THE TRANSVAAL UNDER BRITISH RULE.
The news of the Annexation was received all over the country with a
sigh of relief, and in many parts of it with great rejoicings. At the
Gold Fields, for instance, special thanksgiving services were held, and
"God save the Queen" was sung in church. Nowhere was there the
slightest disturbance, but, on the contrary, addresses of
congratulation and thanks literally poured in by every mail, many of
them signed by Boers who have since been conspicuous for their bitter
opposition to English rule. At first, there was some doubt as to what
would be the course taken under the circumstances by the volunteers
enlisted by the late Republic. Major Clarke, R.A., was sent to convey
the news, and to take command of them, unaccompanied save by his Kafir
servant. On arrival at the principal fort, he at once ordered the
Republican flag to be hauled down and the Union Jack run up, and his
orders were promptly obeyed. A few days afterwards some members of the
force thought better of it, and having made up their minds to kill him,
came to the tent where he was sitting to carry out their purpose. On
learning their kind intentions, Major Clarke fixed his eye-glass in his
eye, and after steadily glaring at them through it for some time, said,
"You are all drunk, go back to your tents." The volunteers, quite
overcome by his coolness and the fixity of his gaze, at once slipped
off, and there was no further trouble. About three weeks after the
Annexation, the I-13th Regiment arrived at Pretoria, having been very
well received all along the road by the Boers, who came from miles
round to hear the band play. Its entry into Pretoria was quite a sight;
the whole population turned out to meet it; indeed the feeling of
rejoicing and relief was so profound that when the band began to play
"God save the Queen" some of the women burst into tears.
Meanwhile the effect of the Annexation on the country was perfectly
magical. Credit and commerce were at once restored; the railway bonds
that were down to nothing in Holland rose with one bound to par, and
the value of landed property nearly doubled. Indeed it would have been
possible for any one, knowing what was going to happen, to have
realised large sums of money by buying land in the beginning of 1877,
and selling it shortly after the Annexation.
On the 24th May, being Her Majesty's birthday, all the native chiefs
who were anywhere within reach were summoned to attend the first formal
hoisting of the English flag. The day was a general festival, and the
ceremony was attended by a large number of Boers and natives in
addition to all the English. At mid-day, amidst the cheers of the
crowd, the salute of artillery, and the strains of "God save the
Queen," the Union Jack was run up a lofty flagstaff, and the Transvaal
was formally announced to be British soil. The flag was hoisted by
Colonel Brooke, R.E., and the present writer. Speaking for myself, I
may say that it was one of the proudest moments of my life. Could I
have foreseen that I should live to see that same flag, then hoisted
with so much joyous ceremony, within a few years shamefully and
dishonourably hauled down and buried,[8] I think it would have been the
most miserable.
[8] The English flag was during the signing of the Convention
at Pretoria formally buried by a large crowd of Englishmen
and loyal natives.
The Annexation was as well received in England as it was in the
Transvaal. Lord Carnarvon wrote to Sir T. Shepstone to convey "the
Queen's entire approval of your conduct since you received Her
Majesty's commission, with a renewal of my own thanks on behalf of the
Government for the admirable prudence and discretion with which you
have discharged a great and unwonted responsibility." It was also
accepted by Parliament with very few dissentient voices, since it was
not till afterwards, when the subject became useful as an
electioneering howl, that the Liberal party, headed by our "powerful
popular minister," discovered the deep iniquity that had been
perpetrated in South Africa. So satisfied were the Transvaal Boers with
the change that Messrs. Kruger, Jorissen, and Bok, who formed the
deputation to proceed to England and present President Burgers' formal
protest against the Annexation, found great difficulty in raising
one-half of the necessary expenses--something under one thousand
pounds--towards the cost of the undertaking. The thirst for
independence cannot have been very great when all the wealthy burghers
in the Transvaal put together would not subscribe a thousand pounds
towards retaining it. Indeed, at this time the members of the
deputation themselves seem to have looked upon their undertaking as
being both doubtful and undesirable, since they informed Sir T.
Shepstone that they were going to Europe to discharge an obligation
which had been imposed upon them, and if the mission failed, they would
have done their duty. Mr. Kruger said that if they did fail, he would
be found to be as faithful a subject under the new form of government
as he had been under the old; and Dr. Jorissen admitted with equal
frankness that "the change was inevitable, and expressed his belief
that the cancellation of it would be calamitous."
