MR. JUSTICE JACKSON:

“. . . and runs the risk of having his prisoners of war taken

from him.”

Now, I am still quoting you and I want you to find the entry.

“In one case, two Russian officers took off with an airplane but

crashed. I ordered that these two men be hanged at once. They

were hanged or shot yesterday. I left that to the SS. I wanted

them to be hanged in the factory for the others to see.”

Do you find that?

MILCH: I have found it, and I can only say I have never had anybody

hanged nor have I even given such an order. I could not possibly have

said such a thing. I had nothing to do with this question. Neither do I

know of any instance where two Russian officers tried to escape by

plane.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Is there anything else you would like to say with

reference to that entry?

MILCH: No. I have nothing to say. I do not know anything about it and I

also do not believe I ever said it.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is all that I have at the present time.

MR. G. D. ROBERTS (Leading Counsel for the United Kingdom): Witness, I

have some questions on behalf of the British Delegation. My first point

is this: You said on Friday that, beginning in 1935, an air force was

built up in Germany for defensive purposes. Do you remember that?

MILCH: Yes; 1935.

MR. ROBERTS: And do you say that it remained on a defensive basis up to

December 1939?

MILCH: Yes.

MR. ROBERTS: You do. I want you to listen to three pieces of

evidence—speeches made by your chief, the Defendant Göring. I am

quoting from the shorthand notes of the 8th of January, in the

afternoon, on Page 2306. In May 1935, Göring said:

“I intend to create a Luftwaffe which, if the hour should

strike, will burst upon the foe like an avenging host. The enemy

must feel that he has lost even before he has started fighting.”

Does that sound like a defensive air force?

MILCH: No, that does not sound like it; but one has to distinguish

between words and deeds.

MR. ROBERTS: I shall come to the deeds in a moment.

[_Laughter._]

THE PRESIDENT: If there is any more of this laughter, the Court will

have to be cleared.

MR. ROBERTS: On the 8th of July 1938 Göring, addressing a number of

German aircraft manufacturers, said:

“War with Czechoslovakia is imminent; the German Air Force is

already superior to the English Air Force. If Germany wins the

war, she will be the greatest power in the world; she will

dominate the world markets, and Germany will be a rich nation.

To attain this goal risks must be taken.”

Does that sound like a defensive German Air Force? Does it?

MILCH: No, that certainly does not sound like it. I should like to be

allowed to say something to that, when you have finished.

MR. ROBERTS: Please limit yourself, if you can, in the interest of time,

to answering my question, which is very short. Now may I read you one

further piece of evidence; the speech made by Göring on 14 October 1938,

that is less than a month after the Munich Pact.

“Hitler has ordered me to organize a gigantic armament program,

which would make all previous achievements appear insignificant.

I have been ordered to build as rapidly as possible an air force

five times as large as the present one.”

Does that sound like an air force for defensive purposes?

MILCH: This air force would have taken many years to build.

MR. ROBERTS: I suggest to you that your evidence on that point was

grossly incorrect. I now want to come to my second point. You were

present at the conference of chiefs of the services in the Chancellery

on 23 May 1939?

MILCH: What was the date please?

MR. ROBERTS: I would like you to see the document, which is L-79. You

did see it on Friday, I think.

MILCH: On 23 May, was it not?

MR. ROBERTS: Yes, that is right. I just want to remind you who else was

present. There were the Führer, Göring, Raeder, Von Brauchitsch, Keitel,

yourself, Halder, General Bodenschatz, Warlimont—was Warlimont the

deputy for Jodl?

MILCH: I cannot say for whom he was there.

MR. ROBERTS: Very well—and others; I will not mention the names. Now,

Witness, those were leaders of the German Armed Forces?

MILCH: May I say, as far as I can remember Field Marshal Göring was not

present. I cannot remember.

MR. ROBERTS: He is down there as being present. You think he was not

there?

MILCH: Yes. I cannot remember, but to my recollection I was sent there

at the last moment to represent him.

MR. ROBERTS: Well, then, apart from Göring, if he was not there, those

were mostly the leaders of the German forces, is that right?

MILCH: Yes. It was the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and the

Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, and the OKW, yes.

MR. ROBERTS: Would you describe them, from your knowledge of them, as

men of honor?

MILCH: Yes.

MR. ROBERTS: Is it one of the qualities of a man of honor that he keeps

his word?

MILCH: Yes.

MR. ROBERTS: You knew, of course, did you not, that Germany had pledged

her word to respect the neutrality of Belgium, of the Netherlands, and

Luxembourg?

MILCH: I suppose so, but I did not know the various agreements.

MR. ROBERTS: Did you not know that less than a month before that

meeting, namely on the 28th of April, Hitler in the Reichstag gave an

assurance of his respect for the neutrality of a large number of

countries, European countries, including the three I have mentioned? Did

you not know that as a matter of history?

MILCH: I suppose so, yes.

MR. ROBERTS: We have seen the film, you know, in this Court, of that

very occurrence with the Defendant Göring presiding as President of the

Reichstag while that assurance was given.

MILCH: I have not seen the film. I do not know the film.

MR. ROBERTS: Yes. It is a German newsreel. Do you remember that at that

conference Hitler said these words, which are well known to the

Tribunal:

“The Dutch and Belgian air bases must be occupied by the Armed

Forces. Declarations of neutrality must be ignored. . . . An

effort must be made to deal the enemy a heavy or decisive final

blow right at the start. Considerations of right or wrong, or

treaties, do not enter into the matter.”

Do you remember those words being said?

MILCH: I cannot remember exactly what the words were. I know that it was

a question of the Polish Corridor and Danzig, that in this connection

Hitler explained what complications might follow in the West, and what

he intended to do about it; but what he said in detail I can no longer

remember.

MR. ROBERTS: Was any protest made by any of these honorable men at the

breach of Germany’s pledged word?

MILCH: During this meeting it was impossible for anyone present to speak

at all. Hitler addressed us from his desk, and after the speech he left

the room. A discussion did not take place; he did not allow it.

MR. ROBERTS: You say it is impossible for an honorable man to protect

his honor, Witness?

MILCH: I cannot remember Hitler’s actual words shown here.

MR. ROBERTS: Can you give the Tribunal your opinion of it?

MILCH: At this meeting I did not have the impression that Hitler said

anything contrary to the obligations entered into. That I cannot

remember.

MR. ROBERTS: Are you now saying that those minutes are wrong?

MILCH: No, I cannot say that either. I can only say I have no

recollection of the exact words used. Whether the minutes are completely

correct I do not know either. As far as I know they were recorded

subsequently by one of the adjutants present.

MR. ROBERTS: Because we know that is exactly what Germany did 12 months

after, when she broke her pledged word to Belgium, to the Netherlands,

and Luxembourg, and brought misery and death to millions. You know that

now, do you not?

MILCH: That I know, yes; but as soldiers we had nothing to do with the

political side. We were not asked about that.

MR. ROBERTS: Do you call the honoring of . . .

DR. RUDOLPH DIX (Counsel for the Defendant Schacht): I do not speak now

for the Defendant Schacht, but for the entire Defense. I ask the

Tribunal that the witness be questioned about facts, and not about his

opinion as to moral standards.

THE PRESIDENT: He is being asked about facts.

MR. ROBERTS: You have just said that you know now—we know, that 12

months later Germany did violate the neutrality of Belgium, the

Netherlands, and Luxembourg.

MILCH: But we do not know what the reasons were for this, and what other

obligations these countries might have entered into. It was not a job of

the soldiers to judge this.

MR. ROBERTS: Was it not a job of the soldier to object if he was asked

to break his country’s word?

MILCH: I fully agree with you, if a soldier breaks his word in matters

which are his province and where he has a say as a soldier. As regards

matters quite outside his province, which he cannot judge and about

which he knows nothing, he cannot be made responsible and called to

account.

MR. ROBERTS: You can only speak for your own knowledge. Are you saying

that you did not know that your country was pledged to observe the

neutrality of these three small countries?

MILCH: That I have read in the Reichstag speech. But I did not know how

the other side had reacted to that promise. It was not known to me, and

it could easily be that the other side did not at all want this

protection, or this promise, or this guarantee. The soldier could not

judge this at all; only the political authorities could know this.

MR. ROBERTS: Well, we perhaps will have to ask that of the soldiers in

the High Command, who are now in the dock, when they get in the witness

box. But I put it to you it must have been common knowledge in Germany

that Hitler was giving guarantees and assurances to all these smaller

countries?

MILCH: Hitler proposed and offered many things. He offered limitations

of armaments for all countries; he offered not to use bombers; but in

these cases also his proposals were not accepted. Therefore the

political authorities alone could know what they should and could demand

from their soldiers. The only duty of a soldier is to obey.

MR. ROBERTS: Will you please answer my question. That was not an answer

at all to my question. We know the facts now, Witness, from the

documents, from your own German documents. I want to test your knowledge

and your ideas of honor. Did you not think it grossly dishonorable to

give a pledge on 28 April, and to make secret resolution to break it on

23 May?

MILCH: You are right, if the situation had not changed in any way, and

that I cannot judge.

MR. ROBERTS: You must have your own code of honor, even though you are

in the service. You know, of course, that the neutrality of Norway was

violated?

