the further course of

reconstruction, become the only factor of power, which would lead the

Reich and lead it—as we hoped—to a great development.

DR. STAHMER: What offices did you hold after the seizure of power?

GÖRING: First I was President of the Reichstag, as before, and I

remained that until the end. In the Reich Cabinet I was given at first

the post of Reich Minister and Reich Commissioner for Aviation, not the

Air Force. In parentheses I should like to say that from the very

beginning it was clear to me that we had to establish an air force.

In Prussia I was given the position of the Prussian Minister of the

Interior, then on 20 April 1933, in addition, the post of Prime Minister

of Prussia.

The Reich Commissariat for Aviation had become before this, I believe

already in March 1933, a Reich Ministry for Aviation.

Then there were still several not very important offices, President of

the State Council, and so on.

Important at that time, however, were the two offices of Prime Minister

of Prussia on the one hand and Minister of Aviation on the other. The

office of Prussian Minister of the Interior I handed over to the Reich

Minister of the Interior at the beginning of 1934, for it was part of

the consolidation of power and above all, of the clarification necessary

for proper governing authority in the Reich, that the Prussian

ministries should be combined with those of the Reich. Only in this way

was it possible for the Reich ministries to receive practical

information about the political work of the day and about the work of

the departments. Only through this combination was that possible.

DR. STAHMER: Did you in your capacity as Prussian Minister of the

Interior create the Gestapo and the concentration camps which have so

often been mentioned here? When and for what purpose were they

established?

GÖRING: I mentioned before that for the consolidation of power the first

prerequisite was to create along new lines that instrument which at all

times and in all nations is always the inner political instrument of

power, namely, the police. There was no Reich police, only provincial

police. The most important was the Prussian police. This had already

been filled by our predecessors, the former parties, with their own

people, according to their political attitude. I have mentioned the

filling of the posts of police commissioners and those of the chiefs of

the main police offices within the Prussian Ministry of the Interior.

Thus it was that our opponents, our most bitter opponents, who up to

then had always opposed us most vigorously with this police power, were

still in the regional offices.

A slight loosening up had taken place before I took charge, during the

time when the Social Democratic Braun-Severing government was replaced

by the government of Herr Von Papen. At that time the bitterest

opponents were also removed from the police. Nevertheless the most

important positions were still in the hands of definite political

opponents. I could not very well expect that those who until yesterday

were ready to employ the police with particular severity against us,

would today show the same loyalty to the new state.

Before our time there was also a political police in Prussia. That was

Police Department Ia, and its task was first of all the supervision of

and the fight against the National Socialists, and also, in part,

against the Communists.

Now, I could have simply put new people into this political police and

let it continue along the old lines. But the situation had changed

because of our seizure of power, for at this time, as I have mentioned

before, the Communist Party was extraordinarily strong. It had over 6

million voters, and in its Red Front Organization it had a thoroughly

revolutionary instrument of power. It was quite obvious to the Communist

Party that if we were to stay in power for any length of time, it would

ultimately lose its power.

Looking back, the danger positively existed at that time of political

tension, and with [an] atmosphere of conflict, that revolutionary acts

might have taken place on the part of the Communists, particularly as,

even after we came to power political murders and political shootings of

National Socialists and policemen by that party did not stop, but at

times even increased. Also the information which I received was such

that I was made extremely fearful of a sudden swing in that direction.

Therefore with this department as it was, I could not ward off that

danger. I needed reliable political police not only in the main office,

but also in the branch offices. I therefore had to enlarge this

instrument.

In order to make clear from the outset that the task of this police was

to make the State secure I called it the Secret State Police, and at the

same time I established branch offices of this police. I took in a great

number of political officials who were experienced, and at the beginning

took fewer people from the Party circles because for the time being I

had to attach importance to professional ability.

I also wanted this police to be concerned exclusively with protecting

the State, first of all against its enemies. And the leader whom I

selected for this police force was not from the Party but came from the

former police. He, Diels, was already there at that time as

Oberregierungsrat and later as Ministerialrat, and likewise the main

chiefs of the Gestapo were officials who were not from the Party. Later

the Party element appeared in the police more and more. Their mission

was first of all to create as quickly as possible all assurance of

security against any action from the left.

I know—as was afterwards proved—that the headquarters of the

Communists in Berlin, the Liebknecht House, was strongly fortified and

contained very many arms; we had also at that time brought to light very

strong connections between the Russian Trade Delegation and the German

Communist Party. Even if I arrested, as I did, thousands of communist

functionaries at one blow, so that an immediate danger was averted at

the outset, the danger as such was by no means eliminated. It was now

necessary to disclose the secret connections, the network of these

secret connections, and to keep them constantly under observation. For

that purpose a police leadership would have to crystallize. The Social

Democratic Party on the whole seemed to me not nearly so dangerous,

especially as far as its members were concerned. But of course they were

also absolute opponents of our new State. A part of their functionaries

were radical, another part less radical. The more radical I likewise

placed under observation, while a whole number of former Social

Democratic ministers, heads of Prussian provinces and higher officials,

as I said before, were quietly discharged and received their pensions,

and nothing further was undertaken against them. Of course there were

also other functionaries of the Social Democratic Party whom we

definitely had to watch carefully. Thus the Secret State Police was

created by me for these tasks, first of all in Prussia, because I had

nothing to do with the other states at that time. The organization of

the rest of the police is not of such importance here.

DR. STAHMER: The concentration camps?