Whilst the Annexation was thus well received in the country immediately
interested, a lively agitation was commenced in the Western Province of
the Cape Colony, a thousand miles away, with a view of inducing the
Home Government to repudiate Sir T. Shepstone's act. The reason of this
movement was that the Cape Dutch party, caring little or nothing for
the real interests of the Transvaal, did care a great deal about their
scheme to turn all the white communities of South Africa into a great
Dutch Republic, to which they thought the Annexation would be a
deathblow. As I have said elsewhere, it must be borne in mind that the
strings of the anti-annexation agitation have all along been pulled in
the Western Province, whilst the Transvaal Boers have played the parts
of puppets. The instruments used by the leaders of the movement in the
Cape were, for the most part, the discontented and unprincipled
Hollander element, a newspaper of an extremely abusive nature called
the _Volkstem_, and another in Natal known as the _Natal Witness_,
lately edited by the notorious Aylward, which has an almost equally
unenviable reputation.
On the arrival of Messrs. Jorissen and Kruger in England, they were
received with great civility by Lord Carnarvon, who was, however,
careful to explain to them that the Annexation was irrevocable. In this
decision they cheerfully acquiesced, assuring his lordship of their
determination to do all they could to induce the Boers to accept the
new state of things, and expressing their desire to be allowed to serve
under the new Government.
Whilst these gentlemen were thus satisfactorily arranging matters with
Lord Carnarvon, Sir. T. Shepstone was making a tour round the country
which resembled a triumphal progress more than anything else. He was
everywhere greeted with enthusiasm by all classes of the community,
Boers, English, and natives, and numerous addresses were presented to
him couched in the warmest language, not only by Englishmen, but also
by Boers.
It is very difficult to reconcile the enthusiasm of a great number of
the inhabitants of the Transvaal for English rule, and the quiet
acquiescence of the remainder, at this time, with the decidedly
antagonistic attitude assumed later on. It appears to me, however, that
there are several reasons that go far towards accounting for it. The
Transvaal, when we annexed it, was in the position of a man with a
knife at his throat, who is suddenly rescued by some one stronger than
he, on certain conditions which at the time he gladly accepts, but
afterwards, when the danger is passed, wishes to repudiate. In the same
way the inhabitants of the South African Republic were in the time of
need very thankful for our aid, but after a while, when the
recollection of their difficulties had grown faint, when their debts
had been paid and their enemies defeated, they began to think that they
would like to get rid of us again, and start fresh on their own account
with a clean sheet. What fostered agitation more than anything else,
however, was the perfect impunity with which it was allowed to be
carried on. Had only a little firmness and decision been shown in the
first instance there would have been no further trouble. We might have
been obliged to confiscate half-a-dozen farms, and perhaps imprison as
many free burghers for a few months, and there it would have ended.
Neither Boers or natives understand our namby-pamby way of playing at
government; they put it down to fear. What they want, and what they
expect, is to be governed with a just but a firm hand. Thus when the
Boers found that they could agitate with impunity, they naturally
enough continued to agitate. Anybody who knows them will understand
that it was very pleasant to them to find themselves in possession of
that delightful thing, a grievance, and, instead of stopping quietly at
home on their farms, to feel obliged to proceed, full of importance and
long words, to a distant meeting, there to spout and listen to the
spouting of others. It is so much easier to talk politics than to sow
mealies. Some attribute the discontent among the Boers to the
postponement of the carrying out of the Annexation proclamation
promises with reference to the free institutions to be granted to the
country, but in my opinion it had little or nothing to do with it. The
Boers never understood the question of responsible government, and
never wanted that institution; what they did want was to be free of all
English control, and this they said twenty times in the most outspoken
language. I think there is little doubt the causes I have indicated are
the real sources of the agitation, though there must be added to them
their detestation of our mode of dealing with natives, and of being
forced to pay taxes regularly, and also the ceaseless agitation of the
Cape wire-pullers, through their agents the Hollanders, and their
organs in the press.
On the return of Messrs. Kruger and Jorissen to the Transvaal, the
latter gentleman resumed his duties as Attorney-General, on which
occasion, if I remember aright, I myself had the honour of
administering to him the oath of allegiance to Her Majesty, that he
afterwards kept so well. The former reported the proceedings of the
deputation to a Boer meeting, when he took a very different tone to
that in which he addressed Lord Carnarvon, announcing that if there
existed a majority of the people in favour of independence, he still
was Vice-President of the country.
Both these gentlemen remained for some time in the pay of the British
Government, Mr. Jorissen as Attorney-General, and Mr. Kruger as member
of the Executive Council. The Government, however, at length found it
desirable to dispense with their services, though on different grounds.
Mr. Jorissen had, like several other members of the Republican
Government, been a clergyman, and was quite unfit to hold the post of
Attorney-General in an important colony like the Transvaal, where legal
questions were constantly arising requiring all the attention of a
trained mind; and after he had on several occasions been publicly
admonished from the bench, the Government retired him on liberal terms.
Needless to say, his opposition to English rule then became very
bitter. Mr. Kruger's appointment expired by law in November 1877, and
the Government did not think it advisable to re-employ him. The terms
of his letter of dismissal can be found on page 135 of Blue-book (c.
