SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 64, Art. 2]

Whether the Will of the Demons Is Obstinate in Evil?

Objection 1: It would seem that the will of the demons is not

obstinate in evil. For liberty of will belongs to the nature of an

intellectual being, which nature remains in the demons, as we said

above (A. 1). But liberty of will is directly and firstly ordained

to good rather than to evil. Therefore the demons' will is not so

obstinate in evil as not to be able to return to what is good.

Obj. 2: Further, since God's mercy is infinite, it is greater than

the demons' malice, which is finite. But no one returns from the

malice of sin to the goodness of justice save through God's mercy.

Therefore the demons can likewise return from their state of malice

to the state of justice.

Obj. 3: Further, if the demons have a will obstinate in evil, then

their will would be especially obstinate in the sin whereby they

fell. But that sin, namely, pride, is in them no longer; because the

motive for the sin no longer endures, namely, excellence. Therefore

the demon is not obstinate in malice.

Obj. 4: Further, Gregory says (Moral. iv) that man can be reinstated

by another, since he fell through another. But, as was observed

already (Q. 63, A. 8), the lower demons fell through the highest one.

Therefore their fall can be repaired by another. Consequently they

are not obstinate in malice.

Obj. 5: Further, whoever is obstinate in malice, never performs any

good work. But the demon performs some good works: for he confesses

the truth, saying to Christ: "I know Who Thou art, the holy one of

God" (Mark 1:24). "The demons" also "believe and tremble" (James

2:19). And Dionysius observes (Div. Nom. iv), that "they desire what

is good and best, which is, to be, to live, to understand." Therefore

they are not obstinate in malice.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (Ps. 73:23): "The pride of them that

hate Thee, ascendeth continually"; and this is understood of the

demons. Therefore they remain ever obstinate in their malice.

_I answer that,_ It was Origen's opinion [*Peri Archon i. 6] that

every will of the creature can by reason of free-will be inclined to

good and evil; with the exception of the soul of Christ on account of

the union of the Word. Such a statement deprives angels and saints of

true beatitude, because everlasting stability is of the very nature

of true beatitude; hence it is termed "life everlasting." It is also

contrary to the authority of Sacred Scripture, which declares that

demons and wicked men shall be sent "into everlasting punishment,"

and the good brought "into everlasting life." Consequently such an

opinion must be considered erroneous; while according to Catholic

Faith, it must be held firmly both that the will of the good angels

is confirmed in good, and that the will of the demons is obstinate

in evil.

We must seek for the cause of this obstinacy, not in the gravity of

the sin, but in the condition of their nature or state. For as

Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii), "death is to men, what the fall is

to the angels." Now it is clear that all the mortal sins of men, grave

or less grave, are pardonable before death; whereas after death they

are without remission and endure for ever.

To find the cause, then, of this obstinacy, it must be borne in mind

that the appetitive power is in all things proportioned to the

apprehensive, whereby it is moved, as the movable by its mover. For

the sensitive appetite seeks a particular good; while the will seeks

the universal good, as was said above (Q. 59, A. 1); as also the

sense apprehends particular objects, while the intellect considers

universals. Now the angel's apprehension differs from man's in this

respect, that the angel by his intellect apprehends immovably, as we

apprehend immovably first principles which are the object of the habit

of "intelligence"; whereas man by his reason apprehends movably,

passing from one consideration to another; and having the way open by

which he may proceed to either of two opposites. Consequently man's

will adheres to a thing movably, and with the power of forsaking it

and of clinging to the opposite; whereas the angel's will adheres

fixedly and immovably. Therefore, if his will be considered before its

adhesion, it can freely adhere either to this or to its opposite

(namely, in such things as he does not will naturally); but after he

has once adhered, he clings immovably. So it is customary to say that

man's free-will is flexible to the opposite both before and after

choice; but the angel's free-will is flexible either opposite before

the choice, but not after. Therefore the good angels who adhered to

justice, were confirmed therein; whereas the wicked ones, sinning, are

obstinate in sin. Later on we shall treat of the obstinacy of men who

are damned (Suppl., Q. 98, AA. 1, 2).

Reply Obj. 1: The good and wicked angels have free-will, but

according to the manner and condition of their state, as has been

said.

Reply Obj. 2: God's mercy delivers from sin those who repent. But

such as are not capable of repenting, cling immovably to sin, and

are not delivered by the Divine mercy.

Reply Obj. 3: The devil's first sin still remains in him according to

desire; although not as to his believing that he can obtain what he

desired. Even so, if a man were to believe that he can commit murder,

and wills to commit it, and afterwards the power is taken from him;

nevertheless, the will to murder can stay with him, so that he would

he had done it, or still would do it if he could.

Reply Obj. 4: The fact that man sinned from another's suggestion, is

not the whole cause of man's sin being pardonable. Consequently the

argument does not hold good.

Reply Obj. 5: A demon's act is twofold. One comes of deliberate will;

and this is properly called his own act. Such an act on the demon's

part is always wicked; because, although at times he does something

good, yet he does not do it well; as when he tells the truth in order

to deceive; and when he believes and confesses, yet not willingly,

but compelled by the evidence of things. Another kind of act is

natural to the demon; this can be good and bears witness to the

goodness of nature. Yet he abuses even such good acts to evil purpose.

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