“The order begins by insisting that these people live in clean
barracks. This can, in fact, only be achieved by us Germans, for
there is hardly any other nation which would act as humanely as
we do. Linen is frequently changed. The people are instructed to
wash twice a day, and the use of tooth brushes is advised, a
thing which is unknown to most of them.”
Do you know that the Armed Forces were given instructions of this kind,
which, as we know today, do not correspond to conditions as they really
were?
KESSELRING: As I said earlier, we did not concern ourselves with such
questions at all, and this lecture by Himmler is unknown to me.
HERR PELCKMANN: Unknown. Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: Does any other Defense Counsel wish to ask any questions?
Then the Prosecution may cross-examine.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You understand, Witness, in giving your testimony,
as to the definition of the High Command and the General Staff, as that
definition is included in the Indictment, you are accused as a member of
that group, do you not?
KESSELRING: I understand.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And that you are testifying here virtually as one
of the defendants?
KESSELRING: I understand.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You have spoken of the establishment in Germany of
a police state by the National Socialist Party, and I want to ask you
whether it is not a fact that the police state rested on two
institutions very largely, first, the Secret State Police, and secondly,
the concentration camps?
KESSELRING: The assistance by the police is an established fact to me.
The concentration camp was, in my opinion, a final means to that end.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And both the secret police and the concentration
camp were established by Hermann Göring, is that not a fact known to
you?
KESSELRING: The Secret State Police was created by Hermann Göring.
Whether it was formed by Himmler . . .
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Your lectures will be reserved for your own
counsel, and I shall ask to have you so instructed. Just answer my
questions. Was not the concentration camp also established by Hermann
Göring?
KESSELRING: I do not know.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You do not know that. Did you favor the police
state?
KESSELRING: I considered it as abnormal according to German conceptions
that a state had been formed within a state thus keeping certain things
away from public knowledge.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you ever do anything or can you point to
anything that you did in public life to prevent that abnormal condition
coming to Germany?
KESSELRING: I cannot remember anything, except that during conversations
with my superiors I may have brought the point up for discussion. But I
emphasize expressly that in general I confined myself to my own sphere
and my own tasks.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Do you want this Tribunal to understand that you
never knew that there was a campaign by this state to persecute the Jews
in Germany? Is that the way you want your testimony to be understood?
KESSELRING: A persecution of the Jews as such was not known to me.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Is it not a fact that Jewish officers were excluded
from your army and from your command?
KESSELRING: Jewish officers did not exist.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Is it not a fact that certain officers of your
army, certain officers of the Luftwaffe, took steps to Aryanize
themselves in order to escape the effect of Göring’s decrees? Did you
know about that?
KESSELRING: I heard rumors to that effect.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Any Aryanizing, where the father was suspected of
Jewish ancestry, consisted in showing that the normal father was not the
actual father, did it not?
KESSELRING: I admit that. Naturally there are other cases as well.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes. It might be that the mother was suspected of
Jewish ancestry?
KESSELRING: That in certain exceptional cases certain facts were
overlooked.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes. Did you know anything about the Jewish riots,
anti-Jewish riots of November 9th and 10th in Germany in 1938?
KESSELRING: Are you talking about the “Mirror Action” (Spiegelsache)? I
am not sure which day you are talking about.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I am talking about the riots in which synagogues
were burned, which made Göring so very angry. Did you not hear about
that in 1938?
KESSELRING: No, I did not hear anything about it.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Where were you in 1938?
KESSELRING: In 1938 I was in Dresden.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In November?
KESSELRING: In November I was in Berlin as Chief of the Air Force.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In Berlin. And you never heard about the
anti-Jewish riots of the 9th and 10th of November 1938?
KESSELRING: I only heard about the so-called “Mirror or Glass Campaign
(Spiegel- oder Glas-Campagne).”
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What was that? You have me down. I do not know
anything by that name.
KESSELRING: That was the smashing of shop windows and more, which
assumed rather large proportions in Berlin.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You did hear, then, about the anti-Jewish riots?
KESSELRING: About those, yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And did you hear that Hermann Göring issued a
decree confiscating the insurance that was to make reparations to those
Jews who owned shops? Did you hear about Göring’s action in that
respect?
KESSELRING: I did not quite understand. May I ask to have it repeated?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you hear about the decree passed by Hermann
Göring a few days later, November 12th, to be exact, confiscating the
insurance of the victims of those raids and fining the Jewish community
a billion Reichsmark?
KESSELRING: It is possible that I heard about it at the time, but I now
have no certain recollection.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But you did hear about it. You did not regard those
things as persecution?
KESSELRING: Naturally I must regard this “Glass Campaign” as an excess
against the Jews.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You have stated, as I understand you, based on your
experience with Hitler, that it was permissible for officers to differ
with him in opinion so long as they obeyed his orders. Is that what you
want understood?
KESSELRING: I have to apologize, but I did not quite understand the last
half of that sentence.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I have understood from your testimony this morning
that you felt perfectly free to disagree with Hitler and to make
suggestions to him and give him information, but that, after his mind
was made up and an order issued, it had to be obeyed. That is to say
. . .
KESSELRING: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is to say, an officer was at all times at
liberty to go to Hitler and give him technical information, such as the
state of the preparedness of his branch of the service?
KESSELRING: Generally speaking, no. For that purpose the
commanders-in-chief of the branches of the Armed Forces concerned were
the only people admitted.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: So the only channel through which information as to
the state of the Air Force would reach Hitler was through Hermann
Göring, is that a fact?
KESSELRING: Hermann Göring and, from time to time, State Secretary
Milch, deputy of the Reich Marshal.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: If Hitler was about to engage in a war for which
the Luftwaffe was unprepared, based on your information of the
situation, would it or would it not have been possible for the Luftwaffe
officers to have advised Hitler of that fact?
KESSELRING: We had complete confidence in our Reich Marshal, and we knew
that he was the only person who had a decisive influence upon Adolf
Hitler. In that way we knew, since we also knew his peaceful attitude,
that we were perfectly secure, and we relied on it.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: There came a time when you went into the East, did
you not, as a commander? You went into Poland and you went into Soviet
Russia, did you not?
KESSELRING: Poland and Russia, yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And was it not understood among the officers in
those Polish and Russian campaigns that the Hague regulations would not
be applied to Soviet Russia as to the treatment of prisoners of war?
KESSELRING: That was not known to me.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You have testified that the Luftwaffe was purely a
weapon of defense, is that your testimony?
KESSELRING: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What was the German strength at the beginning of
the Polish campaign in various types of planes?
KESSELRING: As I was not a member of the central board I can give you
only an approximation on my own responsibility, without guaranteeing the
historical certainty of these figures. All told, I would say we must
have had approximately three thousand aircraft. All in all, so far as I
can remember now, there were between thirty and forty bomber groups, the
same number of fighters, and there were ten groups of dive-bombers,
fighters . . .
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Will you give me the number of each group?
KESSELRING: About thirty aircraft, which would drop to seven, six or
five aircraft during the course of the day. To continue, there were ten
to twelve groups of dive-bombers, including ground “strafers” and
twin-engine fighters. Also included in that figure were reconnaissance
planes and a certain number of naval aircraft.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the proportion of bombers to fighters was
approximately two to one, was it not?
KESSELRING: The proportion of bombers to fighters was about one to one
or one point two, or one point three to one. I said thirty to forty and
about thirty fighter groups. If I include the twin-engine fighters, then
the figure would be about one to one.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is the way you make up the total of about
three thousand units?
KESSELRING. The reason why I can give you that figure is because during
these months of quiet reflection I made an estimate, without thereby
revealing the historical truth.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, do you count as a weapon of defense the
bomber, or do you treat that as an offensive weapon?