144), and involving as they do a serious charge of misrepresentation in
money matters, are not very creditable to him. After this event he also
pursued the cause of independence with increased vigour.
During the last months of 1877 and the first part of 1878 agitation
against British rule went on unchecked, and at last grew to alarming
proportions, so much so that Sir T. Shepstone, on his return from the
Zulu border in March 1878, where he had been for some months discussing
the vexed and dangerous question of the boundary line with the Zulus,
found it necessary to issue a stringent proclamation warning the
agitators that their proceedings and meetings were illegal, and would
be punished according to law. This document, which was at the time
vulgarly known as the "Hold-your-jaw" proclamation, not being followed
by action, produced but little effect.
On the 4th April 1878 another Boer meeting was convened, at which it
was decided to send a second deputation to England, to consist this
time of Messrs. Kruger and Joubert, with Mr. Bok as secretary. This
deputation proved as abortive as the first, Sir. M. Hicks Beach
assuring it, in a letter dated 6th August 1878, that it is "impossible,
for many reasons, ... that the Queen's sovereignty should now be
withdrawn."
Whilst the Government was thus hampered by internal disaffection, it
had also many other difficulties on its hands. First, there was the
Zulu boundary question, which was constantly developing new dangers to
the country. Indeed, it was impossible to say what might happen in that
direction from one week to another. Nor were its relations with
Secocoeni satisfactory. It will be remembered that just before the
Annexation this chief had expressed his earnest wish to become a
British subject, and even paid over part of the fine demanded from him
by the Boer Government to the Civil Commissioner, Major Clarke. In
March 1878, however, his conduct towards the Government underwent a
sudden change, and he practically declared war. It afterwards appeared,
from Secocoeni's own statement, that he was instigated to this step
by a Boer, Abel Erasmus by name--the same man who was concerned in the
atrocities in the first Secocoeni war--who constantly encouraged him
to continue the struggle. I do not propose to minutely follow the
course of this long war, which, commencing in the beginning of 1878,
did not come to an end till after the Zulu war: when Sir Garnet
Wolseley attacked Secocoeni's stronghold with a large force of
troops, volunteers, and Swazi allies, and took it with great slaughter.
The losses on our side were not very heavy, so far as white men were
concerned, but the Swazis are reported to have lost 400 killed and 500
wounded.
The struggle was, during the long period preceding the final attack,
carried on with great courage and ability by Major Clarke, R.A.,
C.M.G., whose force, at the best of times, only consisted of 200
volunteers and 100 Zulus. With this small body of men he contrived,
however, to keep Secocoeni in check, and to take some important
strongholds. It was marked also by some striking acts of individual
bravery, of which one, performed by Major Clarke himself, whose
reputation for cool courage and presence of mind in danger is
unsurpassed in South Africa, is worthy of notice; and which, had public
attention been more concentrated on the Secocoeni war, would
doubtless have won him the Victoria Cross. On one occasion, on visiting
one of the outlying forts, he found that a party of hostile natives,
who were coming down to the fort on the previous day with a flag of
truce, had been accidentally fired on, and had at once retreated. As
his system in native warfare was always to try and inspire his enemy
with perfect faith in the honour of Englishmen, and their contempt of
all tricks and treachery even towards a foe, he was very angry at this
occurrence, and at once, unarmed and unattended save by his native
servant, rode up into the mountains to the kraal from which the white
flag party had come on the previous day, and apologised to the chief
for what had happened. When I consider how very anxious Secocoeni's
natives were to kill or capture Clarke, whom they held in great dread,
and how terrible the end of so great a captain would in all probability
have been had he been taken alive by these masters of refined torture,
I confess that I think this act of gentlemanly courage is one of the
most astonishing things I ever heard of. When he rode up those hills he
must have known that he was probably going to meet his death at the
hands of justly incensed savages. When Secocoeni heard of what Major
Clarke had done he was so pleased that he shortly afterwards released a
volunteer whom he had taken prisoner, and who would otherwise, in all
probability, have been tortured to death. I must add that Major Clarke
himself never reported or alluded to this incident, but an account of
it can be found in a despatch written by Sir O. Lanyon to the Secretary
of State, dated 2d February 1880.
Concurrently with, though entirely distinct from, the political
agitation that was being carried on among the Boers having for object
the restoration of independence, a private agitation was set on foot by
a few disaffected persons against Sir T. Shepstone, with the view of
obtaining his removal from office in favour of a certain Colonel
Weatherley. The details of this impudent plot are so interesting, and
the plot itself so typical of the state of affairs with which Sir T.
Shepstone had to deal, that I will give a short account of it.
After the Annexation had taken place, there were naturally enough a
good many individuals who found themselves disappointed in the results
so far as they personally were concerned; I mean that they did not get
so much out of it as they expected. Among these was a gentleman called
Colonel Weatherley, who had come to the Transvaal as manager of a
gold-mining company, but getting tired of that had taken a prominent
part in the Annexation, and who, being subsequently disappointed about
an appointment, became a bitter enemy of the Administrator. I may say
at once that Colonel Weatherley seems to me to have been throughout the
dupe of the other conspirators.
