Whether the Persons Are Distinguished by the Relations?
Objection 1: It would seem that the persons are not distinguished by
the relations. For simple things are distinct by themselves. But the
persons are supremely simple. Therefore they are distinguished by
themselves, and not by the relation.
Obj. 2: Further, a form is distinguished only in relation to its
genus. For white is distinguished from black only by quality. But
"hypostasis" signifies an individual in the genus of substance.
Therefore the hypostases cannot be distinguished by relations.
Obj. 3: Further, what is absolute comes before what is relative. But
the distinction of the divine persons is the primary distinction.
Therefore the divine persons are not distinguished by the relations.
Obj. 4: Further, whatever presupposes distinction cannot be the first
principle of distinction. But relation presupposes distinction, which
comes into its definition; for a relation is essentially what is
towards another. Therefore the first distinctive principle in God
cannot be relation.
_On the contrary,_ Boethius says (De Trin.): "Relation alone
multiplies the Trinity of the divine persons."
_I answer that,_ In whatever multitude of things is to be found
something common to all, it is necessary to seek out the principle of
distinction. So, as the three persons agree in the unity of essence,
we must seek to know the principle of distinction whereby they are
several. Now, there are two principles of difference between the
divine persons, and these are "origin" and "relation." Although these
do not really differ, yet they differ in the mode of signification;
for "origin" is signified by way of act, as "generation"; and
"relation" by way of the form, as "paternity."
Some, then, considering that relation follows upon act, have said that
the divine hypostases are distinguished by origin, so that we may say
that the Father is distinguished from the Son, inasmuch as the former
begets and the latter is begotten. Further, that the relations, or the
properties, make known the distinctions of the hypostases or persons
as resulting therefrom; as also in creatures the properties manifest
the distinctions of individuals, which distinctions are caused by the
material principles.
This opinion, however, cannot stand--for two reasons. Firstly,
because, in order that two things be understood as distinct, their
distinction must be understood as resulting from something intrinsic
to both; thus in things created it results from their matter or their
form. Now origin of a thing does not designate anything intrinsic, but
means the way from something, or to something; as generation signifies
the way to a thing generated, and as proceeding from the generator.
Hence it is not possible that what is generated and the generator
should be distinguished by generation alone; but in the generator and
in the thing generated we must presuppose whatever makes them to be
distinguished from each other. In a divine person there is nothing to
presuppose but essence, and relation or property. Whence, since the
persons agree in essence, it only remains to be said that the persons
are distinguished from each other by the relations. Secondly: because
the distinction of the divine persons is not to be so understood as if
what is common to them all is divided, because the common essence
remains undivided; but the distinguishing principles themselves must
constitute the things which are distinct. Now the relations or the
properties distinguish or constitute the hypostases or persons,
inasmuch as they are themselves the subsisting persons; as paternity
is the Father, and filiation is the Son, because in God the abstract
and the concrete do not differ. But it is against the nature of origin
that it should constitute hypostasis or person. For origin taken in an
active sense signifies proceeding from a subsisting person, so that it
presupposes the latter; while in a passive sense origin, as
"nativity," signifies the way to a subsisting person, and as not yet
constituting the person.
It is therefore better to say that the persons or hypostases are
distinguished rather by relations than by origin. For, although in
both ways they are distinguished, nevertheless in our mode of
understanding they are distinguished chiefly and firstly by relations;
whence this name "Father" signifies not only a property, but also the
hypostasis; whereas this term "Begetter" or "Begetting" signifies
property only; forasmuch as this name "Father" signifies the relation
which is distinctive and constitutive of the hypostasis; and this term
"Begetter" or "Begotten" signifies the origin which is not distinctive
and constitutive of the hypostasis.
Reply Obj. 1: The persons are the subsisting relations themselves.
Hence it is not against the simplicity of the divine persons for them
to be distinguished by the relations.
Reply Obj. 2: The divine persons are not distinguished as regards
being, in which they subsist, nor in anything absolute, but only as
regards something relative. Hence relation suffices for their
distinction.
Reply Obj. 3: The more prior a distinction is, the nearer it
approaches to unity; and so it must be the least possible
distinction. So the distinction of the persons must be by that which
distinguishes the least possible; and this is by relation.
Reply Obj. 4: Relation presupposes the distinction of the subjects,
when it is an accident; but when the relation is subsistent, it does
not presuppose, but brings about distinction. For when it is said
that relation is by nature to be towards another, the word "another"
signifies the correlative which is not prior, but simultaneous in the
order of nature.
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