THE ANNEXATION.
The state of affairs described in the previous chapter was one that
filled the Secretary of State for the Colonies with alarm. During his
tenure of office Lord Carnarvon evidently had the permanent welfare of
South Africa much at heart, and he saw with apprehension that the
troubles that were brewing in the Transvaal were of a nature likely to
involve the Cape and Natal in a native war. Though there is a broad
line of demarcation between Dutch and English, it is not so broad but
that a victorious nation like the Zulus might cross it, and beginning
by fighting the Boer, might end by fighting the white man irrespective
of race. When the reader reflects how terrible would be the
consequences of a combination of native tribes against the Whites, and
how easily such a combination might at that time have been brought
about in the first flush of native successes, he will understand the
anxiety with which all thinking men watched the course of events in the
Transvaal in 1876.
At last they took such a serious turn that the Home Government saw that
some action must be taken if the catastrophe was to be averted, and
determined to despatch Sir Theophilus Shepstone as Special Commissioner
to the Transvaal, with powers, should it be necessary, to annex the
country to Her Majesty's dominions, "in order to secure the peace and
safety of Our said colonies and of Our subjects elsewhere."
The terms of his Commission were unusually large, leaving a great deal
to his discretionary power. In choosing that officer for the execution
of a most difficult and delicate mission, the Government, doubtless,
made a very wise selection. Sir Theophilus Shepstone is a man of
remarkable tact and ability, combined with great openness and
simplicity of mind, and one whose name will always have a leading place
in South African history. During a long official lifetime he has had to
do with most of the native races in South Africa, and certainly knows
them and their ways better than any living man; whilst he is by them
all regarded with a peculiar and affectionate reverence. He is _par
excellence_ their great white chief and "father," and a word from
him, even now that he has retired from active life, still carries more
weight than the formal remonstrances of any governor in South Africa.
With the Boers he is almost equally well acquainted, having known many
of them personally for years. He possesses, moreover, the rare power of
winning the regard and affection, as well as the respect, of those
about him in such a marked degree that those who have served him once
would go far to serve him again. Sir T. Shepstone, however, has enemies
like other people, and is commonly reported among them to be a disciple
of Machiavelli, and to have his mind steeped in all the darker wiles of
Kafir policy. The Annexation of the Transvaal is by them attributed to
a successful and vigorous use of those arts that distinguished the
diplomacy of two centuries ago. Falsehood and bribery are supposed to
have been the great levers used to effect the change, together with
threats of extinction at the hands of a savage and unfriendly nation.
That the Annexation was a triumph of mind over matter is quite true,
but whether or no that triumph was unworthily obtained, I will leave
those who read this short chronicle of the events connected with it to
judge. I saw it somewhat darkly remarked in a newspaper the other day
that the history of the Annexation had evidently yet to be written; and
I fear that the remark represents the feeling of most people about that
event, implying as it did that it was carried out by means certainly
mysteriously and presumably doubtful. I am afraid that those who think
thus will be disappointed in what I have to say about the matter, since
I know that the means employed to bring the Boers--
"Fracti bello, fatisque repulsi"--
under Her Majesty's authority were throughout as fair and honest as the
Annexation itself was, in my opinion, right and necessary.
To return to Sir T. Shepstone. He undoubtedly had faults as a ruler,
one of the most prominent of which was that his natural mildness of
character would never allow him to act with severity even when severity
was necessary. The very criminals condemned to death ran a good chance
of reprieve when he had to sign their death-warrants. He has also that
worst of faults (so-called), in one fitted by nature to become
great--want of ambition, a failing that in such a man marks him the
possessor of an even and a philosophic mind. It was no seeking of his
own that raised him out of obscurity, and when his work was done to
comparative obscurity he elected to return, though whether a man of his
ability and experience in South African affairs should, at the present
crisis, be allowed to remain there, is another question.
On the 20th December 1876, Sir T. Shepstone wrote to President Burgers,
informing him of his approaching visit to the Transvaal, to secure, if
possible, the adjustment of existing troubles, and the adoption of such
measures as might be best calculated to prevent their recurrence in the
future.
On his road to Pretoria, Sir Theophilus received a hearty welcome from
the Boer as well as the English inhabitants of the country. One of
these addresses to him says: "Be assured, high honourable Sir, that we
burghers, now assembled together, entertain the most friendly feeling
towards your Government, and that we shall agree with anything you may
do in conjunction with our Government for the progress of our State,
the strengthening against our native enemies, and for the general
welfare of all the inhabitants of the whole of South Africa. Welcome in
Heidelberg, and welcome in the Transvaal."
At Pretoria the reception of the Special Commissioner was positively
enthusiastic; the whole town came out to meet him, and the horses
having been taken out of the carriage, he was dragged in triumph
through the streets. In his reply to the address presented to him, Sir
Theophilus shadowed forth the objects of his mission in these words:
"Recent events in this country have shown to all thinking men the
absolute necessity for closer union and more oneness of purpose among
the Christian Governments of the southern portion of this continent:
the best interests of the native races, no less than the peace and
prosperity of the white, imperatively demand it, and I rely upon you
and upon your Government to co-operate with me in endeavouring to
achieve the great and glorious end of inscribing on a general South
African banner the appropriate motto--"Eendragt maakt magt" (Unity
makes strength)."
A few days after his arrival a commission was appointed, consisting of
Messrs. Henderson and Osborn, on behalf of the Special Commissioner,
and Messrs. Kruger and Jorissen, on behalf of the Transvaal Government,
to discuss the state of the country. This commission came to nothing,
and was on both sides nothing more than a bit of by-play.