KESSELRING: I must speak of the bomber in the same way as the
dive-bomber and the fighter, equally as a defensive and as an offensive
weapon. I explained yesterday that no matter whether defensive or
offensive warfare is concerned, the task of the air force must be
carried out on the offensive and the targets are far and wide. I also
explained that an air force which has only light aircraft is doomed to
be destroyed, since it cannot attack the phases of the enemy’s aircraft
production, his air assembly areas, nor his movements in various
sectors.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In other words, the Luftwaffe was a defensive
weapon if you were on the defensive, and an offensive weapon if you were
on attack?
KESSELRING: I did not understand the last half of the sentence.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The Luftwaffe would serve as a defensive weapon if
you were on the defensive, and as an offensive weapon if you were on
attack, is that not true?
KESSELRING: One could put it like that. I would express it differently.
As I said, the air force is essentially an offensive weapon, no matter
whether it is used for defense or for attack.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think you have improved on my sentence. Now, in
the Netherlands, in Poland . . .
KESSELRING: May I just say something else on the subject?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes, yes.
KESSELRING: Namely, what I said yesterday at the very end, that the
essential of an offensive air force is the long-distance four-engine
heavy bombers, and Germany had none of these.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: How did it come that Germany had none of those?
KESSELRING: Firstly, because being actually in a period of danger, we
were confining ourselves to the absolute essentials of a defensive air
force only.
Secondly, we tried, in keeping with our characteristics, to achieve as
much as possible by precision bombing, in other words, by dive-bombing,
utilizing the minimum of war material, and I am here thinking of the Ju
88 as a typical example of that.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You were examined by the United States Strategic
Bombing Survey, were you not, on the 28th of June 1945? Do you recall
that?
KESSELRING: Yes, of course.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, it is quite certain, is it not?
KESSELRING: I have often been interrogated.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, I ask you whether on the 28th of June 1945,
you did not say to the officer examining you on behalf of the United
States Strategic Bombing Survey this:
“Everything had been done to make the German Air Force from the
point of view of airmanship, aircraft, flak, air corps, signals,
and so forth, the most formidable in the world. This effort led
to the fact that at the beginning of the war, or in 1940 at the
latest, from a fighter viewpoint, from a dive-bomber viewpoint,
from a combat viewpoint, we had particularly good aircraft, even
if the standard was not uniform entirely.”
Did you not state that?
KESSELRING: That is still my view today, that as far as material,
pursuit planes, dive-bombers, and fighters were concerned, we did in
fact have a certain advantage over the other powers.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, as to the failure to have the number of
four-engine bombers; that was because of your peaceful intentions, was
it, or was it because of a mistake in judgment as to what the
requirements of war would be?
KESSELRING: To that I must say the following: It would have been
insanity on the part of the Air Force leaders to consider producing a
complete air force within 3 to 4 years. It was in 1940, at the earliest,
that the possibility existed of building up an effective air force which
would comply with all requirements. For that reason, in my view, it was
an amazing achievement of organization to have attained such
effectiveness under the existing limitations.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I understood you to give as one of the indications
of your unaggressive intentions the fact that you had not an adequate
number of four-engine bombers at the outset of the war. Did I
misunderstand you?
KESSELRING: That is an excerpt from the whole story. The strength of the
Air Force was, particularly in comparison with the small states, to be
regarded as sufficient; certainly not, however, in comparison with
powerful opponents who were fully equipped in the air.
I have an example in mind. In a heated discussion with the Reich
Marshal, before the beginning of the Russian campaign, I asked for
reinforcements for fighters and dive-bombers. For certain reasons that
was refused. The certain reasons were, firstly, shortage of material,
and secondly, which I could also gather from the conversation, that the
Reich Marshal did not agree with this campaign.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you not testify to the Bomber Investigating
Commission of the United States that you intended to build a long-range
heavy bomber but—and I quote your words:
“We had developed the He 111 and the Ju 88 and they were
actually put into the fighting as long-range heavy bombers. The
Ju 88 was then used in the French campaign and against England.
“Question: The Ju 88 is not really a long-range bomber?”
Your answer:
“It was considered a long-range bomber at that time, but
unfortunately we had a low opinion of the four-engine aircraft,
and an erroneous belief which proved to be a mistake in the
course of later years.”
Is that true?
KESSELRING: That was my opinion.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the reason you did not build the four-engine
aircraft was your low opinion of it?
KESSELRING: May I say the following: That was the conception of a
service department; the decisions in all these questions were made in
the highest service department.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The highest service department made a mistake about
the utility of the four-engine bomber?
KESSELRING: Well, looking at the situation retrospectively, I must say
that the absence of a four-engine bomber became extremely awkward.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And that the highest authority in aircraft
production was Hermann Göring. He was the head of the whole plan of
aircraft production, was he not?
KESSELRING: Yes, that is correct but it did not exclude the fact that
erroneous conceptions of certain measures for the conduct of war or
organizational measures may exist temporarily.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You were in the Polish campaign you have said?
KESSELRING: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Is it not a fact that the German Air Force made the
decisive contribution to that campaign as regards the time taken to
conquer Poland?
KESSELRING: From the point of view of the Air Force officers I must
agree with that conception absolutely, but the army officers did not
quite share it.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, you are testifying now as to your opinion.
And in that campaign you developed the technique of low-level attacks by
fighters, light bombers, and dive-bombers against marching columns, and
the dive-bomber, the light bomber, and the fighters all contributed to
the success of that movement.
KESSELRING: I must admit that. The foundations of the short-range
bombing technique were certainly laid during the Polish campaign.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I turn now to the French campaign. You were in the
air in the French campaign, were you not?
KESSELRING: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the Air Force contributed decisively to the
success of that campaign, did it not?
KESSELRING: From the point of view of an Air Force officer, I must
consider that view as correct.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you testified, did you not, that Dunkirk would
not have been such a catastrophe if the Luftwaffe had not been there?
That is true, is it not?
KESSELRING: Dunkirk, did you say? I did not quite understand.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes, Dunkirk.
KESSELRING: Yes. In my opinion, that is certain, and it would have been
even more so if bad weather had not considerably hindered our
operations.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is, the catastrophe would have increased for
the English except for bad weather. You had the air force to do a better
job at Dunkirk than you did, from your point of view?
KESSELRING: We were grounded for about 2 days.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You were one of the principal advocates of the plan
to invade England, were you not?
KESSELRING: Personally I am of the opinion that, if the war against
England was to be brought to a successful end, this end could only be
achieved for certain by invasion.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you had an adequate Air Force after having
defeated Poland, defeated Holland, defeated Belgium, and defeated
France, so that you advocated proceeding with an invasion of England,
did you not?
KESSELRING: I must give an explanation on that point.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: First tell me if that is true.
THE PRESIDENT: Witness, will you please understand that you must answer
the question first, and give an explanation afterwards. Every question,
or nearly every question, admits of either an affirmative or negative
answer, and you will kindly give that answer and make your explanation
afterwards.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you not advocate the invasion of England, and
was not the Air Force ready to invade England?
KESSELRING: Subject to certain conditions, considering the existing air
situation at that time the Air Force was ready to fulfill that task.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you recommended very strongly to the Reich
Marshal that the invasion take place immediately after Dunkirk, did you
not?
KESSELRING: Yes, and I still advocated that view later on too.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the preparations of the Luftwaffe for this
invasion were complete, and the invasion was called off only because the
procurement of sea-going craft was not sufficient, is that not true?
KESSELRING: Yes. I have to supplement the previous statement by saying
that, of course, a certain interval between the French campaign and the
English campaign would have had to elapse in order to effect the
material replenishment of the air force.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, you also told the Strategic Bombing Survey
that Hitler had ordered not only the bombing of military targets,
including industrial production, but also the bombing of political
targets. Is that true?
KESSELRING: After a certain date, yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is, to paralyze the government of the enemy.
That is what you meant by a political target, did you not?
