Thälmann and Göring?
KÖRNER: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What did he complain about then in the
concentration camp?
KÖRNER: About treatment during interrogations.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That was the only complaint he made?
KÖRNER: Yes, as far as I can remember. The Reich Marshal asked him
whether he had good food and whether he was properly treated. All these
things were discussed.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And Thälmann found no fault with the concentration
camp except treatment during interrogation?
KÖRNER: Yes; as far as I remember that was his chief complaint.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Were the Communists regarded by the Nazis as
enemies of the country?
KÖRNER: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And concentration camps, then, were built to
receive Communists among others, were they not?
KÖRNER: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And Jews?
KÖRNER: Yes, as far as they were known to be enemies of the State.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Were Jews also regarded as enemies of the State?
KÖRNER: Generally not; only when they had been recognized as such.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Recognized as such—what, as Jews?
KÖRNER: No, if a Jew was recognized as an enemy of the State, he was
treated as an enemy of the State.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What was the test as to whether he was an enemy of
the State?
KÖRNER: Well, his attitude, his active participation in actions hostile
to the State.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Such as what? What actions?
KÖRNER: I cannot give any details. I was not Chief of the Gestapo, and
therefore I do not know any details.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Were you not with Göring as his secretary during
the time he was Chief of the Gestapo?
KÖRNER: In April 1933 I became State Secretary in the Prussian State
Ministry.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And did you not have to do with concentration camps
under the secret police as such?
KÖRNER: No, I had nothing to do with that.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Who handled that for Göring?
KÖRNER: The then Ministerialdirektor Diels.
MR; JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you know that, in setting up the Secret State
Police, Göring used SS men to man the Gestapo?
KÖRNER: I cannot remember that any more.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You were a member of the SS, were you not?
KÖRNER: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What was your office in the SS?
KÖRNER: I never held any office in the SS, neither was I in charge of an
SS formation. I was just a member of the SS.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Were you not Obergruppenführer?
KÖRNER: Yes, I was an SS-Obergruppenführer.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, as to these unauthorized concentration camps,
you were asked who set them up, and I do not think you answered. Will
you tell us about who set up these concentration camps?
KÖRNER: I remember two camps. In the case of one, I know for certain it
was Gruppenführer Heines, in Breslau.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Gruppenführer of what?
KÖRNER: SA-Gruppenführer Heines, in Breslau.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Who was the other?
KÖRNER: I cannot say exactly. I believe it was Karpfenstein, but I am
not sure of it.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Who was he?
KÖRNER: Karpfenstein was Gauleiter in Stettin.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the Gauleiter was a Party official?
KÖRNER: Yes, he was a Party official.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the concentration camps were designed to take
care of not only enemies of the State but enemies of the Party, were
they not?
KÖRNER: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The Prime Minister of Prussia was the Chief of the
Secret State Police?
KÖRNER: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And in his absence the State Secretary of the State
Ministry was to act as Chief of the Secret State Police?
KÖRNER: No, that was Diels.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Was that not the law, whatever was done about it?
Did you not know that that was the law under which the Secret State
Police was set up, Section 1, Paragraph 2?
KÖRNER: I cannot remember that law any more. I no longer know the
details.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Do you know the law of 30 November 1933? You do not
know the law under which you were operating?
KÖRNER: I do not remember that law now. I would have to see it again.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, what was wrong with these concentration camps
that they had to be closed down?
KÖRNER: These unauthorized concentration camps had been established
without permission of the then Prussian Prime Minister and for that
reason he prohibited them immediately.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is the only reason, that they were set up
without this authority?
KÖRNER: I believe so; yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And he had them stopped immediately?
KÖRNER: Stopped; yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Göring did not tolerate concentration camps that
were not under his control and the Führer backed him up in it, is that
right?
KÖRNER: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, from time to time complaints came to you about
the treatment of people in concentration camps, during all the time you
were with Göring, did they not?
KÖRNER: Yes, there were frequent complaints.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What did they complain of?
KÖRNER: Various things.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Tell the Tribunal what the complaints were with
which you had to deal.
KÖRNER: Well, mostly from relatives of the people taken to concentration
camps whose release was applied for; or complaints that these people had
been taken to a concentration camp without reason.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is, that they were innocent people, innocent
of any offense?
KÖRNER: The relatives asserted this.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you do anything to get them released from
concentration camps?
KÖRNER: The Reich Marshal had ordered that all complaints were to be
replied to. Every case was followed up at once.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And did you find that many of these people were
innocent, or did you find that they were guilty?
KÖRNER: If anybody was found to have been wrongly taken to a
concentration camp he was released immediately.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And to whom was the communication given, that he
had been found innocent and was to be released from the concentration
camp?
KÖRNER: It was given to the Secret State Police.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: To whom at the Secret State Police? Who was the man
you communicated with?
KÖRNER: I cannot name the individual who dealt with these matters. The
chief, as far as I remember, was first Heydrich and then Kaltenbrunner
or Müller.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Göring was on good terms with all of those, was he
not?
KÖRNER: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well acquainted with all of those men?
KÖRNER: Of course.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, when you say that Göring obtained the release
of people from concentration camps, are you talking about just one or
two cases or did he obtain the release of a good many people?
KÖRNER: In the course of the years, there were naturally several cases.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What do you mean by “several”?
KÖRNER: Well, I cannot give the number now, but there were quite a lot
of releases.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you find any where the people were guilty when
you investigated?
KÖRNER: If they could not be released, then they were guilty somehow.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Who decided that?
KÖRNER: That, as far as I know, was decided by the chief men of the
Secret State Police.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, then, what did you do in requesting their
release? Did you advise the Secret State Police that you disagreed with
their conclusion that the man was guilty, or did Göring simply order the
man to be released or request his release?
KÖRNER: No, they were told the exact reason why the man should be
released.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Do you know of any instance in which Göring
requested the release of a person from a concentration camp, where it
was not granted?
KÖRNER: I cannot say that now. I have to think it over.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You cannot recall any today, can you, in which
Göring’s word requesting a release was not honored?
KÖRNER: At the moment I cannot remember any particular case.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: How many people were put in concentration camps as
a result of the Röhm revolt?
KÖRNER: That I cannot say either.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: How many people were killed as a result of it?
KÖRNER: I cannot say from memory. As far as I know, the figures were
published at the time.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, would it be a couple of hundred people that
were killed for it?
KÖRNER: I should not like to tie myself to a figure, because I may be
wrong.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, it was a very large number of people was it
not?
KÖRNER: No, I am sure it was not a very large number.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Give a figure.
KÖRNER: The number was published at the time. This could still be
checked.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, why did the Reich Marshal want Hitler to stop
punishing the people who had been a party to the Röhm revolt?
KÖRNER: I did not quite understand the question.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I understood your testimony to be that the Reich
Marshal went to Hitler at some time and wanted this campaign against
people who were in the Röhm revolt to be stopped. And I want to know why
he wanted it stopped?
KÖRNER: In order to prevent innocent people being involved. Only the
really guilty were to be caught and punished accordingly. It was clear
that someone or other might seize this opportunity to take personal
revenge and do away with his enemy, and in order to prevent this the
action should be stopped immediately and only ordinary courts should
deal with the matter.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Who was in charge of the selection of the people
who were shot or otherwise killed as a result of the Röhm revolt?
KÖRNER: The Führer himself.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the Reich Marshal had sufficient influence to
stop that immediately when he complained?
KÖRNER: At that time, yes, the Reich Marshal definitely had sufficient
influence.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In connection with this Four Year Plan you said
that it was its function to regulate the confusion in the labor market?
KÖRNER: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, you represented the Reich Marshal at many
meetings, did you not?
KÖRNER: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And was not one of your functions to get prisoners
of war to work in the armament industry and other industries that needed
labor?
KÖRNER: No.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You never had anything to do with that?
KÖRNER: No. The Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor of
course applied for prisoners of war for labor.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You attended many meetings when that was discussed,
did you not?
KÖRNER: I cannot recall that.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you report to the Reich Marshal what happened
at those meetings?
KÖRNER: When questions of a general nature were discussed, a report was
made and submitted to the Reich Marshal.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You were a member of the Central Planning Board,
were you not?
KÖRNER: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you were representing the Reich Marshal on that
Board?
KÖRNER: No. I did not represent the Reich Marshal there. It was a board
of three men—Minister Speer, Field Marshal Milch and myself. The
Central Planning Board was set up in the spring of 1942.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Who appointed you?
KÖRNER: The three of us were appointed to the Central Planning Board.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Who appointed you?
KÖRNER: As far as I remember, Göring.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you reported to him, did you not, what occurred
from time to time?
KÖRNER: The Central Planning Board was merely an office for the
distribution of raw materials. We usually met every 3 months in order to
fix the quotas for the following quarter. Previously the office of the
Four Year Plan, in co-operation with the Minister of Economics, handled
the distribution and, from the spring of 1942 on, the Central Planning
Board handled it in the interests of armament.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, do you want us to understand that the Central
Planning Board only met every 3 months?