GÖRING: When the need became evident for creating order first of all,

and removing the most dangerous element of disorder directed against us,

I decided to have the communist functionaries and leaders arrested all

at once. I therefore had a list made for that purpose, and it was clear

to me that even if I arrested only the most important and most dangerous

of these functionaries it still would involve several thousands, for it

was necessary to arrest not only the party functionaries but also those

from the Red Front Organization, as the Communists also had affiliated

organizations. These arrests were in accordance with reasons of State

security and State necessity. It was a question of removing a danger.

Only one possibility was available here, that of protective

custody—that is, whether or not one could prove that these people were

involved in a traitorous act or an act hostile to the State, whether or

not one could expect such an act from them, such an act must be

prevented and the possibility eliminated by means of protective custody.

That was nothing new and it was not a National Socialist invention.

Already before this such protective custody measures had been carried

out, partly against the Communists, and chiefly against us, the National

Socialists. The prisons were not available for this purpose, and also I

want to stress from the very beginning that this was a political act for

the defense of the State. Therefore, I said that these men should first

of all be gathered into camps—one to two camps were proposed at that

time—because I could not tell them how long the internment of these

people would be necessary nor how the number would be increased by the

further exposure of the entire communist movement. When we occupied the

Karl Liebknecht House we found so many arms, material, and preparations

for a civil war, that, as I said, one could not gain a general view of

its extent. I have already indicated, as is obvious, that in view of

such great political tension as existed between the extreme wings of

these political opponents and in view of the bitterness of the

opposition caused by the continuous fighting in the streets, the mutual

tension, _et cetera_, resulting from the political struggle, the

situation would conceivably not be a very pleasant one for the inmates.

For this reason I gave instructions that the guard, if possible to a

large extent, should consist of police forces; only where these were not

adequate should auxiliary forces be called. I have stated my opinion

with regard to the question of concentration camps and I should like to

point out that this name was not created by us, but that it appeared in

the foreign press and was then adopted. Where the name originated, is

rather an historical matter. At the end of 1933 in a book, which at

first appeared in English, at the request of an English publisher, and

which has already been presented by the Prosecution as evidence, I

stated my views on this matter quite openly—that was at the end of

1933. I point out again that it was for foreign countries, for

English-speaking countries. At that time I openly stated the following:

Of course, in the beginning there were excesses; of course, the innocent

were also hurt here or there; of course, there were beatings here and

there and acts of brutality were committed; but compared to all that has

happened in the past and to the greatness of the events, this German

revolution of freedom is the least bloody and the most disciplined of

all revolutions known to history.

DR. STAHMER: Did you supervise the treatment of the prisoners?

GÖRING: I naturally gave instructions that such things should not

happen. That they did happen and happened everywhere to a smaller or

greater extent I have just stated. I always pointed out that these

things ought not to happen, because it was important to me to win over

some of these people for our side and to re-educate them.

DR. STAHMER: Did you do anything about abuses of which you heard?

GÖRING: I took a personal interest in the concentration camps up to the

spring of 1934. At that time there were two or three camps in Prussia.

Witness Körner has already mentioned the case of Thälmann. I would like

to speak about it briefly, because it was the most striking case, as

Thälmann was the leader of the Communist Party. I could not say today

who it was who hinted to me that Thälmann had been beaten.

I had him called to me in my room directly, without informing the higher

authorities and questioned him very closely. He told me that he had been

beaten during, and especially at the beginning, of the interrogations.

Thereupon, as the witness who was present has said already, I told

Thälmann that I regretted that. At the same time I told him, “Dear

Thälmann, if you had come to power, I probably would not have been

beaten, but you would have chopped my head off immediately.” And he

agreed. Then I told him that in the future he must feel free to let me

know if anything of this sort should happen to him or to others. I could

not always be there, but it was not my wish that any act of brutality

should be committed against them.

Just to demonstrate this case, which was not an unimportant one, I want

to stress that later Thälmann’s wife turned to me for help and that I

answered her letter immediately.

At that time I also—this I can prove by evidence—helped the families

of the inmates financially so far as that was necessary.

At this opportunity I should also like to speak about the unauthorized

concentration camps which have been mentioned, the purpose of which came

under the heading of abolition of abuses. At first I did not know

anything about them, but then I found out about one such camp near

Stettin. It had been established by Karpfenstein, at that time Gauleiter

of Pomerania. I had this camp closed at once—my Defense Counsel will

remember that he, independently of me, received information about this

during the Trial, from an inmate whom I do not know at all—and I had

the guilty persons, who had committed acts of brutality there, brought

before a court and prosecuted by the state attorney, which can likewise

be proved. Karpfenstein was expelled from the Party.

A second camp of that kind was found in Breslau, which Heines had

established. I do not remember today what happened there. At any rate,

it was a camp not authorized by me. This one I likewise closed down and

did away with immediately. Heines was one of the closest of Röhm’s

collaborators, about whom I shall speak later.

As far as I can remember—I cannot name the place exactly anymore—close

to Berlin another unauthorized concentration camp had been secretly

established by Ernst, the SA leader in Berlin, whom I had always

suspected of acts of brutality. That also was closed. Ernst belonged to

those evil figures who were eliminated in the Röhm Putsch. It is

possible to question persons who were inmates of these camps at that

time, 1933 and the beginning of 1934, as to whether during that time

anything happened which even approached that which happened later.

DR. STAHMER: Did you, after a consolidation of power had taken place,

ever free inmates to any great extent and at what time did you do so?

