Whether It Is Proper to the Father to Be Unbegotten?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not proper to the Father to be
unbegotten. For every property supposes something in that of which it
is the property. But "unbegotten" supposes nothing in the Father; it
only removes something. Therefore it does not signify a property of
the Father.
Obj. 2: Further, Unbegotten is taken either in a privative, or in
a negative sense. If in a negative sense, then whatever is not
begotten can be called unbegotten. But the Holy Ghost is not begotten;
neither is the divine essence. Therefore to be unbegotten belongs also
to the essence; thus it is not proper to the Father. But if it be
taken in a privative sense, as every privation signifies imperfection
in the thing which is the subject of privation, it follows that the
Person of the Father is imperfect; which cannot be.
Obj. 3: Further, in God, "unbegotten" does not signify relation,
for it is not used relatively. Therefore it signifies substance;
therefore unbegotten and begotten differ in substance. But the Son,
Who is begotten, does not differ from the Father in substance.
Therefore the Father ought not to be called unbegotten.
Obj. 4: Further, property means what belongs to one alone. Since,
then, there are more than one in God proceeding from another, there
is nothing to prevent several not receiving their being from another.
Therefore the Father is not alone unbegotten.
Obj. 5: Further, as the Father is the principle of the person
begotten, so is He of the person proceeding. So if by reason of his
opposition to the person begotten, it is proper to the Father to be
unbegotten it follows that it is proper to Him also to be
unproceeding.
_On the contrary,_ Hilary says (De Trin. iv): "One is from one--that
is, the Begotten is from the Unbegotten--namely, by the property in
each one respectively of innascibility and origin."
_I answer that,_ As in creatures there exist a first and a secondary
principle, so also in the divine Persons, in Whom there is no before
or after, is formed the principle not from a principle, Who is the
Father; and the principle from a principle, Who is the Son.
Now in things created a first principle is known in two ways; in one
way as the first _principle,_ by reason of its having a relation to
what proceeds from itself; in another way, inasmuch as it is a _first_
principle by reason of its not being from another. Thus therefore the
Father is known both by paternity and by common spiration, as regards
the persons proceeding from Himself. But as the principle, not from a
principle He is known by the fact that He is not from another; and
this belongs to the property of innascibility, signified by this word
"begotten."
Reply Obj. 1: Some there are who say that innascibility, signified by
the word "unbegotten," as a property of the Father, is not a negative
term only, but either that it means both these things
together--namely, that the Father is from no one, and that He is the
principle of others; or that it imports universal authority, or also
His plenitude as the source of all. This, however, does not seem
true, because thus innascibility would not be a property distinct
from paternity and spiration; but would include them as the proper is
included in the common. For source and authority signify in God
nothing but the principle of origin. We must therefore say with
Augustine (De Trin. v, 7) that "unbegotten" imports the negation of
passive generation. For he says that "unbegotten" has the same
meaning as "not a son." Nor does it follow that "unbegotten" is not
the proper notion of the Father; for primary and simple things are
notified by negations; as, for instance, a point is defined as what
has no part.
Reply Obj. 2: "Unbegotten" is taken sometimes in a negative sense
only, and in that sense Jerome says that "the Holy Ghost is
unbegotten," that is, He is not begotten. Otherwise "unbegotten" may
be taken in a kind of privative sense, but not as implying any
imperfection. For privation can be taken in many ways; in one way
when a thing has not what is naturally belongs to another, even
though it is not of its own nature to have it; as, for instance, if a
stone be called a dead thing, as wanting life, which naturally
belongs to some other things. In another sense, privation is so
called when something has not what naturally belongs to some members
of its genus; as for instance when a mole is called blind. In a third
sense privation means the absence of what something ought to have; in
which sense, privation imports an imperfection. In this sense,
"unbegotten" is not attributed to the Father as a privation, but it
may be so attributed in the second sense, meaning that a certain
person of the divine nature is not begotten, while some person of the
same nature is begotten. In this sense the term "unbegotten" can be
applied also to the Holy Ghost. Hence to consider it as a term proper
to the Father alone, it must be further understood that the name
"unbegotten" belongs to a divine person as the principle of another
person; so that it be understood to imply negation in the genus of
principle taken personally in God. Or that there be understood in the
term "unbegotten" that He is not in any way derived from another; and
not only that He is not from another by way only of generation. In
this sense the term "unbegotten" does not belong at all to the Holy
Ghost, Who is from another by procession, as a subsisting person; nor
does it belong to the divine essence, of which it may be said that it
is in the Son or in the Holy Ghost from another--namely, from the
Father.
Reply Obj. 3: According to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 9),
"unbegotten" in one sense signifies the same as "uncreated"; and thus
it applies to the substance, for thereby does the created substance
differ from the uncreated. In another sense it signifies what is not
begotten, and in this sense it is a relative term; just as negation
is reduced to the genus of affirmation, as "not man" is reduced to
the genus of substance, and "not white" to the genus of quality.
Hence, since "begotten" implies relation in God, "unbegotten" belongs
also to relation. Thus it does not follow that the Father unbegotten
is substantially distinguished from the Son begotten; but only by
relation; that is, as the relation of Son is denied of the Father.
Reply Obj. 4: In every genus there must be something first; so in the
divine nature there must be some one principle which is not from
another, and which we call "unbegotten." To admit two innascibles is
to suppose the existence of two Gods, and two divine natures. Hence
Hilary says (De Synod.): "As there is one God, so there cannot be two
innascibles." And this especially because, did two innascibles exist,
one would not be from the other, and they would not be distinguished
by relative opposition: therefore they would be distinguished from
each other by diversity of nature.
Reply Obj. 5: The property of the Father, whereby He is not from
another, is more clearly signified by the removal of the nativity of
the Son, than by the removal of the procession of the Holy Ghost;
both because the procession of the Holy Ghost has no special name, as
stated above (Q. 27, A. 4, ad 3), and because also in the order of
nature it presupposes the generation of the Son. Hence, it being
denied of the Father that He is begotten, although He is the
principle of generation, it follows, as a consequence, that He does
not proceed by the procession of the Holy Ghost, because the Holy
Ghost is not the principle of generation, but proceeds from the
person begotten.
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