Whether Men Are Predestined by God?
Objection 1: It seems that men are not predestined by God, for
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 30): "It must be borne in mind that
God foreknows but does not predetermine everything, since He foreknows
all that is in us, but does not predetermine it all." But human merit
and demerit are in us, forasmuch as we are the masters of our own acts
by free will. All that pertains therefore to merit or demerit is not
predestined by God; and thus man's predestination is done away.
Obj. 2: Further, all creatures are directed to their end by divine
providence, as was said above (Q. 22, AA. 1, 2). But other creatures
are not said to be predestined by God. Therefore neither are men.
Obj. 3: Further, the angels are capable of beatitude, as well as men.
But predestination is not suitable to angels, since in them there
never was any unhappiness (miseria); for predestination, as Augustine
says (De praedest. sanct. 17), is the "purpose to take pity
[miserendi]" [*See Q. 22, A. 3]. Therefore men are not predestined.
Obj. 4: Further, the benefits God confers upon men are revealed by
the Holy Ghost to holy men according to the saying of the Apostle (1
Cor. 2:12): "Now we have received not the spirit of this world, but
the Spirit that is of God: that we may know the things that are given
us from God." Therefore if man were predestined by God, since
predestination is a benefit from God, his predestination would be
made known to each predestined; which is clearly false.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Rom. 8:30): "Whom He predestined,
them He also called."
_I answer that,_ It is fitting that God should predestine men. For
all things are subject to His providence, as was shown above (Q. 22,
A. 2). Now it belongs to providence to direct things towards their
end, as was also said (Q. 22, AA. 1, 2). The end towards which
created things are directed by God is twofold; one which exceeds all
proportion and faculty of created nature; and this end is life
eternal, that consists in seeing God which is above the nature of
every creature, as shown above (Q. 12, A. 4). The other end, however,
is proportionate to created nature, to which end created being can
attain according to the power of its nature. Now if a thing cannot
attain to something by the power of its nature, it must be directed
thereto by another; thus, an arrow is directed by the archer towards
a mark. Hence, properly speaking, a rational creature, capable of
eternal life, is led towards it, directed, as it were, by God. The
reason of that direction pre-exists in God; as in Him is the type of
the order of all things towards an end, which we proved above to be
providence. Now the type in the mind of the doer of something to be
done, is a kind of pre-existence in him of the thing to be done.
Hence the type of the aforesaid direction of a rational creature
towards the end of life eternal is called predestination. For to
destine, is to direct or send. Thus it is clear that predestination,
as regards its objects, is a part of providence.
Reply Obj. 1: Damascene calls predestination an imposition of
necessity, after the manner of natural things which are predetermined
towards one end. This is clear from his adding: "He does not will
malice, nor does He compel virtue." Whence predestination is not
excluded by Him.
Reply Obj. 2: Irrational creatures are not capable of that end which
exceeds the faculty of human nature. Whence they cannot be properly
said to be predestined; although improperly the term is used in
respect of any other end.
Reply Obj. 3: Predestination applies to angels, just as it does to
men, although they have never been unhappy. For movement does not
take its species from the term _wherefrom_ but from the term
_whereto._ Because it matters nothing, in respect of the notion of
making white, whether he who is made white was before black, yellow
or red. Likewise it matters nothing in respect of the notion of
predestination whether one is predestined to life eternal from the
state of misery or not. Although it may be said that every conferring
of good above that which is due pertains to mercy; as was shown
previously (Q. 21, AA. 3, 4).
Reply Obj. 4: Even if by a special privilege their predestination
were revealed to some, it is not fitting that it should be revealed
to everyone; because, if so, those who were not predestined would
despair; and security would beget negligence in the predestined.
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