MILCH: Yes, according to our knowledge and in our opinion it was

violated twice.

MR. ROBERTS: Do you know that on the 12th and 13th of March 1940 Jodl

was putting in his diary, “The Führer is still looking for a pretext” to

give out to the world for an invasion of Norway? Do you know that?

MILCH: I do not know this diary and this entry.

MR. ROBERTS: You took an active part in the invasion of Norway, did you

not?

MILCH: A few days after the invasion started I was in command of the air

force up there for a short time.

MR. ROBERTS: You had actually a command in Norway?

MILCH: Yes.

DR. JAHRREISS: I think it necessary to clear up a point which apparently

concerns a misunderstanding by the interpreter. I have just heard that a

diary entry by the Defendant Jodl has been wrongly translated back into

German. The German text says “nach einer Begründung,” that is “for a

justification.” I also believe the word “justification” is in the

English translation. It should not have been interpreted as “Ausrede,”

that would be “prétexte” in French and that is something quite

different.

MR. ROBERTS: Whatever it reads in the translation, Witness, would you

agree that according to the entry in the diary, the Führer was still

looking for it, whether it was a reason or an excuse?

Now I want to ask you only one more question on this side of the case.

You know that Belgrade was bombed in, I think, April 1941?

MILCH: I heard about that from the Army report at the time.

MR. ROBERTS: Without any declaration of war, or any warning to the

civilian population at all, you heard that?

MILCH: That I do not know, no.

MR. ROBERTS: Did you not discuss it with Göring?

MILCH: The attack on Belgrade? No; I cannot remember.

MR. ROBERTS: Did not even he express regret, shall we say, regarding the

large-scale bombing of a large capital without even one hour warning to

the civilian population?

MILCH: I do not know. I cannot remember any such conversation.

MR. ROBERTS: That is murder, is it not?

[_There was no response._]

MR. ROBERTS: Perhaps you would rather not answer that question?

MILCH: I cannot answer “yes” or “no,” because I know nothing of the

circumstances of the attack. I do not know whether war had been

declared; I do not know whether a warning had been given. Neither do I

know whether Belgrade was a fortress, nor which targets were attacked in

Belgrade. I know of so many bombing attacks about which the same

questions could be asked in the same manner.

MR. ROBERTS: I asked the question, Witness, because we had the use of

the document in front of us, and knew that it was Hitler’s order that

Belgrade was to be suddenly destroyed by waves of bombers, without any

ultimatum, or any diplomatic arguments, or negotiations at all. Would I

put that question if I had not known of the document? Let me turn to

something else.

MILCH: May I say I have heard of this document only today because you

quoted it.

MR. ROBERTS: I want to put to you now an incident with regard to the

Camp Stalag Luft III at Sagan. Do you know about what I am talking?

MILCH: Yes, I know about that now.

MR. ROBERTS: Do you know that on 24 and 25 March 1944 about 80 air force

officers, British and Dominion, with some others, escaped from the

Stalag Luft III Camp?

MILCH: I know about this from the British interrogation camp in which I

was kept, where the whole case was posted up on the wall.

MR. ROBERTS: We will come to that in a moment. Do you know that of those

80, 50 were shot?

MILCH: Yes.

MR. ROBERTS: In various parts of Germany and the occupied countries from

Danzig to Saarbrücken; you have heard of that?

MILCH: I heard that about 50 were shot, but did not know where.

MR. ROBERTS: Have you heard that quite unusually the bodies were never

seen again, but that urns said to contain their ashes were brought back

to the camp; you heard of that?

MILCH: I heard of it in the camp where I was kept, from Mr. Anthony

Eden’s speech in the House of Commons.

MR. ROBERTS: You heard that although these officers were reported by

your Government as having been shot while offering resistance or trying

to escape, yet not one was wounded, and all 50 were shot dead.

MILCH: At first I heard only the official report in Germany, that these

officers had been shot while resisting or trying to escape. We did not

believe this version, and there was a lot of discussion about this

without precise knowledge. We were afraid that these men might have been

murdered.

MR. ROBERTS: You were afraid that murder had been committed. It does

appear likely, does it not?

MILCH: We got that impression, as the various details we heard could not

be pieced together.

MR. ROBERTS: It is quite clear that if that was murder, the order for

that murder would have to come from a high level, is it not?

MILCH: Certainly. I heard further details about this from the Inspector

General for Prisoners of War, General Westhoff, while both of us were in

captivity in England.

MR. ROBERTS: Now, I want to ask you, first of all, about the

Prisoner-of-War Organization. Was the Prisoner-of-War Organization a

department of the OKW?

MILCH: In my opinion, yes.

MR. ROBERTS: Which was called KGW, Kriegsgefangenenwesen?

MILCH: I cannot say anything about its organization, because I do not

know. I only knew that there was a chief of the Kriegsgefangenenwesen

with the OKW.

MR. ROBERTS: And was the chief of the Kriegsgefangenenwesen at that time

Major General Von Graevenitz?

MILCH: Von Graevenitz, yes.

MR. ROBERTS: This was an air force camp? Stalag Luft III was an air

force camp?

MILCH: Yes. So it was called, but I understand that all prisoners were

under the OKW. That is what I thought. I cannot, however, state this

definitely because I did not know much about that organization.

MR. ROBERTS: Was the directorate for supervising the air force camps, or

the inspectorate, rather, called Inspectorate Number 17?

MILCH: There was an inspectorate, which as its name indicated had to

deal with supervision. What it had to do and what were its tasks, I

cannot say. Whether it was just for interrogation, I do not know.

MR. ROBERTS: Was the head of that Major General Grosch?

MILCH: I cannot say, it is possible, I know the name but not whether he

held that post.

MR. ROBERTS: And the second in command, Colonel Waelde?

MILCH: Not known to me.

MR. ROBERTS: You were Number 2 in the Air Force at the Air Ministry in

March 1944, were you not?

MILCH: There were several Number 2 people at that time. I held the same

rank as the chief of the general staff, the chief of the personnel

office, and the chief of technical armament, who were independent of me

and on the same level. As to seniority, I ranked as second officer in

the Air Force.

MR. ROBERTS: Was there a conference in Berlin on the morning of

Saturday, the 25th of March, about this escape?

MILCH: I cannot remember.

MR. ROBERTS: Did not Göring speak to you about that conference?

MILCH: I have no recollection.

MR. ROBERTS: Did Göring never tell you that there was a conference

between Hitler, Himmler, himself, and Keitel on that Saturday morning?

MILCH: No. I do not know anything about that. I do not remember.

MR. ROBERTS: At which the order for the murder of these recaptured

prisoners of war was given?

MILCH: I cannot remember. According to what I heard later, the

circumstances were entirely different. I had information about this from

the previously mentioned General Westhoff and also from General

Bodenschatz.

MR. ROBERTS: General Westhoff we are going to see here as a witness. He

has made a statement about the matter saying . . .

MILCH: I beg your pardon. I could not hear you just now. The German is

coming through very faintly. I can hear you, but not the German

transmission.

MR. ROBERTS: General Westhoff . . .

MILCH: Yes.

MR. ROBERTS: . . . has made a statement . . .

MILCH: Yes.

MR. ROBERTS: . . . and we are going to see him as a witness.

MILCH: Yes.

MR. ROBERTS: So perhaps I had better not put his statement to you,

because he is going to give evidence. Perhaps that would be fairer from

the point of view of the Defense. But are you suggesting that action

against these officers, if they were murdered—to use your words—having

escaped from an air force camp, that action could have been taken

without the knowledge of Göring?

MILCH: I consider it quite possible in view of the great confusion

existing in the highest circles at that time.

MR. ROBERTS: High confusion in March 1944?

MILCH: All through there was terrible confusion.

MR. ROBERTS: But it is quite clear . . .

MILCH: Hitler interfered in all matters, and himself gave orders over

the heads of the chiefs of the Wehrmacht.

MR. ROBERTS: But did you never discuss this matter with Göring at all?

MILCH: No. I cannot remember ever speaking to Göring about this

question.

MR. ROBERTS: Do you not think this is a matter which reflects shame on

the Armed Forces of Germany?

MILCH: Yes; that is a great shame.

MR. ROBERTS: Yet Göring never spoke to you about it at all? Did you ever

speak to Keitel?

MILCH: I could not say. During that time I hardly ever saw Göring.

MR. ROBERTS: Did you ever speak to Keitel about it?

MILCH: No, never. I saw even less of Keitel than of Göring.

MR. ROBERTS: Was there not a General Foster or Foerster at the Air

Ministry?

MILCH: Yes, there was.

MR. ROBERTS: General Foerster?

MILCH: Yes.

MR. ROBERTS: Was he director of operations?

MILCH: No. He was chief of the Luftwehr. As such he had to deal with

replacements of personnel and he worked with the departments concerned,

with the General Staff, and also the Reich Marshal. During the war he

was also in charge of civil aviation, and in that capacity he worked

together with me, but during the war it was a very small job . . .

MR. ROBERTS: I was going to ask you, did he ever mention this shooting

to you?

MILCH: I have been asked that before, but try as I may I cannot

remember. It is possible that in the course of conversation he may have

told me that officers had been shot, but whether he did so, and in what

way, under what circumstances, I cannot recollect. I did not receive an

official report from him; I had no right to ask for one either.