The arrival of the mission was necessarily regarded with mixed feelings
by the inhabitants of the Transvaal. By one party it was eagerly
greeted, viz., the English section of the population, who devoutly
hoped that it had come to annex the country. With the exception of the
Hollander element, the officials also were glad of its arrival, and
secretly hoped that the country would be taken over, when there would
be more chance of their getting their arrear pay. The better educated
Boers also were for the most part satisfied that there was no hope for
the country unless England helped it in some way, though they did not
like having to accept the help. But the more bigoted and narrow-minded
among them were undoubtedly opposed to English interference, and under
their leader, Paul Kruger, who was at the time running for the
President's chair, did their best to be rid of it. They found ready
allies in the Hollander clientelle, with which Mr. Burgers had
surrounded himself, headed by the famous Dr. Jorissen, who was, like
most of the rulers of this singular State, an ex-clergyman, but now an
Attorney-general, not learned in the law. These men were for the most
part entirely unfit for the positions they held, and feared that in the
event of the country changing hands they might be ejected from them;
and also, they did all Englishmen the favour to regard them with that
peculiarly virulent and general hatred which is a part of the secret
creed of many foreigners, more especially of such as are under our
protection. As may easily be imagined, what between all these different
parties and the presence of the Special Commissioner, there were
certainly plenty of intrigues going on in Pretoria during the first few
months of 1877, and the political excitement was very great. Nobody
knew how far Sir T. Shepstone was prepared to go, and everybody was
afraid of putting out his hand further than he could pull it back, and
trying to make himself comfortable on two stools at once. Members of
the Volksraad and other prominent individuals in the country who had
during the day been denouncing the Commissioner in no measured terms,
and even proposing that he and his staff should be shot as a warning to
the English Government, might be seen arriving at his house under cover
of the shades of evening, to have a little talk with him, and express
the earnest hope that it was his intention to annex the country as soon
as possible. It is necessary to assist at a peaceable annexation to
learn the depth of meanness human nature is capable of.
In Pretoria, at any rate, the ladies were of great service to the cause
of the mission, since they were nearly all in favour of a change of
government, and, that being the case, they naturally soon brought their
husbands, brothers, and lovers to look at things from the same point of
view. It was a wise man who said that in any matter where it is
necessary to obtain the goodwill of a population you should win over
the women; that done, you need not trouble yourself about the men.
Though the country was thus overflowing with political intrigues,
nothing of the kind went on in the Commissioner's camp. It was not he
who made the plots to catch the Transvaalers; on the contrary, they
made the plots to catch him. For several months all that he did was to
sit still and let the rival passions work their way, fighting what the
Zulus afterwards called the "fight of sit down." When anybody came to
see him he was very glad to meet them, pointed out the desperate
condition of the country, and asked them if they could suggest a
remedy. And that was about all he did do, beyond informing himself very
carefully as to all that was going on in the country, and the movements
of the natives within and outside its borders. There was no money spent
in bribery, as has been stated, though it is impossible to imagine a
state of affairs in which it would have been more easy to bribe, or in
which it could have been done with greater effect; unless indeed the
promise that some pension should be paid to President Burgers can be
called a bribe, which it was certainly never intended to be, but simply
a guarantee that after having spent all his private means on behalf of
the State he should not be left destitute. The statement that the
Annexation was effected under a threat that if the Government did not
give its consent Sir T. Shepstone would let loose the Zulus on the
country is also a wicked and malicious invention, but with this I shall
deal more at length further on.
It must not, however, be understood that the Annexation was a foregone
conclusion, or that Sir T. Shepstone came up to the Transvaal with the
fixed intention of annexing the country without reference to its
position, merely with a view of extending British influence, or, as has
been absurdly stated, in order to benefit Natal. He had no fixed
purpose, whether it were necessary or no, of exercising the full powers
given to him by his commission; on the contrary, he was all along most
anxious to find some internal resources within the State by means of
which Annexation could be averted, and of this fact his various letters
and despatches give full proof. Thus, in his letter to President
Burgers, of the 9th April 1877, in which he announces his intention of
annexing the country, he says: "I have more than once assured your
Honour that if I could think of any plan by which the independence of
the State could be maintained by its own internal resources I would
most certainly not conceal that plan from you." It is also incidentally
remarkably confirmed by a passage in Mr. Burgers' posthumous defence,
in which he says: "Hence I met Shepstone alone in my house, and opened
up the subject of his mission. With a candour that astonished me, he
avowed that his purpose was to annex the country, as he had sufficient
grounds for it, unless I could so alter as to satisfy his Government.
My plan of a new constitution, modelled after that of America, of a
standing police force of two hundred mounted men, was then proposed. He
promised to give me time to call the Volksraad together, and to
_abandon his design_ if the Volksraad would adopt these measures,
and the country be willing to submit to them, and to carry them out."
Further on he says: "In justice to Shepstone I must say that I would
not consider an officer of my Government to have acted faithfully if he
had not done what Shepstone did."
It has also been frequently alleged in England, and always seems to be
taken as the groundwork of argument in the matter of the Annexation,
that the Special Commissioner represented that the majority of the
inhabitants wished for the Annexation, and that it was sanctioned on
that ground. This statement shows the great ignorance that exists in
this country of South African affairs, an ignorance which in this case
has been carefully fostered by Mr. Gladstone's Government for party
purposes, they having found it necessary to assume, in order to make
their position in the matter tenable, that Sir T. Shepstone and other
officers had been guilty of misrepresentation. Unfortunately, the
Government and its supporters have been more intent upon making out
their case than upon ascertaining the truth of their statements. If
they had taken the trouble to refer to Sir T. Shepstone's despatches,
they would have found that the ground on which the Transvaal was
annexed was, not because the majority of the inhabitants wished for it
but because the State was drifting into anarchy, was bankrupt, and was
about to be destroyed by native tribes. They would further have found
that Sir T. Shepstone never represented that the majority of the Boers
were in favour of Annexation. What he did say was that most thinking
men in the country saw no other way out of the difficulty; but what
proportion of the Boers can be called "thinking men?" He also said, in
the fifteenth paragraph of his despatch to Lord Carnarvon of 6th March
1877, that petitions signed by 2500 people, representing every class of
the community, out of a total adult male population of 8000, had been
presented to the Government of the Republic, setting forth its
difficulties and dangers, and praying it "to treat with me for their
amelioration or removal." He also stated, and with perfect truth, that
many more would have signed had it not been for the terrorism that was
exercised, and that all the towns and villages in the country desired
the change, which was a patent fact.
