FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 64, Art. 1]

Whether the Demons' Intellect Is Darkened by Privation of the

Knowledge of All Truth?

Objection 1: It would seem that the demons' intellect is darkened by

being deprived of the knowledge of all truth. For if they knew any

truth at all, they would most of all know themselves; which is to

know separated substances. But this is not in keeping with their

unhappiness: for this seems to belong to great happiness, insomuch as

that some writers have assigned as man's last happiness the knowledge

of the separated substances. Therefore the demons are deprived of all

knowledge of truth.

Obj. 2: Further, what is most manifest in its nature, seems to be

specially manifest to the angels, whether good or bad. That the same

is not manifest with regard to ourselves, comes from the weakness of

our intellect which draws its knowledge from phantasms; as it comes

from the weakness of its eye that the owl cannot behold the light of

the sun. But the demons cannot know God, Who is most manifest of

Himself, because He is the sovereign truth; and this is because they

are not clean of heart, whereby alone can God be seen. Therefore

neither can they know other things.

Obj. 3: Further, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 22), the

proper knowledge of the angels is twofold; namely, morning and

evening. But the demons have no morning knowledge, because they do

not see things in the Word; nor have they the evening knowledge,

because this evening knowledge refers the things known to the

Creator's praise (hence, after "evening" comes "morning" [Gen. 1]).

Therefore the demons can have no knowledge of things.

Obj. 4: Further, the angels at their creation knew the mystery of the

kingdom of God, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. v, 19; De Civ. Dei

xi). But the demons are deprived of such knowledge: "for if they had

known it, they would never have crucified the Lord of glory," as is

said 1 Cor. 2:8. Therefore, for the same reason, they are deprived of

all other knowledge of truth.

Obj. 5: Further, whatever truth anyone knows is known either

naturally, as we know first principles; or by deriving it from

someone else, as we know by learning; or by long experience, as the

things we learn by discovery. Now, the demons cannot know the truth

by their own nature, because, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 33),

the good angels are separated from them as light is from darkness;

and every manifestation is made through light, as is said Eph. 5:13.

In like manner they cannot learn by revelation, nor by learning from

the good angels: because "there is no fellowship of light with

darkness [*Vulg.: 'What fellowship hath . . . ?']" (2 Cor. 6:14). Nor

can they learn by long experience: because experience comes of the

senses. Consequently there is no knowledge of truth in them.

_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that, "certain gifts

were bestowed upon the demons which, we say, have not been changed at

all, but remain entire and most brilliant." Now, the knowledge of

truth stands among those natural gifts. Consequently there is some

knowledge of truth in them.

_I answer that,_ The knowledge of truth is twofold: one which comes

of nature, and one which comes of grace. The knowledge which comes of

grace is likewise twofold: the first is purely speculative, as when

Divine secrets are imparted to an individual; the other is effective,

and produces love for God; which knowledge properly belongs to the

gift of wisdom.

Of these three kinds of knowledge the first was neither taken away nor

lessened in the demons. For it follows from the very nature of the

angel, who, according to his nature, is an intellect or mind: since on

account of the simplicity of his substance, nothing can be withdrawn

from his nature, so as to punish him by subtracting from his natural

powers, as a man is punished by being deprived of a hand or a foot or

of something else. Therefore Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that the

natural gifts remain entire in them. Consequently their natural

knowledge was not diminished. The second kind of knowledge, however,

which comes of grace, and consists in speculation, has not been

utterly taken away from them, but lessened; because, of these Divine

secrets only so much is revealed to them as is necessary; and that is

done either by means of the angels, or "through some temporal workings

of Divine power," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 21); but not in

the same degree as to the holy angels, to whom many more things are

revealed, and more fully, in the Word Himself. But of the third

knowledge, as likewise of charity, they are utterly deprived.

Reply Obj. 1: Happiness consists in self-application to something

higher. The separated substances are above us in the order of nature;

hence man can have happiness of a kind by knowing the separated

substances, although his perfect happiness consists in knowing the

first substance, namely, God. But it is quite natural for one

separate substance to know another; as it is natural for us to know

sensible natures. Hence, as man's happiness does not consist in

knowing sensible natures; so neither does the angel's happiness

consist in knowing separated substances.

Reply Obj. 2: What is most manifest in its nature is hidden from us

by its surpassing the bounds of our intellect; and not merely because

our intellect draws knowledge from phantasms. Now the Divine

substance surpasses the proportion not only of the human intellect,

but even of the angelic. Consequently, not even an angel can of his

own nature know God's substance. Yet on account of the perfection of

his intellect he can of his nature have a higher knowledge of God

than man can have. Such knowledge of God remains also in the demons.

Although they do not possess the purity which comes with grace,

nevertheless they have purity of nature; and this suffices for the

knowledge of God which belongs to them from their nature.

Reply Obj. 3: The creature is darkness in comparison with the

excellence of the Divine light; and therefore the creature's

knowledge in its own nature is called "evening" knowledge. For the

evening is akin to darkness, yet it possesses some light: but when

the light fails utterly, then it is night. So then the knowledge of

things in their own nature, when referred to the praise of the

Creator, as it is in the good angels, has something of the Divine

light, and can be called evening knowledge; but if it be not referred

to God, as is the case with the demons, it is not called evening, but

"nocturnal" knowledge. Accordingly we read in Gen. 1:5 that the

darkness, which God separated from the light, "He called night."

Reply Obj. 4: All the angels had some knowledge from the very

beginning respecting the mystery of God's kingdom, which found its

completion in Christ; and most of all from the moment when they were

beatified by the vision of the Word, which vision the demons never

had. Yet all the angels did not fully and equally apprehend it; hence

the demons much less fully understood the mystery of the Incarnation,

when Christ was in the world. For, as Augustine observes (De Civ. Dei

ix, 21), "It was not manifested to them as it was to the holy angels,

who enjoy a participated eternity of the Word; but it was made known

by some temporal effects, so as to strike terror into them." For had

they fully and certainly known that He was the Son of God and the

effect of His passion, they would never have procured the crucifixion

of the Lord of glory.

Reply Obj. 5: The demons know a truth in three ways: first of all by

the subtlety of their nature; for although they are darkened by

privation of the light of grace, yet they are enlightened by the

light of their intellectual nature: secondly, by revelation from the

holy angels; for while not agreeing with them in conformity of will,

they do agree, nevertheless, by their likeness of intellectual

nature, according to which they can accept what is manifested by

others: thirdly, they know by long experience; not as deriving it

from the senses; but when the similitude of their innate intelligible

species is completed in individual things, they know some things as

present, which they previously did not know would come to pass, as we

said when dealing with the knowledge of the angels (Q. 57, A. 3, ad

3).

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Summa Theologica, Part I (Prima Pars) From the Complete American Edition · 第 414 / 722 题