KESSELRING: That is not what I mean by political targets. I answered the
question differently; I understood it differently, namely, that this
order became effective at a later date.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You attended the speech made by Hitler in August of
1939?
KESSELRING: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: At that time you were informed that the attack on
Poland would commence immediately or very soon?
KESSELRING: During that conference, the final decision to commence the
Polish campaign had not yet been reached. Negotiations were still in
progress and we were all still hoping that they would bring favorable
results.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You were ordered on the 15th of August to get the
Luftwaffe in readiness for an attack on Poland?
KESSELRING: This order as such is not known to me in detail, but I must
admit that for months before we had made air preparations and erected
bases in a general defensive direction, always thinking of a defensive
situation.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You expected Poland to attack Germany in the air?
Is that your point?
KESSELRING: At any rate, we took this possibility into consideration on
our side. The whole political situation was too unknown for us to be
able to form a pertinent, incontestable judgment on it.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You have said that you never held conferences with
Party leaders or talked politics or had any contacts with politicians,
in substance, have you not?
KESSELRING: Essentially, yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Was not your immediate superior the Number 2
politician of Germany? Did you not know that?
KESSELRING: I did, but I must emphasize that the conversations which I
had with the Reich Marshal were 99 percent concerned with military and
organizational problems.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But you knew that he, at all times, was one of the
leading men in Nazi politics?
KESSELRING: Certainly.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You testified that you knew of the order to shoot
Soviet Commissars?
KESSELRING: Certainly.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And that you did not approve it and did not carry
it out.
KESSELRING: I did not answer to that effect yesterday.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What did you answer?
KESSELRING: I answered as follows: That the Air Force, which was not
fighting on the ground, was not concerned with this problem, and that an
official notification of that order is no longer in my recollection.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Who executed that order? Who was expected to
execute it?
KESSELRING: I was in Russia only until November 1941 and I can give you
no information on it.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you ever hear of the SS?
KESSELRING: Yes, of course.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And is it not a fact that the execution of that
order was committed to the SS?
KESSELRING: I knew nothing about that.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What did you think the SS existed for?
KESSELRING: In my opinion, the SS, as far as it was used in military
operations, was a special section of the Army, indeed a sort of guard of
the Army.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The SS was to guard the Army, or to guard whom?
KESSELRING: No, but the SS divisions were, purely from the point of view
of men, numbers and material, well above the average Army division as
far as equipment and readiness were concerned.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Who was commanding the SS?
KESSELRING: The SS was commanded by Himmler. As far as these divisions
were used within the army, they were tactically under the army
commanders, commanders of the army groups, or the corps headquarters
staffs to which they were attached.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: So far as they had special missions, they were
under the command of Himmler, is that right?
KESSELRING: Yes, certainly; a very clear distinction.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You testified yesterday that you did not consider
Hitler’s Commando Order binding on you, and that you did not carry out
that order, is that right?
KESSELRING: In the Mediterranean theater, yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Was that because the order left discretion in your
hands, or because you just took discretion into your hands?
KESSELRING: I made those reservations myself, firstly for ideological
considerations, and secondly because in the Mediterranean I had, as I
said yesterday, a twofold command, and the German orders could not be
included in the general administration without modification.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well then, the extent to which an order of that
kind was carried out depended somewhat on the character and courage of
the officer who received it, did it not?
KESSELRING: I would like to express it somewhat differently. These
orders could be interpreted in different ways—that Commando Order, for
instance—insofar as it was certainly quite possible for the
Commander-in-Chief to consider an operation either as a special task or
as a tactical measure which was militarily justified.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You were in command of the forces in Italy at this
time, were you not, at the time of the Commando Order?
KESSELRING: With a difference. I did not have full powers until
September 1943.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I will ask to have you shown Document Number 498-PS
in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-501.
I call your attention to Paragraph Number 6 of that order which reads as
follows:
“I will hold responsible, under military law, for failing to
carry out this order, all commanders and officers who either
have neglected their duty of instructing the troops about this
order, or acted against this order where it was to be executed.”
You see that paragraph in the order?
KESSELRING: Yes, I have just read it.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, did you ever report that you were not carrying
out this order or did you deceive your superior officers as to whether
it was being carried out?
KESSELRING: In one special case that question was treated very
decisively at headquarters. This concerned the Commando action “Pescara”
where Adolf Hitler ordered the shooting of certain people in spite of
the fact that we, my troops and I, wanted to spare them. I think
particularly that the influence of Jodl here, as an intermediary, was
decisive; namely, that this subject was forgotten and that consequently
these people were kept alive, in hospitals and prisoner-of-war camps.
But I should not like to call it deception, the word you used just now,
for I wish to emphasize that, in my military sector, I considered
actions of this kind as guiding orders, and this Commando Order
certainly allowed for several interpretations.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In other words, the extent to which one of these
orders was carried out depended on the commanders in charge, is that
right, that Hitler could not depend on it that an order as emphatic as
this would be carried out by his commanders? Was that the state of the
German Army?
KESSELRING: No, not that, but the situation can be explained as follows:
If, on the part of an army, such an operation is reported to a superior
as a Commando operation in the sense of that order, then the necessary
measures would have to be carried out. That depended, however, on the
way of reporting by the units concerned, and I already explained in
detail yesterday that a unified conception had gradually set in, that
men in uniform, who carried out a tactical move, were not Commandos
within the meaning of this order.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You testified today, and another witness has
testified here, that if an order of Adolf Hitler was resisted, it meant
death. You are also testifying that an absolute order to execute
Commandos, under threat of punishment if you failed, left you discretion
to do it or not, and I want you once and for all to tell the Tribunal
which is the fact, and then we will leave that subject.
KESSELRING: I must repeat what I said before, namely, that the Italian
theater of war was not to be compared with the other theaters of war.
Through the co-operation of Hitler and Mussolini there was always a very
obliging attitude, therefore, these orders made by OKW could not easily
be applied to the Italian theater of war.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: They were applied everywhere, so far as you know,
except in the Italian theater, then?
KESSELRING: That I cannot say. I have repeatedly explained that I
confined myself exclusively to my own sphere of operations, which was
considerable.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You testified, as I understand you, that you
punished looting on the part of your soldiers in Italy.
KESSELRING: As soon as I heard of these instances, I punished them, and
I most strictly ordered the Army commanders and Air Force commanders to
do the same.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, the punishment was very mild that you ever
inflicted for any looting, was it not?
KESSELRING: I even went so far as to have culprits shot on the spot, and
in that manner I succeeded in remedying the disorder which had arisen.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: So a German general, dealing with a German soldier,
considers shooting the proper penalty for looting?
KESSELRING: These far-reaching conclusions are something I cannot admit.
On that subject I wish to make the following remarks: If an army—as was
the case with the 14th Army at the time—fell into a certain disorder,
the most severe measures were justified in the interests of the
reputation of that army, and in the interests of the population, in
order to bring about orderly conditions among the civilian population. I
had heated discussion at headquarters on that particular subject.
Apart from that, I was of the opinion that all penalties eventually
became useless, and therefore, for some time I considered penalties
purely as an educational means and not really as punishment.
Consequently for some time, penalties were rather mild.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You testified that you took vigorous steps to
protect the art treasures of Italy.
KESSELRING: Insofar as I was informed of art treasures, yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What steps did you take, and against whom did you
take them?
KESSELRING: Primarily they were preventive measures: First, by excluding
places of art and culture from the field of battle; secondly, by having
these places cleared if they were liable to air raids by the enemy; and
thirdly, by co-operating with General Wolff and having these cultural
and art treasures removed to secure places. I make mention of the art
treasures of Cassino and Florence.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you know that any art treasure was removed from
Mount Cassino, for instance, and taken to Berlin?