KÖRNER: Yes, approximately. In very rare cases another meeting was
called, especially if there were urgent problems to be solved. I
remember, for instance, the case when it was said that agriculture was
not getting enough nitrogen and that if the nitrogen quota were too
small, agricultural production would suffer. In view of this State
Secretary Backe asked for a meeting to be called and this took place at
the Central Planning Board office.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Would you testify that Sauckel did not report to
the Central Planning Board, at a meeting at which you were present, that
out of all the labor that came to Germany only 200,000 came
voluntarily—out of the millions who came only 200,000 came voluntarily?
KÖRNER: I cannot remember that.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Do you say that the Central Planning Board never
discussed labor questions?
KÖRNER: At the Central Planning Board only demands for labor were
submitted, and the quota holders to whom raw materials were allocated
also demanded the necessary labor. Only very rough figures were given
and then passed on to the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of
Labor.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What about prisoners of war?
KÖRNER: With these the Central Planning Board was not at all concerned,
as it was given only rough figures. For instance, if some branch of
industry needed so many thousand workers, they were asked for.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What about concentration camp labor?
KÖRNER: The distribution of labor was dealt with by the labor exchanges.
The Central Planning Board had nothing to do with it.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Are you familiar with a letter dated 9 March 1944,
reciting that 36,000 concentration camp prisoners were now being used
and wanting an increase to 90,000?
KÖRNER: I do not know about these demands.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Do you know about the use of Russian prisoners of
war in manning anti-aircraft guns?
KÖRNER: No.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: After Göring closed the unauthorized concentration
camps, did you know that the number of concentration camps increased
very greatly in Germany?
KÖRNER: This I do not know. What happened after they were turned over to
Himmler is beyond my knowledge. It may be that a large number of
concentration camps was then set up.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: How do you come to know about Göring’s relations
with Himmler? Did he tell you?
KÖRNER: Göring once spoke about it, and I concluded that the relations
were not at all good.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Do you know about the appointment of Kaltenbrunner
as head of the Austrian State Police after the Anschluss?
KÖRNER: No.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Do you know who obtained that appointment for
Kaltenbrunner?
KÖRNER: No, I have no idea.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, you say that Göring and you were in Munich on
the night or nights of the anti-Jewish riots in Germany?
KÖRNER: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Was Goebbels also there?
KÖRNER: No.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Go ahead; do you want to say something else?
KÖRNER: On 9 November we traveled from Munich to Berlin, so Goebbels
could not be there then.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Why could he not be there?
KÖRNER: Because the Reich Marshal, with his entourage, traveled in his
train to Berlin.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I mean, did you know that Goebbels was in Munich
before these uprisings?
KÖRNER: Yes, that I heard afterwards—that Goebbels was in Munich. All
National Socialist leaders were in Munich because 9 November was a day
when all of them met.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And Goebbels spoke in Munich on the Jewish question
that night, did he not?
KÖRNER: That I do not know. I do not remember the speech.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Göring was there to attend the meeting of the
National Socialist leaders, was he not?
KÖRNER: Yes, on 9 November the entire leadership of the National
Socialist Party met in Munich. It was an anniversary meeting.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And Göring attended regularly?
KÖRNER: Of course he did.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you did?
KÖRNER: I did also.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, Hess attended?
KÖRNER: As I said, all National Socialist leaders always attended if
they possibly could. Nobody ever failed to attend unless he were ill, or
prevented by official duties.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Which of the defendants in the dock attended those
meetings? Ribbentrop, of course?
KÖRNER: Ribbentrop, certainly.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Keitel?
KÖRNER: I assume so.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Kaltenbrunner?
KÖRNER: I never saw Kaltenbrunner, because Kaltenbrunner held a public
post only during the latter years, and during these years the meetings
were not as regular as before.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Rosenberg, of course, was there?
KÖRNER: Of course, as I said before.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And Frank and Frick?
KÖRNER: Certainly.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And Streicher?
KÖRNER: Not during the latter years, I do not think so; but previously
he attended.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: When was that, during the latter years?
KÖRNER: As far as I know, Streicher did not attend during the latter
years, but I do not know for certain.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: He attended in November 1938 when the anti-Jewish
uprisings took place, did he not?
KÖRNER: I believe so, because at that time Streicher was still in
Nuremberg.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: He was very active, was he not?
KÖRNER: I did not understand the question quite correctly.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: He was very active in the anti-Jewish matters, was
he not?
KÖRNER: Yes; this is generally known.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And did he see Funk at those meetings?
KÖRNER: I believe that Funk frequently attended these meetings.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What was the subject considered at this meeting of
9 November, the night of the anti-Jewish uprising?
KÖRNER: I do not know of any discussions as there was always a fixed
program on that day, and I did not know about anything else, nor can the
Reich Marshal have known.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Who was the adjutant who informed him on his
arrival the next morning that something had happened during the night?
KÖRNER: This I cannot say exactly as the adjutants were always changing.
I only know that an adjutant came and reported.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What did he say that happened?
KÖRNER: He reported that during the night anti-Jewish riots had taken
place and were still going on; that shop windows had been smashed, goods
thrown into the streets. Göring was infuriated about this.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What was he infuriated about?
KÖRNER: About the riots.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You mean that he was taking the part of the Jews?
KÖRNER: About the entire action.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You mean that he was taking the part of the Jews?
KÖRNER: Göring always showed a different attitude to the Jewish
question.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You just tell us what it was. You may go into all
details. Tell us what his attitude was.
KÖRNER: He always showed a moderate attitude towards the Jews.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Such as fining them a billion Reichsmark right
after the fire, right after these outrages? You know that he did that,
do you not?
KÖRNER: Yes. The Führer demanded it.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You know that the Führer is dead, do you not? Do
you know that for a fact?
KÖRNER: Yes, I know he is dead.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is generally understood, is it not, among all
of you, that the Führer is dead?
KÖRNER: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: So the Führer ordered the Reich Marshal to levy a
fine of a billion Reichsmark? Who ordered the confiscation of the
insurance of the Jews a few days after this assault?
KÖRNER: That I do not know. I can no longer remember the details.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Do you not remember that that was Göring’s order?
KÖRNER: I cannot recall it now.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Why did Göring go to Hitler to get this stopped?
Why did he not go to the head of the police, which is supposed to
prevent crime?
KÖRNER: Naturally he went to the highest chief so that an authoritative
order could be given for these riots to cease immediately.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did he have any idea who had started them?
KÖRNER: It had gone round that Goebbels had instigated these riots.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did he know that the Gestapo and SS also
participated?
KÖRNER: I do not know. As far as I know the SS did not participate.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did the Gestapo?
KÖRNER: No, I do not know that either.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: So he went to Hitler to complain about Goebbels
instigating these riots, is that the fact?
KÖRNER: Yes, that is correct.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: So that he knew the next morning that these riots
against the Jews had been instigated by members of the Government?
KÖRNER: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You were interrogated at Obersalzberg, the
interrogation center, on the 4th of October of last year by Dr. Kempner
of our staff, were you not?
KÖRNER: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you stated in the beginning of your
interrogation that you would not give any testimony against your former
superior, Reich Marshal Göring, and that you regarded Göring as the last
big man of the Renaissance; the last great example of a man from the
Renaissance period; that he had given you the biggest job of your life
and it would be unfaithful and disloyal to give any testimony against
him; is that what you said?
KÖRNER: Yes, that is more or less what I said.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And that is still your answer?
KÖRNER: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: No further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any other members of the Prosecution wish to examine
this witness?
GEN. RUDENKO: Perhaps you can remember, Witness, the conference of the
heads of the German authorities in the occupied territories which took
place on 6 August 1942 under the chairmanship of Defendant Göring.
KÖRNER: I cannot remember straight off what conference that could have
been.
GEN. RUDENKO: Perhaps you can recall that after this conference of 6
August you circulated the minutes to all the ministers. The appendix to
these minutes showed how much foodstuff and other raw materials should
be supplied to Germany by the occupied territories?
KÖRNER: I cannot remember offhand.
GEN. RUDENKO: I shall put before you a document signed by you yourself
which gives proof of this meeting.
KÖRNER: Yes, I have read it.
GEN. RUDENKO: You remember that you circulated this document, do you
not?
KÖRNER: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: The document shows that certain figures were fixed as to
how much foodstuff should be sent to Germany: 1,200,000 tons from
France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Norway. From Russia, 3,000,000
tons of grain were to be sent to Germany, _et cetera_. Do you not
consider such deliveries to be a spoliation of the occupied territories?
KÖRNER: It was a matter of course that the occupied territories had to
make every effort in contributing to the food supply. Quotas were
imposed on the occupied territories which they could meet or, if they
were not in a position to do so, they could subsequently ask for
modifications.
GEN. RUDENKO: You said something about “squeezing out,” I think?
KÖRNER: No, I never talked of squeezing out. I said it was a matter of
course that the occupied territories had to contribute to the food
supply with all the means at their disposal.
GEN. RUDENKO: That the occupied territories had to contribute?
KÖRNER: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: Had these occupied territories asked Germany to come and
rule over them?
KÖRNER: I did not quite understand that question.
GEN. RUDENKO: I do not suppose you did. I now want to ask you another
question in connection with this. You did not see that this was plunder,
but do you not recall that Göring himself . . .
KÖRNER: No, this could not have been plunder.