This is the foundation on which the charge of misrepresentation is
built--a charge which has been manipulated so skilfully, and with such
a charming disregard for the truth, that the British public has been
duped into believing it. When it is examined into, it vanishes into
thin air.
But a darker charge has been brought against the Special Commissioner--a
charge affecting his honour as a gentleman and his character as a
Christian; and, strange to say, has gained a considerable credence,
especially amongst a certain party in England. I allude to the
statement that he called up the Zulu army with the intention of
sweeping the Transvaal if the Annexation was objected to. I may state,
from my own personal knowledge, that the report is a complete
falsehood, and that no such threat was ever made, either by Sir T.
Shepstone or by anybody connected with him, and I will briefly prove
what I say.
When the mission first arrived at Pretoria, a message came from
Cetywayo to the effect that he had heard that the Boers had fired at
"Sompseu" (Sir T. Shepstone), and announcing his intention of attacking
the Transvaal if "his father" was touched. About the middle of March
alarming rumours began to spread as to the intended action of Cetywayo
with reference to the Transvaal; but as Sir T. Shepstone did not think
that the king would be likely to make any hostile movement whilst he
was in the country, he took no steps in the matter. Neither did the
Transvaal Government ask his advice and assistance. Indeed, a
remarkable trait in the Boers is their supreme self-conceit, which
makes them believe that they are capable of subduing all the natives in
Africa, and of thrashing the whole British army if necessary.
Unfortunately, the recent course of events has tended to confirm them
in their opinion as regards their white enemies. To return: towards the
second week in April, or the week before the proclamation of Annexation
was issued, things began to look very serious; indeed, rumours that
could hardly be discredited reached the Special Commissioner that the
whole Zulu army was collected in a chain of Impis or battalions, with
the intention of bursting into the Transvaal and sweeping the country.
Knowing how terrible would be the catastrophe if this were to happen,
Sir T. Shepstone was much alarmed about the matter, and at a meeting
with the Executive Council of the Transvaal Government he pointed out
to them the great danger in which the country was placed. This was done
in the presence of several officers of his staff, and it was on this
friendly exposition of the state of affairs that the charge that he had
threatened the country with invasion by the Zulus was based. On the
11th April, or the day before the Annexation, a message was despatched
to Cetywayo, telling him of the reports that had reached Pretoria, and
stating that if they were true he must forthwith give up all such
intentions, as the Transvaal would at once be placed under the
sovereignty of Her Majesty, and that if he had assembled any armies for
purposes of aggression they must be disbanded at once. Sir T.
Shepstone's message reached Zululand not a day too soon. Had the
Annexation of the Transvaal been delayed by a few weeks even--and this
is a point which I earnestly beg Englishmen to remember in connection
with that act--Cetywayo's armies would have entered the Transvaal,
carrying death before them, and leaving a wilderness behind them.
Cetywayo's answer to the Special Commissioner's message will
sufficiently show, to use Sir Theophilus' own words in his despatch on
the subject, "the pinnacle of peril which the Republic and South Africa
generally had reached at the moment when the Annexation took place." He
says, "I thank my Father Sompseu (Sir T. Shepstone) for his message. I
am glad that he has sent it, because the Dutch have tired me out, and I
intended to fight them once and once only, and to drive them over the
Vaal. Kabana (name of messenger), you see my Impis (armies) are
gathered. It was to fight the Dutch I called them together; now I will
send them back to their homes. Is it well that two men ('amadoda-amabili')
should be made 'iziula' (fools)? In the reign of my father Umpanda the
Boers were constantly moving their boundary further into my country.
Since his death the same thing has been done. I had therefore
determined to end it once for all!" The message then goes on to other
matters, and ends with a request to be allowed to fight the Amaswazi,
because "they fight together and kill one another. This," says Cetywayo
naively, "is wrong, and I want to chastise them for it."
This quotation will suffice to convince all reasonable men, putting
aside all other matters, from what imminent danger the Transvaal was
delivered by the much-abused Annexation.
Some months after that event, however, it occurred to the ingenious
mind of some malicious individual in Natal that, properly used, much
political capital might be made out of this Zulu incident, and the
story that Cetywayo's army had been called up by Sir Theophilus himself
to overawe, and, if necessary, subdue the Transvaal, was accordingly
invented and industriously circulated. Although Sir T. Shepstone at
once caused it to be authoritatively contradicted, such an astonishing
slander naturally took firm root, and on the 12th April 1879 we have
Mr. M. W. Pretorius, one of the Boer leaders, publicly stating at a
meeting of the farmers that "previous to the Annexation Sir T.
Shepstone had threatened the Transvaal with an attack from the Zulus as
an argument for advancing the Annexation." Under such an imputation the
Government could no longer keep silence, and accordingly Sir Owen
Lanyon, who was then Administrator of the Transvaal, caused the matter
to be officially investigated, with these results, which are summed up
by him in a letter to Mr. Pretorius, dated 1st May 1879:--
1. The records of the Republican Executive Council contained no
allusion to any such statement.
2. Two members of that Council filed statements in which they
unreservedly denied that Sir T. Shepstone used the words or threats
imputed to him.
3. Two officers of Sir T. Shepstone's staff, who were always present
with him at interviews with the Executive Council, filed statements to
the same effect.
"I have no doubt," adds Sir Owen Lanyon, "that the report has been
originated and circulated by some evil-disposed person."
In addition to this evidence we have a letter written to the Colonial
Office by Sir T. Shepstone, dated London, August 12, 1879, in which he
points out that Mr. Pretorius was not even present at any of the
interviews with the Executive Council on which occasion he accuses him
of having made use of the threats. He further shows that the use of
such a threat on his part would have, been the depth of folly, and
"knowingly to court the instant and ignominious failure of my mission,"
because the Boers were so persuaded of their own prowess that they
could not be convinced that they stood in any danger from native
sources, and also because "such play with such keen-edged tools as the
excited passions of savages are, and especially such savages as I knew
the Zulus to be, is not what an experience of forty-two years in
managing them inclined me to." And yet, in the face of all this
accumulated evidence, this report continues to be believed, that is, by
those who wished to believe it.
