Whether Abstract Essential Names Can Stand for the Person?
Objection 1: It would seem that abstract essential names can stand
for the person, so that this proposition is true, "Essence begets
essence." For Augustine says (De Trin. vii, i, 2): "The Father and
the Son are one Wisdom, because they are one essence; and taken
singly Wisdom is from Wisdom, as essence from essence."
Obj. 2: Further, generation or corruption in ourselves implies
generation or corruption of what is within us. But the Son is
generated. Therefore since the divine essence is in the Son, it
seems that the divine essence is generated.
Obj. 3: Further, God and the divine essence are the same, as is clear
from what is above explained (Q. 3, A. 3). But, as was shown, it is
true to say that "God begets God." Therefore this is also true:
"Essence begets essence."
Obj. 4: Further, a predicate can stand for that of which it is
predicated. But the Father is the divine essence; therefore essence
can stand for the person of the Father. Thus the essence begets.
Obj. 5: Further, the essence is "a thing begetting," because the
essence is the Father who is begetting. Therefore if the essence is
not begetting, the essence will be "a thing begetting," and "not
begetting": which cannot be.
Obj. 6: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20): "The Father is the
principle of the whole Godhead." But He is principle only by
begetting or spirating. Therefore the Father begets or spirates the
Godhead.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. i, 1): "Nothing begets
itself." But if the essence begets the essence, it begets itself only,
since nothing exists in God as distinguished from the divine essence.
Therefore the essence does not beget essence.
_I answer that,_ Concerning this, the abbot Joachim erred in
asserting that as we can say "God begot God," so we can say "Essence
begot essence": considering that, by reason of the divine simplicity
God is nothing else but the divine essence. In this he was wrong,
because if we wish to express ourselves correctly, we must take into
account not only the thing which is signified, but also the mode of
its signification as above stated (A. 4). Now although "God" is
really the same as "Godhead," nevertheless the mode of signification
is not in each case the same. For since this word "God" signifies the
divine essence in Him that possesses it, from its mode of
signification it can of its own nature stand for person. Thus the
things which properly belong to the persons, can be predicated of
this word, "God," as, for instance, we can say "God is begotten" or
is "Begetter," as above explained (A. 4). The word "essence,"
however, in its mode of signification, cannot stand for Person,
because it signifies the essence as an abstract form. Consequently,
what properly belongs to the persons whereby they are distinguished
from each other, cannot be attributed to the essence. For that would
imply distinction in the divine essence, in the same way as there
exists distinction in the _supposita._
Reply Obj. 1: To express unity of essence and of person, the holy
Doctors have sometimes expressed themselves with greater emphasis
than the strict propriety of terms allows. Whence instead of
enlarging upon such expressions we should rather explain them: thus,
for instance, abstract names should be explained by concrete names,
or even by personal names; as when we find "essence from essence"; or
"wisdom from wisdom"; we should take the sense to be, _the Son_ who
is essence and wisdom, is from the Father who is essence and wisdom.
Nevertheless, as regards these abstract names a certain order should
be observed, forasmuch as what belongs to action is more nearly
allied to the persons because actions belong to _supposita._ So
"nature from nature," and "wisdom from wisdom" are less inexact than
"essence from essence."
Reply Obj. 2: In creatures the one generated has not the same nature
numerically as the generator, but another nature, numerically
distinct, which commences to exist in it anew by generation, and
ceases to exist by corruption, and so it is generated and corrupted
accidentally; whereas God begotten has the same nature numerically as
the begetter. So the divine nature in the Son is not begotten either
directly or accidentally.
Reply Obj. 3: Although God and the divine essence are really the
same, nevertheless, on account of their different mode of
signification, we must speak in a different way about each of them.
Reply Obj. 4: The divine essence is predicated of the Father by mode
of identity by reason of the divine simplicity; yet it does not
follow that it can stand for the Father, its mode of signification
being different. This objection would hold good as regards things
which are predicated of another as the universal of a particular.
Reply Obj. 5: The difference between substantive and adjectival names
consist in this, that the former carry their subject with them,
whereas the latter do not, but add the thing signified to the
substantive. Whence logicians are wont to say that the substantive is
considered in the light of _suppositum,_ whereas the adjective
indicates something added to the _suppositum._ Therefore substantive
personal terms can be predicated of the essence, because they are
really the same; nor does it follow that a personal property makes a
distinct essence; but it belongs to the _suppositum_ implied in the
substantive. But notional and personal adjectives cannot be
predicated of the essence unless we add some substantive. We cannot
say that the "essence is begetting"; yet we can say that the "essence
is a thing begetting," or that it is "God begetting," if "thing" and
God stand for person, but not if they stand for essence. Consequently
there exists no contradiction in saying that "essence is a thing
begetting," and "a thing not begetting"; because in the first case
"thing" stands for person, and in the second it stands for the
essence.
Reply Obj. 6: So far as Godhead is one in several _supposita,_ it
agrees in a certain degree with the form of a collective term. So
when we say, "the Father is the principle of the whole Godhead," the
term Godhead can be taken for all the persons together, inasmuch as
it is the principle in all the divine persons. Nor does it follow
that He is His own principle; as one of the people may be called the
ruler of the people without being ruler of himself. We may also say
that He is the principle of the whole Godhead; not as generating or
spirating it, but as communicating it by generation and spiration.
_______________________