Whether the Exclusive Word "Alone" Should Be Added to the Essential
Term in God?
Objection 1: It would seem that the exclusive word "alone" [solus] is
not to be added to an essential term in God. For, according to the
Philosopher (Elench. ii, 3), "He is alone who is not with another."
But God is with the angels and the souls of the saints. Therefore we
cannot say that God is alone.
Obj. 2: Further, whatever is joined to the essential term in God can
be predicated of every person _per se,_ and of all the persons
together; for, as we can properly say that God is wise, we can say
the Father is a wise God; and the Trinity is a wise God. But
Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 9): "We must consider the opinion that
the Father is not true God alone." Therefore God cannot be said to be
alone.
Obj. 3: Further if this expression "alone" is joined to an essential
term, it would be so joined as regards either the personal predicate
or the essential predicate. But it cannot be the former, as it is
false to say, "God alone is Father," since man also is a father; nor,
again, can it be applied as regards the latter, for, if this saying
were true, "God alone creates," it would follow that the "Father
alone creates," as whatever is said of God can be said of the Father;
and it would be false, as the Son also creates. Therefore this
expression "alone" cannot be joined to an essential term in God.
_On the contrary,_ It is said, "To the King of ages, immortal,
invisible, the only God" (1 Tim. 1:17).
_I answer that,_ This term "alone" can be taken as a categorematical
term, or as a syncategorematical term. A categorematical term is one
which ascribes absolutely its meaning to a given _suppositum_; as, for
instance, "white" to man, as when we say a "white man." If the term
"alone" is taken in this sense, it cannot in any way be joined to any
term in God; for it would mean solitude in the term to which it is
joined; and it would follow that God was solitary, against what is
above stated (A. 2). A syncategorematical term imports the order
of the predicate to the subject; as this expression "every one" or
"no one"; and likewise the term "alone," as excluding every other
_suppositum_ from the predicate. Thus, when we say, "Socrates alone
writes," we do not mean that Socrates is solitary, but that he has no
companion in writing, though many others may be with him. In this way
nothing prevents the term "alone" being joined to any essential term
in God, as excluding the predicate from all things but God; as if we
said "God alone is eternal," because nothing but God is eternal.
Reply Obj. 1: Although the angels and the souls of the saints are
always with God, nevertheless, if plurality of persons did not exist
in God, He would be alone or solitary. For solitude is not removed by
association with anything that is extraneous in nature; thus anyone
is said to be alone in a garden, though many plants and animals are
with him in the garden. Likewise, God would be alone or solitary,
though angels and men were with Him, supposing that several persons
were not within Him. Therefore the society of angels and of souls
does not take away absolute solitude from God; much less does it
remove respective solitude, in reference to a predicate.
Reply Obj. 2: This expression "alone," properly speaking, does not
affect the predicate, which is taken formally, for it refers to the
_suppositum,_ as excluding any other suppositum from the one which it
qualifies. But the adverb "only," being exclusive, can be applied
either to subject or predicate. For we can say, "Only Socrates"--that
is, no one else--"runs: and Socrates runs only"--that is, he does
nothing else. Hence it is not properly said that the Father is God
alone, or the Trinity is God alone, unless some implied meaning be
assumed in the predicate, as, for instance, "The Trinity is God Who
alone is God." In that sense it can be true to say that the Father is
that God Who alone is God, if the relative be referred to the
predicate, and not to the _suppositum._ So, when Augustine says that
the Father is not God alone, but that the Trinity is God alone, he
speaks expositively, as he might explain the words, "To the King of
ages, invisible, the only God," as applying not to the Father, but to
the Trinity alone.
Reply Obj. 3: In both ways can the term "alone" be joined to an
essential term. For this proposition, "God alone is Father," can mean
two things, because the word "Father" can signify the person of the
Father; and then it is true; for no man is that person: or it can
signify that relation only; and thus it is false, because the
relation of paternity is found also in others, though not in a
univocal sense. Likewise it is true to say God alone creates; nor,
does it follow, "therefore the Father alone creates," because, as
logicians say, an exclusive diction so fixes the term to which it is
joined that what is said exclusively of that term cannot be said
exclusively of an individual contained in that term: for instance,
from the premiss, "Man alone is a mortal rational animal," we cannot
conclude, "therefore Socrates alone is such."
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