GÖRING: At Christmas of 1933 I gave orders for the release of the

lighter cases, that is the less dangerous cases, and those cases of

which one had the impression the people had resigned themselves to the

situation; that was about 5,000 people. I repeated that once more in

November 1934 for 2,000 inmates. I stress again that that refers only to

Prussia. At that time, as far as I remember—I cannot say exactly—one

camp was dissolved or at least closed temporarily. That was at a time

when nobody thought that it would ever be the subject of an

investigation before an international tribunal.

DR. STAHMER: How long were you in charge of the Gestapo and the

concentration camps and until what date?

GÖRING: Actually I was in charge until the beginning of 1934, that is,

at the beginning of 1934 Diels was the head and he gave me frequent

reports about the Gestapo and about the concentration camps. Meanwhile,

outside Prussia a re-grouping of police had taken place with the result

that Himmler was in charge of the police in all the provinces of Germany

with the exception of Prussia only. Probably following the example of my

measures, he had installed the Secret State Police there, because the

police at that time was still a matter of the states. There were the

police of Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden, Hesse, Saxony, _et cetera_.

He had become the leader of all these police forces, and of course he

now sought to get the leadership of the police in Prussia as well. I was

very satisfied with Diels at that time, and from my point of view I saw

no reason for letting any change take place.

These efforts, I believe, started as early as in the late summer of

1933. Shortly after I had transferred the Prussian Ministry of the

Interior to the Reich Ministry of the Interior, in the spring of 1934,

and so was no longer a departmental minister, Himmler, I assume,

probably urged the Führer more strongly to put him in charge of the

Prussian police as well. At that time I did not expressly oppose it. It

was not agreeable to me; I wanted to handle my police myself. When,

however, the Führer asked me to do this and said that it would be the

correct thing and the expedient thing, and that it was proved necessary

for the enemy of the State to be fought throughout the Reich in a

uniform way, I actually handed the police over to Himmler, who put

Heydrich in charge. But legally I still retained it, because there was

still no Reich police in existence.

The rest of the police, the state police—that is the uniformed

police—I did not turn over to him, because, as I shall explain later, I

had to a large extent organized this police in Prussia along military

lines, in order to be able to fit it into the future rearmament program.

For this reason I could not and did not want to give him the uniformed

police, because it had been trained for purely military purposes—by me,

at my instigation, and on my responsibility—and had nothing to do with

the actual police. It was turned over to the Armed Forces by me in 1935.

In 1936 the Reich Police Law was issued, and thereby the office of the

Chief of the German Police was created. By virtue of this law the police

was then legally and formally turned over to the Reichsführer SS, or, as

he was called, the Chief of the German Police.

DR. STAHMER: You mentioned before the Röhm Putsch. Who was Röhm, and

with what event was this Putsch connected?

GÖRING: Röhm had become leader of the SA, Chief of Staff of the SA.

THE PRESIDENT: I think we had better adjourn. It is 5 o’clock now.

[_The Tribunal adjourned until 14 March 1946 at 1000 hours._]

EIGHTY-FIRST DAY

Thursday, 14 March 1946

_Morning Session_

DR. STAHMER: Did you take part in laying down the Party program?

GÖRING: No. The Party program had been compiled and announced when I

heard about the movement for the first time and when I declared my

intention of joining.

DR. STAHMER: What is your attitude towards these points of the Party

program?

GÖRING: On the whole, positive. It is a matter of course that there is

hardly any politically minded man who acknowledges and agrees with every

point of the program of a political party.

DR. STAHMER: In addition to these generally known points of the Party

program, were there other aims which were kept secret?

GÖRING: No.

DR. STAHMER: Were these aims to be achieved by every means, even by

illegal means?

GÖRING: Of course, they were to be achieved by every means. The

conception “illegal” should perhaps be clarified. If I aim at a

revolution, then it is an illegal action for the state then in

existence. If I am successful, then it becomes a fact and thereby legal

and law. Until 1923 and the events of 9 November I and all of us had the

view that we would achieve our aim, even, if necessary, in a

revolutionary manner. After this proved a failure, the Führer, after his

return from the fortress, decided that we should in the future proceed

legally by means of a political fight, as the other parties had done,

and the Führer prohibited any illegal action in order to avoid any

setback in the activity of the Party.

DR. STAHMER: When and with what aims was the SS created?

GÖRING: The SS was created while I was abroad; I think it was in 1926 or

1927. Its purpose, as far as I remember, was to form, first of all,

within the Movement a specially picked body as a protection for the

person of the Führer. Originally it was extremely small.

DR. STAHMER: Did you at any time belong to the SS?

GÖRING: I never belonged to the SS in any way, at any time, neither

actively nor passively.

DR. STAHMER: The assumption that you were a general in the SS is

therefore incorrect?

GÖRING: Yes, absolutely incorrect.

DR. STAHMER: What did you understand by the term “master race”?

GÖRING: I myself understood nothing by it. In none of my speeches, in

none of my writings, will you find that term. It is my view that if you

are a master you have no need to emphasize it.

DR. STAHMER: What do you understand by the concept “living space”?

GÖRING: That conception is a very controversial one. I can fully

understand that powers who together—I refer only to the four signatory

powers—call more than three-quarters of the world their own, explain

this idea differently. But for us, where 144 people live in 1 square

kilometer, the words “living space” meant the proper relation between a

population and its nourishment, its growth, and its standard of living.

DR. STAHMER: An expression which is always recurring is that of “seizure

of power.”

GÖRING: I should like to call “seizure of power” a _terminus technicus_.

We might just as well have used another term, but this actually

expresses as clearly as possible what did in fact occur, that is to say,

we seized power.

DR. STAHMER: What is your attitude to the Leadership Principle?