KESSELRING: Much later, at Mondorf, I heard about that. At the time all
I could recollect was that they were handed over to the Vatican in Rome.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Oh. Did you know that art treasures were taken and
delivered to Göring from Mount Cassino? Did you ever hear that?
KESSELRING: I once heard something about some statue of a saint, but I
cannot really give you any more details.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And if Göring received such a thing from Mount
Cassino, was it a violation of your orders?
KESSELRING: The Hermann Göring Division was stationed in that sector. It
was commanded by the former adjutant of Hermann Göring, and it is clear
that there was a certain connection here, but to what extent I cannot
tell you.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I have a few more questions concerning your
interrogations.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps we had better break off for 10 minutes.
[_A recess was taken._]
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think, Your Honors, that we will save some
duplication—perhaps save time—if I now yield to Sir David
Maxwell-Fyfe, who is prepared on some of the subjects I was about to
take up. I think he is in a better position to take up the examination.
THE PRESIDENT: Whatever you think, Mr. Justice Jackson.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the United Kingdom):
Witness, you have been told why Dr. Stahmer wanted you to give evidence?
Have you been told by Dr. Stahmer what to do to give evidence?
KESSELRING: The individual points were communicated to me, without all
questions being directly defined.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want to read you one sentence, so that you
will have it in mind, of Dr. Stahmer’s statement:
“When Rotterdam became a battle zone in May 1940, it became a
military necessity to employ bombers, as the encircled fighting
parachute troops, who had no support from the artillery, had
urgently asked for help from bombers.”
Do you remember the incident? I wanted you to have it in your mind.
KESSELRING: Yes, certainly.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you remember being asked about this incident
in the interrogation on the 28th of June, by the United States bombing
survey? Remember?
KESSELRING: Certainly.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you say there at the question, “What about
Rotterdam?”
“Answer: ‘First, Rotterdam had been defended in the parts which
were later on attacked. Secondly, in this case one could notice
that a firm attitude had to be taken. This one attack brought
immediate peace to Holland. It was asked for by Model and was
approved by the OKW. It was a very small part in the heart of
Rotterdam.’”
Do you remember saying that?
KESSELRING: Approximately I did say that, yes, and I repeated those
words yesterday.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want to deal first with the strategic aspects.
I will come to the tactical aspects later. Your strategic purpose and
real object was to take a firm attitude and secure immediate peace, was
that not right?
KESSELRING: That far-reaching task had not been given to me but, as I
said yesterday, General Wenninger reported the result of the attack to
me in such a way that close on the attack the total surrender of Holland
followed.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But I want you to think of your own words. This
was approved by the OKW; a firm attitude had to be taken. Was not your
purpose in this attack to secure a strategic advantage by terrorization
of the people of Rotterdam?
KESSELRING: That I can deny with the clearest conscience. Neither did I
say, when I was at Mondorf, that I had to adopt a firm attitude. I
merely said that the support which was demanded by Student would have to
be carried out. We only had the one task, and that was to furnish
artillery support for Student’s troops.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What did you mean by saying that a firm attitude
had to be taken, if you did not mean that the people of Holland had to
be possibly terrorized into peace.
KESSELRING: May I repeat in that connection that the conception of the
expression, “firm attitude,” is not in keeping with my accustomed
wording. I cannot admit that this word was in the minutes, and it was
not read out to me, either.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What do you think you said instead of firm
attitude, if you did not say it?
KESSELRING: I remarked that severe measures would bring quick results.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is exactly what I am putting to you,
Witness, “severe measures” . . .
KESSELRING: But only for the purpose of tactical results. May I once
more emphasize that I am a soldier and not a politician, and did not act
as a politician. At that time I was merely and solely complying with
Student’s requirements.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just before I deal with the tactical
position—which I do with great pleasure—have you had to work with the
Defendant Raeder? Have you had to work with the Defendant Raeder at all?
KESSELRING: Admiral Raeder? Only in a general way, insofar as naval
questions were concerned.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I just want you to listen to the views which the
Defendant Raeder has expressed and tell the Tribunal whether you agree
with them. This is United Kingdom Exhibit Number GB-224, Document Number
C-157, and here is the transcript in Page 2735 (Volume V, Page 274).
Now, just listen carefully, if you will be so kind:
“It is desirable to base all military measures taken on existing
international law. However, measures which are considered
necessary from a military point of view, provided a decisive
success can be expected from them, will have to be carried out,
even if they are not covered by existing international law.”
Do you agree with that?
KESSELRING: I cannot completely agree with that concept. As far as
Rotterdam is concerned, conditions were exactly the opposite.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, just for the moment we will deal with the
Defendant Raeder’s words. Do you agree with them?
KESSELRING: No.
DR. LATERNSER: I have an objection. I object to the earlier and to this
present question put to the witness, because they are irrelevant, and
secondly because they do not refer to facts but opinions. The witness is
here to testify to facts.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, the witness is here, as I pointed out
carefully, to deal with what is military necessity.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, the Tribunal thinks that the question in the
form in which you put it may be objectionable, by the introduction of
the views of the Defendant Raeder.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Of course, I bow to the Tribunal, but this
witness is called to say that the explanation for this is military
necessity. I was asking whether he did not agree with the views of one
of his colleagues on this point, what is military necessity. If the
Tribunal has any doubt, I would rather pass it. But the question of
military necessity is one which the Tribunal will have to consider in a
number of fields, and I respectfully do not abandon that point, which
will run through the questions I have to ask on other matters.
[_Turning to the witness._] Now, I will come to the tactical position at
Rotterdam: Will you just tell the Tribunal who were the officers
involved? There was a Lieutenant General Schmidt and with him was Major
General Student, who were in charge of the troops that were attacking
Rotterdam. Do you remember that?
KESSELRING: Only General Student. General Schmidt is unknown to me.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, the evidence that is given in this case is
that the negotiations, the terms of capitulation, were actually written
out by Lieutenant General Schmidt in a creamery near Rotterdam. I
suppose he would be General Student’s superior officer, would he not?
KESSELRING: General Student was the senior German officer in the
Rotterdam sector and the responsible commander. General Schmidt is
unknown to me.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So that General Schmidt would be junior to
General Student, would he?
KESSELRING: He may have been called in for the special purpose, but I do
not know of him.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want you to have the times in mind: Do you
know what time in the day the bombing of Rotterdam started?
KESSELRING: As far as I know, in the early afternoon, about 1400 hours,
I believe.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I was going to put to you 1330.
KESSELRING: Yes, that is quite possible.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you know that negotiations for a capitulation
had been in progress since 1030 in the morning?
KESSELRING: No; as I said yesterday, I have no knowledge of these facts.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And did you know that at 1215 a Dutch officer,
Captain Backer, went to the German lines and saw General Schmidt and
General Student, and that General Schmidt wrote out the suggested terms
of capitulation at 1235?
KESSELRING: No, that is unknown to me.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That had never been told to you?
KESSELRING: It was not communicated to me. At least, I cannot remember
it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, you see, Witness, it is 35 minutes before
the bombing began and . . .
KESSELRING: The important factor would have been for Student to call off
the attack as such, but that did not happen. The cancellation never
reached me, and did not reach my unit either.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I just want you to have the facts in mind,
and then I will ask you some questions. The terms that were discussed at
1235 were to expire; the answer was called for at 1620. After Captain
Backer left with the terms, at 1322 and 1325 two red flares were put up
by the German ground troops under General Student. Did you hear of that?
KESSELRING: I did not hear of that either. Moreover, two red flares
would naturally not have sufficed for the purpose.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, but in addition to that your ground troops
were in excellent wireless communication with your planes, were they
not? Will you answer the question?
KESSELRING: I already said yesterday . . .
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Will you please answer the question?
KESSELRING: Yes, and no. So far as I know, there was no immediate
communication between the ground station and the aircraft, but, as I
said yesterday, from the tactical force, through the ground station, to
the aircraft formation.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If it had been wanted to pass the communication
to the aircraft and stop the bombing, it could quite easily have been
done by wireless, apart from putting up these two red flares?