Such are the accusations that have been brought against the manner of
the Annexation and the officer who carried it out, and never were
accusations more groundless. Indeed, both for party purposes, and from
personal animus, every means, fair or foul, has been used to discredit
it and all connected with it. To take a single instance, one author
(Miss Colenso, p. 134, "History of the Zulu War") actually goes the
length of putting a portion of a speech made by President Burgers into
the mouth of Sir T. Shepstone, and then abusing him for his incredible
profanity. Surely this exceeds the limits of fair criticism.
Before I go on to the actual history of the Annexation there is one
point I wish to submit to my reader. In England the change of
Government has always been talked of as though it only affected the
forty thousand white inhabitants of the country, whilst everybody seems
to forget that this same land had about a million human beings living
on it, its original owners, and only, unfortunately for themselves,
possessing a black skin, and therefore entitled to little
consideration,--even at the hands of the most philanthropic Government
in the world. It never seems to have occurred to those who have raised
so much outcry on behalf of the forty thousand Boers, to inquire what
was thought of the matter by the million natives. If they were to be
allowed a voice in their own disposal, the country was certainly
annexed by the wish of a very large majority of the inhabitants. It is
true that Secocoeni, instigated thereto by the Boers, afterwards
continued the war against us, but, with the exception of this one
chief, the advent of our rule was hailed with joy by every native in
the Transvaal, and even he was glad of it at the time. During our
period of rule in the Transvaal the natives have had, as they foresaw,
more peace than at any time since the white man set foot in the land.
They have paid their taxes gladly, and there has been no fighting among
themselves; but since we have given up the country we hear a very
different tale. It is this million of men, women, and children who,
notwithstanding their black skins, live and feel, and have intelligence
as much as ourselves, who are the principal, because the most numerous
sufferers from Mr. Gladstone's conjuring tricks, that can turn a
Sovereign into a Suzerain as airily as the professor of magic brings a
litter of guinea-pigs out of a top hat. It is our falsehood and
treachery to them whom we took over "for ever," as we told them, and
whom we have now handed back to their natural enemies to be paid off
for their loyalty to the Englishman, that is the blackest stain in all
this black business, and that has destroyed our prestige, and caused us
to be looked on amongst them, for they do not hide their opinion, as
"cowards and liars."
But very little attention, however, seems to have been paid to native
views or claims at any time in the Transvaal; indeed they have all
along been treated as serfs of the soil, to be sold with it, if
necessary, to a new master. It is true that the Government, acting
under pressure from the Aborigines Protection Society, made, on the
occasion of the Surrender, a feeble effort to secure the independence
of some of the native tribes; but when the Boer leaders told them
shortly that they would have nothing of the sort, and that, if they
were not careful, they would reoccupy Laing's Nek, the proposal was at
once dropped, with many assurances that no offence was intended. The
worst of the matter is that this treatment of our native subjects and
allies will assuredly recoil on the heads of future innocent
Governments.
Shortly after the appointment of the Joint-Commission alluded to at the
beginning of this chapter, President Burgers, who was now in possession
of the Special Commissioner's intentions, should he be unable to carry
out reforms sufficiently drastic to satisfy the English Government,
thought it best to call together the Volksraad. In the meantime, it had
been announced that the "rebel" Secocoeni had sued for peace and
signed a treaty declaring himself a subject of the Republic. I shall
have to enter into the question of this treaty a little further on, so
I will at present only say that it was the first business laid before
the Raad, and, after some discussion, ratified. Next in order to the
Secocoeni peace came the question of Confederation, as laid down in
Lord Carnarvon's Permissive Bill. This proposal was laid before them in
an earnest and eloquent speech by their President, who entreated them
to consider the dangerous position of the Republic, and to face their
difficulties like men. The question was referred to a committee, and an
adverse report being brought up, was rejected without further
consideration. It is just possible that intimidation had something to
do with the summary treatment of so important a matter, seeing that
whilst it was being argued a large mob of Boers, looking very
formidable with their sea-cow hide whips, watched every move of their
representatives through the windows of the Volksraad Hall. It was Mr.
Chamberlain's caucus system in practical and visible operation.
A few days after the rejection of the Confederation Bill, President
Burgers, who had frequently alluded to the desperate condition of the
Republic, and stated that either some radical reform must be effected
or the country must come under the British flag, laid before the Raad a
brand new constitution of a very remarkable nature, asserting that they
must either accept it or lose their independence.
The first part of this strange document dealt with the people and their
rights, which remained much as they were before, with the exception
that the secrecy of all letters entrusted to the post was to be
inviolable. The recognition of this right is an amusing incident in the
history of a free Republic. Under following articles the Volksraad was
entrusted with the charge of the native inhabitants of the State, the
provision for the administration of justice, the conduct of education,
the regulation of money-bills, &c. It is in the fourth chapter,
however, that we come to the real gist of the Bill, which was the
endowment of the State President with the authority of a dictator. Mr.
Burgers thought to save the State by making himself an absolute
monarch. He was to be elected for a period of seven instead of five
years, and to be eligible for re-election. In him was vested the power
of making all appointments without reference to the Legislature. All
laws were to be drawn up by him, and he was to have the right of veto
on Volksraad resolutions, which body he could summon and dissolve at
will. Finally, his Executive Council was to consist of heads of
departments appointed by himself, and of one member of the Volksraad.
The Volksraad treated this Bill in much the same way as they had dealt
with the Permissive Confederation Bill, gave it a casual consideration,
and threw it out.
