Whether Relation in God Is the Same As His Essence?
Objection 1: It would seem that the divine relation is not the same as
the divine essence. For Augustine says (De Trin. v) that "not all that
is said of God is said of His substance, for we say some things
relatively, as Father in respect of the Son: but such things do not
refer to the substance." Therefore the relation is not the divine
essence.
Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. vii) that, "every relative
expression is something besides the relation expressed, as master is
a man, and slave is a man." Therefore, if relations exist in God,
there must be something else besides relation in God. This can only
be His essence. Therefore essence differs from relation.
Obj. 3: Further, the essence of relation is the being referred to
another, as the Philosopher says (Praedic. v). So if relation is the
divine essence, it follows that the divine essence is essentially
itself a relation to something else; whereas this is repugnant to the
perfection of the divine essence, which is supremely absolute and
self-subsisting (Q. 3, A. 4). Therefore relation is not the divine
essence.
_On the contrary,_ Everything which is not the divine essence is a
creature. But relation really belongs to God; and if it is not the
divine essence, it is a creature; and it cannot claim the adoration of
latria; contrary to what is sung in the Preface: "Let us adore the
distinction of the Persons, and the equality of their Majesty."
_I answer that,_ It is reported that Gilbert de la Porree erred on
this point, but revoked his error later at the council of Rheims.
For he said that the divine relations are assistant, or externally
affixed.
To perceive the error here expressed, we must consider that in each of
the nine genera of accidents there are two points for remark. One is
the nature belonging to each one of them considered as an accident;
which commonly applies to each of them as inherent in a subject, for
the essence of an accident is to inhere. The other point of remark is
the proper nature of each one of these genera. In the genera, apart
from that of _relation,_ as in quantity and quality, even the true
idea of the genus itself is derived from a respect to the subject; for
quantity is called the measure of substance, and quality is the
disposition of substance. But the true idea of relation is not taken
from its respect to that in which it is, but from its respect to
something outside. So if we consider even in creatures, relations
formally as such, in that aspect they are said to be "assistant," and
not intrinsically affixed, for, in this way, they signify a respect
which affects a thing related and tends from that thing to something
else; whereas, if relation is considered as an accident, it inheres in
a subject, and has an accidental existence in it. Gilbert de la Porree
considered relation in the former mode only.
Now whatever has an accidental existence in creatures, when considered
as transferred to God, has a substantial existence; for there is no
accident in God; since all in Him is His essence. So, in so far as
relation has an accidental existence in creatures, relation really
existing in God has the existence of the divine essence in no way
distinct therefrom. But in so far as relation implies respect to
something else, no respect to the essence is signified, but rather to
its opposite term.
Thus it is manifest that relation really existing in God is really the
same as His essence and only differs in its mode of intelligibility;
as in relation is meant that regard to its opposite which is not
expressed in the name of essence. Thus it is clear that in God
relation and essence do not differ from each other, but are one and
the same.
Reply Obj. 1: These words of Augustine do not imply that paternity or
any other relation which is in God is not in its very being the same
as the divine essence; but that it is not predicated under the mode
of substance, as existing in Him to Whom it is applied; but as a
relation. So there are said to be two predicaments only in God, since
other predicaments import habitude to that of which they are spoken,
both in their generic and in their specific nature; but nothing that
exists in God can have any relation to that wherein it exists or of
whom it is spoken, except the relation of identity; and this by
reason of God's supreme simplicity.
Reply Obj. 2: As the relation which exists in creatures involves not
only a regard to another, but also something absolute, so the same
applies to God, yet not in the same way. What is contained in the
creature above and beyond what is contained in the meaning of
relation, is something else besides that relation; whereas in God
there is no distinction, but both are one and the same; and this is
not perfectly expressed by the word "relation," as if it were
comprehended in the ordinary meaning of that term. For it was above
explained (Q. 13, A. 2), in treating of the divine names, that more
is contained in the perfection of the divine essence than can be
signified by any name. Hence it does not follow that there exists in
God anything besides relation in reality; but only in the various
names imposed by us.
Reply Obj. 3: If the divine perfection contained only what is
signified by relative names, it would follow that it is imperfect,
being thus related to something else; as in the same way, if nothing
more were contained in it than what is signified by the word
"wisdom," it would not in that case be a subsistence. But as the
perfection of the divine essence is greater than can be included in
any name, it does not follow, if a relative term or any other name
applied to God signify something imperfect, that the divine essence
is in any way imperfect; for the divine essence comprehends within
itself the perfection of every genus (Q. 4, A. 2).
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