MR. ROBERTS: If Foerster told you, did you ever report it to Göring?

MILCH: I cannot remember a conversation with Foerster about it: I do not

think I spoke to him. He did not give me a report either, which I should

have had to pass on to Göring. Such a report would have been given by

him to Göring direct, through quite different channels and much quicker.

MR. ROBERTS: Did you take any steps to prevent this shooting from being

carried out?

MILCH: When I first heard about it it was not clear to me what had

actually happened. But even if it had been clear, it was evident from

what Westhoff told me that it would unfortunately have been too late.

MR. ROBERTS: Why too late?

MILCH: Because Westhoff was the first officer to have knowledge of it.

When he was informed he was told that the order had already been carried

out. I may say that General Westhoff made this statement and will

confirm it.

MR. ROBERTS: Very well, you never went to Göring at all in the matter,

as you say.

MILCH: I do not know anything about it.

MR. ROBERTS: Now I am going to deal further with three short points.

With regard to the use of labor for the armament industry, Mr. Justice

Jackson has asked you questions on that. Was labor from concentration

camps used?

MILCH: Yes.

MR. ROBERTS: Would you just look at Document Number 1584-PS: That is

shorthand note 1357, 12 December, in the afternoon.

Is that a teletype from Göring to Himmler, dated 14 February 1944? There

are various code numbers; then, to Reichsführer SS—that was Himmler,

Reichsminister Himmler. Who actually sent that teletype? It is signed by

Göring, but he would not be dealing with questions of labor, would he?

MILCH: I could not say, I could not say from whom it originated.

MR. ROBERTS: That was a subject with which you dealt, was it not, the

provision of labor for air armament?

MILCH: Only while I had to do with air armament did I send demands for

labor to the respective offices. But this telegram did not come from my

office.

MR. ROBERTS: If it did not come from your office, whose office did it

come from?

MILCH: It deals with various matters, there is first the question of

another squadron.

MR. ROBERTS: Please answer the question, whose office did it come from?

MILCH: I cannot say that offhand.

MR. ROBERTS: Very well.

MILCH: I do not know.

MR. ROBERTS: Second sentence: “At the same time I request that a

substantial number of concentration camp prisoners be put at my disposal

for air armament, as this kind of labor has proved to be very useful.”

You had frequently used concentration camp labor, had you?

MILCH: Latterly, yes. May I ask, is the teletype dated the 15th and what

is the month?

MR. ROBERTS: Yes, I told you, Witness, 14 February 1944. It is on the

top.

MILCH: Yes, I could not read it here.

MR. ROBERTS: No, I quite understand. And did Himmler respond by

providing you with 90,000 further concentration camp prisoners? I refer

to Document 1584-PS, Number 3, dated 9 March 1944. It is to the “Most

Honored Reich Marshal” from Heinrich Himmler. It says: “At present

approximately 36,000 prisoners are employed for the Air Force. It is

proposed to bring the number up to 90,000.”

Then he refers in the last paragraph: “The transfer of aircraft

manufacturing plants underground requires a further 100,000 prisoners.”

Now, those were concentration camp internees, Witness?

MILCH: Yes; I see that from the letter.

MR. ROBERTS: You said you were almost ignorant of the conditions in

concentration camps?

MILCH: No; I do not know anything about that.

MR. ROBERTS: You have not seen the films taken when the camps were

captured?

MILCH: No.

MR. ROBERTS: The grim contrast—just wait a moment—the grim contrast

between the plump and well-fed guards and civilians and the skeletons of

the internees?

MILCH: I have not seen the film, but I saw photographs when I was in

England.

MR. ROBERTS: Did you close your eyes deliberately to what was going on

in Germany?

MILCH: No, it was not possible for us to see it.

MR. ROBERTS: You, in your position, could not know what was going on?

MILCH: It was absolutely impossible.

MR. ROBERTS: Now then, I just want to deal very shortly with a matter

upon which Mr. Justice Jackson touched, but he did not read the letter.

That is the question of the experiments for the purpose of Air Force

research. I am anxious to refer to as few documents as possible, but I

can give the reference.

Do you know that on 15 May 1941, and the reference is shorthand note

1848, Document Number 1602-PS, that Dr. Rascher wrote to Himmler?

MILCH: I did not know him. I think I mentioned that during my

interrogation.

MR. ROBERTS: He had very dangerous experiments to make for which no

human being would volunteer. Monkeys were not suitable, so he asked for

human subjects which Himmler at once provided—said he would be glad to

provide human subjects for the experiment. Now, that was in 1941. Did

you know that was taking place?

MILCH: No, I did not know anything about that.

MR. ROBERTS: Now, Rascher was . . .

MILCH: I did not know Rascher personally.

MR. ROBERTS: He was a doctor on the staff of the Air Force.

THE PRESIDENT: But, Mr. Roberts, this is not a letter to this witness,

is it?

MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, I am leading up to it. The next letter is a letter

signed by this witness. That was preliminary. Perhaps I had better come

to the letter which he signed now; I am much obliged.

I want to put to you now Document Number 343-PS, and I also want to put

to you, if the officer in charge of the documents would be so good, I

want to put to you Document Number 607-PS.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Roberts, he has already been cross-examined upon this

letter, has he not?

MR. ROBERTS: I did not think the letter was read or was dealt with

sufficiently. I believe Your Lordship thinks it was.

THE PRESIDENT: The letter was put to him. I do not know whether it was

actually read.

MR. ROBERTS: I shall be guided by the Court entirely. I know the matter

was touched upon. I felt perhaps the letter should be read but I may be

quite wrong.

THE PRESIDENT: I am told it was not read but the two letters were put to

him.

MR. ROBERTS: I agree. If Your Lordship would be good enough to bear with

me for a very few minutes I can perhaps deal with the matters I think

should be dealt with.

[_Turning to the witness._] You will see that on the 20th of May

1942—this is your letter to “Wolffy,” is it not, that is

Obergruppenführer Wolff, and that is signed by you is it not?

MILCH: Yes, I signed it. That is the letter which, as I said this

morning was submitted to me by the Medical Inspection department and

from which it appears that we wanted to dissociate ourselves from the

whole business as politely as possible.

MR. ROBERTS: The point of the letter is, if I may summarize it, that you

say: “In reference to your telegram of 12 May our Medical Inspection

department . . .”

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Roberts, if I remember right, when these letters were

put to the witness he said he had not read them; that he signed them

without reading them.

MR. ROBERTS: Well, My Lord, perhaps I had better leave the matter if

Your Lordship thinks I am going over ground which has been trodden too

often.

[_Turning to the witness._] Are you asking this Tribunal to believe that

you signed these two letters to Wolff, who was liaison officer, was he

not, between—who was Wolff?

MILCH: No, Wolff was not liaison officer, he was Himmler’s adjutant. He

sent a telegram to us, apparently for the attention of the Medical

Inspection department. The Medical Inspection department replied via my

office because for some reason or other it did not appear expedient to

reply direct. I stated in my interrogations that these letters, though

signed by me, were not dictated in my office, but that for this reply

from the Medical Inspection department my stationery was used as was

customary. I had nothing to do either with our high altitude experiments

or with the Medical Inspection department, nor was I in any way

connected with experiments by the SS.

MR. ROBERTS: Did you know that these pressure chamber experiments were

being carried out with human bodies, human souls, provided by Dachau?

MILCH: On whom they were made appears from the letter submitted to me by

the Medical Inspection department. In the Air Force we made many

experiments with our own medical officers who volunteered for it; and as

we did it with our own people we considered it to be our own affair. We,

therefore, did not want any experiments by the SS; we were not

interested in them. We had for a very long time experimented with our

own people. We did not need the SS, who interfered in a matter which did

not concern them; and we could never understand why the SS meddled with

this matter.

MR. ROBERTS: Did not Himmler write you a letter—the reference is

shorthand note 1852—in November 1942, that is Document Number 1617-PS,

in which he says: “Dear Milch: . . . both high pressure and cold water

experiments have been carried out. . . .” and that he, Himmler, provided

asocial persons and criminals from concentration camps? Do you remember

that letter?

MILCH: This letter was shown to me but I cannot remember this letter

either. I do not know why Himmler wrote to me at all. These letters were

always passed on direct by my office, without my seeing them, to the

respective offices of the Medical Inspection department and replied to

via my office. I was not in a position to do anything in this respect

because I did not know what it was all about, nor had I any idea of the

medical aspect.

MR. ROBERTS: If you say you know nothing about letters which you signed

I cannot carry the matter any further.

Now I want to deal with the last point.

MILCH: During the course of the day I had to sign several hundred

letters and I could not know what they dealt with in detail. In this

particular case it was a question for a specialist and I merely signed

in order to relieve the Medical Inspector of responsibility who, for the

reason mentioned this morning, did not want to sign himself.

MR. ROBERTS: Very well, I am leaving that point.

Now then, the last point. You said on Friday that a German general has

been executed for looting jewelry. Where did the looting take place?

MILCH: I cannot say that. I seem to recollect that it was in Belgrade.

The name of the general is General Wafer, this I still remember.

MR. ROBERTS: It was jewelry looted from Belgrade?

MILCH: That I cannot say. I know only what I said on Friday.