GEN. RUDENKO: Göring himself at the same meeting said in his address
that he intended to plunder the occupied territories systematically; you
do not remember his expression “systematically plunder”?
KÖRNER: No, I do not know this expression.
GEN. RUDENKO: No, you do not remember. Perhaps you can recall that at
the same meeting, when addressing the leaders of the occupied
territories, he said to them, “You are sent there not to work for the
welfare of the people you are in charge of, but you are sent there in
order to squeeze out of that country everything possible.” Do you
remember these words of the Defendant Göring?
KÖRNER: No, I cannot remember these words.
GEN. RUDENKO: You cannot remember?
KÖRNER: No.
GEN. RUDENKO: And you do not recall a lengthy correspondence between
Göring and Rosenberg in which Rosenberg insisted that all functions
relative to the economic exploitation of the occupied territories of the
Soviet Union should be taken away from the military economic offices and
transferred to the ministry headed by Rosenberg?
KÖRNER: No, I do not recall this letter.
GEN. RUDENKO: You do not know. And in connection with this you do not
remember that this correspondence did not lead to a final settlement of
the question?
KÖRNER: I do not know anything about this correspondence.
GEN. RUDENKO: You do not know anything, do you? In 1944 do you not
recall that . . .
DR. STAHMER: I should like to point out that the interpretation is very
incomplete and hard to understand. We ourselves do not fully understand
the questions either.
GEN. RUDENKO: I suggest it is not my fault if the witness does not get
all my questions.
[_Turning to the witness._] Do you not recall that in 1944, after the
Red Army had driven the German troops from the Ukraine, Göring, wishing
to shelve the question of the economic exploitation of the Ukraine,
wrote to Rosenberg that it should be postponed until a more opportune
time, and Göring mentioned a second seizure of the Ukraine and other
Soviet territories?
KÖRNER: Is this supposed to have happened in 1944?
GEN. RUDENKO: In 1944.
KÖRNER: No, I cannot remember it.
GEN. RUDENKO: I shall not argue about it.
[_Turning to the President._] Evidently, Mr. President, you wish to
adjourn now. I have a few more questions, but I assume it will be
convenient to resume after the adjournment.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn at 4:30 today.
GEN. RUDENKO: Witness, I intend to hand you a document which is a letter
addressed to you by the Permanent Delegate of the Reich Minister for the
Occupied Eastern Territories. This is Document Number USSR-174. I want
you to read it and say whether you have ever seen this letter before.
You will see that this document begins with the words, “Honorable
Secretary of State and dear Party Comrade Körner.”
This letter deals with the unification of economic leadership.
KÖRNER: I have taken note of this document. I definitely received it.
GEN. RUDENKO: You have received it; that is quite obvious. As is quite
clear from this communication, the question is that of holding a special
meeting under your leadership.
KÖRNER: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: Therefore I may conclude that you were a very close
collaborator of the Defendant Göring in the matter of the so-called
unification of economic leadership?
KÖRNER: Yes, for the conference mentioned.
GEN. RUDENKO: One last question. Do you confirm that the Defendant
Göring as Delegate for the Four Year Plan, was at the head of both the
civilian and the military German organizations dealing with the economic
exploitation of all the occupied territories, and that you were his
closest collaborator where these economic measures were concerned?
KÖRNER: The conference mentioned in this document never took place. The
unification of economic leadership was a problem which arose, but which
never really became a fact. Therefore the conference mentioned was
superfluous.
GEN. RUDENKO: The problem was not solved, because of circumstances over
which you had no control. It depended on the advance of the Red and
Allied Armies. Am I right?
KÖRNER: I did not understand the question clearly enough to answer it.
GEN. RUDENKO: You say that the question was not solved. I ask you, is it
not a fact that the problem was not solved because of circumstances
which did not depend on yourselves? You were prevented by the Red and
Allied Armies?
KÖRNER: I believe that at the time this letter was sent no such
influence could have been felt. The question of the comprehensive
organization of economic matters in occupied territories did not, as a
fact, materialize because it was opposed by other circumstances.
GEN. RUDENKO: I do not mean to discuss these causes with you at the
present moment, but you have not yet answered my last question. I asked:
Do you confirm that Göring, as Delegate for the Four Year Plan, was at
the head of both the civilian and the military German organizations
dealing with the economic exploitation of all the occupied territories,
and that you were his closest collaborator?
KÖRNER: As far as the exploitation of occupied countries is concerned,
it cannot be dealt with in this manner. The Four Year Plan had the
possibility of exerting influence in economic questions in the occupied
countries, but it was done only if it was absolutely necessary. In
general it did not concern itself with such problems. The authorities
who took care of economic matters in the occupied countries were the
military commanders or the heads of the civil administration. In the
East was the Economic Staff East and Rosenberg’s Ministry. Only if there
was a matter between the military and the economic authorities or
between German departments, where there was a dispute or a disagreement,
could the Four Year Plan be drawn in. The Reich Marshal in those cases
could make special decisions, but that was in very, very few cases as,
for instance, in the case of this conference mentioned today, concerning
the occupied countries having to help supply foodstuffs for Europe. We
had the right, since in the occupied territories not only in the East
but also in the West, we carried out many new developments in the sphere
of agriculture. In the West I can point out . . .
GEN. RUDENKO: What right are you discussing?
KÖRNER: I speak of the right which Germany had to share in the
agricultural production of these countries, because we introduced many
new developments there. I would like to point out that in the East, the
regions which had been completely devastated, which had no seed, no
machines, and with greatest difficulty . . .
GEN. RUDENKO: Who gave that right to the Germans?
KÖRNER: The right? It is only natural that once we have occupied a
country and built it up, we are entitled to share in the surplus. We had
to take care of the whole of Europe and we knew what anxieties and
problems we encountered in the occupied countries.
GEN. RUDENKO: I asked you, where did the Germans get the right?
KÖRNER: I am no jurist. Therefore I cannot answer the question.
GEN. RUDENKO: But you were talking about German rights.
KÖRNER: I am speaking only of the natural right that if we built up a
country we should share in the results of that work of development.
GEN. RUDENKO: After you had devastated these areas?
KÖRNER: Germany did not devastate these areas, especially not in any
agricultural respect. We, in fact, instituted great developments. I
remember, in the West, that some parts of France were completely
devastated and our organizations performed reconstruction work there.
Thus we rebuilt the uncultivated land which we found in France, through
a German organization which had reconstructed whole areas in Reich
territory, and repatriated French people there, giving them the
possibility of working again as peasants and sharing in the agricultural
production of the country. In the East we found territories whose
agriculture had been greatly damaged through the war. All the machines
had disappeared. All the tractors had been taken away by the Russians,
and all agricultural implements had been taken away or destroyed. There
we had to start in the most elementary and primitive way to build up
agriculture again.
That it was possible for us in the years of our occupation in the East
to restore agriculture, German initiative and German machinery alone are
to be thanked.
GEN. RUDENKO: Did German initiative also include, together with the
restoration of agricultural measures and developments, a vast net of
concentration camps which you established in the occupied countries? Was
that also included in the extent of the German initiative?
KÖRNER: I had nothing to do with that problem, and can say nothing about
it.
GEN. RUDENKO: But I am asking you this question . . .
KÖRNER: And therefore I do not understand what you mean.
GEN. RUDENKO: You are not sufficiently informed on the question of
concentration camps, but it would appear that you are quite well
informed, or appear to be informed, on restoration work in the
agricultural field?
KÖRNER: Naturally, I know a great deal about the rehabilitation of
agricultural areas.
GEN. RUDENKO: But you know nothing about concentration camps?
KÖRNER: I was not concerned with these matters.
GEN. RUDENKO: You knew nothing about the fact that millions were being
annihilated by the German occupational authorities?
KÖRNER: No, I knew nothing about it.
GEN. RUDENKO: You really knew nothing about it?
KÖRNER: I have only just found out about it.
GEN. RUDENKO: Only now?
KÖRNER: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: I have no further question to ask.
HERR GEORG BOEHM (Counsel for SA): Witness, do you know that Heines was
Chief of Police at Breslau?
THE PRESIDENT: I asked defendants’ counsel at the end of the examination
by Dr. Stahmer whether they wished to ask any questions, and they said
they did not wish to ask any questions. Therefore it is not your turn
now to ask any questions.
HERR BOEHM: Mr. President. In the interrogation by Mr. Justice Jackson a
point arose which I did not know of before and which calls for comment.
It concerns the Chief of Police, Heines. May I be allowed to put two or
three questions to the witness so that the point in question may be
clarified?
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. We hope you will not take too long.
HERR BOEHM: I will try to be brief, Mr. President. Thank you.
[_Turning to the witness._] Witness, do you know that Heines was Chief
of Police at Breslau?
KÖRNER: Yes.
HERR BOEHM: Further, do you know that in that capacity he was in charge
of the prisons in Breslau?
KÖRNER: Of course, the Police Chief is in charge of prisons.
HERR BOEHM: Do you know whether at the time in question when this camp
was set up, the police prisons of Breslau were overcrowded?
KÖRNER: That I do not know. I mentioned the case of Heines only as one
of the camps which at that time were set up without the permission of
the Prime Minister or the Minister of the Interior.