The President, meanwhile, was doing his best to convince the Raad of
the danger of the country; that the treasury was empty, whilst duns
were pressing, that enemies were threatening on every side, and,
finally, that Her Majesty's Special Commissioner was encamped within a
thousand yards of them, watching their deliberations with some
interest. He showed them that it was impossible at once to scorn reform
and reject friendly offers, that it was doubtful if anything could save
them, but that if they took no steps they were certainly lost as a
nation. The "Fathers of the land," however, declined to dance to the
President's piping. Then he took a bolder line. He told them that a
guilty nation never can evade the judgment that follows its steps. He
asked them "conscientiously to advise the people not obstinately to
refuse a union with a powerful Government. He could not advise them to
refuse such a union.... He did not believe that a new constitution
would save them; for as little as the old constitution had brought them
to ruin, so little would a new constitution bring salvation.... If the
citizens of England had behaved towards the Crown as the burghers of
this State had behaved to their Government, England would never have
stood so long as she had." He pointed out to them their hopeless
financial position. "To-day," he said, "a bill for £1100 was laid
before me for signature; but I would sooner have cut off my right hand
than sign that paper--(cheers)--for I have not the slightest ground
to expect that, when that bill becomes due, there will be a penny to
pay it with." And finally, he exhorted them thus: "Let them make the
best of the situation, and get the best terms they possibly could;
let them agree to join their hands to those of their brethren in the
south, and then from the Cape to the Zambesi there would be one great
people. Yes, there was something grand in that, grander even than
their idea of a Republic, something which ministered to their national
feeling--(cheers)--and would this be so miserable? Yes, this would be
miserable for those who would not be under the law, for the rebel and
the revolutionist, but welfare and prosperity for the men of law and
order."
These powerful words form a strong indictment against the Republic, and
from them there can be little doubt that President Burgers was
thoroughly convinced of the necessity and wisdom of the Annexation. It
is interesting to compare them, and many other utterances of his made
at this period, with the opinions he expresses in the posthumous
document recently published, in which he speaks somewhat jubilantly of
the lessons taught us on Laing's Nek and Majuba by such "an inherently
weak people as the Boers," and points to them as striking instances of
retribution. In this document he attributes the Annexation to the
desire to advance English supremacy in South Africa, and to lay hold of
the way to Central South Africa. It is, however, noticeable that he
does not in any way indicate how it could have been averted, and the
State continue to exist; and he seems all along to feel that his case
is a weak one, for in explaining, or attempting to explain, why he had
never defended himself from the charges brought against him in
connection with the Annexation, he says: "Had I not endured in silence,
had I not borne patiently all the accusations, but out of selfishness
or fear told the plain truth of the case, the Transvaal would never
have had the consideration it has now received from Great Britain.
However unjust the Annexation was, my self-justification would have
_exposed the Boers to such an extent_, and the state of the country in
such a way, that it would have deprived them both of the sympathy of
the world and the consideration of the English politicians." In other
words, "If I had told the truth about things as I should have been
obliged to do to justify myself, there would have been no more outcry
about the Annexation, because the whole world, even the English
Radicals, would have recognised how necessary it was, and what a
fearful state the country was in."
But to let that pass, it is evident that President Burgers did not take
the same view of the Annexation in 1877 as he did in 1881, and indeed
his speeches to the Volksraad would read rather oddly printed in
parallel columns with his posthumous statement. The reader would be
forced to one of two conclusions, either on one of the two occasions he
is saying what he does not mean, or he must have changed his mind. As I
believe him to have been an honest man, I incline to the latter
supposition; nor do I consider it so very hard to account for, taking
into consideration his natural Dutch proclivities. In 1877 Burgers is
the despairing head of a State driving rapidly to ruin, if not to
actual extinction, when the strong hand of the English Government is
held out to him. What wonder that he accepts it gladly on behalf of his
country, which is by its help brought into a state of greater
prosperity than it has ever before known? In 1881 the wheel has gone
round, and great events have come about whilst he lies dying. The
enemies of the Boers have been destroyed, the powers of the Zulus and
Secocoeni are no more; the country has prospered under a healthy
rule, and its finances have been restored. More,--glad tidings have
come from Mid-Lothian to the "rebel and the revolutionist," whose hopes
were flagging, and eloquent words have been spoken by the new English
Dictator that have aroused a great rebellion. And, to crown all,
English troops have suffered one massacre and three defeats, and
England sues for peace from the South African peasant, heedless of
honour or her broken word, so that the prayer be granted. With such
events before him, that dying man may well have found cause to change
his opinion. Doubtless the Annexation was wrong, since England disowns
her acts; and may not that dream about the great South African Republic
come true after all? Has not the pre-eminence of the Englishman
received a blow from which it can never recover, and is not his
control over Boers and natives irredeemably weakened? And must
he,--Burgers,--go down to posterity as a Dutchman who tried to forward
the interests of the English party? No, doubtless the Annexation was
wrong; but it has done good, for it has brought about the downfall of
the English: and we will end the argument in the very words of his last
public utterance, with which he ends his statement: "South Africa
gained more from this, and has made a larger step forward in the march
of freedom, than most people can conceive."
Who shall say that he is wrong? the words of dying men are sometimes
prophetic! South Africa has made a great advance towards the "freedom"
of a Dutch Republic.
This has been a digression, but I hope not an uninteresting one. To
return--on the 1st March, Sir T. Shepstone met the Executive Council,
and told them that in his opinion there was now but one remedy to be
adopted, and that was that the Transvaal should be united with the
English colonies of South Africa under one head, namely the Queen,
saying at the same time that the only thing now left to the Republic
was to make the best arrangements it could for the future benefit of
its inhabitants, and to submit to that which he saw to be, and every
thinking man saw to be, inevitable. So soon as this information was
officially communicated to the Raad, for a good proportion of its
members were already acquainted with it unofficially, it flew from a
state of listless indifference into vigorous and hasty action. The
President was censured, and a committee was appointed to consider and
report upon the situation, which reported in favour of the adoption of
Burgers' new constitution. Accordingly, the greatest part of this
measure, which had been contemptuously rejected a few days before, was
adopted almost without question, and Mr. Paul Kruger was appointed
Vice-President. On the following day, a very drastic treason law was
passed, borrowed from the statute-book of the Orange Free State, which
made all public expression of opinion, if adverse to the Government, or
in any way supporting the Annexation party, high treason. This done,
the Assembly prorogued itself until--October 1881.
