Whether the Concrete Essential Names Can Stand for the Person?
Objection 1: It would seem that the concrete, essential names cannot
stand for the person, so that we can truly say "God begot God." For,
as the logicians say, "a singular term signifies what it stands for."
But this name "God" seems to be a singular term, for it cannot be
predicated in the plural, as above explained (A. 3). Therefore, since
it signifies the essence, it stands for essence, and not for person.
Obj. 2: Further, a term in the subject is not modified by a term in
the predicate, as to its signification; but only as to the sense
signified in the predicate. But when I say, "God creates," this name
"God" stands for the essence. So when we say "God begot," this term
"God" cannot by reason of the notional predicate, stand for person.
Obj. 3: Further, if this be true, "God begot," because the Father
generates; for the same reason this is true, "God does not beget,"
because the Son does not beget. Therefore there is God who begets,
and there is God who does not beget; and thus it follows that there
are two Gods.
Obj. 4: Further, if "God begot God," He begot either God, that is
Himself, or another God. But He did not beget God, that is Himself;
for, as Augustine says (De Trin. i, 1), "nothing begets itself."
Neither did He beget another God; as there is only one God. Therefore
it is false to say, "God begot God."
Obj. 5: Further, if "God begot God," He begot either God who is the
Father, or God who is not the Father. If God who is the Father, then
God the Father was begotten. If God who is not the Father, then there
is a God who is not God the Father: which is false. Therefore it
cannot be said that "God begot God."
_On the contrary,_ In the Creed it is said, "God of God."
_I answer that,_ Some have said that this name "God" and the like,
properly according to their nature, stand for the essence, but by
reason of some notional adjunct are made to stand for the Person. This
opinion apparently arose from considering the divine simplicity, which
requires that in God, He "who possesses" and "what is possessed" be
the same. So He who possesses Godhead, which is signified by the name
God, is the same as Godhead. But when we consider the proper way of
expressing ourselves, the mode of signification must be considered no
less than the thing signified. Hence as this word "God" signifies the
divine essence as in Him Who possesses it, just as the name "man"
signifies humanity in a subject, others more truly have said that this
word "God," from its mode of signification, can, in its proper sense,
stand for person, as does the word "man." So this word "God" sometimes
stands for the essence, as when we say "God creates"; because this
predicate is attributed to the subject by reason of the form
signified--that is, Godhead. But sometimes it stands for the person,
either for only one, as when we say, "God begets," or for two, as when
we say, "God spirates"; or for three, as when it is said: "To the King
of ages, immortal, invisible, the only God," etc. (1 Tim. 1:17).
Reply Obj. 1: Although this name "God" agrees with singular terms as
regards the form signified not being multiplied; nevertheless it
agrees also with general terms so far as the form signified is to be
found in several _supposita._ So it need not always stand for the
essence it signifies.
Reply Obj. 2: This holds good against those who say that the word
"God" does not naturally stand for person.
Reply Obj. 3: The word "God" stands for the person in a different way
from that in which this word "man" does; for since the form signified
by this word "man"--that is, humanity--is really divided among its
different subjects, it stands of itself for the person, even if there
is no adjunct determining it to the person--that is, to a distinct
subject. The unity or community of the human nature, however, is not
a reality, but is only in the consideration of the mind. Hence this
term "man" does not stand for the common nature, unless this is
required by some adjunct, as when we say, "man is a species"; whereas
the form signified by the name "God"--that is, the divine essence--is
really one and common. So of itself it stands for the common nature,
but by some adjunct it may be restricted so as to stand for the
person. So, when we say, "God generates," by reason of the notional
act this name "God" stands for the person of the Father. But when we
say, "God does not generate," there is no adjunct to determine this
name to the person of the Son, and hence the phrase means that
generation is repugnant to the divine nature. If, however, something
be added belonging to the person of the Son, this proposition, for
instance, "God begotten does not beget," is true. Consequently, it
does not follow that there exists a "God generator," and a "God not
generator"; unless there be an adjunct pertaining to the persons; as,
for instance, if we were to say, "the Father is God the generator"
and the "Son is God the non-generator" and so it does not follow that
there are many Gods; for the Father and the Son are one God, as was
said above (A. 3).
Reply Obj. 4: This is false, "the Father begot God, that is Himself,"
because the word "Himself," as a reciprocal term, refers to the same
_suppositum._ Nor is this contrary to what Augustine says (Ep. lxvi
ad Maxim.) that "God the Father begot another self [alterum se],"
forasmuch as the word "se" is either in the ablative case, and then
it means "He begot another from Himself," or it indicates a single
relation, and thus points to identity of nature. This is, however,
either a figurative or an emphatic way of speaking, so that it would
really mean, "He begot another most like to Himself." Likewise also
it is false to say, "He begot another God," because although the Son
is another than the Father, as above explained (Q. 31, A. 2),
nevertheless it cannot be said that He is "another God"; forasmuch as
this adjective "another" would be understood to apply to the
substantive God; and thus the meaning would be that there is a
distinction of Godhead. Yet this proposition "He begot another God"
is tolerated by some, provided that "another" be taken as a
substantive, and the word "God" be construed in apposition with it.
This, however, is an inexact way of speaking, and to be avoided, for
fear of giving occasion to error.
Reply Obj. 5: To say, "God begot God Who is God the Father," is
wrong, because since the word "Father" is construed in apposition to
"God," the word "God" is restricted to the person of the Father; so
that it would mean, "He begot God, Who is Himself the Father"; and
then the Father would be spoken of as begotten, which is false.
Wherefore the negative of the proposition is true, "He begot God Who
is not God the Father." If however, we understand these words not to
be in apposition, and require something to be added, then, on the
contrary, the affirmative proposition is true, and the negative is
false; so that the meaning would be, "He begot God Who is God Who is
the Father." Such a rendering however appears to be forced, so that
it is better to say simply that the affirmative proposition is false,
and the negative is true. Yet Prepositivus said that both the
negative and affirmative are false, because this relative "Who" in
the affirmative proposition can be referred to the _suppositum_;
whereas in the negative it denotes both the thing signified and the
_suppositum._ Whence, in the affirmative the sense is that "to be God
the Father" is befitting to the person of the Son; and in the
negative sense is that "to be God the Father," is to be removed from
the Son's divinity as well as from His personality. This, however,
appears to be irrational; since, according to the Philosopher (Peri
Herm. ii), what is open to affirmation, is open also to negation.
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