HERR BOEHM: Then you also know that Heines could establish this camp
merely in his capacity as Chief of Police?
KÖRNER: Yes, that may be.
HERR BOEHM: Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, have you any questions to ask?
DR. STAHMER: I have no further questions to put to the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness may retire.
DR. STAHMER: With the permission of the Tribunal I call as next witness,
Field Marshal Kesselring.
[_The witness Kesselring took the stand._]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you tell me your name?
ALBERT KESSELRING (Witness): Albert Kesselring.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me:
I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure
truth—and will withhold and add nothing.
[_The witness repeated the oath in German._]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit if you wish.
DR. STAHMER: Witness, since when have you served with the Luftwaffe?
KESSELRING: Since 1 October 1933.
DR. STAHMER: What rank did you hold on your transfer to the Luftwaffe?
KESSELRING: Up to that time I was a colonel and officer commanding
artillery in Dresden. Then I was retired as air commodore.
DR. STAHMER: You helped to build up the Luftwaffe?
KESSELRING: During the first 3 years I was Chief of the Administrative
Office, subsequently Chief of the General Staff, and I then served in
the Gruppenkommando.
DR. STAHMER: Was the Luftwaffe being built up for defensive or
aggressive purposes?
KESSELRING: The German Luftwaffe was purely a weapon of defense. I must,
however, add the comment that the single plane as well as the whole of
an air force by its very nature is an aggressive weapon. Even in land
fighting, mere defense unaccompanied by offensive movements is
considered not to lead to any appreciable results or successes. This
applies to a still greater degree to air warfare. The air force covers a
wider range, both for defense and attack. This had been realized by the
Reich Marshal and his generals.
It is obvious that when an air force is being built up, only light
machines are produced, or are the first types to reach the units. Thus,
up to 1936-37 we had only light craft, fighters, Stukas, reconnaissance
planes, and a few “old sledges” as we called them, such as Ju 52, Do 11
and D 13—all obsolete bomber types.
One may hold the view that defense can be successfully conducted with
these light craft. On the other hand, I should like to point to the end
of the World War, when the German defensive air force was smashed by the
offensive air force of the enemy.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, the Tribunal thinks the witness is dealing
with this matter in far too great detail.
KESSELRING: I will go on. Up to 1937-38 there was no offensive air
force, especially no bombers, and the bombers which were built later had
neither the range nor the load capacity necessary for an offensive
weapon. There were no four-engine bombers.
DR. STAHMER: Did you play any part in the attack on Warsaw?
KESSELRING: As Chief of Air Fleet 1, I led this attack.
DR. STAHMER: Did the military situation at the time justify this attack,
and how was it carried out?
KESSELRING: Several attacks were made on Warsaw. In the German view,
Warsaw was a fortress, and, moreover, it had strong air defenses. Thus
the stipulations of the Hague Convention for land warfare, which can
analogously be applied to air warfare, were fulfilled.
As to the first phase of the attack on Warsaw, according to the
operational principle governing the employment of the Luftwaffe, the
enemy air force and the aircraft factories in the immediate vicinity of
the airfields were to be attacked. These attacks were in my opinion
fully justified and they comply with the rules.
The second phase concerns the combating of the operational movements of
the Poles. I may add that Warsaw is a junction for northern and central
Poland. When our long-range reconnaissance reported—this was confirmed
by the final phase—that the railway stations were crammed with material
and that reinforcements in increasing numbers were moving on Warsaw, the
air attack on these movements was ordered and carried out.
It was mainly directed against railway stations and sidings and the
Vistula bridges. For the execution of these attacks I detailed Stukas
and ground “strafer” aircraft, because the precision of these machines
afforded the guarantee that mainly the military targets would be hit.
The third phase was the shelling of Warsaw. I consider the shelling to
be an army action in which, at the request of the army, small units of
the Luftwaffe were employed against military targets. I myself was over
Warsaw, and after practically every air attack I consulted the army
commanders about the execution. From my own experiences and reports I
can assert that everything that was humanly possible was done to hit
military targets only and to spare civilian targets.
DR. STAHMER: Can you confirm conclusively that these attacks were kept
throughout within the limits of military necessity?
KESSELRING: Absolutely.
DR. STAHMER: Did you play any part in the attack on Rotterdam?
KESSELRING: As Air Force Chief 2, to which rank I had been promoted, I
led air attacks on Holland, Belgium, and France, and the airborne corps
operated under my command also. The airborne corps was commanded by
General Student, who asked for his paratroops to be supported by a
bomber attack. General Student had such a comprehensive knowledge of the
ground situation that he alone must be considered responsible for
preparation and execution of the attack. The Fourth Air Corps was
ordered to provide air support, and one group, the smallest unit
necessary for this purpose, was employed. The attack was carried out
solely in accordance with the tactical requirements and technical
possibilities. The orders of General Student reached my command very
early. Thus all preparations could be made leisurely according to plan.
At the instance of the Reich Marshal the unit was informed of possible
changes within Rotterdam and of the approach of Panzer divisions. The
objective set by General Student was quite clear as to extent, central
and key points, and occupation. It was not difficult for seasoned troops
to grasp the objective. There was radio communication between General
Student’s command, my staff, and other staffs, including the
Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe. Any interruption of this
communication could only have been a very short one as radio orders were
transmitted by me or the Reich Marshal. The technique at that time made
it possible to maintain contact through this radio communication between
the tactical ground station and the flying unit, via its ground station.
The ground communications usual at that time such as flags, flares, and
signal code designations at the front were maintained according to plan.
They functioned without a hitch. In accordance with its training and its
orders the formation had sent out a reconnaissance aircraft which kept
them informed of the situation and the objective. In addition, by order
of the Reich Marshal, there followed a General Staff officer attached to
my air fleet who had the same mission.
DR. STAHMER: Had the order been given that the situation and the
objective should be . . .
KESSELRING: I myself never had any doubt that the attack had to be
carried out; I was only not quite sure whether or not it should be
repeated. And this was the question to which the signals referred.
Judging from my knowledge of General Student and—I stress this
particularly—his technique in leading an attack and his clearly stated
requirements, I had to expect the attack to be carried out.
The attack was carried out according to plan and time schedule. The
report that the target had been accurately bombed came through very
quickly together with the message that no further attacks were
necessary. During the 3 days of fighting in Holland the
Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe was kept well informed. Particularly
on the third day, that is, the day I am talking of, the Reich Marshal in
his outspoken manner intervened more than usual in the direction of the
air fleet and did, in my opinion, everything that could possibly be done
from such a high position. I do not remember any message to the effect
that the bomber attack was no longer warranted by the tactical
situation.
DR. STAHMER: Bombs are said to have been dropped when negotiations about
capitulation had already started.
KESSELRING: As I said, no message to this effect had been received by
the command, neither had the formation operating over Rotterdam picked
up a message from the ground. Probably some confusion occurred at the
command in Rotterdam itself of which I know nothing. Neither do I know
about the agreements reached between General Student and the officer
commanding the Dutch troops in Rotterdam. I wanted later to have a talk
with General Student on this question, but it was not possible because
of his having received a serious head injury. If, contrary to my firm
conviction, the attack had been no longer warranted by the situation,
this would be most regrettable. As a soldier of 42 years’ standing, as
an artillery man, as an airman, as a General Staff officer, and as a
leader for many years, I wish to make it clear that this case was one of
those unforeseeable coincidences of war which, I am sorry to say, occur
in the armed services of all countries more frequently than one might
think; only the world does not know.
DR. STAHMER: How do you explain the big fires that still broke out in
Rotterdam?
KESSELRING: When I received the report from the formation I was very
pleasantly surprised to learn that the effect of the bombing was
confined to the target area, but this war has shown that most of the
destruction is not caused by the bombs themselves, but by the spreading
of fires. Unfortunately a bomb had hit a margarine or some other factory
in Rotterdam, causing oil to run out and the fire to spread. As after
the attack the capitulation was already effective, it should have been
possible to prevent the fires from spreading by bringing in the fire
services and the troops.
DR. STAHMER: What were the military consequences of this attack?
KESSELRING: The immediate consequence of the attack was the surrender of
the Rotterdam troops. General Wenninger, who was air attaché at the time
and who later was attached to my air fleet, told me that in consequence
of this attack the whole of the Dutch Army capitulated.
DR. STAHMER: Did you lead the attack on Coventry in November 1940?
KESSELRING: As Chief of Air Fleet 2 I took part in this attack, without
any doubt. I cannot say now whether Air Fleet 3 took part in it as well,
but I did.
DR. STAHMER: What was the object of the attack?
KESSELRING: According to the target index kept by the archives
department of the Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe, Coventry was an
English armament center; it was known as “Little Essen.” This index was
compiled with meticulous care by experts, engineers, and officers, and
contained maps, charts, photographs, description of targets, key points,
_et cetera_. I myself, as well as my men, was fully familiar with these
details. Furthermore, I had the aforementioned General Wenninger and
several engineers with the Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe give
lectures to the troops about targets, in order to make them acquainted
with the nature of the targets, their vulnerability, and the effects of
an air attack.
Preparations for an attack were made most conscientiously. I was very
often present and the Reich Marshal himself occasionally inspected them.
