FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 28, Art. 1]

Whether There Are Real Relations in God?

Objection 1: It would seem that there are no real relations in God.

For Boethius says (De Trin. iv), "All possible predicaments used as

regards the Godhead refer to the substance; for nothing can be

predicated relatively." But whatever really exists in God can be

predicated of Him. Therefore no real relation exists in God.

Obj. 2: Further, Boethius says (De Trin. iv) that, "Relation in the

Trinity of the Father to the Son, and of both to the Holy Ghost, is

the relation of the same to the same." But a relation of this kind is

only a logical one; for every real relation requires and implies in

reality two terms. Therefore the divine relations are not real

relations, but are formed only by the mind.

Obj. 3: Further, the relation of paternity is the relation of a

principle. But to say that God is the principle of creatures does not

import any real relation, but only a logical one. Therefore paternity

in God is not a real relation; while the same applies for the same

reason to the other relations in God.

Obj. 4: Further, the divine generation proceeds by way of an

intelligible word. But the relations following upon the operation of

the intellect are logical relations. Therefore paternity and

filiation in God, consequent upon generation, are only logical

relations.

_On the contrary,_ The Father is denominated only from paternity;

and the Son only from filiation. Therefore, if no real paternity or

filiation existed in God, it would follow that God is not really

Father or Son, but only in our manner of understanding; and this is

the Sabellian heresy.

_I answer that,_ relations exist in God really; in proof whereof we

may consider that in relations alone is found something which is only

in the apprehension and not in reality. This is not found in any

other genus; forasmuch as other genera, as quantity and quality, in

their strict and proper meaning, signify something inherent in a

subject. But relation in its own proper meaning signifies only what

refers to another. Such regard to another exists sometimes in the

nature of things, as in those things which by their own very nature

are ordered to each other, and have a mutual inclination; and such

relations are necessarily real relations; as in a heavy body is found

an inclination and order to the centre; and hence there exists in the

heavy body a certain respect in regard to the centre and the same

applies to other things. Sometimes, however, this regard to another,

signified by relation, is to be found only in the apprehension of

reason comparing one thing to another, and this is a logical relation

only; as, for instance, when reason compares man to animal as the

species to the genus. But when something proceeds from a principle of

the same nature, then both the one proceeding and the source of

procession, agree in the same order; and then they have real

relations to each other. Therefore as the divine processions are in

the identity of the same nature, as above explained (Q. 27, AA. 2,

4), these relations, according to the divine processions, are

necessarily real relations.

Reply Obj. 1: Relationship is not predicated of God according to its

proper and formal meaning, that is to say, in so far as its proper

meaning denotes comparison to that in which relation is inherent, but

only as denoting regard to another. Nevertheless Boethius did not

wish to exclude relation in God; but he wished to show that it was

not to be predicated of Him as regards the mode of inherence in

Himself in the strict meaning of relation; but rather by way of

relation to another.

Reply Obj. 2: The relation signified by the term "the same" is a

logical relation only, if in regard to absolutely the same thing;

because such a relation can exist only in a certain order observed by

reason as regards the order of anything to itself, according to some

two aspects thereof. The case is otherwise, however, when things are

called the same, not numerically, but generically or specifically.

Thus Boethius likens the divine relations to a relation of identity,

not in every respect, but only as regards the fact that the substance

is not diversified by these relations, as neither is it by relation

of identity.

Reply Obj. 3: As the creature proceeds from God in diversity of

nature, God is outside the order of the whole creation, nor does any

relation to the creature arise from His nature; for He does not

produce the creature by necessity of His nature, but by His intellect

and will, as is above explained (Q. 14, AA. 3, 4; Q. 19, A. 8).

Therefore there is no real relation in God to the creature; whereas

in creatures there is a real relation to God; because creatures are

contained under the divine order, and their very nature entails

dependence on God. On the other hand, the divine processions are in

one and the same nature. Hence no parallel exists.

Reply Obj. 4: Relations which result from the mental operation alone

in the objects understood are logical relations only, inasmuch as

reason observes them as existing between two objects perceived by the

mind. Those relations, however, which follow the operation of the

intellect, and which exist between the word intellectually proceeding

and the source whence it proceeds, are not logical relations only,

but are real relations; inasmuch as the intellect and the reason are

real things, and are really related to that which proceeds from them

intelligibly; as a corporeal thing is related to that which proceeds

from it corporeally. Thus paternity and filiation are real relations

in God.

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Summa Theologica, Part I (Prima Pars) From the Complete American Edition · 第 212 / 722 题