FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 115, Art. 4]

Whether the Heavenly Bodies Are the Cause of Human Actions?

Objection 1: It would seem that the heavenly bodies are the cause of

human actions. For since the heavenly bodies are moved by spiritual

substances, as stated above (Q. 110, A. 3), they act by virtue

thereof as their instruments. But those spiritual substances are

superior to our souls. Therefore it seems that they can cause

impressions on our souls, and thereby cause human actions.

Obj. 2: Further, every multiform is reducible to a uniform principle.

But human actions are various and multiform. Therefore it seems that

they are reducible to the uniform movements of heavenly bodies, as to

their principles.

Obj. 3: Further, astrologers often foretell the truth concerning the

outcome of wars, and other human actions, of which the intellect and

will are the principles. But they could not do this by means of the

heavenly bodies, unless these were the cause of human actions.

Therefore the heavenly bodies are the cause of human actions.

_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 7) that "the

heavenly bodies are by no means the cause of human actions."

_I answer that,_ The heavenly bodies can directly and of themselves

act on bodies, as stated above (A. 3). They can act directly indeed

on those powers of the soul which are the acts of corporeal organs,

but accidentally: because the acts of such powers must needs be

hindered by obstacles in the organs; thus an eye when disturbed cannot

see well. Wherefore if the intellect and will were powers affixed to

corporeal organs, as some maintained, holding that intellect does not

differ from sense; it would follow of necessity that the heavenly

bodies are the cause of human choice and action. It would also follow

that man is led by natural instinct to his actions, just as other

animals, in which there are powers other than those which are affixed

to corporeal organs: for whatever is done here below in virtue of the

action of heavenly bodies, is done naturally. It would therefore

follow that man has no free-will, and that he would have determinate

actions, like other natural things. All of which is manifestly false,

and contrary to human habit. It must be observed, however, that

indirectly and accidentally, the impressions of heavenly bodies can

reach the intellect and will, forasmuch, namely, as both intellect and

will receive something from the inferior powers which are affixed to

corporeal organs. But in this the intellect and will are differently

situated. For the intellect, of necessity, receives from the inferior

apprehensive powers: wherefore if the imaginative, cogitative, or

memorative powers be disturbed, the action of the intellect is, of

necessity, disturbed also. The will, on the contrary, does not, of

necessity, follow the inclination of the inferior appetite; for

although the passions in the irascible and concupiscible have a

certain force in inclining the will; nevertheless the will retains

the power of following the passions or repressing them. Therefore the

impressions of the heavenly bodies, by virtue of which the inferior

powers can be changed, has less influence on the will, which is the

proximate cause of human actions, than on the intellect.

To maintain therefore that heavenly bodies are the cause of human

actions is proper to those who hold that intellect does not differ

from sense. Wherefore some of these said that "such is the will of

men, as is the day which the father of men and of gods brings on"

(Odyssey xviii 135). Since, therefore, it is manifest that intellect

and will are not acts of corporeal organs, it is impossible that

heavenly bodies be the cause of human actions.

Reply Obj. 1: The spiritual substances, that move the heavenly

bodies, do indeed act on corporeal things by means of the heavenly

bodies; but they act immediately on the human intellect by

enlightening it. On the other hand, they cannot compel the will,

as stated above (Q. 111, A. 2).

Reply Obj. 2: Just as the multiformity of corporeal movements is

reducible to the uniformity of the heavenly movement as to its cause:

so the multiformity of actions proceeding from the intellect and the

will is reduced to a uniform principle which is the Divine intellect

and will.

Reply Obj. 3: The majority of men follow their passions, which are

movements of the sensitive appetite, in which movements of the

heavenly bodies can cooperate: but few are wise enough to resist

these passions. Consequently astrologers are able to foretell the

truth in the majority of cases, especially in a general way. But not

in particular cases; for nothing prevents man resisting his passions

by his free-will. Wherefore the astrologers themselves are wont to

say that "the wise man is stronger than the stars" [*Ptolemy,

Centiloquium, prop. 5], forasmuch as, to wit, he conquers his passions.

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Summa Theologica, Part I (Prima Pars) From the Complete American Edition · 第 704 / 722 题