The case of Coventry was extremely simple, as during those nights
favorable weather conditions prevailed, so that Coventry could be
reached without radio navigation. The distribution of the targets in
Coventry was likewise very simple, so that bombs could be dropped
without the help of flares, and it was hardly possible to miss the
target. But bombs follow the same law as other projectiles; in other
words, in land and air warfare dispersion covers a wide range. With an
air force this is the further peculiarity that if strong formations are
employed not the individual target but only the target area as a whole
can be aimed at, which naturally causes a deviation from the target
itself. By order of the Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe and on the
reconnaissance pilot’s own initiative, all hits and attacks were checked
the following day by air photographs. The ground visibility was good
but, as I already said in the case of Rotterdam, the destruction of the
objective was not caused so much by the bombs themselves as by the
spreading of fire.
I do not know whether I should add anything further. The Hague
Convention on land warfare did not provide for the requirements of air
warfare. In order to avoid an arbitrary selection of targets, the
Supreme Command had to go into the question and issue general directives
based on the preamble to the Hague Convention, the literature published
in the meantime, and finally, the special conditions governing the
Luftwaffe itself. Only those targets which we considered admissible
according to international law were assigned to the air fleet or
formation. This did not exclude the reconsideration and change of
targets in individual cases, which were discussed with the
Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe, and we took the responsibility
. . .
THE PRESIDENT: You are speaking too fast.
KESSELRING: By personal visits and other means we impressed upon our
units the need to study preparation, the dropping of bombs, aiming, the
meteorological conditions, so carefully that the highest degree of
accuracy could be obtained and regrettable deviations into the perimeter
of the objectives could be avoided. The case of Coventry was
particularly fortunate as it presented an important military target, and
no one could speak of it as an attack directed against the civilian
population.
DR. STAHMER: I have no more questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Does any other defense counsel wish to ask questions?
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, since when were you commander of an army group?
KESSELRING: I became commander of an army group in September 1943 after,
as commander of the German troops in the Supreme Command, I had already
served in a supervisory capacity as far as general strategic and
tactical questions were concerned.
DR. LATERNSER: The army group which you led was in Italy?
KESSELRING: The army group was in the Mediterranean area.
DR. LATERNSER: Do you know the composition of the General Staff and High
Command group as presented by the Prosecution?
KESSELRING: Yes.
DR. LATERNSER: First I have a preliminary question. What is, strictly
speaking, understood by the German General Staff of the individual
branches of the Wehrmacht?
KESSELRING: The General Staff of the individual branches of the
Wehrmacht comprises all those officers who assist the
commanders-in-chief of the services and share their responsibility.
DR. LATERNSER: Would you please state how this group was composed and
organized—in the Luftwaffe, for instance?
KESSELRING: The General Staff of the Luftwaffe was the equivalent of the
General Staff of the Army and these organizations were as alike as two
pins. The General Staff consisted of the central department, called the
Operations Staff in the Luftwaffe, headed by the Chief of the General
Staff, the operational departments, the organizational groups, the
departmental chiefs of the Luftwaffe, the supply office, _et cetera_.
The various commands, from the air fleet down to the division, the
ground staff and the Luftgaue, had General Staff officers attached to
them to assist in the command. A chief of general staff no longer bore
co-responsibility, as was previously customary, since this was held to
be inconsistent with the Leadership Principle. These chiefs of general
staffs and the chief of the central department of the General Staff
exercised their influence regarding military and ideological training on
all the General Staff officers within the Wehrmacht, without prejudice
to the responsibility of the individual military commander.
DR. LATERNSER: If I summarize your reply that by General Staff of the
Luftwaffe is meant the Chief of General Staff and the regimental staff
officers, would I then be describing correctly the composition of the
General Staff of the Luftwaffe?
KESSELRING: Most certainly.
DR. LATERNSER: Do you consider the term “General Staff” as has been
employed in these proceedings to be in accordance with military usage?
KESSELRING: As I said before, the General Staff was composed of officers
assisting in the command, which did not include the commanders and
commanders-in-chief. According to German views they did not belong to
that category, because not all the commanders and commanders-in-chief
had had the same education and training as the General Staff officers.
The commanders-in-chief were single individuals. They would be treated
collectively only in connection with their rank as generals and for
budget and pay purposes.
DR. LATERNSER: Would you consider it to be erroneous to apply the term
“General Staff” to the high military commanders?
KESSELRING: According to the German conception it would be a misnomer.
DR. LATERNSER: Have at any time in the history of the Wehrmacht the high
military commanders been subsumed under this group as is being done
here?
KESSELRING: In Germany such subsumption was not indicated and for
various reasons was not even admissible. Neither did the
commanders-in-chief form a collective body to act in any way as a war
council or as a similar assembly with definite tasks. They were not
even, individually or collectively, members of the Reich Defense
Council, but were only appointed _ad hoc_ commanders of a front or a
command post. To set up the commanders-in-chief as a collective body for
any specific purpose was in my opinion quite impossible, for the simple
reason that they were under the commander-in-chief of the Army, the
Luftwaffe, or the Navy or under the High Command of the Armed Forces.
Moreover, some were 100 percent under the German Supreme Command; others
were 100 percent under Axis command. Some of them were under two
different commands, some were independent commanders-in-chief, others
were army commanders-in-chief subordinate to an army group.
DR. LATERNSER: You are speaking too fast. Had the commanders-in-chief
only to work out military problems set before them, or did they
themselves draw up plans and submit them to Hitler for consideration?
KESSELRING: The commanders-in-chief were purely military leaders,
responsible only for the task allotted to them. Within the scope of this
task they could submit suggestions or improvements, _et cetera_, to the
OKW or to the OKH, but their activities in the sense of collaboration
were limited to these suggestions.
DR. LATERNSER: You just mentioned improvements and modifications. Did
this mean that the commanders-in-chief were expected to suggest
modifications of a plan only from the military-technical aspect, or also
to submit suggestions as to whether or not a plan should be carried out
at all?
KESSELRING: Generally it meant suggestions for modifications from the
military-technical aspect only. In matters of minor importance they had
a say also as to policy. If, however, the highest authority had made a
decision, the others kept silent.
DR. LATERNSER: We will revert to this later. Did the “General Staff”
group as presented here ever meet collectively?
KESSELRING: No.
DR. LATERNSER: Were there any rules providing for the organization of
this group?
KESSELRING: No.
DR. LATERNSER: Did any members of this group ever suggest a departure
from the rules of international law?
KESSELRING: I do not think so; rather the contrary.
DR. LATERNSER: Was there a frequent reshuffle of the holders of the
offices which make up this group, or did they hold the offices for a
long period?
KESSELRING: In the course of the later years the commanders-in-chief and
commanders were rather frequently reshuffled.
DR. LATERNSER: What do you know about the conferences Hitler held with
high-ranking military leaders?
KESSELRING: There were two kinds of conferences. First, an important
address before a campaign to the higher leaders taking part in it. The
object of the address was generally to inform the leaders of the
situation and to brief them. In view of the Führer’s persuasive rhetoric
it was hardly possible for us to take any stand in the matter,
particularly as we were not informed about all the details. At such
conferences discussions did not take place; they were not allowed. There
sometimes followed military-tactical consultations, and every leader had
the chance of putting forward and stressing his views and requests. As I
have said, we had no say in political questions. We were, as is known,
fated with the accomplished fact, which we as soldiers had to accept.
DR. LATERNSER: Did you attend a conference held by Hitler on 22 August
1939, that is, shortly before the Polish campaign started?
KESSELRING: Yes.
DR. LATERNSER: Was it not made known at the end of this conference that
we had concluded a treaty with the Soviet Union?
KESSELRING: At the end, after the address, we were all called together
again and informed that the message had just been received that Russia
would adopt benevolent neutrality.
DR. LATERNSER: What impression did this message have on you and the
other high military leaders?
KESSELRING: It was a tremendous relief to me and to the others.
Otherwise we could not have dismissed the possibility of an extension of
the war toward the East. Now that Russia was going to hold herself
aloof, the Luftwaffe at least—I speak as an army commander—had a
superiority which guaranteed a rapid and decisive success, and which
over and above this, in my opinion, would possibly prevent the expansion
of the war.
DR. LATERNSER: In any case, the message was a great relief to you?
KESSELRING: Yes, very great.
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, can you tell me whether members of the General
Staff and OKW group ever met and had discussions with leading
politicians and Party men?
KESSELRING: If I may speak for myself, I was operating both in the
Mediterranean area and in the West. In the Mediterranean area I had to
work with the Gauleiter Rainer and Hofer and then in the West with . . .
DR. LATERNSER: That was not the point of the question. I wanted to know
whether the high military leaders ever met and discussed any political
plans with leading politicians.
KESSELRING: No, no. That I can definitely say was not the case. We as
soldiers generally did not bother about politics. Political decisions
were made by the politicians and we had to carry them out.
DR. LATERNSER: Among military leaders, as a result of their many years
of experience in the Wehrmacht, which foster the principle of giving the
soldier a nonpolitical education, this attitude is customary, is it not?
KESSELRING: This policy has been developed in the German Army since the
18th century.
