THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 33, Art. 3]

Whether This Name "Father" Is Applied to God, Firstly As a Personal

Name?

Objection 1: It would seem that this name "Father" is not applied to

God, firstly as a personal name. For in the intellect the common

precedes the particular. But this name "Father" as a personal name,

belongs to the person of the Father; and taken in an essential sense

it is common to the whole Trinity; for we say "Our Father" to the

whole Trinity. Therefore "Father" comes first as an essential name

before its personal sense.

Obj. 2: Further, in things of which the concept is the same there is

no priority of predication. But paternity and filiation seem to be of

the same nature, according as a divine person is Father of the Son,

and the whole Trinity is our Father, or the creature's; since,

according to Basil (Hom. xv, De Fide), to receive is common to the

creature and to the Son. Therefore "Father" in God is not taken as an

essential name before it is taken personally.

Obj. 3: Further, it is not possible to compare things which have not

a common concept. But the Son is compared to the creature by reason

of filiation or generation, according to Col. 1:15: "Who is the image

of the invisible God, the first-born of every creature." Therefore

paternity taken in a personal sense is not prior to, but has the same

concept as, paternity taken essentially.

_On the contrary,_ The eternal comes before the temporal. But God is

the Father of the Son from eternity; while He is the Father of the

creature in time. Therefore paternity in God is taken in a personal

sense as regards the Son, before it is so taken as regards the

creature.

_I answer that,_ A name is applied to that wherein is perfectly

contained its whole signification, before it is applied to that which

only partially contains it; for the latter bears the name by reason of

a kind of similitude to that which answers perfectly to the

signification of the name; since all imperfect things are taken from

perfect things. Hence this name "lion" is applied first to the animal

containing the whole nature of a lion, and which is properly so

called, before it is applied to a man who shows something of a lion's

nature, as courage, or strength, or the like; and of whom it is said

by way of similitude.

Now it is manifest from the foregoing (Q. 27, A. 2; Q. 28, A. 4),

that the perfect idea of paternity and filiation is to be found in

God the Father, and in God the Son, because one is the nature and

glory of the Father and the Son. But in the creature, filiation is

found in relation to God, not in a perfect manner, since the Creator

and the creature have not the same nature; but by way of a certain

likeness, which is the more perfect the nearer we approach to the

true idea of filiation. For God is called the Father of some

creatures, by reason only of a trace, for instance of irrational

creatures, according to Job 38:28: "Who is the father of the rain? or

who begot the drops of dew?" Of some, namely, the rational creature

(He is the Father), by reason of the likeness of His image, according

to Deut. 32:6: "Is He not thy Father, who possessed, and made, and

created thee?" And of others He is the Father by similitude of grace,

and these are also called adoptive sons, as ordained to the heritage

of eternal glory by the gift of grace which they have received,

according to Rom. 8:16, 17: "The Spirit Himself gives testimony to

our spirit that we are the sons of God; and if sons, heirs also."

Lastly, He is the Father of others by similitude of glory, forasmuch

as they have obtained possession of the heritage of glory, according

to Rom. 5:2: "We glory in the hope of the glory of the sons of God."

Therefore it is plain that "paternity" is applied to God first, as

importing regard of one Person to another Person, before it imports

the regard of God to creatures.

Reply Obj. 1: Common terms taken absolutely, in the order of our

intelligence, come before proper terms; because they are included in

the understanding of proper terms; but not conversely. For in the

concept of the person of the Father, God is understood; but not

conversely. But common terms which import relation to the creature

come after proper terms which import personal relations; because the

person proceeding in God proceeds as the principle of the production

of creatures. For as the word conceived in the mind of the artist is

first understood to proceed from the artist before the thing

designed, which is produced in likeness to the word conceived in the

artist's mind; so the Son proceeds from the Father before the

creature, to which the name of filiation is applied as it

participates in the likeness of the Son, as is clear from the words

of Rom. 8:29: "Whom He foreknew and predestined to be made

conformable to the image of His Son."

Reply Obj. 2: To "receive" is said to be common to the creature and

to the Son not in a univocal sense, but according to a certain remote

similitude whereby He is called the First Born of creatures. Hence

the authority quoted subjoins: "That He may be the First Born among

many brethren," after saying that some were conformed to the image of

the Son of God. But the Son of God possesses a position of

singularity above others, in having by nature what He receives, as

Basil also declares (Hom. xv De Fide); hence He is called the only

begotten (John 1:18): "The only begotten Who is in the bosom of the

Father, He hath declared unto us."

From this appears the Reply to the Third Objection.

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Summa Theologica, Part I (Prima Pars) From the Complete American Edition · 第 240 / 722 题