GÖRING: I upheld this principle and I still uphold it positively and

consciously. One must not make the mistake of forgetting that the

political structure in different countries has different origins,

different developments. Something which suits one country extremely well

would perhaps fail completely in another. Germany, through the long

centuries of monarchy, has always had a leadership principle. Democracy

appeared in Germany at a time when Germany was very badly off and had

reached rock-bottom. I explained yesterday the total lack of unity that

existed in Germany—the number of parties, the continuous unrest caused

by elections. A complete distortion of the concepts of authority and

responsibility had arisen, and in the reverse direction. Authority lay

with the masses and responsibility was with the leader, instead of the

other way about. I am of the opinion that for Germany, particularly at

that moment of its lowest ebb, when it was necessary for all forces to

be welded together in a positive fashion, the Leadership Principle—that

is, authority from above downwards and responsibility from below

upwards—was the only possibility. Naturally I realize the fact that

here, too, a principle, while thoroughly sound in itself, can lead to

extremes. I should like to mention some parallels. The position of the

Catholic Church rests now, as before, on the clear leadership principle

of its hierarchy. And I think I can also say that Russia, too, without

the leadership principle, could not have survived the great burden which

was imposed on her by this war.

DR. STAHMER: Concerning the measures for strengthening your power which

you described yesterday, did they take place in full agreement with

Reich President Von Hindenburg?

GÖRING: As long as the Reich President was alive, and therefore active,

they naturally did take place in agreement with him. And as far as his

assent was constitutionally necessary, according to Paragraph 48, that

assent was also given.

DR. STAHMER: Was the National Socialist Government recognized by foreign

powers?

GÖRING: Our government was recognized from the first day of its

existence and remained recognized until the end, that is, except where

hostilities severed diplomatic connections with several states.

DR. STAHMER: Did diplomatic representatives of foreign countries visit

your Party rallies in Nuremberg?

GÖRING: The diplomatic representatives were invited to the Party

rallies, these being the greatest event and the greatest demonstration

of the movement; and they all attended, even if not the full number of

them every year. But one I remember very well.

DR. STAHMER: Until what year?

GÖRING: Until the last Party rally, 1938.

DR. STAHMER: To what extent after the seizure of power was property of

political opponents confiscated?

GÖRING: Laws were issued which decreed confiscation of the property of

people hostile to the State, that is, the property of parties we

declared to be hostile to the State. The party property of the Communist

Party and its associated units, and the property of the Social

Democratic Party was partly confiscated—but not, and I want to

emphasize that, the private property of the members or even of the

leaders of these parties. On the contrary, a number of leading Social

Democrats who had been ministers or civil servants were still paid their

full pension. In fact, later on it was increased.

DR. STAHMER: How do you explain the actions against the trade unions?

How do you explain the actions against free workers’ associations?

GÖRING: First of all, the trade unions: Trade unions in Germany were for

the most part, or the most important of them, very closely connected

with the Social Democratic Party, and also to an increasing extent, due

to the influence and the activity of the Communists, with the Communist

Party. They were in fact, if not formally so, organs, indeed very active

organs, of these parties, and here I am not talking about the masses of

the members of the trade unions, but about the leaders of the trade

unions. In addition there was also a smaller Christian trade union, an

organ of the Center Party.

These trade unions, because of their leaders and the close connection of

these leaders with those parties which we regarded as our opponents,

agreed with our opponents to such an extent that they did not in any way

fit into our new State. Consequently the organization of trade unions

was dissolved, and for the workers the organization of the German Labor

Front was created. This did not result in the destruction of the liberty

of the German worker, in my opinion; on the contrary, I am convinced

that we were the ones to give the German workers real freedom, for it

consisted first of all in the fact that we made his right to have work

secure, and laid particular stress on his position in the State.

We did, of course, do away with two things which perhaps must be

regarded as two characteristics of a freedom which I do not understand:

strikes on one side and lockouts on the other. These could not be made

consistent with the right to have work nor with the duties which every

citizen has towards the greatness of his nation. These two disquieting

elements, which also contributed to the great number of unemployed, we

removed and replaced with an enormous labor program.

Creation of work was another essential point of our social program and

has also been adopted by others, though under a different name.

I do not propose to elaborate on this social program. It was, however,

the first time that the worker had a right to a vacation, a paid

vacation, this I only add as an aside. Great recreation centers were

created for the workers. Enormous sums were invested in new housing

projects for workers. The whole standard of living for the worker was

raised. Up to that time the worker had been used and exploited. He

hardly had any property of his own because, during years of

unemployment, he had to sell everything or pawn it. Thus, without going

into detail, I should like to say in conclusion that we did not enslave

free workers, but rather we liberated the worker from the misery of

unemployment.

DR. STAHMER: You talked about the Röhm revolt yesterday. Who was Röhm

and of what did the revolt consist?

GÖRING: Röhm, from 1931, had been the Chief of Staff of the SA, that is

to say, he was responsible for the SA to the Führer, who was himself the

highest SA leader, and he led it in the Führer’s name.

The main controversy between Röhm and us was that Röhm, like his

predecessor Pfeffer, wanted a stronger revolutionary way to be adopted,

whereas the Führer, as I said earlier, had ordered a legal development,

the final victory of which could be expected.

After the seizure of power Röhm desired, under all circumstances, to get

hold of the Reich Defense Ministry. The Führer refused that point-blank,

as he did not wish the Armed Forces to be conducted politically in any

way, or to have any political influence brought to bear on the Armed

Forces.

