THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 82, Art. 3]

Whether the Will Is a Higher Power Than the Intellect?

Objection 1: It would seem that the will is a higher power than the

intellect. For the object of the will is good and the end. But the

end is the first and highest cause. Therefore the will is the first

and highest power.

Obj. 2: Further, in the order of natural things we observe a progress

from imperfect things to perfect. And this also appears in the powers

of the soul: for sense precedes the intellect, which is more noble.

Now the act of the will, in the natural order, follows the act of the

intellect. Therefore the will is a more noble and perfect power than

the intellect.

Obj. 3: Further, habits are proportioned to their powers, as

perfections to what they make perfect. But the habit which perfects

the will--namely, charity--is more noble than the habits which

perfect the intellect: for it is written (1 Cor. 13:2): "If I should

know all mysteries, and if I should have all faith, and have not

charity, I am nothing." Therefore the will is a higher power than

the intellect.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher holds the intellect to be the

higher power than the intellect.

_I answer that,_ The superiority of one thing over another can be

considered in two ways: "absolutely" and "relatively." Now a thing is

considered to be such absolutely which is considered such in itself:

but relatively as it is such with regard to something else. If

therefore the intellect and will be considered with regard to

themselves, then the intellect is the higher power. And this is clear

if we compare their respective objects to one another. For the object

of the intellect is more simple and more absolute than the object of

the will; since the object of the intellect is the very idea of

appetible good; and the appetible good, the idea of which is in the

intellect, is the object of the will. Now the more simple and the

more abstract a thing is, the nobler and higher it is in itself; and

therefore the object of the intellect is higher than the object of

the will. Therefore, since the proper nature of a power is in its

order to its object, it follows that the intellect in itself and

absolutely is higher and nobler than the will. But relatively and by

comparison with something else, we find that the will is sometimes

higher than the intellect, from the fact that the object of the will

occurs in something higher than that in which occurs the object of

the intellect. Thus, for instance, I might say that hearing is

relatively nobler than sight, inasmuch as something in which there is

sound is nobler than something in which there is color, though color

is nobler and simpler than sound. For as we have said above (Q. 16,

A. 1; Q. 27, A. 4), the action of the intellect consists in

this--that the idea of the thing understood is in the one who

understands; while the act of the will consists in this--that the

will is inclined to the thing itself as existing in itself. And

therefore the Philosopher says in _Metaph._ vi (Did. v, 2) that "good

and evil," which are objects of the will, "are in things," but "truth

and error," which are objects of the intellect, "are in the mind."

When, therefore, the thing in which there is good is nobler than the

soul itself, in which is the idea understood; by comparison with such

a thing, the will is higher than the intellect. But when the thing

which is good is less noble than the soul, then even in comparison

with that thing the intellect is higher than the will. Wherefore the

love of God is better than the knowledge of God; but, on the

contrary, the knowledge of corporeal things is better than the love

thereof. Absolutely, however, the intellect is nobler than the will.

Reply Obj. 1: The aspect of causality is perceived by comparing one

thing to another, and in such a comparison the idea of good is found

to be nobler: but truth signifies something more absolute, and

extends to the idea of good itself: wherefore even good is something

true. But, again, truth is something good: forasmuch as the intellect

is a thing, and truth its end. And among other ends this is the most

excellent: as also is the intellect among the other powers.

Reply Obj. 2: What precedes in order of generation and time is less

perfect: for in one and in the same thing potentiality precedes act,

and imperfection precedes perfection. But what precedes absolutely

and in the order of nature is more perfect: for thus act precedes

potentiality. And in this way the intellect precedes the will, as the

motive power precedes the thing movable, and as the active precedes

the passive; for good which is understood moves the will.

Reply Obj. 3: This reason is verified of the will as compared with

what is above the soul. For charity is the virtue by which we love

God.

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Summa Theologica, Part I (Prima Pars) From the Complete American Edition · 第 510 / 722 题