The next personage was a good-looking desperado, who called himself
Captain Gunn of Gunn, and who was locally somewhat irreverently known
as the very Gunn of very Gunn. This gentleman, whose former career had
been of a most remarkable order, was, on the annexation of the country,
found in the public prison charged with having committed various
offences, but on Colonel Weatherley's interesting himself strongly on
his behalf, he was eventually released without trial. On his release,
he requested the Administrator to publish a Government notice declaring
him innocent of the charges brought against him. This Sir T. Shepstone
declined to do, and so, to use his own words, in a despatch to the High
Commissioner on the subject, Captain Gunn of Gunn at once became "what
in this country is called a patriot."
The third person concerned was a lawyer, who had got into trouble on
the Diamond Fields, and who felt himself injured because the rules of
the High Court did not allow him to practise as an advocate. The
quartette was made up by Mr. Celliers, the editor of the patriotic
organ, the _Volkstem_, who, since he had lost the Government printing
contract, found that no language could be too strong to apply to the
_personnel_ of the Government, more especially its head. Of course,
there was a lady in it; what plot would be complete without? She was
Mrs. Weatherley, now, I believe, Mrs. Gunn of Gunn. These gentlemen
began operations by drawing up a long petition to Sir Bartle Frere as
High Commissioner, setting forth a string of supposed grievances, and
winding up with a request that the Administrator might be "promoted to
some other sphere of political usefulness." This memorial was forwarded
by the "committee," as they called themselves, to various parts of the
country for signature, but without the slightest success, the fact of
the matter being that it was not the Annexor but the Annexation that
the Boers objected to.
At this stage in the proceedings Colonel Weatherley went to try and
forward the good cause with Sir Bartle Frere at the Cape. His letters
to Mrs. Weatherley from thence, afterwards put into Court in the
celebrated divorce case, contained many interesting accounts of his
attempts in that direction. I do not think, however, that he was
cognisant of what was being concocted by his allies in Pretoria, but
being a very vain, weak man, was easily deceived by them. With all his
faults he was a gentleman. As soon as he was gone a second petition was
drawn up by the "committee," showing "the advisability of immediately
suspending our present Administrator, and temporarily appointing and
recommending for Her Majesty's royal and favourable consideration an
English gentleman of high integrity and honour, in whom the country at
large has respect and confidence."
The English gentleman of high integrity and honour of course proves to
be Colonel Weatherley, whose appointment is, further on, "respectfully
but earnestly requested," since he had "thoroughly gained the
affections, confidence, and respect of Boers, English, and other
Europeans in this country." But whilst it is comparatively easy to
write petitions, there is sometimes a difficulty in getting people to
sign them, as proved to be the case with reference to the documents
under consideration. When the "committee" and the employés in the
office of the _Volkstem_ had affixed their valuable signatures it
was found to be impossible to induce anybody else to follow their
example. Now, a petition with some half dozen signatures attached would
not, it was obvious, carry much weight with the Imperial Government,
and no more could be obtained.
But really great minds rise superior to such difficulties, and so did
the "committee," or some of them, or one of them. If they could not get
genuine signatures to their petitions, they could at any rate
manufacture them. This great idea once hit out, so vigorously was it
prosecuted that they, or some of them, or one of them, produced in a
very little while no less than 3883 signatures, of which sixteen were
proved to be genuine, five were doubtful, and all the rest fictitious.
But the gentleman, whoever he was, who was the working partner in the
scheme--and I may state, by way of parenthesis, that when Gunn of Gunn
was subsequently arrested, petitions in process of signature were found
under the mattress of his bed--calculated without his host. He either
did not know, or had forgotten, that on receipt of such documents by a
superior officer, they are at once sent to the officer accused to
report upon. This course was followed in the present case, and the
petitions were discovered to be gross impostures. The ingenuity
exercised by their author or authors was really very remarkable, for it
must be remembered that not one of the signatures was forged; they were
all invented, and had, of course, to be written in a great variety of
hands. The plan generally pursued was to put down the names of people
living in the country, with slight variations. Thus "De _V_illiers"
became "De _W_illiers," and "Van Z_y_l" "Van Z_u_l." I remember that my
own name appeared on one of the petitions with some slight alteration.
Some of the names were evidently meant to be facetious. Thus there was
a "Jan Verneuker," which means "John the Cheat."
Of the persons directly or indirectly concerned in this rascally plot,
the unfortunate Colonel Weatherley subsequently apologised to Sir T.
