Whether the Will Moves the Intellect?
Objection 1: It would seem that the will does not move the intellect.
For what moves excels and precedes what is moved, because what moves
is an agent, and "the agent is nobler than the patient," as Augustine
says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16), and the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 5).
But the intellect excels and precedes the will, as we have said above
(A. 3). Therefore the will does not move the intellect.
Obj. 2: Further, what moves is not moved by what is moved, except
perhaps accidentally. But the intellect moves the will, because the
good apprehended by the intellect moves without being moved; whereas
the appetite moves and is moved. Therefore the intellect is not moved
by the will.
Obj. 3: Further, we can will nothing but what we understand. If,
therefore, in order to understand, the will moves by willing to
understand, that act of the will must be preceded by another act of
the intellect, and this act of the intellect by another act of the
will, and so on indefinitely, which is impossible. Therefore the will
does not move the intellect.
_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 26): "It is in
our power to learn an art or not, as we list." But a thing is in our
power by the will, and we learn art by the intellect. Therefore the
will moves the intellect.
_I answer that,_ A thing is said to move in two ways: First, as an
end; for instance, when we say that the end moves the agent. In this
way the intellect moves the will, because the good understood is the
object of the will, and moves it as an end. Secondly, a thing is said
to move as an agent, as what alters moves what is altered, and what
impels moves what is impelled. In this way the will moves the
intellect and all the powers of the soul, as Anselm says (Eadmer, De
Similitudinibus). The reason is, because wherever we have order among
a number of active powers, that power which regards the universal end
moves the powers which regard particular ends. And we may observe
this both in nature and in things politic. For the heaven, which aims
at the universal preservation of things subject to generation and
corruption, moves all inferior bodies, each of which aims at the
preservation of its own species or of the individual. The king also,
who aims at the common good of the whole kingdom, by his rule moves
all the governors of cities, each of whom rules over his own
particular city. Now the object of the will is good and the end in
general, and each power is directed to some suitable good proper to
it, as sight is directed to the perception of color, and the
intellect to the knowledge of truth. Therefore the will as agent
moves all the powers of the soul to their respective acts, except the
natural powers of the vegetative part, which are not subject to our
will.
Reply Obj. 1: The intellect may be considered in two ways: as
apprehensive of universal being and truth, and as a thing and a
particular power having a determinate act. In like manner also the
will may be considered in two ways: according to the common nature of
its object--that is to say, as appetitive of universal good--and as
a determinate power of the soul having a determinate act. If,
therefore, the intellect and the will be compared with one another
according to the universality of their respective objects, then, as
we have said above (A. 3), the intellect is simply higher and nobler
than the will. If, however, we take the intellect as regards the
common nature of its object and the will as a determinate power, then
again the intellect is higher and nobler than the will, because under
the notion of being and truth is contained both the will itself, and
its act, and its object. Wherefore the intellect understands the will,
and its act, and its object, just as it understands other species of
things, as stone or wood, which are contained in the common notion of
being and truth. But if we consider the will as regards the common
nature of its object, which is good, and the intellect as a thing and
a special power; then the intellect itself, and its act, and its
object, which is truth, each of which is some species of good, are
contained under the common notion of good. And in this way the will is
higher than the intellect, and can move it. From this we can easily
understand why these powers include one another in their acts, because
the intellect understands that the will wills, and the will wills the
intellect to understand. In the same way good is contained in truth,
inasmuch as it is an understood truth, and truth in good, inasmuch as
it is a desired good.
Reply Obj. 2: The intellect moves the will in one sense, and the will
moves the intellect in another, as we have said above.
Reply Obj. 3: There is no need to go on indefinitely, but we must
stop at the intellect as preceding all the rest. For every movement
of the will must be preceded by apprehension, whereas every
apprehension is not preceded by an act of the will; but the principle
of counselling and understanding is an intellectual principle higher
than our intellect--namely, God--as also Aristotle says (Eth.
Eudemic. vii, 14), and in this way he explains that there is no need
to proceed indefinitely.
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