During and after the sitting of the Raad, rumours arose that the chief
Secocoeni's signature to the treaty of peace, ratified by that body,
had been obtained by misrepresentation. As ratified, this treaty
consisted of three articles, according to which Secocoeni consented,
first, to become a subject of the Republic, and obey the laws of the
country; secondly, to agree to a certain restricted boundary line; and,
thirdly, to pay 2000 head of cattle; which, considering he had captured
quite 5000 head, was not exorbitant.
Towards the end of February a written message was received from
Secocoeni by Sir T. Shepstone, dated after the signing of the
supposed treaty. The original, which was written in Sisutu, was a great
curiosity. The following is a correct translation:--
"_February 16, 1877._
"FOR MYN HEER SHEPSTONE,--I beg you, Chief, come help me, the Boers
are killing me, and I don't know the reasons why they should be
angry with me; Chief, I beg you come with Myn Heer Merensky.--I am
SIKUKUNI."
This message was accompanied by a letter from Mr. Merensky, a
well-known and successful missionary, who had been for many years
resident in Secocoeni's country, in which he stated that he heard on
very good authority that Secocoeni had distinctly refused to agree to
that article of the treaty by which he became a subject of the State.
He adds that he cannot remain "silent while such tricks are played."
Upon this information, Sir T. Shepstone wrote to President Burgers,
stating that "if the officer in whom you have placed confidence has
withheld any portion of the truth from you, especially so serious a
portion of it, he is guilty of a wrong towards you personally, as well
as towards the Government, because he has caused you to assume an
untenable position," and suggesting that a joint-commission should be
despatched to Secocoeni, to thoroughly sift the question in the
interest of all concerned. This suggestion was after some delay agreed
to, and a commission was appointed, consisting of Mr. Van Gorkom, a
Hollander, and Mr. Holtshausen, a member of the Executive Council, on
behalf of the Transvaal Government, and Mr. Osborn, R.M., and Captain
Clarke, R.A.,[7] on behalf of the Commissioner, whom I accompanied as
Secretary.
[7] Now Sir Marshall Clarke, Special Commissioner for
Basutoland.
At Middleburg the native Gideon who acted as interpreter between
Commandant Ferreira, C.M.G. (the officer who negotiated the treaty on
behalf of the Boer Government), and Secocoeni was examined, and also
two natives, Petros and Jeremiah, who were with him, but did not
actually interpret. All these men persisted that Secocoeni had
positively refused to become a subject of the Republic, and only
consented to sign the treaty on the representations of Commandant
Ferreira that it would only be binding as regards to the two articles
about the cattle and the boundary line.
The Commission then proceeded to Secocoeni's town, accompanied by a
fresh set of interpreters, and had a long interview with Secocoeni.
The chiefs Prime Minister or "mouth," Makurupiji, speaking in his
presence and on his behalf, and making use of the pronoun "I" before
all the assembled headmen of the tribe, gave an account of the
interview between Commandant Ferreira in the presence of that
gentleman, who accompanied the Commission, and Secocoeni, in almost
the same words as had been used by the interpreters at Middleburg. He
distinctly denied having consented to become a subject of the Republic
or to stand under the law, and added that he feared he "had touched the
feather to" (signed) things that he did not know of in the treaty.
Commandant Ferreira then put some questions, but entirely failed to
shake the evidence; on the contrary, he admitted by his questions that
Secocoeni had not consented to become a subject of the Republic.
Secocoeni had evidently signed the piece of paper under the
impression that he was acknowledging his liability to pay 2000 head of
cattle, and fixing a certain portion of his boundary line, and on the
distinct understanding that he was not to become a subject of the
State.
Now it was the Secocoeni war that had brought the English Mission
into the country, and if it could be shown that the Secocoeni war had
come to a successful termination, it would go far towards helping the
Mission out again. To this end, it was necessary that the chief should
declare himself a subject of the State, and thereby, by implication,
acknowledge himself to have been a rebel, and admit his defeat. All
that was required was a signature, and that once obtained the treaty
was published and submitted to the Raad for confirmation, without a
whisper being heard of the conditions under which this ignorant Basuto
was induced to sign. Had no Commission visited Secocoeni, this treaty
would afterwards have been produced against him in its entirety.
Altogether, the history of the Secocoeni Peace Treaty does not
reassure one as to the genuineness of the treaties which the Boers are
continually producing, purporting to have been signed by native chiefs,
and, as a general rule, presenting the State with great tracts of
country in exchange for a horse or a few oxen. However fond the natives
may be of their Boer neighbours, such liberality can scarcely be
genuine. On the other hand, it is so easy to induce a savage to sign a
paper, or even, if he is reticent, to make a cross for him, and once
made, as we all know, _litera scripta manet_, and becomes title to
the lands.
During the Secocoeni investigation, affairs in the Transvaal were
steadily drifting towards anarchy. The air was filled with rumours; now
it was reported that an outbreak was imminent amongst the English
population at the Gold Fields, who had never forgotten Von
Schlickmann's kind suggestion that they should be "subdued;" now it was
said that Cetywayo had crossed the border, and might shortly be
expected at Pretoria; now that a large body of Boers were on their road
to shoot the Special Commissioner, his twenty-five policemen, and
Englishmen generally, and so on.
Meanwhile, Paul Kruger and his party were not letting the grass grow
under their feet, but worked public feeling with great vigour, with the
double object of getting Paul made President and ridding themselves of
the English. Articles in his support were printed in the well-known
Dutch paper _Die Patriot_, published in the Cape Colony, which are
so typical of the Boers and of the only literature that has the
slightest influence over them, that I will quote a few extracts from
one of them.
