SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 25, Art. 2]

Whether the Power of God Is Infinite?

Objection 1: It seems that the power of God is not infinite. For

everything that is infinite is imperfect according to the Philosopher

(Phys. iii, 6). But the power of God is far from imperfect. Therefore

it is not infinite.

Obj. 2: Further, every power is made known by its effect; otherwise

it would be ineffectual. If, then, the power of God were infinite, it

could produce an infinite effect, but this is impossible.

Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 79) that if the

power of any corporeal thing were infinite, it would cause

instantaneous movement. God, however, does not cause instantaneous

movement, but moves the spiritual creature in time, and the corporeal

creature in place and time, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. 20, 22,

23). Therefore, His power is not infinite.

_On the contrary,_ Hilary says (De Trin. viii), that "God's power is

immeasurable. He is the living mighty one." Now everything that is

immeasurable is infinite. Therefore the power of God is infinite.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), active power exists in God

according to the measure in which He is actual. Now His existence is

infinite, inasmuch as it is not limited by anything that receives it,

as is clear from what has been said, when we discussed the infinity of

the divine essence (Q. 7, A. 1). Wherefore, it is necessary that

the active power in God should be infinite. For in every agent is it

found that the more perfectly an agent has the form by which it acts

the greater its power to act. For instance, the hotter a thing is, the

greater the power has it to give heat; and it would have infinite

power to give heat, were its own heat infinite. Whence, since the

divine essence, through which God acts, is infinite, as was shown

above (Q. 7, A. 1) it follows that His power likewise is infinite.

Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher is here speaking of an infinity in

regard to matter not limited by any form; and such infinity belongs

to quantity. But the divine essence is otherwise, as was shown above

(Q. 7, A. 1); and consequently so also His power. It does not follow,

therefore, that it is imperfect.

Reply Obj. 2: The power of a univocal agent is wholly manifested in

its effect. The generative power of man, for example, is not able to

do more than beget man. But the power of a non-univocal agent does

not wholly manifest itself in the production of its effect: as, for

example, the power of the sun does not wholly manifest itself in the

production of an animal generated from putrefaction. Now it is clear

that God is not a univocal agent. For nothing agrees with Him either

in species or in genus, as was shown above (Q. 3, A. 5; Q. 4, A. 3).

Whence it follows that His effect is always less than His power. It

is not necessary, therefore, that the infinite power of God should be

manifested so as to produce an infinite effect. Yet even if it were

to produce no effect, the power of God would not be ineffectual;

because a thing is ineffectual which is ordained towards an end to

which it does not attain. But the power of God is not ordered toward

its effect as towards an end; rather, it is the end of the effect

produced by it.

Reply Obj. 3: The Philosopher (Phys. viii, 79) proves that if a body

had infinite power, it would cause a non-temporal movement. And he

shows that the power of the mover of heaven is infinite, because it

can move in an infinite time. It remains, therefore, according to his

reckoning, that the infinite power of a body, if such existed, would

move without time; not, however, the power of an incorporeal mover.

The reason of this is that one body moving another is a univocal

agent; wherefore it follows that the whole power of the agent is made

known in its motion. Since then the greater the power of a moving

body, the more quickly does it move; the necessary conclusion is that

if its power were infinite, it would move beyond comparison faster,

and this is to move without time. An incorporeal mover, however, is

not a univocal agent; whence it is not necessary that the whole of

its power should be manifested in motion, so as to move without time;

and especially since it moves in accordance with the disposition of

its will.

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Summa Theologica, Part I (Prima Pars) From the Complete American Edition · 第 195 / 722 题