DR. LATERNSER: Do you know whether the higher military leaders had any
contact with the Fifth Column?
KESSELRING: The military leadership had nothing to do with the Fifth
Column. This was beneath us.
DR. LATERNSER: What was your impression of the conference Hitler held
with the higher military leaders before the Eastern campaign started?
Was the situation presented to you in such a way that war had to be
considered unavoidable?
KESSELRING: I had the definite impression that the purpose of the
address to the leaders was to convince them of the necessity of the war
as a preventive war, and that it was imperative to strike before the
building up and the mobilization of the Russian armed forces became a
danger to Germany.
DR. LATERNSER: Could you state the reasons for your impression?
KESSELRING: As I have already said, the purpose of the address was to
give us a convincing picture of the general situation, of the military
situation and its time schedule—and it did convince us. In connection
with the Russian campaign I should like to say that up to the last day
of August I had no doubt . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Witness, will you go more slowly please and have some
consideration for the interpreters.
DR. LATERNSER: Would you please repeat the last answer.
KESSELRING: I had still less reason to doubt Hitler’s words because, up
to the last moment, I, as Commander-in-Chief of Air Fleet 2, was engaged
in operations against England and had had neither time nor the means to
form a well-founded judgment of my own on the Russian situation. I had
to confine myself . . .
DR. LATERNSER: This Trial has shown that the commanders-in-chief are
being made responsible for what is bound to happen in a war. I should
like you to describe the daily routine of a commander-in-chief of an
army group, an army, or an air fleet.
KESSELRING: The daily routine depended of course on the personality of
the individual leader. If I may speak of myself . . .
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, I ask you to be very brief.
THE PRESIDENT: Witness—Dr. Laternser, surely that is cumulative to what
the witness has already been saying, and likely to be very long. About
the description of the day of a commander, this witness already said the
commander had nothing to do with politics and nothing to do with the
staff. Why should we be troubled with what the commander’s day consists
of?
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I attach particular importance to this
question for the following reasons: In view of the range of a
commander-in-chief’s activities, especially at the front, not every
report can reach him because even reports from his own sector have to be
dealt with by the respective officers. Thus, only those reports come to
him which are of particular importance and of a decisive nature and
which have a direct bearing on the conduct of the action.
THE PRESIDENT: Give it in that way then, rather than giving the witness
a full day to describe.
DR. LATERNSER: Very well, I shall put it that way.
Witness, in view of the range of your activities as commander-in-chief
did every report reach you, or only those which, after having been
studied by the respective officers, were found to be of such importance
that they had to be submitted to the commander-in-chief?
KESSELRING: Especially when an action was in progress all reports could
not reach the commander-in-chief. In my particular case this was still
less possible as I spent 50 to 70 percent of my time at the front. The
staffs of the armies, air fleets, and navy units had to retain a
responsibility of their own within their competence.
DR. LATERNSER: Did the many activities of a commander-in-chief allow all
reports on violations of international law, even of a minor nature, to
be submitted to him?
KESSELRING: This had to be aimed at. I doubt, however, for the
aforementioned reasons, whether this was possible in every case.
DR. LATERNSER: In this matter, therefore, the commander-in-chief had to
rely on his staff, had he not?
KESSELRING: Yes; 100 percent.
DR. LATERNSER: Were you commander-in-chief of an air fleet on the
Eastern front from June to November 1941?
KESSELRING: Yes.
DR. LATERNSER: Did you hear anything about the extermination of Jews in
the East?
KESSELRING: No.
DR. LATERNSER: Did you hear anything about the Einsatzgruppen of the SS?
KESSELRING: Nothing. I did not even know the name of these units.
DR. LATERNSER: Did you get to know anything about the regrettable order
that Russian commissars were to be shot after their capture?
KESSELRING: I heard of this order at the end of the war. The air fleet,
not being engaged in ground fighting, had actually nothing to do with
this question. I think I can safely say the Luftwaffe knew nothing
whatsoever about it. Though I very frequently had personal dealings with
Field Marshal Von Bock, with commanders of armies and armored units,
none of these gentlemen ever told me of such an order.
DR. LATERNSER: Did you know about the Commando Order?
KESSELRING: Yes, I did.
DR. LATERNSER: And what did you think of this order?
KESSELRING: I considered such an order, received by me as
commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean, where I held a double post, as
not binding for me, but as the outline of an order which left me a free
hand in its application. On this question I held the view that it was
for me, as commander-in-chief, to decide whether a Commando action was
contrary to international law or whether it was tactically justified.
The view adopted more and more by the army group, which view was
directed by me, was that personnel in uniform who had been sent out on a
definite tactical task were to be treated and considered as soldiers in
accordance with the provisions of the Hague Convention for land warfare.
DR. LATERNSER: The Commando Order was consequently not applied within
your command?
KESSELRING: In one case, yes, it was certainly applied.
DR. LATERNSER: Which case do you mean?
KESSELRING: I mean the case of General Dostler.
DR. LATERNSER: The case of General Dostler has already been mentioned in
this Trial. Did you know about this case when it was pending?
KESSELRING: As a witness under oath I have stated that I cannot remember
this case. I think there are two reasons why I was not informed of it.
Firstly, after a conversation with my chief, who spoke to another
commander about it, it appeared that none of us knew anything. Secondly,
because of the gigantic operations on the Southern Front, I was more
often absent than not from my headquarters.
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, if you had been called upon to make a decision
on the Dostler case, how would you have decided?
KESSELRING: I am not well enough acquainted with the case. I know it
only from hearsay.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I do not think we can try Dostler’s case, or that
this witness should give his conclusions, inasmuch as Dostler’s case has
been tried by a competent court and that issue is disposed of. I have no
objection to any facts that inform this Tribunal, but his conclusion as
to the guilt of his fellow officer is hardly helpful.
THE PRESIDENT: Particularly as he said he cannot remember.
DR. LATERNSER: I withdraw the question.
Witness, can you quote other cases where the Commando Order was not
applied in your area?
KESSELRING: Small scale landings behind the lines at Commazzio, south of
Venice, also airborne landings north of Albenda in the region of Genoa
and minor actions in the Lago di Ortona district. I am convinced the
troops adopted this general view and acted accordingly.
DR. LATERNSER: You were commander-in-chief of an air fleet in the East.
What can you say about the treatment of the Russian civilian population
during the campaign?
KESSELRING: I was in Russia until the end of November and I can say only
that the population and the troops were on the best of terms, and that
the field kitchens were used everywhere for the benefit of the poor and
the children; also that the morality of the Russian woman, which, as is
known, is on a high level, was respected by the German soldiers to a
remarkable extent. I know that my doctors, during the hours of
attendance, were frequently consulted by the Russian population. I
remember this, because the doctors spoke to me about the fortitude they
showed in enduring pain. The war passed so quickly over the plains as
far as Smolensk that the whole area presented quite a peaceful aspect;
peasants were at work, fairly large herds of cattle were grazing, and
when I visited the area I found the small dwellings intact.
DR. LATERNSER: Did you hear of any excesses committed by German soldiers
in the East? Whenever cases of violations of international law were
reported to you, did you take action with all the means at your
disposal?
KESSELRING: I at least tried to do so, if only for the sake of
maintaining the reputation of the German Wehrmacht and also in the
interests of the relations of the Wehrmacht with our Italian allies. I
therefore thought it expedient to deal severely with any German soldier
who committed an offense. As I was mindful of the fact that war is a
brutal business and the longer it lasts the more brutal it becomes,
particularly if the leaders and subordinates are no longer able to cope
with their tasks, I had recourse to preventive measures. The preventive
regulations, which I am sure were seen at many places by the Allied
Forces during their advance through Italy, my various announcements of
the penalties imposed which became generally known, are the best proof
of what I just said.
As a preventive measure I ordered whole towns, or if this was not
possible, their centers to be cleared of military and administrative
offices and soldiers, and barricaded off. Furthermore, as far as air
raid precautions allowed, the soldiers were garrisoned and billeted in
confined areas. I also ordered detached individual soldiers, who are
usually the cause of such trouble—for instance soldiers going on and
returning from leave—to be grouped together, and nonmilitary vehicles
to form convoys. For control purposes I had cordons drawn by military
police, field police, gendarmes, with mobile courts and flying squads
attached to them.
The buying-up of Italian goods, which was partly the cause of the
trouble, was to be restricted by establishing stores, in co-operation
with the Italian Government, along the return routes, and here the
soldiers could buy something to take home. This was enforced by
penalties. German offenders reported to me by the Italians, I had
prosecuted or I myself took proceedings against them. Whenever local
operations prevented my personal intervention, as for instance at Siena,
I notified the Wehrmacht that I would have the case dealt with by court
martial at a later date. In other cases, when the situation was
critical, I declared an emergency law and imposed the death penalty for
looting, robbery, murder, _et cetera_. The death penalty was, however,
rarely found to have a deterrent effect. I took action against officers
who, naturally disposed to shield their men, had shown too great
leniency.
I understand all files are available here, so that all details can be
seen from the marginal notes on the reports sent in by the military
police.
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, do you also know of any violations of
international law by the other side?
KESSELRING: During my many visits to the front I did, of course, come
across a large number . . .