The contrast between the Armed Forces and the Röhm group—I am

intentionally not speaking of a contrast between the Armed Forces and

the SA, since there was none, but solely of this leadership group, which

called itself at that time the SA Leadership and it actually was—was

that Röhm wanted to remove the greater number of the generals and higher

officers who had been members of the Reichswehr all this time, since it

was his view that these officers did not offer a guarantee for the new

State, because, as he expressed it, their backbone had been broken in

the course of the years and they were no longer capable of being active

elements of the new National Socialist State.

The Führer, and I also, had exactly the opposite point of view in this

connection.

Secondly, the aims of the Röhm-minded people, as I should like to call

them, were directed in a different direction, towards a revolutionary

act; and they were opposed to what they called reaction. They definitely

desired to adopt a more Leftist attitude. They were also sharply opposed

to the Church and also very strongly opposed to the Jews. Altogether,

and I refer only to the clique consisting of certain persons, they

wished to carry out a revolutionary act. That Röhm placed all his people

in leading positions in the SA and removed the decent elements, and

misguided the decent SA people without their knowledge, is a well-known

fact.

If encroachments did occur at that time, they always involved the same

persons, first of all the Berlin SA leader, Ernst, secondly the Breslau

leader, Heines, the Munich and Stettin leaders, _et cetera_. A few weeks

before the Röhm Putsch a low-ranking SA leader confided in me that he

had heard that an action against the Führer and his corps was being

planned to replace the Third Reich as expeditiously as possible by a

final Fourth Reich, an expression which these people used.

I myself was urged and begged to place outside my house not only guards

from a police regiment but also to appoint an SA guard of honor. I had

agreed, and later on I heard from the commander of these troops that the

purpose of that guard of honor was to arrest me at a given moment.

I knew Röhm very well. I had him brought to me. I put to him openly the

things which I had heard. I reminded him of our mutual fight and I asked

him to keep unconditional faith with the Führer. I brought forward the

same arguments which I have just mentioned, but he assured me that he

naturally was not thinking of undertaking anything against the Führer.

Shortly afterward I received further news to the effect that he had

close connections with those circles who also were strongly opposed to

us. There was, for instance, the group around the former Reich

Chancellor Schleicher. There was the group around Gregor Strasser, the

former member of the Reichstag and organizational leader of the Party,

who had been excluded from the Party. These were groups who had belonged

to the former trade unions and were rather inclined to the Left. I felt

it my duty to consult the Führer now on this subject. I was astonished

when he told me that he, too, already knew about these things and

considered them a great threat. He said that he wished, however, to

await further developments and observe them carefully.

The next event occurred just about as the witness Körner described it

here, and therefore I can skip it. I was given the order to proceed

immediately against the implicated men of the Röhm group in northern

Germany. It was decided that some of them were to be arrested. In the

course of the day the Führer ordered the execution of the SA leader of

Pomerania, Ernst, and two or three others. He himself went to Bavaria

where the last meeting of a number of Röhm leaders was taking place and

personally arrested Röhm and these people in Wiessee.

At that time this matter presented a real danger, as a few SA units,

through the use of false passwords, had been armed and called up. At one

spot only a very short fight ensued and two SA leaders were shot. I

deputized the police, which in Prussia was then already under Himmler

and Heydrich, to make the arrests. Only the headquarters of Röhm, who

himself was not present, I had occupied by a regiment of the uniformed

police subordinated to me. When the headquarters of the SA leader Ernst

in Berlin were searched, we found in the cellars of those headquarters

more submachine guns than the whole Prussian police had in its

possession.

After the Führer, on the strength of the events which had been met with

at Wiessee, had ordered who should be shot in view of the state of

national emergency, the order for the execution of Ernst, Heydebreck,

and some of the other Röhm collaborators was issued. There was no order

to shoot the other people who had been arrested. In the course of the

arrest of the former Reich Chancellor Schleicher, it happened that both

he and his wife were killed. An investigation of this event took place

and it was found that when Schleicher was arrested, according to the

statements of the two witnesses, he reached for a pistol, possibly in

order to kill himself, whereupon the two men raised their pistols and

Frau Schleicher threw herself upon one of them, to hold him, causing his

revolver to go off. We deeply regretted that event.

In the course of that evening I heard that other people had been shot as

well, even some people who had nothing at all to do with this Röhm

Putsch. The Führer came to Berlin that same evening. After I learned

this, later that evening or night, I went to him at noon the next day

and asked him to issue an order immediately, that any further execution

was under any circumstances forbidden by him, the Führer, although two

other people who were deeply involved and who had been ordered by the

Führer to be executed, were still alive. These people were consequently

left alive. I asked him to do that because I was worried lest the matter

should get out of hand—as, in fact, it had already done to some

extent—and I told the Führer that under no circumstances should there

be any further bloodshed.

This order was then given by the Führer in my presence, and it was

communicated at once to all offices. The action was then announced in

the Reichstag, and it was approved by the Reichstag and the Reich

President as an action called for by the state of national emergency. It

was regretted that, as in all such incidents, there were a number of

blunders.

The number of victims has been greatly exaggerated. As far as I can

remember exactly today, there were 72 or 76 people, the majority of whom

were executed in southern Germany.

DR. STAHMER: Did you know about the development of the attitude of the

Party and the State toward the Church, in the course of time?

GÖRING: Certainly. But as a final remark on the Röhm Putsch I should

like to emphasize that I assume full responsibility for the actions

taken against those people—Ernst, Heydebreck, and several others—by

the order of the Führer, which I carried out or passed on; and that,

even today, I am of the opinion that I acted absolutely correctly and

with a sense of duty. That was confirmed by the Reich President, but no

such confirmation was necessary to convince me that here I had averted

what was a great danger to the State.

