Whether We Should Distinguish Irascible and Concupiscible Parts in
the Superior Appetite?
Objection 1: It would seem that we ought to distinguish irascible and
concupiscible parts in the superior appetite, which is the will. For
the concupiscible power is so called from "concupiscere" (to desire),
and the irascible part from "irasci" (to be angry). But there is a
concupiscence which cannot belong to the sensitive appetite, but only
to the intellectual, which is the will; as the concupiscence of
wisdom, of which it is said (Wis. 6:21): "The concupiscence of wisdom
bringeth to the eternal kingdom." There is also a certain anger which
cannot belong to the sensitive appetite, but only to the intellectual;
as when our anger is directed against vice. Wherefore Jerome
commenting on Matt. 13:33 warns us "to have the hatred of vice in the
irascible part." Therefore we should distinguish irascible and
concupiscible parts of the intellectual soul as well as in the
sensitive.
Obj. 2: Further, as is commonly said, charity is in the
concupiscible, and hope in the irascible part. But they cannot be in
the sensitive appetite, because their objects are not sensible, but
intellectual. Therefore we must assign an irascible and concupiscible
power to the intellectual part.
Obj. 3: Further, it is said (De Spiritu et Anima) that "the soul
has these powers"--namely, the irascible, concupiscible, and
rational--"before it is united to the body." But no power of the
sensitive part belongs to the soul alone, but to the soul and body
united, as we have said above (Q. 78, AA. 5, 8). Therefore the
irascible and concupiscible powers are in the will, which is the
intellectual appetite.
_On the contrary,_ Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Nat. Hom.) says that
the irrational part of the soul is divided into the desiderative and
irascible, and Damascene says the same (De Fide Orth. ii, 12). And the
Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 9) "that the will is in reason, while
in the irrational part of the soul are concupiscence and anger," or
"desire and animus."
_I answer that,_ The irascible and concupiscible are not parts of the
intellectual appetite, which is called the will. Because, as was said
above (Q. 59, A. 4; Q. 79, A. 7), a power which is directed to an
object according to some common notion is not differentiated by
special differences which are contained under that common notion. For
instance, because sight regards the visible thing under the common
notion of something colored, the visual power is not multiplied
according to the different kinds of color: but if there were a power
regarding white as white, and not as something colored, it would be
distinct from a power regarding black as black.
Now the sensitive appetite does not consider the common notion of
good, because neither do the senses apprehend the universal. And
therefore the parts of the sensitive appetite are differentiated by
the different notions of particular good: for the concupiscible
regards as proper to it the notion of good, as something pleasant to
the senses and suitable to nature: whereas the irascible regards the
notion of good as something that wards off and repels what is
hurtful. But the will regards good according to the common notion of
good, and therefore in the will, which is the intellectual appetite,
there is no differentiation of appetitive powers, so that there be in
the intellectual appetite an irascible power distinct from a
concupiscible power: just as neither on the part of the intellect are
the apprehensive powers multiplied, although they are on the part of
the senses.
Reply Obj. 1: Love, concupiscence, and the like can be understood in
two ways. Sometimes they are taken as passions--arising, that is,
with a certain commotion of the soul. And thus they are commonly
understood, and in this sense they are only in the sensitive
appetite. They may, however, be taken in another way, as far as they
are simple affections without passion or commotion of the soul, and
thus they are acts of the will. And in this sense, too, they are
attributed to the angels and to God. But if taken in this sense, they
do not belong to different powers, but only to one power, which is
called the will.
Reply Obj. 2: The will itself may be said to [be] irascible, as far
as it wills to repel evil, not from any sudden movement of a passion,
but from a judgment of the reason. And in the same way the will may
be said to be concupiscible on account of its desire for good. And
thus in the irascible and concupiscible are charity and hope--that
is, in the will as ordered to such acts. And in this way, too, we may
understand the words quoted (De Spiritu et Anima); that the irascible
and concupiscible powers are in the soul before it is united to the
body (as long as we understand priority of nature, and not of time),
although there is no need to have faith in what that book says.
Whence the answer to the third objection is clear.
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