MR. ROBERTS: So the German authorities regarded the death penalty as a

suitable one for looting; apparently that is right.

MILCH: I could not hear the question.

MR. ROBERTS: Well, perhaps it was a comment. I will ask you the next

question. What was the value of the jewelry which was looted?

MILCH: I can say only that I do not know how it was stolen, or what was

stolen, or how valuable it was; but only that it was said to be jewelry

which he had appropriated and that he was sentenced to death.

MR. ROBERTS: Did Göring ever speak to you about his art collection he

was getting from occupied countries?

MILCH: I do not know anything about that.

MR. ROBERTS: May I read you a piece of evidence, shorthand note 2317,

and it is an order of Göring signed on the 5th of November 1940.

“Göring to the Chief of the Military Administration in Paris and

to the Einsatzstab Rosenberg:

“To dispose of the art objects brought to the Louvre in the

following order of priority:

“First, those art objects . . .”

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Roberts, he has never seen this document and he says

he knows nothing about it.

MR. ROBERTS: If your Lordship pleases, if you do not think I should put

it to him . . .

[_Turning to the witness._] You say Göring never discussed with you his

art collection?

MILCH: No.

MR. ROBERTS: Did you not know that valuable art objects, according to an

inventory over 21,000 objects, were taken from the western occupied

countries?

MILCH: No; that is not known to me.

MR. ROBERTS: What ought the general who looted the jewelry, perhaps from

Belgrade, to have done with it? Given it to the Führer, or given it to

Göring?

MILCH: I ask to be excused from answering this question.

GEN. RUDENKO: Will you please tell me when you heard of Hitler’s plan to

go to war with the Soviet Union? In January 1941?

MILCH: As I said on Friday, I heard in January from Reich Marshal Göring

that Hitler had told him he expected there would be an attack on Russia.

Then for several months I heard nothing more about the whole thing,

until by chance I found out from a subordinate that war with Russia was

imminent and preparations for the clothing of the troops were being

made.

GEN. RUDENKO: Did you know about Case Barbarossa?

MILCH: I had heard the name, and I heard the plan expounded at a Führer

conference with the commanders of the various army groups and armies 1

or 2 days before the attack.

GEN. RUDENKO: And when did this take place—1, 2 days before the

invasion?

MILCH: I will let you know the exact date in a minute.

GEN. RUDENKO: Please do.

MILCH: On 14 June. That is about eight days before the attack which took

place on the 22d.

GEN. RUDENKO: And before that, you had neither heard of, nor seen this

plan?

MILCH: I say that I had probably heard the name Barbarossa before.

GEN. RUDENKO: And how long before?

MILCH: That I cannot say, because during the months of January,

February, March, and also in April I was outside Germany and I did not

return until May. I was in Africa, Greece, Yugoslavia, and the West.

GEN. RUDENKO: I am interested in the period when you were in the High

Command of the German Air Force. Were you in Germany in December and

January?

MILCH: In December 1940.

GEN. RUDENKO: So?

MILCH: Only part of December as during that month I was in France and

also in Italy.

GEN. RUDENKO: And where were you in January 1941?

MILCH: I was in the West, and as far as I remember not one day in

Germany.

GEN. RUDENKO: But you just told us that in January 1941 you had a talk

with Göring about the plan of war against the Soviet Union.

MILCH: Yes, I . . .

GEN. RUDENKO: In January 1941?

MILCH: Yes, on 13 January, but I cannot say now whether I spoke to

Göring in France, or whether it was over the telephone, or whether I was

in Germany for a day or two. That I cannot say, I did not make a note of

it.

GEN. RUDENKO: Excuse me; what has a telephone conversation to do with an

attack on the Soviet Union?

MILCH: Not an attack on Russia, but an attack by Russia on Germany was

mentioned at that time, and we had . . .

GEN. RUDENKO: You mean to say you discussed over the telephone the

question of an attack by the Soviet Union on Germany?

MILCH: No, I have not stated anything like that, but I said I do not

know whether I received the information on a special line which could

not be tapped, or whether the Reich Marshal told me about it in France,

or whether on that particular day I was in Germany.

GEN. RUDENKO: And when did you discuss this question with Göring, and

when did Göring express his apprehension as to this war against the

Soviet Union?

MILCH: That was on 22 May.

GEN. RUDENKO: The 22nd of May 1941?

MILCH: 1941, yes.

GEN. RUDENKO: And where was this question discussed?

MILCH: In Veldenstein near Nuremberg.

GEN. RUDENKO: Did you discuss this question with Göring alone, or was

anybody else present at this conversation?

MILCH: At that time only with Göring. We were alone.

GEN. RUDENKO: And you assert that Göring did not wish to go to war with

Russia?

MILCH: That was my impression.

GEN. RUDENKO: So. And why did Göring not want this war against the

Soviet Union? This was a defensive war, was it not?

MILCH: Göring was opposed to such a war, because he wanted, all of us

did . . .

GEN. RUDENKO: He was opposed also to a defensive war?

MILCH: He personally was against any war.

GEN. RUDENKO: That is strange. Maybe you will be able to give me precise

reasons why Göring did not wish war against the Soviet Union.

MILCH: Because a war on two fronts, especially a war against Russia, as

I saw it, meant losing the war; and I believe that many fighting men and

others thought as I did.

GEN. RUDENKO: So you too were opposed to a war against the Soviet Union?

MILCH: Yes, most definitely so.

GEN. RUDENKO: Strange. Your statements are not very consistent. On the

one hand, you say that the Soviet Union was going to attack Germany, and

on the other hand that German officers did not want a war with the

Soviet Union.

MILCH: May I explain again. On 13 January Göring told me that Hitler had

the impression that Russia intended to march against Germany. That was

not Göring’s opinion, neither was it mine. I assume it was Hitler’s

opinion which he had expressed as his own.

GEN. RUDENKO: Excuse me. Do I understand that neither you nor Göring

thought this opinion of Hitler’s to be correct?

MILCH: I can only speak for myself. I often expressed it as my view that

Russia would not go against us. What Göring thought about it I could not

say. He did not talk to me about it. You should ask him.

GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, and now I shall ask you. You mean to say that you

personally did not share Hitler’s opinion? And you mean that Göring,

too, did not want a war against the Soviet Union?

MILCH: On 22 May, when I spoke to Göring about this matter and urgently

requested him to do everything to prevent a war with Russia, he told me

that he had used the same arguments with Hitler but that it was

impossible to get Hitler to change his mind; he had made his decision

and no power on earth could influence him.

GEN. RUDENKO: I see. You mean that Göring was opposed to a war with the

Soviet Union, because he thought it impracticable while you were at war

with England, and he wanted to prevent war on two fronts?

MILCH: From a purely military point of view, yes; and I believe that if

war had been avoided at that time it would not have come about later.

GEN. RUDENKO: And you seriously maintain that it is possible to talk

about a preventive war so far ahead, and at the same time to work out

Case Barbarossa and all the directives to implement it, as well as

gaining allies for the attack on Russia? Do you seriously believe in the

preventive character of such a war?

MILCH: I do not understand the meaning of the question.

GEN. RUDENKO: Do you think one could make known that the Soviet Union

was going to attack Germany, and at the same time work out an aggressive

plan against the Soviet Union, and this as early as December 1940, as

appears from the dates of the official documents?

MILCH: As I understand it, Hitler, expecting an attack by Russia—if he

really expected it—said that he had to meet a Russian invasion by a

preventive war. This, however, has nothing to do with the opinion for

which I have been asked here. Speaking for myself, I did not

unreservedly hold the view that Russia would invade us. Without being

able to judge the situation as a whole, I personally believed that

Russia in her own interest, which I tried to visualize, would not do

this.

GEN. RUDENKO: I understand. I should like to put a few questions to you

with regard to the prisoners of war. The employment of prisoners of war,

especially from the Soviet Union, on work in the aircraft industry has

already been mentioned here.

MILCH: Yes.

GEN. RUDENKO: What is your attitude to employing prisoners of war on

work against their own country? What do you think of that?

MILCH: It is, of course, not a nice thing to do; but as far as I know it

was also done to our prisoners of war by all the other countries.

GEN. RUDENKO: I am talking of Germany now. You say it is not a nice

thing. Is not that a rather mild way of putting it?

MILCH: It depends upon what the others do. All laws of warfare are based

on reciprocity, as long as there is any reciprocity.

GEN. RUDENKO: I should like you to answer my question. What was the

German High Command’s attitude to this kind of employment? Do you

consider that by this employment the regulations of international law

were being violated?

MILCH: That is a moot point which even now is not clear to me. I only

know that orders were given to employ them, and to use these men, as

well as women, in the struggle for our existence.

GEN. RUDENKO: Do you consider this to be a legitimate order?

MILCH: I cannot judge that; that depends upon conditions and, as I said,

upon reciprocity.

DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I ask to have this question and answer

stricken from the record. The witness has been asked to give a legal

opinion, and it is not for him to do so; since the question is not

admissible, the answer too should be stricken.

THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko?

GEN. RUDENKO: I should like to say I did not realize that the witness

did not know whether or not this was a violation of international law. I

had every reason to believe that the witness was competent to answer

this question, the more so as at the beginning of his statement today,

and on Friday, he mentioned the ten rules of the soldier, which he said

must not be broken as they were based on international law. I thought,

therefore, the witness to be competent to answer the question concerning

the use of prisoners of war by the Luftwaffe against their own country.

