Whether the Son Is Other Than the Father?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Son is not other than the Father.
For "other" is a relative term implying diversity of substance. If,
then, the Son is other than the Father, He must be different from the
Father; which is contrary to what Augustine says (De Trin. vii), that
when we speak of three persons, "we do not mean to imply diversity."
Obj. 2: Further, whosoever are other from one another, differ in
some way from one another. Therefore, if the Son is other than the
Father, it follows that He differs from the Father; which is against
what Ambrose says (De Fide i), that "the Father and the Son are one
in Godhead; nor is there any difference in substance between them,
nor any diversity."
Obj. 3: Further, the term alien is taken from _alius_ (other).
But the Son is not alien from the Father, for Hilary says (De Trin.
vii) that "in the divine persons there is nothing diverse, nothing
alien, nothing separable." Therefore the Son is not other than the
Father.
Obj. 4: Further, the terms "other person" and "other thing" [alius et
aliud] have the same meaning, differing only in gender. So if the Son
is another person from the Father, it follows that the Son is a thing
apart from the Father.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine [*Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum i.] says:
"There is one essence of the Father and Son and Holy Ghost, in which
the Father is not one thing, the Son another, and the Holy Ghost
another; although the Father is one person, the Son another, and the
Holy Ghost another."
_I answer that,_ Since as Jerome remarks [*In substance, Ep. lvii.], a
heresy arises from words wrongly used, when we speak of the Trinity we
must proceed with care and with befitting modesty; because, as
Augustine says (De Trin. i, 3), "nowhere is error more harmful, the
quest more toilsome, the finding more fruitful." Now, in treating of
the Trinity, we must beware of two opposite errors, and proceed
cautiously between them--namely, the error of Arius, who placed a
Trinity of substance with the Trinity of persons; and the error of
Sabellius, who placed unity of person with the unity of essence.
Thus, to avoid the error of Arius we must shun the use of the terms
diversity and difference in God, lest we take away the unity of
essence: we may, however, use the term "distinction" on account of the
relative opposition. Hence whenever we find terms of "diversity" or
"difference" of Persons used in an authentic work, these terms of
"diversity" or "difference" are taken to mean "distinction." But lest
the simplicity and singleness of the divine essence be taken away, the
terms "separation" and "division," which belong to the parts of a
whole, are to be avoided: and lest quality be taken away, we avoid the
use of the term "disparity": and lest we remove similitude, we avoid
the terms "alien" and "discrepant." For Ambrose says (De Fide i) that
"in the Father and the Son there is no discrepancy, but one Godhead":
and according to Hilary, as quoted above, "in God there is nothing
alien, nothing separable."
To avoid the heresy of Sabellius, we must shun the term "singularity,"
lest we take away the communicability of the divine essence. Hence
Hilary says (De Trin. vii): "It is sacrilege to assert that the Father
and the Son are separate in Godhead." We must avoid the adjective
"only" (unici) lest we take away the number of persons. Hence Hilary
says in the same book: "We exclude from God the idea of singularity or
uniqueness." Nevertheless, we say "the only Son," for in God there is
no plurality of Sons. Yet, we do not say "the only God," for the Deity
is common to several. We avoid the word "confused," lest we take away
from the Persons the order of their nature. Hence Ambrose says (De
Fide i): "What is one is not confused; and there is no multiplicity
where there is no difference." The word "solitary" is also to be
avoided, lest we take away the society of the three persons; for, as
Hilary says (De Trin. iv), "We confess neither a solitary nor a
diverse God."
This word "other" [alius], however, in the masculine sense, means only
a distinction of _suppositum_; and hence we can properly say that "the
Son is other than the Father," because He is another _suppositum_ of
the divine nature, as He is another person and another hypostasis.
Reply Obj. 1: "Other," being like the name of a particular thing,
refers to the _suppositum_; and so, there is sufficient reason for
using it, where there is a distinct substance in the sense of
hypostasis or person. But diversity requires a distinct substance in
the sense of essence. Thus we cannot say that the Son is diverse from
the Father, although He is another.
Reply Obj. 2: "Difference" implies distinction of form. There is one
form in God, as appears from the text, "Who, when He was in the form
of God" (Phil. 2:6). Therefore the term "difference" does not
properly apply to God, as appears from the authority quoted. Yet,
Damascene (De Fide Orth. i, 5) employs the term "difference" in the
divine persons, as meaning that the relative property is signified by
way of form. Hence he says that the hypostases do not differ from
each other in substance, but according to determinate properties. But
"difference" is taken for "distinction," as above stated.
Reply Obj. 3: The term "alien" means what is extraneous and
dissimilar; which is not expressed by the term "other" [alius]; and
therefore we say that the Son is "other" than the Father, but not
that He is anything "alien."
Reply Obj. 4: The neuter gender is formless; whereas the masculine is
formed and distinct; and so is the feminine. So the common essence is
properly and aptly expressed by the neuter gender, but by the
masculine and feminine is expressed the determined subject in the
common nature. Hence also in human affairs, if we ask, Who is this
man? we answer, Socrates, which is the name of the _suppositum_;
whereas, if we ask, What is he? we reply, A rational and mortal
animal. So, because in God distinction is by the persons, and not by
the essence, we say that the Father is other than the Son, but not
something else; while conversely we say that they are one thing, but
not one person.
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