Shepstone for his share in the agitation, and shortly afterwards died
fighting bravely on Kambula. Captain Gunn of Gunn and Mrs. Weatherley,
after having given rise to the most remarkable divorce case I ever
heard--it took fourteen days to try--were, on the death of Colonel
Weatherley, united in the bonds of holy matrimony, and are, I believe,
still in Pretoria. The lawyer vanished I know not where, whilst Mr.
Celliers still continues to edit that admirably conducted journal the
_Volkstem_; nor, if I may judge from the report of a speech made
by him recently at a Boer festival, which, by the way, was graced by
the presence of our representative, Mr. Hudson, the British Resident,
has his right hand forgotten its cunning, or rather his tongue lost the
use of those peculiar and _recherché_ epithets that used to adorn
the columns of the _Volkstem_. I see that he, on this occasion,
denounced the English element as being "poisonous and dangerous" to a
State, and stated, amidst loud cheers, that "he despised" it. Mr.
Cellier's lines have fallen in pleasant places; in any other country he
would long ago have fallen a victim to the stern laws of libel. I
recommend him to the notice of enterprising Irish newspapers. Such is
the freshness and vigour of his style that I am confident he would make
the fortune of any Hibernian journal.
Some little time after the Gunn of Gunn frauds a very sad incident
happened in connection with the government of the Transvaal. Shortly
after the Annexation, the Home Government sent out Mr. Sergeaunt,
C.M.G., one of the Crown Agents for the Colonies, to report on the
financial Condition of the country. He was accompanied, in an
unofficial capacity, amongst other gentlemen, by Captain Patterson and
his son, Mr. J. Sergeaunt; and when he returned to England, these two
gentlemen remained behind to go on a shooting expedition. About this
time Sir Bartle Frere was anxious to send a friendly mission to Lo
Bengula, king of the Matabele, a branch of the Zulu tribe, living up
towards the Zambesi. This chief had been making himself unpleasant by
causing traders to be robbed, and it was thought desirable to establish
friendly relations with him, so it was suggested to Captain Patterson
and Mr. Sergeaunt that they should combine business with pleasure, and
go on a mission to Lo Bengula, an offer which they accepted, and
shortly afterwards started for Matabeleland with an interpreter and a
few servants. They reached their destination in safety; and having
concluded their business with the king, started on a visit to the
Zambesi Falls on foot, leaving the interpreter with the waggon. The
falls were about twelve days' walk from the king's kraal, and they were
accompanied thither by young Mr. Thomas, the son of the local
missionary, two Kafir servants, and twenty native bearers supplied by
Lo Bengula. The next thing that was heard of them was that they had all
died through drinking poisoned water, full details of the manner of
their deaths being sent down by Lo Bengula.
In the first shock and confusion of such news it was not very closely
examined, at any rate by the friends of the dead men, but, on
reflection, there were several things about it that appeared strange.
For instance, it was well known that Captain Patterson had a habit, for
which, indeed, we had often laughed at him, of, however thirsty he
might be, always having his water boiled when he was travelling, in
order to destroy impurities, and it seemed odd that he should on this
one occasion have neglected the precaution. Also, it was curious that
the majority of Lo Bengula's bearers appeared to have escaped, whereas
all the others were, without exception, killed; nor even in that
district is it usual to find water so bad that it will kill with the
rapidity it had been supposed to do in this case, unless indeed it had
been designedly poisoned. These doubts of the poisoning-by-bad-water-story
resolved themselves into certainty when the waggon returned in charge
of the interpreter, when, by putting two and two together, we were able
to piece out the real history of the diabolical murder of our poor
friends with considerable accuracy, a story which shows what
blood-thirsty wickedness a savage is capable of when he fancies his
interests are threatened.
It appeared that, when Captain Patterson first interviewed Lo Bengula,
he was not at all well received by him. I must, by way of explanation,
state that there exists a pretender to his throne, Kruman by name, who,
as far as I can make out, is the real heir to the kingdom. This man
had, for some cause or other, fled the country, and for a time acted as
gardener to Sir T. Shepstone in Natal. At the date of Messrs. Patterson
and Sergeaunt's mission to Matabeleland he was living, I believe, in
the Transvaal. Captain Patterson, on finding himself so ill received by
the king, and not being sufficiently acquainted with the character of
savage chiefs, most unfortunately, either by accident or design,
dropped some hint in the course of conversation about this Kruman. From
that moment Lo Bengula's conduct towards the mission entirely changed,
and, dropping his former tone, he became profusely civil; and from that
moment, too, he doubtless determined to kill them, probably fearing
that they might forward some scheme to oust him and place Kruman, on
whose claim a large portion of his people looked favourably, on the
throne.
When their business was done, and Captain Patterson told the king that
they were anxious, before returning, to visit the Zambesi Falls, he
readily fell in with their wish, but, in the first instance, refused
permission to young Thomas, the son of the missionary, to accompany
them, only allowing him to do so on the urgent representations of
Captain Patterson. The reason of this was, no doubt, that he had kindly
feelings towards the lad, and did not wish to include him in the
slaughter.