If the Tribunal considers this question to be inadmissible, I will of

course withdraw it.

THE PRESIDENT: The question might have been framed differently, as to

whether it was not a breach of the rules set out in the soldiers’ pay

book. However, as to international law, that is one of the matters which

the Tribunal has got to decide, and upon that, of course, we do not wish

the evidence of witnesses.

GEN. RUDENKO: Yes. I still have two questions to put to this witness.

THE PRESIDENT: We wanted to rise at half-past 4. If it is your intention

to ask some more questions, perhaps we had better rise now, or, have you

finished?

GEN. RUDENKO: We had better call a recess now, because I may still have

a few questions to put to this witness.

[_The Tribunal adjourned until 12 March 1946 at 1000 hours._]

SEVENTY-NINTH DAY

Tuesday, 12 March 1946

_Morning Session_

THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, have you concluded your interrogation?

GEN. RUDENKO: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Does the French Prosecution wish to ask any questions?

Dr. Stahmer, do you wish to examine further?

DR. STAHMER: No, Sir.

THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness can retire.

[_The witness left the stand._]

DR. STAHMER: I call the next witness, Colonel of the Luftwaffe, Bernd

von Brauchitsch.

[_The witness Von Brauchitsch took the stand._]

THE PRESIDENT: What is your name?

BERND VON BRAUCHITSCH (Witness): Bernd von Brauchitsch.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat the oath after me. I swear by God—the

Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will

withhold and add nothing.

[_The witness repeated the oath in German._]

THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down if you wish.

DR. STAHMER: Witness, what position did you hold on the staff of the

Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe?

VON BRAUCHITSCH: I was the first military adjutant of the

Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe. I held the rank of chief adjutant.

I had the job of making the daily arrangements as ordered by the

Commander-in-Chief and working out the adjutants’ duty roster. The

military position had to be reported daily; military reports and

messages only to the extent that they were not communicated by the

offices themselves. I had no command function.

DR. STAHMER: In the course of your work did you know that on 25 March

1944 from the prison camp of Sagan, Stalag Luft III, 75 English Air

Force officers had escaped?

VON BRAUCHITSCH: I knew of this as a special event, as at that time it

was reported that a number of air force officers had escaped.

DR. STAHMER: Can you give us some information about the fate of these

officers after their escape?

VON BRAUCHITSCH: The fate of these officers is not known to me.

DR. STAHMER: Were you not ever informed that 50 of these officers were

shot ostensibly while trying to escape?

VON BRAUCHITSCH: I heard only much later that a number of these officers

were said to have been shot.

DR. STAHMER: Can you tell us under what circumstances these shootings

were carried out?

VON BRAUCHITSCH: I do not know anything about that.

DR. STAHMER: Did Reich Marshal Göring order the shooting, or did he have

any part in these measures?

VON BRAUCHITSCH: I know nothing about the Reich Marshal having taken

part or given an order in this matter.

DR. STAHMER: Do you know of the attitude of Hitler with regard to the

treatment of so-called terror-fliers who were shot down?

VON BRAUCHITSCH: In the spring of 1944 the number of civilian air-raid

casualties by machine-gunning increased suddenly. These attacks were

directed against civilians working in the fields; against secondary

railroads and stations without any military importance; against

pedestrians and cyclists, all within the homeland. This must have been

the reason for Hitler giving not only defense orders, but also orders

for measures against the fliers themselves. As far as I know, Hitler

favored the most drastic measures. Lynching was said to be countenanced.

DR. STAHMER: What was the attitude of the Reich Marshal of the Luftwaffe

to this order?

VON BRAUCHITSCH: The Commander-in-Chief and the Chief of the General

Staff expressed their opinion that a most serious view must be taken of

these attacks, which were directed solely against civilians.

Notwithstanding, no special measure should be taken against these

airmen. The suggestion that those who bailed out should be lynched and

not afforded protection could not be agreed with. In view of Hitler’s

instructions, the Luftwaffe was forced to deal with these questions.

They endeavored to prevent these ideas of Hitler, of which they

disapproved, from being put into practice. The solution was to pretend

that measures would be taken which, however, were not actually carried

out.

Then I was given the task, which was outside my competence, of

conferring with the High Command of the Armed Forces about the

definition of the term “terror-fliers.” All those cases which

constituted violations of international law and criminal acts were the

subject of subsequent discussions and correspondence. These definitions

were meant to prevent lynching. The lengthy correspondence also shows

the endeavors of the office to put the matter off. At the end of June

1944, the term “terror-fliers” was defined. The Stalag was instructed to

report all cases of violation, but not to take any action. Thus we

avoided giving an order of the character Hitler had wanted.

DR. STAHMER; In your opinion, therefore, could we say that the measures

directed by Hitler were not carried out by the Luftwaffe?

VON BRAUCHITSCH: Yes. It can be said that the measures directed by

Hitler were not carried out. As confirmed by the commanders of the air

fleets, their men did not receive any orders to shoot enemy airmen or to

turn them over to the SD.

DR. STAHMER: Do you know anything about the Luftwaffe having received

directives to take hostages or to shoot them?

VON BRAUCHITSCH: I do not know of any directive or order dealing with

hostages.

DR. STAHMER: Now one more question: Can you give us any information

about the treatment of the five enemy airmen who in March 1945 bailed

out over the Schorfheide and were captured?

VON BRAUCHITSCH: In March 1945, an American four-engined bomber was shot

down after an attack over the Schorfheide. Part of the crew saved

themselves by jumping. Some of them were injured and sent to a hospital.

The observer, an American captain of the reserve, who in civilian life

was a film director in Hollywood, on the following day was interrogated

by the Reich Marshal himself about this mission and his bringing down.

DR. STAHMER: I have no more questions for this witness.

THE PRESIDENT: Do any other defendants’ counsel wish to ask the witness

any questions?

DR. LATERNSER: I have only a few questions for this witness.

[_Turning to the witness._] What post did you hold when the war started?

VON BRAUCHITSCH: At the outbreak of war I was at the war academy and had

just left my squadron.

DR. LATERNSER: Can one say that the outbreak of war caused a happy

feeling among the professional soldiers? What was the mood like at that

time?

VON BRAUCHITSCH: No, one cannot say that the outbreak of war was greeted

with enthusiasm. Rather we faced the fact with great gravity. As young

soldiers, we saw our mission in training and educating our men for the

defense of our country.

DR. LATERNSER: What posts did you hold during the war? Were you ever on

the staff of an air fleet?

VON BRAUCHITSCH: I was never on the staff of an air fleet. Except for a

short time, when I served as group commander, I was throughout adjutant

of the Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe.

DR. LATERNSER: As chief adjutant, as you said before, to the

Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe, you had a lot of inside information

about the Luftwaffe?

VON BRAUCHITSCH: Insofar as material was available, yes.

DR. LATERNSER: Now, according to your inside information, did the chiefs

of air fleets have any influence on political decisions or the conduct

of the war?

VON BRAUCHITSCH: According to my information the chiefs of air fleets

had no influence on any political decisions. Their job was the technical

execution of the orders received, and orders on the conduct of the air

war were given more and more by Hitler himself.

DR. LATERNSER: Did the chiefs of air fleets make any suggestions to use

more severe methods in the conduct of the war?

VON BRAUCHITSCH: I do not know of any suggestions of that kind made by

chiefs of air fleets. They were professional soldiers who acted

according to orders.

DR. LATERNSER: I have still one question: Was there any co-ordination

between the branches of the Wehrmacht? Was this co-ordination of a

purely official nature or did it go farther?

VON BRAUCHITSCH: There was co-ordination between the leading local

authorities at the front; at a higher level it was effected by the

Führer himself.

DR. LATERNSER: I have no more questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Does any other defendant’s counsel wish to ask any

questions? Do the Prosecution wish to cross-examine?

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I would ask that the witness be shown Document

Number 1156-PS of the United States documents.

[_Document 1156-PS was submitted to the witness._]

Do you recognize this document, Witness?

VON BRAUCHITSCH: No, I do not know this document.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I call your attention to the date, the 20th of

March 1941, and I call your attention to the fact that it purports to be

a report to Reich Marshal Göring at the 19th of March 1941 meeting.

VON BRAUCHITSCH: While in the service I attended military conferences

only if they did not take place at the Führer’s Headquarters, or if they

were not personal discussions. I have not seen this document and I do

not know the facts.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Let me call your attention to Item 2, which refers

to you, I take it, and which reads:

“The directive worked out by the Wi regarding destructive

measures to be undertaken by the Luftwaffe in Case Barbarossa

was agreed to by the Reich Marshal. One copy was handed to

Captain Von Brauchitsch for transmission to the General Staff of

the Luftwaffe.”

And I ask you whether that states the facts.

VON BRAUCHITSCH: I cannot remember these facts, neither can I give any

information about the contents of the letter mentioned here.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You knew about Case Barbarossa, did you not?

VON BRAUCHITSCH: I did not hear about Case Barbarossa until the

beginning of 1941. I was not present at the conferences.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But you did know that certain destructive measures

were planned to be undertaken in connection with that by the Luftwaffe,

did you not?