KESSELRING: In my opinion, yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, what I am suggesting is, you see, that
everyone saw these bombers coming over. You know that. Student saw the
bombers coming over. You know that do you not?
KESSELRING: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If that attack had any tactical significance
about helping your troops, it could have been called off, could it not?
KESSELRING: I did not understand the final sentence.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If the object of this attack was merely
tactical, to help in the attack on Rotterdam, it could easily have been
called off by a wireless message from General Student to the planes,
could it not?
KESSELRING: Yes, if the tactical situation had been communicated, or if
the situation had been reported to the bombing units immediately, then
there could have been no doubt.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But if in honest negotiations, Witness, terms of
surrender have been given and are to expire 3 hours later, it is only
demanded of a soldier that he will call off the attack, is it not?
KESSELRING: If no other conditions have been made, yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But if he can stop the attack, it would have
been the easiest thing in the world to do so. I want to make my
suggestion quite clear—that this tactical matter had nothing to do with
the attack on Rotterdam; that the purpose of the attack on Rotterdam
was, in your own words, to show a firm attitude and to terrorize the
Dutch into surrender.
KESSELRING: May I repeat again, that I have said explicitly that this
attack was only serving the tactical requirements, and that I
disassociate myself completely from these political considerations.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, you know that General Student apologized
afterwards for the attack; you know that? Apologized to the Dutch
commander for the attack?
KESSELRING: I do not know it and, as I explained yesterday, I saw
General Student when he was seriously injured, and I could not even talk
to him.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am not going to take more time. I have put my
point, I hope, quite clearly. I want to ask you on one other point on
which you spoke yesterday in regard to bombing. You said that the attack
on Warsaw on 1 September 1939 was made because you considered Warsaw a
defended fortress with air defense. Is that fair?
KESSELRING: Yes, certainly.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, you know that at the same time—at 5
o’clock on the morning of Friday, 1 September—the German Air Force
attacked Augostów, Nowy Dwor, Ostrów Mazowiecki, Tczew, Puck, Zambrów,
Radomsko, Toron, Kutno, Kraków, Grodno, Trzebinia, and Gdynia, which is
in rather a different position. Just answer my question. The German Air
Force attacked these towns?
KESSELRING: With my comrades—yes. Not the towns, I repeat, not the
towns.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, all this attack was made at 5 o’clock on
the morning of 1 September, was it not?
KESSELRING: The attack started in the morning, but not, as you put it,
on the towns but on military targets; airfields, staff headquarters, and
traffic centers were attacked. As I have already explained, very
detailed instructions were published by the OKW that only these military
targets should be bombed.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You are suggesting that all these towns I had
read out were military targets?
KESSELRING: Insofar as they were in my sector, yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You had not had time for a single reconnaissance
plane to fly over Poland before that attack was made, had you?
KESSELRING: That is correct. On the other hand, agents and others
furnished sufficient intelligence on the situation and, apart from that,
this whole plan was absolutely controlled by operational considerations
of air warfare.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Of course, the whole plan had been worked out in
April of 1939 under the Fall Weiss, had it not?
KESSELRING: At that time I did not even know that I was going to be
concerned in it, or that war would be declared.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you not know, Witness, after you were
appointed, that a Fall Weiss had been worked out in April 1939? You were
never told that?
KESSELRING: That was not said, but, on the other hand, may I say, as a
soldier, that a general plan made in April would undergo many
alterations by September, and decisive alterations might still have to
be made even at the very last minute.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just one other point I want you to have in mind.
Do you remember that the German radio broadcast the last note to Poland
at 9 o’clock the night before, on 31 August? Do you remember that?
KESSELRING: I believe I do.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That was 8 hours before your attack, and you
know, do you not, that the Defendant Göring had been at his secret
headquarters for a week before that, considering this matter?
KESSELRING: That I can well imagine, if on the . . .
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, what I am putting to you is that this
general attack on Polish towns was again a well-planned scheme to try
and break down natural resistance for your attack?
KESSELRING: May I say the following on that subject? If my statements as
Field Marshal and witness under oath are considered as little as you are
considering them, Mr. Prosecutor, then further statements of mine do not
serve any purpose. I have emphasized that it was not an attack against
towns, but an attack on military targets, and you must finally believe
me when I say that as a soldier.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The Tribunal will decide as to the value of the
evidence. I am not going to discuss it. I am just going to ask you about
one or two other matters, in order to get your view on it, what you
consider to be of military necessity. You remember the orders with
regard to partisans in Italy during the time of your command? The orders
with regard to partisans?
KESSELRING: Certainly.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And I want to put it perfectly correctly, so
tell me if I am wrong, but I understand this to be the position. The
Defendant Keitel issued a general order as to partisans on 16 December
1942. A copy was found in your headquarters or your ex-headquarters, and
your recollection is that it came to your attention later on, but you
are not quite sure of the date. Is that right? You are not quite sure of
the time?
KESSELRING: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I would like you to try, because you have had
time to consider it; do you think that Keitel’s order of December 1942
had come to your attention before you issued your own order of 17 June
1944? Perhaps you would like to see your own order, would you?
KESSELRING: It was read out to me; but in November, then again in
December, and subsequently in January, I requested that I should be
heard once more on these questions and these orders, as I had certain
doubts about the issuing of these orders, the distribution, the persons
to whom they were sent, and the date.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I will pass you the orders, Witness,
because you ought to see them and recall them to your recollection. I do
not think they have been put in before. Let us take first Defendant
Keitel’s order of 16 December 1942.
[_The document was submitted to the witness._]
I hope I have passed you the right document. Does it read—I will read
it very slowly.
“The Führer has therefore ordered that:
“1. The enemy employs, in partisan warfare, communist-trained
fanatics who do not hesitate to commit any atrocity. It is more
than ever a question of life and death. This fight has nothing
to do with soldierly gallantry or principles of the Geneva
Convention. If the fight against the partisans in the East, as
well as in the Balkans, is not waged with the most brutal means,
we will shortly reach the point where the available forces are
insufficient to control this area.
“It is therefore not only justified, but it is the duty of the
troops to use all means without restriction, even against women
and children, as long as it insures success. Any consideration
for the partisans is a crime against the German people.”
Do you remember that order?
KESSELRING: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you in turn issued an order on the 17th of
June 1944 when you were commanding in Italy? Do you remember that? I
will show you in one moment, if I can get the German copy out of the
file. I will just read a short passage again so that the Tribunal will
have it in mind; but Witness, please refer to any other passage because
I want to give a fair effect of the order:
“1. The partisan situation in the Italian theater, particularly
central Italy, has recently deteriorated to such an extent that
it constitutes a serious danger to the fighting troops and their
supply lines, as well as to the war industry and economic
potential. The fight against the partisans must be carried on
with all means at our disposal and with the utmost severity. I
will protect any commander who exceeds our usual restraint in
the choice of severity of the methods he adopts against
partisans. In this connection the old principle holds good, that
a mistake in the choice of methods in executing one’s orders is
better than failure or neglect to act.”
Do you remember that, Witness?
KESSELRING: Yes, I remember that order.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you remember 3 days later, so that there
will be no mistake as to what you meant, you issued this further one,
another top-secret order. Reading the third line after saying, “The
announcement does not represent an empty threat,” you say:
“It is the duty of all troops and police in my command to adopt
the severest measures. Every act of violence committed by
partisans must be punished immediately. Reports submitted must
also give details of countermeasures taken. Wherever there is
evidence of considerable numbers of partisan groups, a
proportion of the male population of the area will be arrested;
and in the event of an act of violence being committed, these
men will be shot.”
Now, I just want only to take two examples, Witness, of the way that
that was carried out. You remember when one of your officers, Colonel
Von Gablenz, was captured by partisans; do you remember?