After drawing a very vivid picture of the wretched condition of the
country as compared to what it was when the Kafirs had "a proper
respect" for the Boers, before Burgers came into power, the article
proceeds to give the cause of this state of affairs. "God's word," it
says, "gives us the solution. Look at Israel, while the people have a
godly king, everything is prosperous, but under a godless prince the
land retrogrades, and the whole of the people must suffer. Read
Leviticus, chapter xxvi., with attention, &c. In the day of the
Voortrekkers (pioneers), a handful of men chased a thousand Kafirs and
made them run; so also in the Free State war (Deut. xxxii. 30; Jos.
xxiii. 10; Lev. xxvi. 8). But mark, now, when Burgers became President,
he knows no Sabbath, he rides through the land in and out of town on
Sunday, he knows not the church and God's service (Lev. xxvi. 2, 3), to
the scandal of pious people. And he formerly was a priest too. And what
is the consequence? No harvest (Lev. xxvi. 16), an army of 6000 men
runs because one man falls (Lev. xxvi 17, &c.). What is now the
remedy?" The remedy proves to be Paul Kruger, "because there is no
other candidate. Because our Lord clearly points him out to be the man,
for why is there no other candidate? Who arranged it this way?" Then
follows a rather odd argument in favour of Paul's election. "Because he
himself (Paul Kruger) acknowledges in his own reply that he is
_incompetent_, but that all his ability is from our Lord. Because
he is a warrior. Because he is a Boer." Then Paul Kruger, the warrior
and the Boer, is compared to Joan of Arc, "a simple Boer girl who came
from behind the sheep." The burghers of the Transvaal are exhorted to
acknowledge the hand of the Lord, and elect Paul Kruger, or to look for
still heavier punishment. (Lev. xxvi. 18 _et seq._) Next the _Patriot_
proceeds to give a bit of advice to "our candidate, Paul Kruger." He is
to deliver the land from the Kafirs. "The Lord has given you the heart
of a warrior, arise and drive them," a bit of advice quite suited to
his well-known character. But this chosen vessel was not to get all the
loaves and fishes; on the contrary, as soon as he had fulfilled his
mission of "driving" the Kafirs, he was to hand over his office to a
"good" President. The article ends thus: "If the Lord wills to use you
now to deliver this land from its enemies, and a day of peace and
prosperity arises again, and you see that you are not exactly the
statesman to further govern the Republic, then it will be your greatest
honour to say, 'Citizens, I have delivered you from the enemy, I am no
statesman, but now you have peace and time to choose and elect a _good_
President.'"
An article such as the above, is instructive reading, as showing the
low calibre of the minds that are influenced by it. Yet such writings
and sermons have more power among the Boers than any other arguments,
appealing as they do to the fanaticism and vanity of their nature,
which causes them to believe that the Divinity is continually
interfering on their behalf at the cost of other people. It will be
noticed that the references given are all to the Old Testament, and
nearly all refer to acts of blood.
These doctrines were not, however, at all acceptable to Burgers' party,
or the more enlightened members of the community, and so bitter did the
struggle of rival opinions become that there is very little doubt that
had the country not been annexed, civil war would have been added to
its other calamities. Meanwhile the natives were from day to day
becoming more restless, and messengers were constantly arriving at the
Special Commissioner's camp, begging that their tribe might be put
under the Queen, and stating that they would fight rather than submit
any longer to the Boers.
At length on the 9th April, Sir T. Shepstone informed the Government of
the Republic that he was about to declare the Transvaal British
territory. He told them that he had considered and reconsidered his
determination, but that he could see no possible means within the State
by which it could free itself from the burdens that were sinking it to
destruction, adding that if he could have found such means he would
certainly not have hidden them from the Government. This intimation was
received in silence, though all the later proceedings with reference to
the Annexation were in reality carried out in concert with the
authorities of the Republic. Thus on the 13th March the Government
submitted a paper of ten questions to Sir T. Shepstone as regards the
future condition of the Transvaal under English rule, whether the debts
of the State would be guaranteed, &c. To these questions replies were
given which were on the whole satisfactory to the Government. As these
replies formed the basis of the proclamation guarantees, it is not
necessary to enter into them.
It was further arranged by the Republican Government that a formal
protest should be entered against the Annexation, which was accordingly
prepared and privately shown to the Special Commissioner. The
Annexation proclamation was also shown to President Burgers, and a
paragraph eliminated at his suggestion. In fact, the Special
Commissioner and the President, together with most of his Executive,
were quite at one as regards the necessity of the proclamation being
issued, their joint endeavours being directed to the prevention of any
disturbance, and to secure a good reception for the change.
At length, after three months of inquiry and negotiation, the
proclamation of annexation was on the 12th of April 1877 read by Mr.
Osborn, accompanied by some other gentlemen of Sir T. Shepstone's
staff. It was an anxious moment for all concerned. To use the words of
the Special Commissioner in his despatch home on the subject, "Every
effort had been made during the previous fortnight by, it is said,
educated Hollanders, and who had but lately arrived in the country, to
rouse the fanaticism of the Boers, and to induce them to offer 'bloody'
resistance to what it was known I intended to do. The Boers were
appealed to in the most inflammatory language by printed manifestoes
and memorials; ... it was urged that I had but a small escort, which
could easily be overpowered." In a country so full of desperadoes and
fanatical haters of anything English, it was more than possible that,
though such an act would have been condemned by the general sense of
the country, a number of men could easily be found who would think they
were doing a righteous act in greeting the "annexationists" with an
ovation of bullets. I do not mean that the anxiety was personal,
because I do not think the members of that small party set any higher
value on their lives than other people, but it was absolutely necessary
for the success of the act itself, and for the safety of the country,
that not a single shot should be fired. Had that happened it is
probable that the whole country would have been involved in confusion
and bloodshed, the Zulus would have broken in, and the Kafirs would
have risen; in fact, to use Cetywayo's words, "the land would have
burned with fire."
It will therefore be easily understood what an anxious hour that was
both for the Special Commissioner sitting up at Government House, and
for his staff down on the Market Square, and how thankful they were
when the proclamation was received with hearty cheers by the crowd. Mr.