VON BRAUCHITSCH: I know only of the first missions given to the

Luftwaffe, and I recollect that attacks on airfields were ordered.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did it not also provide for attacks against cities,

particularly St. Petersburg?

VON BRAUCHITSCH: To my recollection and knowledge, at the time this

letter was written nothing was said about these targets but only about

attacks on airfields, which were the main targets of the Luftwaffe.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I will ask that the witness be shown Document

Number 735-PS, in evidence as Exhibit Number GB-151.

[_Document 735-PS was submitted to the witness._]

That is in evidence and appears to be a most secret document of which

only three copies were made, is that correct?

VON BRAUCHITSCH: May I read this letter first before I answer the

question?

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I call your attention first to the signature at the

end of it and ask you if you recognize it?

VON BRAUCHITSCH: The signature is Warlimont.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Who was Warlimont?

VON BRAUCHITSCH: Warlimont was the Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces

Operations Staff.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you knew him well and he knew you well, is that

not so?

VON BRAUCHITSCH: I knew him by sight and on this occasion I spoke to him

for the first time.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: On the occasion of this meeting that is recorded in

these minutes, is that the occasion when you first met and spoke to

Warlimont?

VON BRAUCHITSCH: When I first spoke to him officially, yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That was on the 6th of June 1944, when this meeting

was held?

VON BRAUCHITSCH: According to this letter, yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, I call your attention to Paragraph Number 1 of

the minutes of this meeting, from which it appears that

Obergruppenführer Kaltenbrunner opened this meeting with a report that a

conference on the question of the fliers had been held shortly before

with the Reich Marshal, the Reich Foreign Minister and the Reich Führer

SS. That is the opening of it, is it not?

VON BRAUCHITSCH: I know nothing of the record of this conference or even

that it took place.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Who was the Reich Marshal at that time?

VON BRAUCHITSCH: I remember the fact because on the 6th of June the

invasion started and during the night of the 5th to the 6th I phoned

Reich Marshal Göring himself at 0200 hours and informed him that the

invasion had begun. In the morning he left Veldenstein for Klessheim in

order to attend in the afternoon a conference there on the situation.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And this meeting is said to have been held in

Klessheim on the afternoon of the 6th of June, is it not?

VON BRAUCHITSCH: I said once before that I do not know anything of the

meeting as such and of the subject of the discussion.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes, I understand, you were not present. Göring was

Reich Marshal; is that right?

VON BRAUCHITSCH: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Ribbentrop was Foreign Minister at that time, was

he not?

VON BRAUCHITSCH: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And who was the Reich Führer SS?

VON BRAUCHITSCH: Himmler.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, it was as a result of that meeting at which

the Foreign Minister—just follow the next sentence, “. . . the Foreign

Minister who wished to include every type of terror attack on the native

civilian population. . . .” It was agreed that this conference, which

you did attend, was to take place; is that not the sense of the first

paragraph?

VON BRAUCHITSCH: In the first place, I was not at this meeting and,

secondly, I do not know anything about the subject as shown in evidence

here.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, were you not at the meeting with

Kaltenbrunner which Kaltenbrunner called?

VON BRAUCHITSCH: I was not at the meeting with Kaltenbrunner which is

mentioned here.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Despite the signature of Warlimont on these minutes

which says you were?

VON BRAUCHITSCH: In spite of the signature. May I first read the whole

document before I give a definite answer?

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Read the last sentence. Witness, I may be

misinterpreting this. It does not say you were present, but it does say

that you gave them this information. I ask you to look at the last

paragraph and say whether that is not true?

VON BRAUCHITSCH: The last paragraph of this document, above the

signature, can only refer to a conference which, if I remember

correctly, took place in the late afternoon of 6 June in General

Warlimont’s quarters and which I have mentioned in my previous

statement.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think I was confused about the two meetings and

that these minutes do not show you to have been present. There was such

a conference as Warlimont describes but it was not the same conference

at which Kaltenbrunner was present, is that correct?

VON BRAUCHITSCH: Yes, that is correct. I know only of this one meeting

in the late afternoon of 6 June between Warlimont and myself.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And that is the conference to which he refers in

the first paragraph?

VON BRAUCHITSCH: No, the conference in the afternoon has nothing to do

with the first paragraph which I just read, and has no connection with

it.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The third paragraph had no connection with the

first meeting, you say?

VON BRAUCHITSCH: Paragraph Number 3 has no connection with Paragraph

Number 1. I had no knowledge of Paragraph Number 1. I mentioned before

that I was given the task of conferring with the OKW about the

definition of acts which were to be considered as violations of

international law, and criminal acts.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Let us ask it once more so we will have no

misunderstanding about it. The conference referred to in Paragraph

Number 3 of Warlimont’s minutes is a conference between you and him

later that afternoon and had nothing to do with the Kaltenbrunner

conference which was held earlier in the day.

VON BRAUCHITSCH: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, what was the situation in the beginning of

1944 with reference to the bombing of German cities?

VON BRAUCHITSCH: The situation was that the air raids had increased in

intensity and in the beginning of 1944 they were very heavy.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That was becoming very embarrassing to the Reich

Marshal, was it not?

VON BRAUCHITSCH: Of course it was very unpleasant for the Luftwaffe,

because their defensive strength was too weak to stave off these

attacks.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And they were being blamed somewhat and the Reich

Marshal was being blamed for the air attacks, was he not?

VON BRAUCHITSCH: Of course, that goes without saying.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the Reich Marshal was in the embarrassing

position of having assured the German people back in 1939 that they

could be protected against air attacks on the German cities. You

understood that fact, did you not?

VON BRAUCHITSCH: I understand that to be so, but I also know that the

conditions in 1939, which led to this statement, were entirely different

from those of 1944 when the whole world was against us.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But the fact was that German cities were being

bombed and the German people had looked to the Reich Marshal to protect

them, is that not a fact?

VON BRAUCHITSCH: It is clear that the German people expected the

Luftwaffe to use all available means to ward off these attacks.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, what were the relations between Göring and

Hitler at this time?

VON BRAUCHITSCH: May I ask to have the question repeated? I did not

understand it clearly.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What was the relation between Göring and Hitler at

this time? Was there any change in the relations as this bombing of

German cities progressed?

VON BRAUCHITSCH: The relations between the Reich Marshal and the Führer

were no doubt worse than they had been before. Whether that was only due

to the conditions caused by the air warfare is not known to me.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You were very close to Reich Marshal Göring

throughout this period, the entire period of the war, were you not?

VON BRAUCHITSCH: I do not know what you mean by close in the relations

between a commander-in-chief and his adjutant.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, you were particularly friendly; he had great

confidence in you and you had great regard for him. Is that not a fact?

VON BRAUCHITSCH: I can confirm that, but unfortunately only on very rare

occasions did the Reich Marshal disclose his real motives.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You were with him on the 20th day of April 1945,

when he sent the telegram proposing to take over the government of

Germany himself, and was arrested and condemned to death?

VON BRAUCHITSCH: Yes, I was present at that time.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the SS seized you and the Reich Marshal and

several others and searched your houses, seized all your papers, and

took you prisoner, did they not?

VON BRAUCHITSCH: It is correct that on 23 April at 1900 hours we were

surrounded. The Reich Marshal was led to his room and from that moment

on he was kept closely guarded; later we were separated and put into

solitary confinement. Finally we were separated from him altogether by

SS troops stationed at the Berghof.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And this occurred at Berchtesgaden?

VON BRAUCHITSCH: It happened at Berchtesgaden.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think you have told us that you were all supposed

to be shot by the SS at the time of the surrender and were supposed to

approve it by your own signature. Is that correct?

VON BRAUCHITSCH: No, that is not quite correct.

I know that an order existed that the Reich Marshal with his family and

his entourage should be shot in Berlin at the time of capitulation.

The second thing you mentioned refers to something else, namely, that we

were to be compelled to report voluntarily to the SS. I must say, in

order to be just, that this SS leader would far rather not have had us

there at that time so as not to have to carry out this order. At that

time we were already separated from the Commander-in-Chief.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What was the state of your knowledge about the

activities of the SS? What was the SS and what was its relation to the

Wehrmacht at this time? What was its relation to the Luftwaffe? Tell us

about the SS.

VON BRAUCHITSCH: I can only say this much, that SS was a comprehensive

term, that the SD, Gestapo, and Waffen-SS were quite separate

subdivisions, and that the Gestapo was an instrument of repression which

restricted much personal freedom.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the Waffen-SS likewise, is that not a fact?

VON BRAUCHITSCH: The Waffen-SS was a military force. I myself had

neither trouble nor any friction with them.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But what about the SS proper? Witness, you know

this situation about the SS, I am sure, and you impress me as wanting to

tell us candidly what you know about this situation, and I wish you

would tell us a little, what the influence of the SS was on these

situations.

VON BRAUCHITSCH: I pointed out once before that as a purely military

adjutant I am able to give you information only about the Luftwaffe, but

I am not in a position to say anything about general things of which I

have no expert knowledge but merely personal opinions.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, was not the SS the subject of a good deal of

discussion among you officers, and was not everybody aware that the SS

was an organization like the Gestapo which was repressive and cruel?