KESSELRING: General Von Gablenz?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I think he was a colonel at this stage, it was
the 26th of June, just after your order. You remember Colonel Von
Gablenz being captured, do you?
KESSELRING: No.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: He was a colonel of the lines of communication;
not a very important officer, but still a colonel.
KESSELRING: Yes, I remember.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, just look at these two documents. Is this
right?—this is an extract from the daily situation report by the
Commander-in-Chief of Southwest Italy for the 26th of June.
“Partisan situation. North of Arezzo, Colonel Von Gablenz, a
member of the staff of the officer commanding lines of
communication, area 10th Army, was captured by bandits. The
entire male population of the villages on the stretch of road
concerned was taken into custody.”
It was further announced that all these hostages would be shot if the
captured colonel were not set free within 48 hours. Remember that?
KESSELRING: Not in detail, but in general . . .
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, no, but do you remember the incident?
KESSELRING: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Look at the next bit which is the 2-day
situation report, the report for 2 days later, the 28th of June, the
second paragraph: “As reprisal for the capture of Colonel Freiherr Von
Gablenz, so far 560 persons, including 250 men, have been taken into
custody.”
Is that your conception of what is meant by “steps necessary to deal
with partisan warfare” that 410 women and children should be taken into
custody?
KESSELRING: That was not necessary, but in connection with this I may
. . .
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let us take one other example. You remember
Civitella? You remember what was done with Civitella by your forces, do
you not?
KESSELRING: At the moment, no.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, just let me remind you what was done at
Civitella—that was on the 18th of June, one day after your order.
“Two German soldiers were killed and a third wounded in a fight
with partisans in the village of Civitella. Fearing reprisals,
the inhabitants evacuated the village, but when the Germans
discovered this, punitive action was postponed. On June
29”—that, you will remember, Witness, was 9 days after your
proclamation to reinforce your order—“when the local
inhabitants were returned and when feeling secure once more, the
Germans carried out a well-organized reprisal, combing the
neighborhood. Innocent inhabitants were often shot on sight.
During that day 212 men, women, and children in the immediate
district were killed. Some of the dead women were found
completely naked. In the course of investigations, a nominal
roll of the dead has been compiled and is complete with the
exception of a few names whose bodies could not be identified.
Ages of the dead ranged from 1 year to 84 years. Approximately
one hundred houses were destroyed by fire. Some of the victims
were burned alive in their homes.”
That is the report of the United Nations War Crimes Commission on the
incident. Now, Witness, do you really think that military necessity
commands the killing of babies of 1 and people of 84?
KESSELRING: No.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, I just want to acquaint you with one
subject which you have dealt with yourself, that is the position of the
Hermann Göring Division. You mentioned one of the persons I have in
mind, but let me just, in order to make it clear to the Tribunal, get
clear who your officers were at that time.
Did General Vietinghoff—sorry, I think it was Von Vietinghoff—did he
command the 10th Army?
KESSELRING: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: In 1944?
KESSELRING: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Was he directly under your orders?
KESSELRING: Yes, he was under my command.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then I take it he is a fairly senior and
responsible general. I do not know his rank—full general or . . .
KESSELRING: Full general.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And under him was the 76th Corps, was it not,
commanded by General Herr; is that correct?
KESSELRING: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And under General Herr was a Hermann Göring
Division, commanded by General Schmalz, whom you mentioned this morning;
is that right?
KESSELRING: General Von Schmalz commanded, but previously I mentioned
another name.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I think it was Schmalz at this time. Now, the
Hermann Göring Division had been concerned in a number of three—I call
them incidents; I would not say—what I mean by incidents is the sort of
thing which I have been describing at Civitella. Let me remind you of
one or two. Do you remember at Stia, on the 13th to the 18th of April,
137 civilians were killed, including 45 women and children; do you
remember that incident? Civitella, that was on the 29th of June. And do
you remember Buchini on the 7th and 9th of July; do you remember an
incident at Buchini?
KESSELRING: It is possible, but I would have to study the details first.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Perhaps you will remember this. I will put it to
you generally, Witness, because it is a perfectly general course of
conduct, and there were a number of these incidents in which the Hermann
Göring Division was engaged. Do you remember that?
KESSELRING: There were many incidents like that on both sides, and I
would first have to study the exact details of the question.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, this is what I really want you to apply
your mind to. Is it correct that the Hermann Göring Division was only
under General Herr and General Von Vietinghoff for tactical purposes,
and reported each day to Berlin to Reich Marshal Göring as to what they
were doing?
KESSELRING: The Hermann Göring Division was under the General Command
and the Army for tactical purposes, but I must assume that, in these
questions, subordination to the General Command and the Army actually
did exist. Whether there were any matters operating outside that, I do
not know.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I will put the words exactly, and you can see
where I have the words from the way I put them:
“The 1st Airborne Division and the Hermann Göring Division came
under the army commanders only as regards tactics; for all other
questions, on the other hand, directly under the Reich Marshal,
to whom they had to send daily reports. They were not permitted
to receive orders from the army commanders concerning criminal
proceedings, nor to report the results of such proceedings. Thus
they carried on the war against guerrillas according to
principles which to some extent deviated from those of the
Army.”
Is that a correct statement?
KESSELRING: That conception is correct, but the question is, perhaps,
that the word “tactics” can, of course, be understood in a somewhat
wider or narrower sense.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The word what?
KESSELRING: Tactics. That this tactical subordination can be understood
either in a wider or a narrower sense.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Witness, that is why I read the whole thing to
you, because it is quite clear what the person’s statement I am reading
means there, is it not? He says that they were not permitted to receive
orders from the army commanders on criminal proceedings or to report the
results, and that they carried on the war against guerrillas according
to principles which deviated from those of General Von Vietinghoff, did
they not?
KESSELRING: This is the first time that I have heard of this, but if
another officer has said so then I must assume it is correct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, are you sure it is the first time that you
have heard about it? It is very difficult to remember every incident.
Please, do not think that I want to be offensive, but I want you to try
to remember. Did not General Herr make numerous complaints to you about
this anomalous position with regard to the Hermann Göring Division, and
did you never give any official reply to General Herr’s reports?
KESSELRING: Numerous reports certainly did not arrive from General Herr.
There may have been verbal consultations . . .
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: In your command post?
KESSELRING: Yes. And may I add once more that such definitions of
attitude were definitely in existence within the army group. With regard
to the case concerned, I must say that I do not know whether this comes
under the heading “tactics” or belongs to another function.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I am not really putting the point to you
quite clearly. What I am suggesting is this: If you disagree with
“numerous,” will you accept “some,” that on some occasions General Herr
reported to you that he was in difficulties through this anomalous
position of the Hermann Göring Division?
KESSELRING: That I can assume.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Your Chief of Staff at this time was General
Roettiger, was he not?
KESSELRING: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: From the 10th of June onwards, just over this
time, did not General Roettiger also talk to you about the position of
the Hermann Göring Division being under the special protection of Reich
Marshal Göring in Berlin?
KESSELRING: Yes. We discussed that subject quite a lot.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, as far as the particular incident, in
which the Hermann Göring Division was involved, is concerned, they took
their orders from the Defendant Göring, who is sitting at the dock, did
they not, as to how they were to treat the partisans?
KESSELRING: I could not tell you that. Those channels bypassed me.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes; they bypassed you. They bypassed General
Herr, they bypassed Vietinghoff, they bypassed you, and went straight to
Berlin. That is right, is it not?
KESSELRING: Yes, certainly. That was the special channel for the SS and
for the Hermann Göring Division.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. You see, at the moment the Tribunal is
dealing with the case of the Defendant Göring. That is why I ask you
these questions.
Now, just one or two short points. You remember Dr. Laternser asking you
one or two questions about the High Command and the General Staff.
