Whether God Is Omnipotent?
Objection 1: It seems that God is not omnipotent. For movement and
passiveness belong to everything. But this is impossible with God,
for He is immovable, as was said above (Q. 2, A. 3). Therefore He
is not omnipotent.
Obj. 2: Further, sin is an act of some kind. But God cannot sin,
nor "deny Himself" as it is said in 2 Tim. 2:13. Therefore He is
not omnipotent.
Obj. 3: Further, it is said of God that He manifests His omnipotence
"especially by sparing and having mercy" [*Collect, 10th Sunday after
Pentecost]. Therefore the greatest act possible to the divine power
is to spare and have mercy. There are things much greater, however,
than sparing and having mercy; for example, to create another world,
and the like. Therefore God is not omnipotent.
Obj. 4: Further, upon the text, "God hath made foolish the wisdom of
this world" (1 Cor. 1:20), a gloss says: "God hath made the wisdom of
this world foolish [*Vulg.: 'Hath not God', etc.] by showing those
things to be possible which it judges to be impossible." Whence it
would seem that nothing is to be judged possible or impossible in
reference to inferior causes, as the wisdom of this world judges
them; but in reference to the divine power. If God, then, were
omnipotent, all things would be possible; nothing, therefore
impossible. But if we take away the impossible, then we destroy also
the necessary; for what necessarily exists is impossible not to
exist. Therefore there would be nothing at all that is necessary in
things if God were omnipotent. But this is an impossibility.
Therefore God is not omnipotent.
_On the contrary,_ It is said: "No word shall be impossible with God"
(Luke 1:37).
_I answer that,_ All confess that God is omnipotent; but it seems
difficult to explain in what His omnipotence precisely consists: for
there may be doubt as to the precise meaning of the word 'all' when we
say that God can do all things. If, however, we consider the matter
aright, since power is said in reference to possible things, this
phrase, "God can do all things," is rightly understood to mean that
God can do all things that are possible; and for this reason He is
said to be omnipotent. Now according to the Philosopher (Metaph. v,
17), a thing is said to be possible in two ways. First in relation to
some power, thus whatever is subject to human power is said to be
possible to man. Secondly absolutely, on account of the relation in
which the very terms stand to each other. Now God cannot be said to be
omnipotent through being able to do all things that are possible to
created nature; for the divine power extends farther than that. If,
however, we were to say that God is omnipotent because He can do all
things that are possible to His power, there would be a vicious circle
in explaining the nature of His power. For this would be saying
nothing else but that God is omnipotent, because He can do all that He
is able to do.
It remains therefore, that God is called omnipotent because He can do
all things that are possible absolutely; which is the second way of
saying a thing is possible. For a thing is said to be possible or
impossible absolutely, according to the relation in which the very
terms stand to one another, possible if the predicate is not
incompatible with the subject, as that Socrates sits; and absolutely
impossible when the predicate is altogether incompatible with the
subject, as, for instance, that a man is a donkey.
It must, however, be remembered that since every agent produces an
effect like itself, to each active power there corresponds a thing
possible as its proper object according to the nature of that act on
which its active power is founded; for instance, the power of giving
warmth is related as to its proper object to the being capable of
being warmed. The divine existence, however, upon which the nature of
power in God is founded, is infinite, and is not limited to any genus
of being; but possesses within itself the perfection of all being.
Whence, whatsoever has or can have the nature of being, is numbered
among the absolutely possible things, in respect of which God is
called omnipotent. Now nothing is opposed to the idea of being except
non-being. Therefore, that which implies being and non-being at the
same time is repugnant to the idea of an absolutely possible thing,
within the scope of the divine omnipotence. For such cannot come under
the divine omnipotence, not because of any defect in the power of God,
but because it has not the nature of a feasible or possible thing.
Therefore, everything that does not imply a contradiction in terms, is
numbered amongst those possible things, in respect of which God is
called omnipotent: whereas whatever implies contradiction does not
come within the scope of divine omnipotence, because it cannot have
the aspect of possibility. Hence it is better to say that such things
cannot be done, than that God cannot do them. Nor is this contrary to
the word of the angel, saying: "No word shall be impossible with God."
For whatever implies a contradiction cannot be a word, because no
intellect can possibly conceive such a thing.
Reply Obj. 1: God is said to be omnipotent in respect to His active
power, not to passive power, as was shown above (A. 1). Whence the
fact that He is immovable or impassible is not repugnant to His
omnipotence.
Reply Obj. 2: To sin is to fall short of a perfect action; hence to
be able to sin is to be able to fall short in action, which is
repugnant to omnipotence. Therefore it is that God cannot sin,
because of His omnipotence. Nevertheless, the Philosopher says
(Topic. iv, 3) that God can deliberately do what is evil. But this
must be understood either on a condition, the antecedent of which is
impossible--as, for instance, if we were to say that God can do evil
things if He will. For there is no reason why a conditional
proposition should not be true, though both the antecedent and
consequent are impossible: as if one were to say: "If man is a
donkey, he has four feet." Or he may be understood to mean that God
can do some things which now seem to be evil: which, however, if He
did them, would then be good. Or he is, perhaps, speaking after the
common manner of the heathen, who thought that men became gods, like
Jupiter or Mercury.
Reply Obj. 3: God's omnipotence is particularly shown in sparing and
having mercy, because in this is it made manifest that God has
supreme power, that He freely forgives sins. For it is not for one
who is bound by laws of a superior to forgive sins of his own free
will. Or, because by sparing and having mercy upon men, He leads them
on to the participation of an infinite good; which is the ultimate
effect of the divine power. Or because, as was said above (Q. 21, A.
4), the effect of the divine mercy is the foundation of all the
divine works. For nothing is due to anyone, except on account of
something already given him gratuitously by God. In this way the
divine omnipotence is particularly made manifest, because to it
pertains the first foundation of all good things.
Reply Obj. 4: The absolute possible is not so called in reference
either to higher causes, or to inferior causes, but in reference to
itself. But the possible in reference to some power is named possible
in reference to its proximate cause. Hence those things which it
belongs to God alone to do immediately--as, for example, to create,
to justify, and the like--are said to be possible in reference to a
higher cause. Those things, however, which are of such kind as to be
done by inferior causes are said to be possible in reference to those
inferior causes. For it is according to the condition of the
proximate cause that the effect has contingency or necessity, as was
shown above (Q. 14, A. 1, ad 2). Thus is it that the wisdom of the
world is deemed foolish, because what is impossible to nature, it
judges to be impossible to God. So it is clear that the omnipotence
of God does not take away from things their impossibility and
necessity.
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