VON BRAUCHITSCH: In the Luftwaffe we had so many troubles of our own

because of the growing air power of the enemy that we had no time to

worry about anything else.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But you knew, did you not, about the campaign

against the Jews of Germany and the Jews of occupied countries?

VON BRAUCHITSCH: I did not know about the campaign against the Jews as

it has been presented here and in the press.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, I do not want to interrogate you on what is

in the press, but do you want the Tribunal to understand that you had no

knowledge of a campaign against the Jews in Germany?

VON BRAUCHITSCH: I only knew that some of the Jews were taken to

ghettos. I had, however, no knowledge of the cruelties against Jews as

now published in the press.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Your father was Field Marshal, was he not?

VON BRAUCHITSCH: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: At what period was he Field Marshal?

VON BRAUCHITSCH: Field Marshal is a military rank which he held from

1940 until now.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: He has never been deprived of his rank, is that a

fact?

VON BRAUCHITSCH: He was never deprived of his rank.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: There came a time when your father, as you know,

disagreed with Hitler as to military programs?

VON BRAUCHITSCH: I know that my father had great difficulties with

Hitler concerning political and military questions, and that this led to

his retirement in December 1941.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you not say to the interrogator who examined

you for the United States that he retired from active command in 1941?

VON BRAUCHITSCH: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And what did you understand to be the reason for

his retirement?

You gave the reasons as follows, that neither in the military nor in the

political considerations did he see eye to eye with Hitler, and could

not come to any accord and, since he could not make his own opinions

prevail, he desired to manifest his dissent by resigning, and that

specifically also referred to religious questions.

VON BRAUCHITSCH: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is true, is it not?

VON BRAUCHITSCH: That is correct, and I still maintain it.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I hope you are proud of it.

You were also asked this:

“And from 1941 to the end of the war, do you know what he was

doing?”

And you answered:

“Well, he had, through his second marriage, a little house in a

small town in Silesia, Bockenheim, and he occupied himself with

studies of family history and also with forestry, economics, and

hunting, but did not take part . . .”

VON BRAUCHITSCH: Only with questions of military history and

agriculture.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Beg pardon. I did not get that.

VON BRAUCHITSCH: He was interested only in economic questions and

hunting, but not in military questions.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Not in military, yes.

“. . . but did not take part in any sort of bloody political

endeavors.”

You said that, did you not?

VON BRAUCHITSCH: May I ask to hear the question once more.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: This is your answer in full. You interrupted me.

This is your answer to the interrogator:

“Well, he had, through his second marriage, a little house in a

small town in Silesia, Bockenheim, and he occupied himself with

studies of family history and also with forestry, economics and

hunting, but did not take part in any sort of bloody political

endeavors.”

And, with, the exception of economics, you still stand by that answer,

do you not?

VON BRAUCHITSCH: I have never said that he ever took part in bloody

things. It must be an error. I never saw this record again. I did not

sign it.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I have not made myself clear. You said he did not

take part in any bloody political endeavors. That is what this says you

said.

VON BRAUCHITSCH: He did not take part; but I did not say anything of a

bloody movement.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You did not use these terms in the examination?

VON BRAUCHITSCH: No, I cannot remember having said that. I did not sign

the protocol and I did not see it again after the interrogation.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you say that you did not use these words on the

26th of February 1946 to Captain Horace Hahn, interrogator?

VON BRAUCHITSCH: I say I did not use the words “take part in any bloody

endeavors,” _et cetera_, because that expression is foreign to me.

Neither do I know in what connection it is supposed to have occurred.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, you do not know of any that he did partake

in, do you?

VON BRAUCHITSCH: No. My father retired.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Absolutely from this whole Nazi outfit. He

disassociated himself from them and retired to a little village rather

than go on with the program he did not agree with, did he not? Is that

not a fact?

VON BRAUCHITSCH: Yes.

HERR HORST PELCKMANN (Counsel for SS): I believe that I have no longer

any formal right to question this witness after Justice Jackson has

cross-examined him, but I should be grateful if I might be permitted to

do so since Justice Jackson questioned the witness also about the SS.

THE PRESIDENT: The witness’ statement about the SS was that he knew

nothing about it. What ground does it give for a cross-examination by

you?

HERR PELCKMANN: He was asked whether he was guarded by the SS on

Obersalzberg who also had the order to shoot him and Göring too. I

should like to have it made clear whether that was SS or SD.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

HERR PELCKMANN: I therefore ask the witness: Do you know whether these

people whom you have just mentioned were members of the SS or SD? Do you

know the difference, Witness?

VON BRAUCHITSCH: I have a general idea of the difference. I believe that

the troops which had the task of guarding us were SS, but that the

Sicherheitsdienst (SD) had been given the special order.

HERR PELCKMANN: Thank you.

THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the other counsel for the Prosecution wish to

cross-examine?

Dr. Stahmer, do you wish to re-examine?

DR. STAHMER: I have only two short questions.

Colonel Von Brauchitsch, can you tell us something about the relations

between the Reich Marshal and Himmler?

VON BRAUCHITSCH: As far as I know and am able to give information, in

their outward relations Himmler and Göring exercised the utmost

circumspection, but there was no real personal contact between the two.

DR. STAHMER: Can you tell us whether the German people, until the last

moment, still had confidence in Reich Marshal Göring, and showed it on

special occasions? Can you mention any particular instances?

VON BRAUCHITSCH: I can mention two cases.

The first one was at the end of 1944 or the beginning of 1945—I cannot

say the exact date—in a public air raid shelter. The Reich Marshal had

no guards or escort and chatted with the people, and they greeted him

with the old cry, “Hermann, halt’ die Ohren steif! (Hermann, keep your

chin up).”

Another example was on the trip from Berlin to Berchtesgaden during the

night of the 20th to 21st April. In the morning or towards noon of the

21st the Reich Marshal arrived at a town in Sudetengau, where he made a

short stop for breakfast at an inn. After a short while the market place

became so crowded with people asking for his autograph, that we could

not get his car through the crowd. Here too, he was greeted by the old

cry, “Hermann.”

DR. STAHMER: I have no more questions.

THE PRESIDENT: The witness may retire.

DR. STAHMER: As next witness, I call State Secretary Paul Körner.

[_The witness Körner took the stand._]

THE PRESIDENT: Is your name Paul Körner?

PAUL KÖRNER (Witness): Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the

Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will

withhold and add nothing.

[_The witness repeated the oath in German._]

THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down if you wish.

DR. STAHMER: Witness, what official post did you hold before the

capitulation?

KÖRNER: I was State Secretary in the Prussian State Ministry.

DR. STAHMER: In this capacity were you one of the Reich Marshal’s close

collaborators?

KÖRNER: Yes.

DR. STAHMER: When did you first meet the Reich Marshal?

KÖRNER: In 1926.

DR. STAHMER: When were you selected by him to collaborate?

KÖRNER: At the end of 1931.

DR. STAHMER: In what capacity?

KÖRNER: I became his secretary.

DR. STAHMER: When were you taken over by the Civil Service?

KÖRNER: In April 1933. Pardon; the previous date was 1931.

THE PRESIDENT: The translator said the previous date was 1931; which

date was 1931?

DR. STAHMER: In 1931 he first came into contact with Göring and became

his private secretary. In 1933 he entered the Civil Service.

DR. STAHMER: What post was given to you?

KÖRNER: I became State Secretary in the Prussian State Ministry.

DR. STAHMER: What do you know about the institution of the Secret State

Police, the Gestapo?

KÖRNER: In the first months after the seizure of power the Secret State

Police evolved from the Political Police Department Ia. Basically the

Political Police Department remained; it was only reorganized under the

name of Secret State Police.

DR. STAHMER: What was its range of activities?

KÖRNER: Its main task was to watch the enemies of the State.

DR. STAHMER: Have you any information about the establishment of

concentration camps?

KÖRNER: I know that at that time concentration camps were established.

DR. STAHMER: What purposes did they serve?

KÖRNER: They were supposed to receive enemies of the State.

DR. STAHMER: What do you mean by “receive”?

KÖRNER: Elements hostile to the State, mainly Communists, were to be

concentrated in these camps.

DR. STAHMER: And what was to be done with them there?

KÖRNER: They were to be taken into protective custody, and, as far as I

remember, they were also to be re-educated so that later on they could

be incorporated into the community of the people.

DR. STAHMER: Do you know anything of the treatment meted out to the

inmates?

KÖRNER: As far as I know, the treatment was always good.

DR. STAHMER: Did you ever hear anything about unauthorized concentration

camps?

KÖRNER: Yes, in 1933, in various places unauthorized concentration camps

were established.

DR. STAHMER: By whom?

KÖRNER: I remember that one was established in Breslau by SA

Gruppenführer Heines; and one in Stettin. Whether there were any others,

I do not know.

DR. STAHMER: In Stettin?

KÖRNER: I think it was Karpfenstein, but I cannot say for certain.

DR. STAHMER: And what became of these camps?

KÖRNER: When the Reich Marshal heard about them he had them instantly

disbanded because they were established without his permission.

DR. STAHMER: What was the Reich Marshal’s attitude when he heard of

complaints?

KÖRNER: He always followed them up immediately.

DR. STAHMER: Do you know of any case where he took specially strong

measures?