Do you remember Dr. Laternser asking you some questions?
KESSELRING: Yes, I am aware of that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I wanted just to clear one part out of the
way altogether. You must have realized, Witness, that the body that is
mentioned in this case has nothing to do with the Staff Corps of the
German Army. I think you made that clear yourself yesterday.
KESSELRING: With what did you say?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: With the staff corps. You had, both in the Army
and the Air Force, a corps of officers who had gone through the Military
Academy and were staff officers of all ranks, I suppose down to captain,
had you not?
KESSELRING: The question is not quite clear to me.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am sorry. You had in both the Army and the
Luftwaffe a staff corps of officers who had been to Military Academy and
were thereafter staff officers. And they had, I think, the right of
reporting directly to the Chief of Staff if they wanted to? Is that not
so? Is that right or wrong?
KESSELRING: That is not correct, except, as I said yesterday, as far as
education was concerned. As far as the general attitude was concerned,
the General Chief of Staff had the right to influence General Staff
officers directly; but the other way around, no.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, that corps went right down, I suppose, to
captain or lieutenant, did it not?
KESSELRING: No, captain.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I thought that was it. May I tell you, we are
not interested in that corps at all. The Prosecution are not interested
in that corps at all.
Now, with regard to the persons who are named in the Indictment, you
know there are nine commander-in-chief or staff positions named, and
then the Oberbefehlshaber, who commanded in certain areas or commanded
certain fleets of the Luftwaffe. You have looked at that, I suppose,
have you?
KESSELRING: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am trying to put it shortly, Witness, so that
we would not take time. I just want you to consider this. Are not these
people who are mentioned—that is, the heads of the OKW, OKH, OKM, OKL,
and their deputies and the Oberbefehlshaber—the officers in the German
Armed Forces who would have had most to do with the policy and planning
of wars?
KESSELRING: The commanders-in-chief of the branches of the Armed Forces
were of course the advisory organs of the Supreme Head of the State in
all military-political questions. The commanders-in-chief of Army Groups
had no influence whatever.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I would like you to take the case of two
examples. I think you were present at both of these. Before the attack
on Poland there was a meeting on the 22d of August, which has been
mentioned here before. Did that consist of these higher officers that I
mentioned, the heads of the various branches, and also of the
Oberbefehlshaber?
KESSELRING: It consisted of the commanding officers of the war in that
theater.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. Well, at that time the sector which was
going to be the subject of war was Poland. At that time the main purpose
was considering the Polish campaign, was it not? The main purpose of
that meeting, I suppose, was to consider the Polish campaign with the
possibility of a campaign against the Western Powers if they came in?
KESSELRING: About that I can give you no information. Generally speaking
we discussed only Polish questions . . .
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, the Tribunal has heard about that meeting
so often I am not going to ask about it. I am only getting from you the
people who were there.
Now, let me remind you of another meeting. On the 9th of June 1941 there
was a conference—Barbarossa—for the attack on the Soviet Union. Do you
remember that? Berchtesgaden.
KESSELRING: Whether it was on the 9th of June, I do not know. But I did
take part in one conference.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You were there, and again, before the Russian
campaign, the people who were there were the holders of these supreme
positions and the Oberbefehlshaber, were they not?
KESSELRING: That is correct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Including those that had territorial commands,
like, for example, General Von Falkenhorst, who was the Army High
Commander in Norway at that time? He was there?
KESSELRING: General Von Falkenhorst?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes.
KESSELRING: It is quite possible.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: General Stumpf of Air Fleet 5, and, if I may, I
do not know what the ranks were so I just give the names. Rundstedt,
Reichenau, Stülpnagel, Schubert, Kleist, and of course Bock, Kluge,
Guderian, Halder, Kesselring?
KESSELRING: The latter were certainly there. As for Stumpf and
Falkenhorst, I cannot say.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So that before a campaign it was customary for
the holders of these high positions to meet, was it not—to meet the
Führer?
KESSELRING: Certainly.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I just want you to help me on one other
small point. Do you remember saying yesterday to Dr. Laternser that the
members of this alleged group were far too concerned with high matters
of strategy to have anything to do with Fifth Columnists? Do you
remember saying that, words to that effect?
KESSELRING: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I do not know if you know, but outside Germany
the name Quisling has become an ordinary word of use as an alternative
to Fifth Columnist. Did you know that? You talk about a Quisling meaning
a Fifth Columnist. You have not heard that?
KESSELRING: No, I did not know that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You know who Quisling was?
KESSELRING: Yes, indeed I do.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I would just like you to listen to this,
because it concerns your service. The Defendant Rosenberg in January
1940 wrote to the Führer as follows:
“Assuming that his”—that is, Quisling—“statements would be of
special interest to the Marshal of the Reich, Göring, for
aero-strategical reasons, Quisling was referred to State
Secretary Körner by the Foreign Affairs Office.”
Did he come to you at all for aero-strategical reasons?
KESSELRING: No, that is unknown to me.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, did you know that the Defendant Raeder
introduced Quisling to Hitler in December 1939? Did you know that?
KESSELRING: No, that is unknown to me.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You agree that the head of the German Air Force
and the head of the German Navy are important members of this group of
commanders-in-chief, are they not?
KESSELRING: Supreme commanders, yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If they were dealing with the typical columnist,
perhaps members of the group had more to do with Fifth Columnists than
you knew.
KESSELRING: Yesterday I merely spoke from the point of view of the
supreme commanders on the front and our tasks were in a different
sphere.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I think I have finished, but perhaps
your Lordship would allow me just over the adjournment to see if there
is any small point.
My Lord, the other thing is this. I think we ought to put in these
documents to which I have referred, because the Defense may want to deal
with them later on.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, if they have not already been put in.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I think some of the orders have not been put in.
I have read part of them into the record, and I will put them in.
THE PRESIDENT: They must be put in and marked then.
[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Will you direct your attention to the text after
the bomb plot in Rome on 23 March 1944. Do you remember what I have in
mind—the bomb plot in Rome? Remember? At that time your Chief of Staff
was General Westphal, and he reported the plot directly to General
Buettler? Perhaps you will help me as to the pronunciation?
KESSELRING: Winter.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: General what?
KESSELRING: General Winter.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Didn’t he report to a General Buettler, spelled
B-u-e-t-t-l-e-r?
KESSELRING: Von Buttlar.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: General Von Buttlar?
KESSELRING: That was his predecessor.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: General Von Buttlar informed your Chief of Staff
that he would have to report the matter to the Führer, is that right?
KESSELRING: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And he got in touch with the Defendant Jodl, and
the Defendant Jodl and the Defendant Keitel reported the matter to the
Führer?
KESSELRING: That is probably correct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The Führer gave an order that either 20 or
10—you aren’t quite sure which, but you rather think 20—Italians
should be killed?
KESSELRING: I believe that that is a report from Westphal, which I must
assume is correct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Can you remember, Witness, whether it was 20 or
10 now?
KESSELRING: I assume 10, I do not know the exact number.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You do not know the exact number?
KESSELRING: I assume 10.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We will take it as 10 for the moment.
The competent authority for Rome was General Von Mackensen, was it not?
KESSELRING: General Mackensen was Commander-in-Chief of the 14th Army,
and the commander of Rome was subordinate to him.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And the person, to use your words, who advised
him on this matter was a man called Kappler, wasn’t he?
KESSELRING: Kappler, of the Security Service.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What was he? An Obergruppenführer or something
like that?
KESSELRING: Obersturmbannführer.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You remember, after some comments in the
_Osservatore Romano_ you had an inquiry directed into the incident by
your intelligence officer whose name was Zolling, don’t you?
KESSELRING: Yes, that is correct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you also got a report from Kappler himself,
did you not?
KESSELRING: Kappler merely had a brief report relayed to me by telephone
to the effect that he had a corresponding number of condemned men
available.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Didn’t Kappler tell you that he had executed 382
people?