As to the attitude towards the Church—the Führer’s attitude, was a

generous one, at the beginning absolutely generous. I should not like to

say that it was positive in the sense that he himself was a positive or

convinced adherent of any one confession, but it was generous and

positive in the sense that he recognized the necessity of the Church.

Although he himself was a Catholic, he wished the Protestant Church to

have a stronger position in Germany, since Germany was two-thirds

Protestant.

The Protestant Church, however, was divided into provincial churches,

and there were various small differences which the dogmatists took very

seriously. For that reason they once in the past, as we know, fought

each other for 30 years; but these differences did not seem so important

to us. There were the Reformed, the United, and the pure Lutherans—I

myself am not an expert in this field.

Constitutionally, as Prussian Prime Minister, I was, to be sure, in a

certain sense the highest dignitary of the Prussian Church, but I did

not concern myself with these matters very much.

The Führer wanted to achieve the unification of the Protestant

Evangelical Churches by appointing a Reich Bishop, so that there would

be a high Protestant church dignitary as well as a high Catholic church

dignitary. To begin with, he left the choice to the Evangelical

churches, but they could not come to an agreement. Finally they brought

forward one name, exactly the one which was not acceptable to us. Then a

man was made Reich Bishop who had the Führer’s confidence to a higher

degree than any of the other provincial bishops.

With the Catholic Church the Führer ordered a concordat to be concluded

by Herr Von Papen. Shortly before that agreement was concluded by Herr

Von Papen I visited the Pope myself. I had numerous connections with the

higher Catholic clergy because of my Catholic mother, and thus—I am

myself a Protestant—I had a view of both camps.

One thing, of course, the Führer and all of us, I, too, stood for was to

remove politics from the Church as far as was possible. I did not

consider it right, I must frankly say, that on one day the priest in

church should humbly concern himself with the spiritual welfare of his

flock and then on the following day make a more or less belligerent

speech in parliament.

A separation was planned by us, that is to say, the clergy were to

concentrate on their own sphere and refrain from becoming involved in

political matters. Owing to the fact that we had in Germany political

parties with strong church leanings, considerable confusion had arisen

here. That is the explanation of the fact that, because of this

political opposition that at first played its role in the political

field in parliament, and in election campaigns, there arose among

certain of our people an antagonistic attitude toward the Church. For

one must not forget that such election disputes and speeches often took

place before the electors between political representatives of our Party

and clergymen who represented those political parties which were more

closely bound to the Church.

Because of this situation and a certain animosity, it is understandable

that a more rabid faction—if I may use that expression in this

connection—did not forget these contentions and now, on its side,

carried the struggle on again on a false level. But the Führer’s

attitude was that the churches should be given the chance to exist and

develop. In a movement and a party which gradually had absorbed more or

less the greater part of the German nation, and which now in its active

political aspect had also absorbed the politically active persons of

Germany, it is only natural that not all the members would be of the

same opinion in every respect, despite the Leadership Principle. The

tempo, the method, the attitude may be different; and in such large

movements, even if they are ever so authoritatively led, certain groups

form in response to certain problems. And if I were to name the group

which still saw in the Church, if not a political danger, at least an

undesirable institution, then I should mention above all two personages:

Himmler on one side and Bormann—particularly later on much more

radically than Himmler—on the other side.

Himmler’s motives were less of a political and more of a confused

mystical nature. Bormann’s aims were much more clear-cut. It was clear,

too, that from the large group of Gauleiter, one or another might be

more keenly interested in this fight against the Church. Thus, there

were a number of Gaue where everything was in the best of order as far

as the Church was concerned, and there were a few others where there was

a keen fight against the Church.

I did interfere personally on frequent occasions. First of all, in order

to demonstrate my attitude and to create order, I called into the

Prussian State Council, as men in whom I had special confidence, a high

Protestant and a high Catholic clergyman.

I myself am not what you might call a churchgoer, but I have gone now

and then, and have always considered I belonged to the Church and have

always had those functions over which the Church presides—marriage,

christening, burial, _et cetera_—carried out in my house by the Church.

My intention thereby was to show those weak-willed persons who, in the

midst of this fight of opinions did not know what they should do, that,

if the second man in the State goes to church, is married by the Church,

has his child christened and confirmed, _et cetera_, then they can

calmly do the same. From the number of letters which I received as the

result, I can see that I did the right thing.

But as time went by, in other spheres as well as this, the situation

became more critical. During the early years of the war I spoke to the

Führer about it once more and told him that the main concern now was,

that every German should do his duty and that every soldier should go to

his death, if need be, bravely. If in that connection his religious

belief is a help and a support to him, whether he belongs to this or

that confession, it can be only an advantage, and any disturbance in

this connection could conceivably affect the soldier’s inward strength.

The Führer agreed absolutely. In the Air Force I deliberately had no

chaplains, because I was of the opinion that every member of the Air

Force should go to the clergyman in whom he had the most confidence.

This was repeatedly told to the soldiers and officers at roll call. But

to the Church itself I said that it would be good if we had a clear

separation. Men should pray in church and not drill there; in the

barracks men should drill and not pray. In that manner, from the very

beginning, I kept the Air Force free from any religious disturbances and

I insured complete liberty of conscience for everyone.