GEN. RUDENKO: I protest against this question. In my opinion, the
witness is not the person to make any statement as to whether Germany’s
enemies have violated international law. I think this question should be
omitted.
DR. LATERNSER: May I explain my point? I am interested in an answer to
this question because I want to follow it with the further question to
the witness, whether after he heard of violations of international law
by the other side, he became more lenient concerning violations of
international law by his own men. That is why I am anxious to have this
question answered.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like to know exactly what your
question is and why you say it is competent.
DR. LATERNSER: The exact wording of the question is as follows:
I asked the witness, “Do you also know of any violations of
international law by the other side?”
According to his answer I intend to put the further questions to the
witness, whether, in view of such violations of international law by the
other side, he either did not punish at all or dealt more leniently with
violations of international law by his own men.
From the answer to this latter question I want to ascertain the attitude
of the witness as a member of the group, and that is why I consider the
answer to the first question to be important.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like to hear what Counsel for the
United States says about it.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: If Your Honor pleases, I believe it is a
well-established principle of international law that a violation on one
side does not excuse or warrant violations on the other side. There is,
of course, a doctrine of reprisal, but it is clearly not applicable
here, on any basis that has been shown.
In the second place, even if the treatment of the subject matter were
competent, I think it is being improperly gone into in this manner. Here
is a broad question, “Did you hear of violations of international law?”
It would at least, even if the subject were proper, require that some
particularity of a case be given. A broad conclusion of a charge—a
violation of international law—would hardly be sufficient to inform
this Tribunal as to the basis on which this witness may have acted.
If there were some specific instance, with credible information called
to his attention, there might be some basis; but surely the question as
asked by counsel does not afford a basis here.
It seems to me we are getting far afield from the charges here and that
this is far afield from anything that is involved in the case. I do not
know what particular atrocities or violations of international law are
to be excused by this method. There must have been atrocities committed,
on the basis of which there is sought to be excused atrocities committed
by somebody else. Who else committed them, why they were committed, is a
subject we might have to try if we went into this subject. It seems to
me that the inquiry is quite beside the point, and even if it were not,
if there were any way that it is within the point, it is improperly put
in this manner.
DR. STAHMER: This question, which is of fundamental importance, was
argued before this Tribunal some time ago. This was when I applied for
permission to be given to produce White Books containing reports on
atrocities. I think it was during the sitting of 25 February.
At that time Professor Exner defined his attitude to this question and
the Tribunal then permitted me to produce these White Books, with the
proviso that I would still have to state what I intended to present from
these books.
Already on that occasion attention was drawn to the importance of the
question of whether atrocities were committed by the other side as well,
because this very point may contribute to a more just and possibly to a
more lenient judgment of German behavior. The motive of an act has
always a decisive bearing on the findings, and the view will be taken
here that an act on the German part will be judged differently if the
other side has not really shown entirely correct behavior.
Furthermore it is an important question whether measures taken may have
been reprisals. On the strength of these considerations I hold that this
important question should be admitted.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn for 10 minutes.
[_A recess was taken._]
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal have considered the questions which Dr.
Laternser proposed to put to the witness and have also considered the
objections made by General Rudenko and Mr. Justice Jackson, and they
hold the questions are inadmissible.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I assume that I am allowed to put the
following question.
[_Turning to the witness._] Witness, did you either not punish at all or
deal more leniently with violations of international law by your own men
when violations of this law by the other side were reported to you?
THE PRESIDENT: That seems to me to be putting in one question what
before you put in two.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, this question is not meant to cause the
witness to give instances of violations of international law by the
other side. From the answer, I merely want to ascertain the fundamental
attitude of the witness, namely whether he, as commander-in-chief, dealt
most severely with violations of international law by his own men even
if violations on the other side were reported to him. I withdraw the
question.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would see no objection in your asking the
witness whether he was anxious to avoid violations of international law;
if you wish to put that question to him there will be no objection to
that question. The question which you have suggested putting is really
identical with the questions you put before.
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, during this Trial severe accusations have been
made because of atrocities committed by German soldiers. Was not every
soldier sufficiently enlightened and instructed about the regulations of
international law?
KESSELRING: I answer this question in the affirmative. The many talks
given by me and the commanders under me always contained such
admonitions and instructions.
DR. LATERNSER: Did you, as commander of an army group, spare art
treasures and churches as far as possible?
KESSELRING: I regarded it as a matter of course as my duty to spare
centers of art and learning and churches, and I gave orders accordingly,
and acted accordingly myself in all my operations and tactical measures.
DR. LATERNSER: What do you know about the treatment of prisoners of war
who had fallen into German hands?
KESSELRING: Prisoners of war were treated according to international
law. Wherever inspections ordered by me revealed any neglect, I had it
redressed and reprimanded the commandant in charge.
DR. LATERNSER: I have still three more questions. Were you, as Field
Marshal, informed that Italy would enter the war?
KESSELRING: No, I had not been informed about that. As far as I know,
the entry of Italy into the war was so spontaneous that even the
political leaders were surprised.
DR. LATERNSER: And were you informed that war would be declared upon
America?
KESSELRING: No. I cannot say anything about this question.
DR. LATERNSER: And now the last question. What was the position
regarding the resignation of military leaders during the war?
KESSELRING: Resignation from the Wehrmacht of one’s own free will, or an
application for permission to resign from the Wehrmacht, was not
allowed. In 1944 there was an order prohibiting this under threat of the
severest penalties. The Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht reserved for
himself the exclusive right to make changes of personnel in the leading
positions.
DR. LATERNSER: Was there a written order to this effect?
KESSELRING: Yes, I think so.
DR. LATERNSER: I have no further questions.
DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, you said before that the commanders-in-chief
had, in military matters, the right and the opportunity to present their
demands and views to Hitler, the Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht. Did
I understand that correctly?
KESSELRING: Yes.
DR. JAHRREISS: Did you personally have differences of opinion with
Hitler?
KESSELRING: Considerable differences about operational and tactical
questions.
DR. JAHRREISS: Did it come to a real clash?
KESSELRING: “Clash” is perhaps putting it too strongly; rather a
divergence of opinion on either side.
DR. JAHRREISS: Shall we say disputes? Were they frequent?
KESSELRING: Yes.
DR. JAHRREISS: After all we have heard, here, Adolf Hitler must have
been a rather difficult customer.
KESSELRING: That must be admitted. On the other hand, I found him—I do
not know why—understanding in most of the matters I put to him.
DR. JAHRREISS: Did you yourself settle these differences of opinion with
Hitler?
KESSELRING: In critical cases Colonel General Jodl called me in if he
could not carry his point.
DR. JAHRREISS: If you could not carry the point?
KESSELRING: No, if Jodl could not carry the point.
DR. JAHRREISS: If Jodl could not carry the point, you were called in?
KESSELRING: Yes.
DR. JAHRREISS: Did Jodl’s opinions, too, differ from Hitler’s?
KESSELRING: On the various occasions when I attended for reporting I
observed very definite, differences of opinion between the two
gentlemen, and that Jodl—who was our spokesman at the OKW—put his
point of view with remarkable energy and stuck to it right to the end.
DR. JAHRREISS: What do you mean, he was your spokesman? Whose spokesman?
KESSELRING: My theaters of war, speaking as a general in the Wehrmacht,
were so-called OKW theaters of war, and the East was an Army theater of
war. The East was an Army theater of war, whereas the others were OKW
war theaters.
DR. JAHRREISS: Had the OKW no say regarding the Army theaters of war in
the East?
KESSELRING: No.
DR. JAHRREISS: And the Army had no say regarding the OKW theater of war?
KESSELRING: No.
DR. JAHRREISS: I think not everybody will be able to understand this
difference.
KESSELRING: It would be asking too much, because I myself cannot
understand it.
DR. JAHRREISS: So, you were in an OKW theater of war?
KESSELRING: Yes.
DR. JAHRREISS: What does OKW mean in this connection?
KESSELRING: Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.
DR. JAHRREISS: Yes, I know that.
KESSELRING: It meant that the commander-in-chief was directly under
Adolf Hitler, and headquarters under Jodl’s operations staff.
DR. JAHRREISS: In a previous interrogation you spoke of orders from the
OKW, did you not?
KESSELRING: Yes.
DR. JAHRREISS: Who is the OKW? Who gave orders?
KESSELRING: Orders of a fundamental nature were issued by one person
only, and that was Adolf Hitler. All the others were only executive
officers. This did not prevent these executive officers from holding
views of their own or sharing the views of the army groups under them.
They presented these views energetically to Adolf Hitler.
DR. JAHRREISS: What you are saying now rather surprises me, since the
opinion had been voiced that Jodl, who you say was a kind of spokesman
for the commanders-in-chief, was a willing tool of Adolf Hitler.
KESSELRING: I think the one does not exclude the other. I cannot imagine
any marriage of 6 years standing without both partners having tried to
understand each other. On the other hand, I can very well imagine that
even in the happiest marriage serious quarrels occur.
DR. JAHRREISS: But in the average marriage the husband does not
necessarily have to be a willing tool.
KESSELRING: Here the situation is still a little bit different. As with
all comparisons, this comparison with marriage does not go the whole
way. In addition to this, in the army there is the principle of
unquestioning subordination.
