Whether the Relations in God Are Really Distinguished from Each Other?
Objection 1: It would seem that the divine relations are not really
distinguished from each other. For things which are identified with
the same, are identified with each other. But every relation in God
is really the same as the divine essence. Therefore the relations are
not really distinguished from each other.
Obj. 2: Further, as paternity and filiation are by name distinguished
from the divine essence, so likewise are goodness and power. But this
kind of distinction does not make any real distinction of the divine
goodness and power. Therefore neither does it make any real
distinction of paternity and filiation.
Obj. 3: Further, in God there is no real distinction but that of
origin. But one relation does not seem to arise from another.
Therefore the relations are not really distinguished from each other.
_On the contrary,_ Boethius says (De Trin.) that in God "the substance
contains the unity; and relation multiplies the trinity." Therefore,
if the relations were not really distinguished from each other, there
would be no real trinity in God, but only an ideal trinity, which is
the error of Sabellius.
_I answer that,_ The attributing of anything to another involves the
attribution likewise of whatever is contained in it. So when "man" is
attributed to anyone, a rational nature is likewise attributed to him.
The idea of relation, however, necessarily means regard of one to
another, according as one is relatively opposed to another. So as in
God there is a real relation (A. 1), there must also be a real
opposition. The very nature of relative opposition includes
distinction. Hence, there must be real distinction in God, not,
indeed, according to that which is absolute--namely, essence, wherein
there is supreme unity and simplicity--but according to that which is
relative.
Reply Obj. 1: According to the Philosopher (Phys. iii), this argument
holds, that whatever things are identified with the same thing are
identified with each other, if the identity be real and logical; as,
for instance, a tunic and a garment; but not if they differ
logically. Hence in the same place he says that although action is
the same as motion, and likewise passion; still it does not follow
that action and passion are the same; because action implies
reference as of something "from which" there is motion in the thing
moved; whereas passion implies reference as of something "which is
from" another. Likewise, although paternity, just as filiation, is
really the same as the divine essence; nevertheless these two in
their own proper idea and definitions import opposite respects. Hence
they are distinguished from each other.
Reply Obj. 2: Power and goodness do not import any opposition in
their respective natures; and hence there is no parallel argument.
Reply Obj. 3: Although relations, properly speaking, do not arise or
proceed from each other, nevertheless they are considered as opposed
according to the procession of one from another.
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