Captain Patterson was a man of extremely methodical habits, and,
amongst other things, was in the habit of making notes of all that he
did. His note-book had been taken off his body, and sent down to
Pretoria with the other things. In it we found entries of his
preparations for the trip, including the number and names of the
bearers provided by Lo Bengula. We also found the chronicle of the
first three days' journey, and that of the morning of the fourth day,
but there the record stopped. The last entry was probably made a few
minutes before he was killed; and it is to be observed that there was
no entry of the party having been for several days without water, as
stated by the messengers, and then finding the poisoned water.
This evidence by itself would not have amounted to much, but now
comes the curious part of the story, showing the truth of the old
adage, "Murder will out." It appears that when the waggon was coming
down to Pretoria in charge of the interpreter, it was outspanned
one day outside the borders of Lo Bengula's country, when some
Kafirs--Bechuanas, I think--came up, asked for some tobacco, and fell
into conversation with the driver, remarking that he had come up with a
full waggon, and now he went down with an empty one. The driver replied
by lamenting the death by poisoned water of his masters, whereupon one
of the Kafirs told him the following story:--He said that a brother of
his was out hunting, a little while back, in the desert for ostriches,
with a party of other Kafirs, when hearing shots fired some way off,
they made for the spot, thinking that white men were out shooting, and
that they would be able to beg meat. On reaching the spot, which was by
a pool of water, they saw the bodies of three white men lying on the
ground, and also those of a Hottentot and a Kafir, surrounded by an
armed party of Kafirs. They at once asked the Kafirs what they had been
doing killing the white men, and were told to be still, for it was by
"order of the king." They then learned the whole story. It appeared
that the white men had made a mid-day halt by the water, when one of
the bearers, who had gone to the edge of the pool, suddenly shouted to
them to come and look at a great snake in the water. Captain Patterson
ran up, and, as he leaned over the edge, was instantly killed by a blow
with an axe; the others were then shot and assegaied. The Kafir further
described the clothes that his brother had seen on the bodies, and also
some articles that had been given to his party by the murderers, that
left little doubt as to the veracity of his story. And so ended the
mission to Matabeleland.
No public notice was taken of the matter, for the obvious reason that
it was impossible to get at Lo Bengula to punish him; nor would it have
been easy to come by legal evidence to disprove the ingenious story of
the poisoned water, since anybody trying to reach the spot of the
massacre would probably fall a victim to some similar accident before
he got back again. It is devoutly to be hoped that the punishment he
deserves will sooner or later overtake the author of this devilish and
wholesale murder.
The beginning of 1879 was signalised by the commencement of operations
in Zululand and by the news of the terrible disaster at Isandhlwana,
which fell on Pretoria like a thunderclap. It was not, however, any
surprise to those who were acquainted with Zulu tactics and with the
plan of attack adopted by the English commanders. In fact, I know that
one solemn warning of what would certainly happen to him if he
persisted in his plan of advance was addressed to Lord Chelmsford,
through the officer in command at Pretoria, by a gentleman whose
position and long experience of the Zulus and their mode of attack
should have carried some weight. If it ever reached him, he took, to
the best of my recollection, no notice of it whatever.
But though some such disaster was daily expected by a few, the majority
both of soldiers and civilians never dreamed of anything of the sort,
the general idea being that the conquest of Cetywayo was a very easy
undertaking; and the shock produced by the news of Isandhlwana was
proportionately great, especially as it reached Pretoria in a much
exaggerated form. I shall never forget the appearance of the town that
morning; business was entirely suspended, and the streets were filled
with knots of men talking, with scared faces, as well they might: for
there was scarcely anybody but had lost a friend, and many thought that
their sons or brothers were among the dead on that bloody field. Among
others, Sir T. Shepstone lost one son, and thought for some time that
he had lost three.
Shortly after this event Sir Theophilus went to England to confer with
the Secretary of State on various matters connected with the Transvaal,
carrying with him the affection and respect of all who knew him, not
excepting the majority of the malcontent Boers. He was succeeded by
Colonel, now Sir Owen Lanyon, who was appointed to administer the
Government during the absence of Sir T. Shepstone.
By the Boers, however, the news of our disaster was received with great
and unconcealed rejoicing, or at least by the irreconcilable portion of
that people. England's necessity was their opportunity, and one of
which they certainly meant to avail themselves. Accordingly, notices
were sent out summoning the burghers of the Transvaal to attend a mass
meeting on the 18th March, at a place about thirty miles from Pretoria.
Emissaries were also sent to native chiefs, to excite them to follow
Cetywayo's example, and massacre all the English within reach, of whom
a man called Solomon Prinsloo was one of the most active The natives,
however, notwithstanding the threats used towards them, one and all
declined the invitation.