DR. JAHRREISS: Yes, but what you have just told us, about Jodl’s
position as spokesman for the commanders-in-chief, sounds as if Jodl
acted as an intermediary, does it not?
KESSELRING: Jodl represented our interests in an outstanding way and
thus acted as an intermediary for all of us.
DR. JAHRREISS: Did he also pit his opinions against those of Adolf
Hitler when Adolf Hitler, in one of his famous fits of rage, had issued
an order?
KESSELRING: I can state only that, on the occasion of my few visits to
headquarters, I saw Colonel General Jodl grow red in the face, if I may
say so, and in expressing his views he went very near the limit of what
is permissible for a military man.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.
[_The Tribunal adjourned, until 13 March 1946 at 1000 hours._]
EIGHTIETH DAY
Wednesday, 13 March 1946
_Morning Session_
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has made an order with respect to further
proceedings on the charge against organizations and the applications of
members thereof. I do not propose to read that order, but the order will
be posted on the Defense Counsel’s information board and will be
communicated to them and to the Prosecution.
Dr. Jahrreiss, had you finished your examination?
DR. JAHRREISS: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Does any other of the Defense Counsel wish to
examine the witness?
[_The witness Kesselring resumed the stand._]
DR. KAUFFMANN: Witness, have you any recollection when the Defendant
Kaltenbrunner first came into the public eye?
KESSELRING: I have no knowledge of Kaltenbrunner’s becoming particularly
prominent in the public eye. I heard the name Kaltenbrunner for the
first time when he appeared as successor to General Canaris.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Have you any recollection of him being made the Chief of
the Reich Security Main Office in January 1943?
KESSELRING: I may have heard of it, but I have no certain recollection
of it.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Kaltenbrunner states that in April 1945 he tried to save
the country of Austria from further acts of war. Have you by chance any
recollection of that?
KESSELRING: I merely heard that Kaltenbrunner was one of those persons
who were working for an independent Austria, but I have no definite,
accurate knowledge of the situation.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Furthermore, Kaltenbrunner states that he, on the basis
of an agreement with the Red Cross at Geneva, had arranged for the
return of civilian internees to their homeland through the firing line.
He had communicated a request to your office—not to you personally—to
the effect that a gap should be created in the fighting line to let
these civilian internees go home. Do you happen to remember that?
KESSELRING: It is quite possible that such a request was actually
submitted. It did not come to my personal knowledge, because I was away
from my office a great deal.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Witness, have you any recollection when concentration
camps were first established in Germany?
KESSELRING: Yes. It was in 1933. I remember three concentration camps,
but I do not know exactly when they were established: Oranienburg, which
I often passed by and flew over; Dachau, which had been discussed
vehemently in the newspapers; and Weimar-Nora, Weimar, a concentration
camp which I flew over quite frequently on my official trips. I have no
recollection of any other concentration camps; but perhaps I may add
that, as a matter of principle, I kept aloof from rumors, which were
particularly rife during those periods of crisis, in order to devote
myself to my own duties which were particularly heavy.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Regarding the internees in the concentration camps, did
you have any definite idea as to who would be brought to these
concentration camps?
KESSELRING: I had an idea, without knowing where I got it from, which
seemed plausible to me; namely, that the National Socialist Revolution
should be achieved without the loss of life, and that political
opponents should be detained until the founding of the new State had
given sufficient security for them to return to public life. That is my
knowledge of the situation, from which I conclude, in order to answer
your question, that these people must, for the most part, have been
persons who were opposed to the National Socialist ideology.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Have you ever thought what the treatment in these
concentration camps would be like according to your idea? What was your
conception of the treatment of the prisoners in the camps? There may
perhaps be a difference according to whether you think of the earlier or
the later years?
KESSELRING: I know nothing about the methods of treatment in the camps.
During the earlier years, when I was still working in Germany, rumors
were heard to the effect that treatment was normal. In the later years I
was abroad, that is to say, in theaters of war outside Germany; and I
was so far away that I knew nothing whatsoever of these incidents and
did not ask for any information about them.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Is it right therefore to assume that as far as the
atrocities were concerned which did actually occur, you had no positive
knowledge?
KESSELRING: No, I did not have any positive knowledge, not even in March
1945, when I became Supreme Commander in the West. Even then the
occurrences in the concentration camps were completely unknown to me.
This I attributed to two reasons: First, the personal attitude which I
expressed earlier, that on principle I concerned myself only with my own
business—which in itself was sufficiently extensive, and secondly, that
within the State a police state had developed which had hermetically
sealed and closed itself off from the rest of the world.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Have you any proof that there was more knowledge in your
officers’ circles than what you have just described with regard to
yourself?
KESSELRING: I was in very close contact with my officers and I do not
believe that there can have been a large number of officers who knew
more about these things. Of course I cannot give information regarding
individuals.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you know that Hitler had decided to eliminate the
Jewish people physically?
KESSELRING: That was absolutely unknown to me.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you not have frequent opportunities to discuss
ideological questions with Hitler?
KESSELRING: Whenever I was at headquarters only military and similar
questions concerning my theater of war were discussed during the
official part of the conversation. When I was invited to a meal, then
historical matters or matters of general interest were usually
discussed, but acute political problems or ideological questions never
came up for discussion. I personally cannot remember any instance when
Hitler influenced me, or any of the other generals, in any way
whatsoever with regard to professing themselves active National
Socialists.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you believe in Hitler’s personality in the sense that
Hitler was determined to lead the German people to a better Germany,
with consideration for personal freedom and respect for human dignity?
What was your conception about that?
THE PRESIDENT: What is the relevancy of a witness’ belief upon a subject
of that sort? What relevancy has it got to do with any part of the case
of the Defendant Kaltenbrunner? The Tribunal considers this sort of
question a waste of the Tribunal’s time.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Is it correct that in the absolute leadership state which
existed in Germany any opposition by a human being to a superior order
was impossible?
KESSELRING: In that form I would not deny that. One could certainly
represent one’s own views against another view. But if one’s own views
were rendered invalid by a decision, absolute obedience became
necessary, and its execution was demanded and ensured under certain
circumstances by the application of penal law. Resistance to that order,
or an order, was, according to our knowledge of the personality and
attitude of Adolf Hitler, out of the question and would have achieved
nothing.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Would not a person attempting to resist a finally issued
order have to consider whether he might not be risking his life?
KESSELRING: During the later years that was an absolute certainty.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you at any time think the war could not be won, and
if so, when?
KESSELRING: In 1943, the possibility had to be considered that a
victorious peace might not be achieved. I emphasize expressly that one
had to consider that possibility, for by observing certain
organizational or operational measures, the situation might still have
been reversed.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you ever discuss this question with someone of
importance—the misgivings which you may have had about the continuance
of the war?
KESSELRING: At various times when I discussed my own military sector, I
referred to certain difficulties which might influence the outcome of
the war in general; however, as representative of one military sector, I
considered myself in no way entitled to judge the entire military
situation, since I could not, from my limited viewpoint, judge the
situation regarding production and the organization of manpower
reserves. And as I said before, I refused, as an amateur, to make any
statement about a situation, which under certain circumstances might
have been regarded as official as it would have had the signature of
Field Marshal Kesselring.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you kindly explain to the Tribunal what relevancy
the last two or three questions have to the case of Kaltenbrunner?
DR. KAUFFMANN: The same applies to Kaltenbrunner, that he could not, as
he says, resist an order. It would have meant the loss of his life.
THE PRESIDENT: You asked the witness whether at any time during the war
he thought how long the war would last. What has that got to do with
Kaltenbrunner?
DR. KAUFFMANN: The Prosecution accuses several defendants of having
continued the struggle in spite of the fact that they knew it was
hopeless, and of having prolonged the war. That is the problem I wish to
clarify in my last question.
THE PRESIDENT: I do not think it was put specifically against
Kaltenbrunner. If it is your last question you may put it.
DR. KAUFFMANN: If I understand you correctly, Witness, what you are
trying to explain is that the leading motive of your continuing to fight
was also your duty towards your country?
KESSELRING: That is a matter of course. I had other motives too. One was
that the possibility of a political termination of the war was denied,
at least officially; but that I believed in it, and I am still convinced
of it today, may be proved by the fact that I personally, together with
Obergruppenführer Wolff, undertook negotiations through Switzerland with
an American, in order to prepare the ground for a political discussion
to that end.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Mr. President, I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Any other Counsel for the Defense?
HERR PELCKMANN: Witness, Dr. Kauffmann asked you whether the officers’
corps had any knowledge of the conditions and the establishment of
concentration camps. Do you know that within the Armed Forces so-called
national-political instruction courses were held?
KESSELRING: Yes, I know of that.
HERR PELCKMANN: May I ask you whether you know that during one of the
Armed Forces national-political courses of instruction, which were held
from 15 to 23 January 1937, and I am referring now to Document Number
1992(a)-PS concerning the establishment of concentration camps, Himmler,
the SS Leader, in the presence of the assembled officers, made a speech
more or less to this effect:
“Naturally, we make a difference between inmates who may be
there for a few months for educational purposes, and those who
will be there for a long time.”