KESSELRING: The execution lay in the hands of the 14th Army and I
finally received merely the news of its being carried out without any
further explanation, and had no direct conversation with Kappler.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Are you sure of that?
KESSELRING: At the end—I expressly emphasize this once more—I
conversed with him briefly by telephone, after I had arrived at my
command post and this report had been given me, as I said earlier.
Otherwise I can recall no further direct communication. I do remember
that perhaps 8 or 10 days later I met him and I told him that I was to a
certain extent grateful to him that this very distasteful matter had
been settled in a way which was legally and morally above reproach.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let us see what you had to be grateful for. You
were interrogated about this on the 8th of January. Do you remember
being asked this question? “Then Zolling didn’t tell you that all this
number that was executed had previously been convicted of some crime
punishable by death?” And you answered, “Yes, I said that already. Yes,
he did that. Even Kappler had told me that.”
KESSELRING: Yes, that is correct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So the explanation which you say was given to
you was that they took a number of people, 382 I suggest, who had been
guilty of other crimes and executed them as a reprisal for the bomb
plot, isn’t that right?
KESSELRING: That is correct, on the assumption that these people had
been sentenced to death.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: This has already been put to you. This is
Kappler’s account—that of the 382, 176 had committed acts punishable by
death; 22 were people whose cases were marked “closed”; 17 had been
sentenced to terms of labor; 4 had actually been condemned to death; 4
had been arrested near the scene of the crime. That made 223.
Didn’t Kappler say to you, “Later the number of victims rose to 325 and
I decided to add 57 Jews?” Didn’t Kappler give you these figures?
KESSELRING: No.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But you agree with this, that a large number of
persons were executed in consequence of the order to kill 10 Italians,
or maybe 20 Italians, for one German who had been killed?
KESSELRING: I admit that, on the assumption, as I have already stated,
that these were people who had already been convicted.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But it didn’t make any difference to you whether
they had been convicted for the bomb outrage or for any other offense?
KESSELRING: The situation was as follows: The Garigliano battle had
begun to rage on the Southern Front. At that time a bomb attack was made
on a police company by people of Rome, who had been treated with
unparalleled mildness until then. The excitement on the German side was
such that I, as well as the officers under my command, including Embassy
Counsellor Moellhausen, had to do anything we could to calm the
agitation. Therefore on the one side, and on the other, something had to
be done—something which seemed to me the most expedient measure for
preventing such incidents, namely a public humiliation, a notification
that nothing could be undertaken against the German Army without
consequences being faced. For me that was the essential point; whether X
or Y was involved in this outrage was for me a question of small
importance. This alone was of primary importance—that public opinion
should be quieted in the shortest possible time, on the Roman as well as
on the German side.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Your prior point was to take a third attitude,
or some people might say, “terrorize” the population, so that they would
not repeat or do anything against the German Army.
KESSELRING: I do not know—this expression comes from the Rotterdam
examination. As far as I know and believe I did not use this expression.
I have to repeat that I stood, if I may say so, on ideally friendly
terms with the Italians—for this very reason I was called to Italy—and
that I had the most compelling reason to win friendship and not to sow
enmity; and I intervened there, and certainly in a decisive way, only
because it was a matter of cutting off the root of this evil growth
within a short time.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I asked you various questions about your acts of
friendship to the Italians this morning and I am not going back to them.
I only want to ask you one other point about which perhaps you will be
able to relieve my mind. On the 2d of November 1943 were you the
commanding general in Italy, that is, after you became . . .
KESSELRING: May I add something to the first point?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You must come on to this point, and I want you
to tell whether you were the commanding general in Italy on the 2d of
November 1943? Were you?
KESSELRING: Since November, since 2 November 1943?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you remember sending a telegram to the OKW
that three British Commandos taken prisoner near Pescara were to be
given special treatment? That means murder, “special treatment”; it
means that they were killed by the SS.
KESSELRING: No. I beg your pardon . . .
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What do you mean by “special treatment”?
KESSELRING: That these people at Pescara, as I have already mentioned
once today, were not shot, but rather the wounded were taken to a
hospital and, as far as I recall, the unwounded to a prisoner-of-war
camp.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: There were nine others who were taken to a
hospital and three, according to your telegram got “special treatment”
and nine others were taken to hospitals. I was going to ask you about
those taken to hospitals. What did you do with people who came under the
Commando Order who were taken to hospitals?
KESSELRING: As I have already stated before, they were treated according
to the principles of the Hague Convention as generally practiced.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I am not going to argue with you whether
the Commando Order was in accordance with the Hague Convention. We know
what the Commando Order was, that people taking in Commandos were to be
shot. What I am asking you is, supposing some Commandos had the
misfortune to be wounded, what happened to them?
KESSELRING: According to the text of this order they would have to be
shot. I stated before that this order in this case—I assume with the
collaboration of General Jodl—was carried out in the normal fashion.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: There is heard evidence in this Court that in
Vilna it was the practice of the SS to kill offhand newborn Jewish
babies in hospitals. Can you give me your assurance that Commando troops
who were wounded and taken to hospitals were not killed offhand.
KESSELRING: I assure you that I was not informed of any execution of
this sort and would also not have tolerated it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is all.
THE PRESIDENT: Does the Prosecution wish any further cross-examination?
Then, Dr. Stahmer, do you wish to re-examine?
DR. STAHMER: The British Prosecution has just submitted new facts which
were not known until now, especially about the shooting of hostages,
which was carried out in Italy by the Hermann Göring Division in
connection with the combating of partisans and for which the Defendant
Göring apparently is to be made responsible. In this connection new
documents were submitted. At the moment I am not in the position to
answer these facts and these serious charges, and to put pertinent
questions to the witness.
After a careful examination of the material, I shall submit the
appropriate motions and I ask for the opportunity to make a statement as
to whether I need further witnesses and have to recall the witness
Kesselring.
I shall of course limit myself to submitting only absolutely necessary
requests for evidence within the framework of the accusations just made,
in order to prevent an unnecessary prolongation of the trial.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, the Tribunal thinks that you must re-examine
the witness now and that if you wish to make an application hereafter to
recall the witness you will have to show very strong grounds for doing
it. You may make written application to recall the witness at a later
stage, but I would point out to you that the cross-examination of this
witness has not been relevant solely to the case of the Defendant
Göring. He is a member of the General Staff and, as it was pointed out
to him at the opening of one part of the cross-examination, he is one of
the accused persons as such, and the evidence, therefore, may be
relevant to Göring, or it may have been relevant to the General Staff.
Is that clear to you?
DR. STAHMER: Yes, I quite follow; but I can naturally put questions to a
witness only if I am in possession of the facts. I am not in such a
position today because documents were referred to which are completely
unknown to me, and, as far as I know, the Prosecution has the intention
of making this material available to us.
THE PRESIDENT: Documents were put to the witness and, as I say, the
Tribunal will consider any application which you make hereafter to have
this witness recalled, but you may continue now with your re-examination
and finish with the witness.
DR. STAHMER: At present I have no further questions to address to the
witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Then the witness can retire.
[_The witness left the stand._]
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, this morning I have noted that the witness
has been called a defendant twice, once by a member of the Prosecution
and now in your statement. First of all, the witness has appeared here
as a witness, and moreover not the individual member of the group but
rather the group itself is indicted, so that it cannot be correct to
call the witness a defendant.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, possibly it was inaccurate to call him an
accused person, but he is a member of the General Staff. I rather think
that Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe made it clear that he meant only a member of
the group which the Indictment asked the Tribunal to declare criminal.
That is all that is meant, and I was only pointing out to Dr. Stahmer
that the questions which have been asked were not necessarily relevant
to the Defendant Göring, but might be relevant and relevant alone to the
case of the General Staff.