It must not be supposed that all the Boers who attended these meetings
did so of their own free will; on the contrary, a very large number
came under compulsion, since they found that the English authorities
were powerless to give them protection. The recalcitrants were
threatened with all sorts of pains and penalties if they did not
attend, a favourite menace being that they should be made "biltong" of
when the country was given back (_i.e._, be cut into strips and hung
in the sun to dry). Few, luckily for themselves, were brave enough
to tempt fortune by refusing to come, but those who did have had to
leave the country since the war. Whatever were the means employed, the
result was an armed meeting of about 3000 Boers, who evidently meant
mischief.
Just about this time a corps had been raised in Pretoria, composed, for
the most part, of gentlemen, and known as the Pretoria Horse, for the
purpose of proceeding to the Zulu border, where cavalry, especially
cavalry acquainted with the country, was earnestly needed. In the
emergency of the times officials were allowed to join this corps, a
permission of which I availed myself, and was elected one of the
lieutenants.[9] The corps was not, after all, allowed to go to Zululand
on account of the threatening aspect adopted by the Boers, against whom
it was retained for service. In my capacity as an officer of the corps
I was sent out with a small body of picked men, all good riders and
light weights, to keep up a constant communication between the Boer
camp and the Administrator, and found the work both interesting and
exciting. My headquarters were at an inn about twenty-five miles from
Pretoria, to which our agents in the meeting used to come every evening
and report how matters were proceeding, whereupon, if the road was
clear, I despatched a letter to headquarters; or, if I feared that the
messengers would be caught _en route_ by Boer patrols and searched, I
substituted different coloured ribbons according to what I wished to
convey. There was a relief hidden in the trees or rocks every six
miles, all day and most of the night, whose business it was to take the
despatch or ribbon and gallop on with it to the next station, in which
way we used to get the despatches into town in about an hour and a
quarter.
[9] It is customary in South African volunteer forces to
allow the members to elect their own officers, provided the
men elected are such as the Government approves. This is
done, so that the corps may not afterwards be able to declare
that they have no confidence in their officers in action, or
to grumble at their treatment by them.
On one or two occasions the Boers came to the inn and threatened to
shoot us, but as our orders were to do nothing unless our lives were
actually in danger, we took no notice. The officer who came out to
relieve me had not, however, been there more than a day or two before
he and all his troopers were hunted back into Pretoria by a large mob
of armed Boers whom they only escaped by very hard riding.
Meanwhile the Boers were by degrees drawing nearer and nearer to the
town, till at last they pitched their laagers within six miles, and
practically besieged it. All business was stopped, the houses were
loopholed and fortified, and advantageous positions were occupied by
the military and the various volunteer corps. The building, normally in
the occupation of the Government mules, fell to the lot of the Pretoria
Horse, and, though it was undoubtedly a post of honour, I honestly
declare that I have no wish to sleep for another month in a mule stable
that has not been cleaned out for several years. However, by sinking a
well, and erecting bastions and a staging for sharpshooters, we
converted it into an excellent fortress, though it would not have been
of much use against artillery. Our patrols used to be out all night,
since we chiefly feared a night attack, and generally every preparation
was made to resist the onset that was hourly expected, and I believe
that it was that state of preparedness that alone prevented it.
Whilst this meeting was going on, and when matters had come to a point
that seemed to render war inevitable, Sir Bartle Frere arrived at
Pretoria and had several interviews with the Boer leaders, at which
they persisted in demanding their independence, and nothing short of
it. After a great deal of talk the meeting finally broke up without any
actual appeal to arms, though it had, during its continuance, assumed
many of the rights of government, such as stopping post-carts and
individuals, and sending armed patrols about the country. The principal
reason of its break-up was that the Zulu war was now drawing to a
close, and the leaders saw that there would soon be plenty of troops
available to suppress any attempt at revolt, but they also saw to what
lengths they could go with impunity. They had for a period of nearly
two months been allowed to throw the whole country into confusion, to
openly violate the laws, and to intimidate and threaten Her Majesty's
loyal subjects with war and death. The lesson was not lost on them; but
they postponed action till a more favourable opportunity offered.
Sir Bartle Frere before his departure took an opportunity at a public
dinner given him at Potchefstroom of assuring the loyal inhabitants of
the country that the Transvaal would never be given back.
Meanwhile a new Pharaoh had arisen in Egypt, in the shape of Sir Garnet
Wolseley, and on the 29th June 1879 we find him communicating the fact
to Sir 0. Lanyon in very plain language, telling him that he
disapproved of his course of action with regard to Secocoeni, and
that "in future you will please take orders only from me."