Burgers' protest, which was read immediately afterwards, was received
in respectful silence.
And thus the Transvaal Territory passed for a while into the great
family of the English Colonies. I believe that the greatest political
opponent of the act will bear tribute to the very remarkable ability
with which it was carried out. When the variety and number of the
various interests that had to be conciliated, the obstinate nature of
the individuals who had to be convinced, as well as the innate hatred
of the English name and ways which had to be overcome to carry out this
act successfully, are taken into consideration, together with a
thousand other matters, the neglect of any one of which would have
sufficed to make failure certain, it will be seen what tact and skill
and knowledge of human nature was required to execute so difficult a
task. It must be remembered that no force was used, and that there
never was any threat of force. The few troops that were to enter the
Transvaal were four weeks' march from Pretoria at the time. There was
nothing whatsoever to prevent the Boers putting a summary stop to the
proceedings of the Commissioner if they had thought fit.
That Sir Theophilus played a bold and hazardous game nobody will deny,
but, like most players who combine boldness with coolness of head and
justice of cause, he won; and, without shedding a single drop of blood,
or even confiscating an acre of land, and at no cost, annexed a great
country, and averted a very serious war. That same country four years
later cost us a million of money, the loss of nearly a thousand men
killed and wounded, and the ruin of many more confiding thousands, to
surrender. It is true, however, that nobody can accuse the retrocession
of having been conducted with judgment or ability--very much the
contrary.
There can be no more ample justification of the issue of the Annexation
proclamation than the proclamation itself.
First, it touches on the Sand River Convention of 1852, by which
independence was granted to the State, and shows that the "evident
objects and inciting motives" in granting such guarantee were to
promote peace, free-trade, and friendly intercourse, in the hope and
belief that the Republic "would become a flourishing and
self-sustaining State, a source of strength and security to
neighbouring European communities, and a point from which Christianity
and civilisation might rapidly spread toward Central Africa." It goes
on to show how these hopes have been disappointed, and how that
increasing weakness in the State itself on the one side, and more than
corresponding growth of real strength and confidence among the native
tribes on the other, have produced their natural and inevitable
consequence ... that after more or less of irritating conflict with
aboriginal tribes to the north, there commenced about the year 1867
gradual abandonment to the natives in that direction of territory
settled by burghers of the Transvaal "in well-built towns and villages
and on granted farms."
It goes on to show that "this decay of power and ebb of authority in
the north is being followed by similar processes in the south under yet
more dangerous circumstances. People of this State residing in that
direction have been compelled within the last three months, at the
bidding of native chiefs, and at a moment's notice, to leave their
farms and homes, their standing crops ... all to be taken possession of
by natives, but that the Government is more powerless than ever to
vindicate its assumed rights or to resist the declension that is
threatening its existence." It then recites how all the other colonies
and communities of South Africa have lost confidence in the State, how
it is in a condition of hopeless bankruptcy, and its commerce
annihilated, whilst the inhabitants are divided into factions, and the
Government has fallen into "helpless paralysis." How also the prospect
of the election of a new President, instead of being looked forward to
with hope, would in the opinion of all parties be the signal for civil
war, anarchy, and bloodshed. How that this state of things affords the
very strongest temptation to the great neighbouring native powers to
attack the country, a temptation that they were only too ready and
anxious to yield to, and that the State was in far too feeble a
condition to repel such attacks, from which it had hitherto only been
saved by the repeated representations of the Government of Natal. The
next paragraphs I will quote as they stand, for they sum up the reasons
for the Annexation.
"That the Secocoeni war, which would have produced but little effect
on a healthy constitution, has not only proved suddenly fatal to the
resources and reputation of the Republic, but has shown itself to be a
culminating point in the history of South Africa, in that a Makatee or
Basuto tribe, unwarlike and of no account in Zulu estimation,
successfully withstood the strength of the State, and disclosed for the
first time to the native powers outside the Republic, from the Zambesi
to the Cape, the great change that had taken place in the relative
strength of the white and black races, that this disclosure at once
shook the prestige of the white man in South Africa, and placed every
European community in peril, that this common danger has caused
universal anxiety, has given to all concerned the right to investigate
its cause, and to protect themselves from its consequences, and has
imposed the duty upon those who have the power to shield enfeebled
civilisation from the encroachments of barbarism and inhumanity." It
proceeds to point out that the Transvaal will be the first to suffer
from the results of its own policy, and that it is for every reason
perfectly impossible for Her Majesty's Government to stand by and see a
friendly white State ravaged, knowing that its own possessions will be
the next to suffer. That Her Majesty's Government, being persuaded that
the only means to prevent such a catastrophe would be by the annexation
of the country, and, knowing that this was the wish of a large
proportion of the inhabitants of the Transvaal, the step must be taken.
Next follows the formal annexation.
Together with the proclamation, an address was issued by Sir T.
Shepstone to the burghers of the State, laying the facts before them in
a friendly manner, more suited to their mode of thought than it was
possible to do in a formal proclamation. This document, the issue of
which was one of those touches that insured the success of the
Annexation, was a powerful summing up in colloquial language of the
arguments used in the proclamation, strengthened by quotations from the
speeches of the President. It ends with these words: "It remains only
for me to beg of you to consider and weigh what I have said calmly and
without undue prejudice. Let not mere feeling or sentiment prevail over
your judgment. Accept what Her Majesty's Government intends shall be,
and what you will soon find from experience, is a blessing not only to
you and your children, but to the whole of South Africa through you,
and believe that I speak these words to you as a friend from my heart."
Two other proclamations were also issued, one notifying the assumption
of the office of Administrator of the Government by Sir T. Shepstone,
and the other repealing the war-tax, which was doubtless an unequal and
oppressive impost.
I have in the preceding pages stated all the principal grounds of the
Annexation and briefly sketched the history of that event. In the next
chapter I propose to follow the fortunes of the Transvaal, under
British Rule.