The situation became rapidly more critical—and I cannot really give the

reasons for this—especially in the last 2 or 3 years of the war. It may

have something to do with the fact that in some of the occupied

territories, particularly in the Polish territory and also in the Czech

territory, the clergy were strong representatives of national feeling

and this led again to clashes on a political level which were then

naturally carried over to religious fields. I do not know whether this

was one of the reasons, but I consider it probable. On the whole I

should like to say that the Führer himself was not opposed to the

Church. In fact, he told me on one occasion that there are certain

things in respect to which even as Führer one cannot entirely have one’s

way if they are still undecided and in need of reform, and that he

believed that at the time much was being thought and said about the

reorganization of the Church. He said that he did not consider himself

destined to be a reformer of the Church and that he did not wish that

any of his political leaders should win laurels in this field.

DR. STAHMER: Now, in the course of years, a large number of clergy, both

from Germany and especially from the occupied territories—you yourself

mentioned Poland and Czechoslovakia—were taken to concentration camps.

Did you know anything about that?

GÖRING: I knew that at first in Germany a number of clergymen were taken

to concentration camps. The case of Niemöller was common knowledge. I do

not want to go into it in detail, because it is well known. A number of

other clergymen were sent to concentration camps but not until the later

years when the fight became more critical, for they made political

speeches in the pulpit and criticized measures of the State or the

Party; then, according to the severity of this criticism, the police

intervened.

I told Himmler on one occasion that I did not think it was wise to

arrest clergymen. As long as they talked in church they should say what

they wanted, but if they made political speeches outside their churches

then he could proceed against them, just as he would in connection with

any other people who made speeches hostile to the State. Several

clergymen who went very far in their criticism were not arrested. As far

as the arrest of clergy from occupied territories is concerned, I heard

about it; and I said earlier that this did not occur so much on the

religious level just because they were clergymen, but because they were

at the same time nationalists—I understand that from their point of

view—and consequently often involved in actions hostile to the

occupying forces.

DR. STAHMER: The Party program included two points, I believe, dealing

with the question of the Jews. What was your basic attitude towards this

question?

GÖRING: This question, which has been so strongly emphasized in the

Indictment, forces me under all circumstances to interpose certain

statements.

After Germany’s collapse in 1918 Jewry became very powerful in Germany

in all spheres of life, especially in the political, general

intellectual and cultural, and, most particularly, the economic spheres.

The men came back from the front, had nothing to look forward to, and

found a large number of Jews who had come in during the war from Poland

and the East, holding positions, particularly economic positions. It is

known that, under the influence of the war and business concerned with

it—demobilization, which offered great possibilities for doing

business, inflation, deflation—enormous shifts and transfers took place

in the propertied classes.

There were many Jews who did not show the necessary restraint and who

stood out more and more in public life, so that they actually invited

certain comparisons because of their numbers and the position they

controlled in contrast to the German people. In addition there was the

fact that particularly those parties which were avoided by nationally

minded people also had Jewish leadership out of proportion to the total

number of Jews.

That did not apply only to Germany, but also to Austria, which we have

always considered a part of Germany. There the entire Social Democratic

leadership was almost exclusively in Jewish hands. They played a very

considerable part in politics, particularly in the left-wing parties,

and they also became very prominent in the press in all political

directions.

At that time, there thus ensued a continuous uninterrupted attack on

everything national, national concepts and national ideals. I draw

attention to all the magazines and articles which dragged through the

mud things which were holy to us. I likewise call attention to the

distortion which was practiced in the field of art in this direction, to

plays which dragged the fighting at the front through the mud and

befouled the ideal of the brave soldier. In fact I could submit an

enormous pile of such articles, books, plays, and so forth; but this

would lead too far afield and I am actually not too well informed on the

subject. Because of all this, a defense movement arose which was by no

means created by National Socialism but which had existed before, which

was already strong during the war and which came even more strongly to

the fore after the war, when the influence of Jewry had such effects.

Moreover, in the cultural and intellectual sphere also many things which

were not in accordance with German feeling came to be expressed. Here,

too, there was a great split. In addition there was the fact that in

economic matters, if one overlooks the western industry, there was an

almost exclusive domination on the part of Jewry, which, indeed,

consisted of elements which were most sharply opposed by the old,

established Jewish families.

When the movement then drew up its program, which was done by a few

simple people—as far as I know, not even Adolf Hitler himself took part

in the drafting of the program, at least not yet as a leader—the

program included that point which played a prominent part as a defensive

point among large sections of the German people. Shortly before that

there had been the Räte-Republik in Munich and the murder of hostages,

and here, too the leaders were mostly Jews. It can be understood,

therefore, that a program drawn up in Munich by simple people quite

naturally took this up as a defense point. News also came of a

Räte-Republik in Hungary—again consisting mainly of Jews. All this had

made a very strong impression. When the program became known, the

Party—which was at that time extremely small—was at first not taken

seriously and was laughed at. But then, from the very beginning, a

concentrated and most bitter attack on the part of the entire Jewish

press, or the Jewish-influenced press, was started against the movement.

Everywhere Jewry was in the lead in the fight against National

Socialism, whether in the press, in politics, in cultural life by making

National Socialism contemptible and ridiculous, or in the economic

sphere. Whoever was a National Socialist could not get a position; the

National Socialist businessman could not get supplies or space for

advertisements, and so on. All this naturally resulted in a strong

defensive attitude on the part of the Party and led from the very

beginning to an intensification of the fight, such as had not originally

been the intention of the program. For the program aimed very definitely

at one thing above all—that Germany should be led by Germans. And it

was desired that the leadership, especially the political shaping of the

fate of the German people, should be in the hands of German persons who

could raise up the spirit of the German people again in a way that

people of a different kind could not. Therefore the main point was at

first merely to exclude Jewry from politics, from the leadership of the

State. Later on, the cultural field was also included because of the

very strong fight which had developed, particularly in this sphere,

between Jewry on the one side and National Socialism on the other.