KÖRNER: Yes, I can remember the case of Thälmann.

DR. STAHMER: What happened in that case?

KÖRNER: It had come to the Reich Marshal’s knowledge that Thälmann had

not been treated in the way the Reich Marshal wished. He immediately

followed the matter up and had Thälmann brought to him.

DR. STAHMER: Who was Thälmann?

KÖRNER: Thälmann was one of the leaders of the Communist Party and a

communist member of the Reichstag.

DR. STAHMER: And how did the Reich Marshal speak to Thälmann?

KÖRNER: He had him brought into his office and asked him to tell him

exactly why he had made a complaint.

DR. STAHMER: And then?

KÖRNER: Thälmann was very reticent at first, because he feared a trap.

When the Reich Marshal spoke to him in a humane manner, he realized that

he could speak freely. He told the Reich Marshal that on several

occasions he had not been treated properly. The Reich Marshal promised

him immediate redress and gave the necessary instructions. He also asked

Thälmann to notify him immediately if it happened again. In addition he

ordered that any complaints made by Thälmann should be passed on to him.

DR. STAHMER: Do you know how long the Reich Marshal was in charge of the

Gestapo in the concentration camps?

KÖRNER: Until the spring of 1934; I believe it was March or April.

DR. STAHMER: Under whom did they come then?

KÖRNER: By order of the Führer, they came under the competence of

Reichsführer Himmler.

DR. STAHMER: What do you know about the events in connection with the

Röhm revolt on 30 June 1934?

KÖRNER: That a Röhm revolt was planned I heard when I was with the Reich

Marshal in Essen, where we were attending the wedding of Gauleiter

Terboven. During the wedding festivities Himmler arrived and made a

report to the Führer. Later the Führer drew the Reich Marshal aside and

told him in confidence of Röhm’s designs.

DR. STAHMER: Do you also know what he told him?

KÖRNER: I can only say that what Himmler told the Führer was also

brought to Göring’s knowledge.

DR. STAHMER: Do you not know any further details?

KÖRNER: No, I do not know any further details, but I think that is

sufficient.

DR. STAHMER: What instructions did Göring receive?

KÖRNER: The Führer instructed Göring to return to Berlin immediately

after the wedding festivities, and the Führer went to southern Germany

to investigate the reports personally.

DR. STAHMER: When was this wedding?

KÖRNER: As far as I remember, it was 2 days before the Röhm Putsch.

DR. STAHMER: Do you know whether, on the day after the Röhm Putsch, the

Reich Marshal was with Hitler?

KÖRNER: No. The Reich Marshal was in Berlin. We returned to Berlin the

same evening.

DR. STAHMER: And on the day after the Röhm Putsch on 30 June, that is on

1 July?

KÖRNER: The Reich Marshal was in Berlin.

DR. STAHMER: Do you know whether there was a conversation between him

and Hitler?

KÖRNER: Yes. I remember that the Reich Marshal drove to the Reich

Chancellery to report several things to the Führer. In particular the

Reich Marshal had heard that on this occasion innocent people also might

have or rather had fallen victim. Therefore, he wanted to ask the Führer

to stop the whole action immediately.

DR. STAHMER: Was that done?

KÖRNER: Yes, that was done.

DR. STAHMER: In what way?

KÖRNER: After the report of the Reich Marshal, the Führer himself issued

an order that no further unauthorized action should take place, that the

action was over, and if any guilty people were still found they should

be brought before the ordinary courts which would decide whether or not

proceedings should be brought against these people.

DR. STAHMER: Do you know whether the Reich Marshal had anything to do

with the action against the Jews during the night of 9 November 1938?

KÖRNER: No, the Reich Marshal had definitely nothing to do with it and

had no inkling of it.

DR. STAHMER: How do you know?

KÖRNER: Because I was with the Reich Marshal on 9 November in Munich—he

was always there on that day. The same evening we went to Berlin. Had

the Reich Marshal known anything about it, he would certainly have told

me or those who were with him. He had no inkling.

DR. STAHMER: When did he find out about it?

KÖRNER: Shortly before he arrived in Berlin, or at the Anhalter Station

in Berlin.

DR. STAHMER: Through whom?

KÖRNER: Through his adjutant.

DR. STAHMER: And how did he take the news?

KÖRNER: He was furious when he received the report, because he was

strongly opposed to the whole action.

DR. STAHMER: And what did he do about it?

KÖRNER: He got in touch with the Führer immediately to ask for the

action to be stopped at once.

DR. STAHMER: What were your tasks within the framework of the Four Year

Plan?

KÖRNER: I was Chief of the Office of the Four Year Plan.

DR. STAHMER: What were your tasks?

KÖRNER: The management and supervision of that office.

DR. STAHMER: How did the Four Year Plan come about? When and how did it

start?

KÖRNER: The official Four Year Plan was announced in October 1936, but

its origin goes back to the food crisis of 1935. In the autumn of 1935

the Reich Marshal received the order from the Führer . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Witness, try not to go quite so fast. It is very

difficult to get the translation.

KÖRNER: Yes, Sir.

In the autumn of 1935 the Reich Marshal received the order from the

Führer to make the food for the German people secure, as the food

situation was serious because of the bad harvests of 1934 and 1935. At

the time we were short of at least 2 million tons of bread-grain and

several hundred thousand tons of fat, which had to be procured by some

means or other.

The Reich Marshal solved this problem satisfactorily, and this led the

Führer to ask him for suggestions as to how the entire German economy

could be made proof against crises. These suggestions were worked out in

the first half of 1936 and by midsummer were submitted to the Führer.

These suggestions gave the Führer the idea of a Four Year Plan, which he

announced on Party Day 1936. On 18 October 1936 the Führer issued a

decree appointing the Reich Marshal Delegate of the Four Year Plan.

DR. STAHMER: What were the aims of the Four Year Plan?

KÖRNER: As I said before, to make [the] German economy proof against

crises. The main tasks were to increase German exports to the utmost,

and to cover any deficits as far as possible by increased production,

particularly in the agricultural sphere.

DR. STAHMER: Did the Four Year Plan also serve rearmament?

KÖRNER: Of course it also served the rebuilding of the German Wehrmacht

indirectly.

DR. STAHMER: Did the Four Year Plan also provide for the allocation of

labor?

KÖRNER: Yes. The Four Year Plan provided for the appointment of a

General Plenipotentiary for the Allocation of Labor. The former

president of the Reich Labor Office, President Syrup, was appointed

Plenipotentiary General.

DR. STAHMER: When was he appointed?

KÖRNER: That was at the beginning of the Four Year Plan, in the autumn

of 1936.

DR. STAHMER: What were his particular tasks?

KÖRNER: He had to regulate the allocation of labor and thus put an end

to the great muddle on the labor market.

DR. STAHMER: How long did Syrup remain in office?

KÖRNER: Syrup left in the spring of 1942 for reasons of health.

DR. STAHMER: Who became his successor?

KÖRNER: His successor was Gauleiter Sauckel.

DR. STAHMER: Who appointed Sauckel?

KÖRNER: Sauckel was appointed by the Führer.

DR. STAHMER: And what was his task?

KÖRNER: His main task as Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of

Labor was to regulate labor.

DR. STAHMER: Under whom did he work?

KÖRNER: He was formally under the Delegate of the Four Year Plan, but he

received his instructions straight from the Führer.

DR. STAHMER: What was your part in it?

KÖRNER: In the spring of 1942 I ceased to have any influence over the

allocation of labor, since Sauckel received his directions straight from

the Führer and carried them out accordingly.

DR. STAHMER: Did you not have any more dealings with Sauckel?

KÖRNER: No; there were no more dealings as far as I remember, because he

received his directions from the Führer.

DR. STAHMER: Who allocated the manpower?

KÖRNER: The labor exchanges allocated the manpower and were under

Sauckel.

DR. STAHMER: What were the relations between the Reich Marshal and

Himmler?

KÖRNER: They were not very cordial. There was frequent tension and

mutual confidence was completely lacking.

DR. STAHMER: I have no further questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Do any other defendants’ counsel wish to ask any

questions?

[_There was no response._]

Do the Prosecution wish to ask any questions?

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In your testimony you made some references to a

conversation between Göring and Thälmann.

KÖRNER: Yes, I did.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Will you tell us when that occurred?

KÖRNER: That must have been in the summer of 1933.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In the summer of 1933? Was that before or after the

Reichstag fire?

KÖRNER: That was after the Reichstag fire.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And Thälmann was accused in the Reichstag fire

trial and acquitted by the court, was he not?

KÖRNER: I cannot remember that very well.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Do you remember it at all? Do you remember that he

was accused?

KÖRNER: I can no longer remember whether he was accused. It may be.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Do you know where he died?

KÖRNER: No, I do not know.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Do you know that he was interned in Buchenwald

after the Reichstag fire and remained there until he died in 1944? Did

you know that?

KÖRNER: Yes, I remember it was said he was a victim of an air attack.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And where was he when he was caught in this air

attack?

KÖRNER: Where was Thälmann? I did not quite understand the question.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Where was he when he became a victim of an air

attack?

KÖRNER: As far as I heard, he was said to be in the Buchenwald

concentration camp.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And how long had he been there?

KÖRNER: That I do not know; I have no knowledge of that.