I believe that if, in this connection, many a hard word which was said

by us against Jews and Jewry were to be brought up, I should still be in

a position to produce magazines, books, newspapers, and speeches in

which the expressions and insults coming from the other side were far in

excess. All that obviously was bound to lead to an intensification.

Shortly after the seizure of power countless exceptions were made. Jews

who had taken part in the World War and who had been decorated were

treated differently and shown consideration; they remained unaffected by

measures excluding Jews from civil services.

As I have said, the chief aim was to exclude them from the political

sphere, then from the cultural sphere.

The Nuremberg Laws were intended to bring about a clear separation of

races and, in particular, to do away with the notion of persons of mixed

blood in the future, as the term of half Jew or quarter Jew led to

continuous distinctions and confusion as far as their position was

concerned. Here I wish to emphasize that I personally had frequent

discussions with the Führer regarding persons of mixed blood and that I

pointed out to the Führer that, once German Jews were clearly separated,

it was impossible to have still another category between the two which

constituted an unclarified section of the German people, which did not

stand on the same level as the other Germans. I suggested to him that,

as a generous act, he should do away with the concept of the person of

mixed blood and place such people on the same footing as the other

Germans. The Führer took up this idea with great interest and was all

for adopting my point of view, in fact, he gave certain preparatory

orders. Then came more troubled times, as far as foreign policy was

concerned—the Sudeten crisis, Czechoslovakia, the occupation of the

Rhineland, and afterward the Polish crisis—and the question of persons

of mixed blood stepped into the background; but at the beginning of the

war the Führer told me that he was prepared to solve this matter in a

positive, generous fashion, but only after the war.

The Nuremberg Laws were to exclude, for the future, that concept of

persons of mixed blood by means of a clear separation of races.

Consequently it was provided in the penal regulations of the Nuremberg

Laws, that never the woman but always the man should be punishable, no

matter whether he was German or Jewish. The German woman or the Jewess

should not be punished. Then quieter times came, and the Führer was

always of the opinion that for the time being Jews should remain in

economy, though not in leading and prominent positions, until a

controlled emigration, gradually setting in, then intensified, should

solve this problem. In spite of continuous disturbances and difficulties

in the economic field, the Jews on the whole remained unmolested in

their economic positions.

The extraordinary intensification which set in later did not really

start in until after the events of 1938, and then to a still greater

extent in the war years. But here, again, there was naturally one more

radical group for whom the Jewish question was more significantly in the

foreground than it was for other groups of the Movement; just as, as I

should like to emphasize at this point, the idea of National Socialism

as a philosophy was understood in various ways—by one person more

philosophically, by another mystically, by a third in a practical and

political sense. This was also true of the different points of the

program. For one person certain points were more important, for another

person less so. One person would see in the point of the program which

was directed against Versailles and toward a free and strong Germany the

main point of the program; another person, perhaps, would consider the

Jewish question the main point.

THE PRESIDENT: Would that be a convenient time to break off? Dr.

Stahmer, can you inform the Tribunal how much longer you think the

Defendant Göring’s examination will last?

DR. STAHMER: I think that we shall finish in the course of tomorrow

morning.

THE PRESIDENT: That is a very long time.

DR. STAHMER: I shall do my best to shorten it.

[_A recess was taken._]

DR. STAHMER: To what extent did you participate in the issuing of the

Nuremberg Laws of 1935?

GÖRING: In my capacity as President of the Reichstag I announced those

laws and the law concerning the new Reich flag simultaneously here in

Nuremberg when the Reichstag was meeting at that time.

DR. STAHMER: In the Indictment it says that the destruction of the

Jewish race was part of the planning of aggressive wars.

GÖRING: That has nothing to do with the planning of aggressive wars;

also, the destruction of the Jewish race was not planned in advance.

DR. STAHMER: Were you a party to the action against the Jews in the

night of 9-10 November 1938?

GÖRING: I should like to discuss that briefly. I gathered yesterday,

from the cross-examination of the witness Körner, that a

misunderstanding had arisen in regard to this. On 9 November the march

to the Feldherrnhalle took place. This march was repeated every year and

for this occasion the prominent leaders of the movement gathered. Körner

referred to that when he said that everybody came to Munich. It was

customary, after the march was over, for practically everybody to meet

at the Munich City Hall for a dinner, at which the Führer was also

present.

I never attended that dinner in any of the years in question, as I used

to utilize my stay in Munich by attending to various other matters in

the afternoon of that day. I did not take part in the dinner on this

occasion either, nor did Körner. He and I returned in my special train

to Berlin in the evening. As I heard later, when the investigation was

carried out, Goebbels announced at that dinner, after the Führer had

left, that the seriously wounded counsellor of the Embassy in Paris had

died of his wounds. There was a certain amount of excitement and then

Goebbels apparently spoke some words about retaliation and in his

way—he was probably the very strongest representative of

anti-Semitism—must have brought on this development of events; but that

was after the Führer had left.

I myself, in fact, heard of the events upon my arrival in Berlin. First

of all the conductor in my car told me that he had seen fires in Halle.

Half an hour later I called my adjutant, who reported to me that riots

had taken place during the night, that Jewish stores had been broken

into and plundered and that synagogues had been set on fire. He did not

know any more about it himself.