As soon as Sir Garnet had completed his arrangements for the
pacification of Zululand, he proceeded to Pretoria, and having caused
himself to be sworn in as Governor, set vigorously to work. I must say
that in his dealings with the Transvaal he showed great judgment and a
keen appreciation of what the country needed, namely, strong
government; the fact of the matter being, I suppose, that being very
popular with the Home authorities he felt that he could more or less
command their support in what he did, a satisfaction not given to most
governors, who never know but that they may be thrown overboard in
emergency to lighten the ship.
One of his first acts was to issue a proclamation, stating that,
"Whereas it appears that, notwithstanding repeated assurances of
contrary effect given by Her Majesty's representatives in this
territory, uncertainty or misapprehension exists amongst some of Her
Majesty's subjects as to the intention of Her Majesty's Government
regarding the maintenance of British rule and sovereignty over the
territory of the Transvaal: and whereas it is expedient that all
grounds for such uncertainty or misapprehension should be removed once
and for all beyond doubt or question: now therefore I do hereby
proclaim and make known, in the name and on behalf of Her Majesty
the Queen, that it is the will and determination of Her Majesty's
Government that this Transvaal territory shall be, _and shall
continue to be for ever_, an integral portion of Her Majesty's
dominions in South Africa."
Alas! Sir G. Wolseley's estimate of the value of a solemn pledge thus
made in the name of Her Majesty, whose word has hitherto been held to
be sacred, differed greatly to that of Mr. Gladstone and his
Government.
Sir Garnet Wolseley's operations against Secocoeni proved eminently
successful, and were the best arranged bit of native warfare that I
have yet heard of in South Africa. One blow was struck, and only one,
but that was crushing. Of course the secret of his success lay in the
fact that he had an abundance of force; but it was not ensured by that
alone, good management being very requisite in an affair of the sort,
especially where native allies have to be dealt with. The cost of the
expedition, not counting other Secocoeni war expenditure, amounted to
over £300,000, all of which is now lost to this country.
Another step in the right direction undertaken by Sir Garnet was the
establishment of an Executive Council and also of a Legislative
Council, for the establishment of which Letters Patent were sent from
Downing Street in November 1880.
Meanwhile the Boers, paying no attention to the latter proclamation,
for they guessed that it, like other proclamations in the Transvaal,
would be a mere _brutum fulmen_, had assembled for another mass
meeting, at which they went forward a step, and declared a Government
which was to treat with the English authorities. They had now learnt
that they could do what they liked with perfect impunity, provided they
did not take the extreme course of massacring the English. They had yet
to learn that they might even do that. At the termination of this
meeting, a vote of thanks was passed to "Mr. Leonard Courtney of
London, and other members of the British Parliament." It was wise of
the Boer leaders to cultivate Mr. Courtney of London. As a result of
this meeting, Pretorius, one of the principal leaders, and Bok, the
secretary, were arrested on a charge of treason, and underwent a
preliminary examination; but as the Secretary of State, Sir M. Hicks
Beach, looked rather timidly on the proceeding, and the local
authorities were doubtful of securing a verdict, the prosecution was
abandoned, and necessarily did more harm than good, being looked upon
as another proof of the impotence of the Government.
Shortly afterwards, Sir G. Wolseley changed his tactics, and, instead
of attempting to imprison Pretorius, offered him a seat on the
Executive Council, with a salary attached. This was a much more
sensible way of dealing with him, and he at once rose to the bait,
stating his willingness to join the Government after a while, but that
he could not publicly do so at the moment lest he should lose his
influence with those who were to be brought round through him. It does
not, however, appear that Mr. Pretorius ever did actually join the
Executive, probably because he found public opinion too strong to allow
him to do so.
In December 1879 a new light broke upon the Boers, for in the previous
month Mr. Gladstone had been delivering his noted attack on the policy
of the Conservative Government. Those Mid-Lothian speeches did harm, it
is said, in many parts of the world; but I venture to think that they
have proved more mischievous in South Africa than anywhere else; at any
rate, they have borne fruit sooner. It is not to be supposed that Mr.
Gladstone really cared anything about the Transvaal or its independence
when he was denouncing the hideous outrage that had been perpetrated by
the Conservative Government in annexing it. On the contrary, as he
acquiesced in the Annexation at the time (when Lord Kimberley stated
that it was evidently unavoidable), and declined to rescind it when he
came into power, it is to be supposed that he really approved of it, or
at the least looked on it as a necessary evil. However this may be, any
stick will do to beat a dog with, and the Transvaal was a convenient
point on which to attack the Government. He probably neither knew nor
cared what effect his reckless words might have on ignorant Boers
thousands of miles away; and yet, humanly speaking, many a man would
have been alive and strong to-day whose bones now whiten the African
Veldt had those words never been spoken. Then, for the first time, the
Boers learnt that, if they played their cards properly and put on
sufficient pressure, they would, in the event of the Liberal party
coming to office, have little difficulty in coercing it as they wished.
There was a fair chance at the time of the utterance of the Mid-Lothian
speeches that the agitation would, by degrees, die away; Sir G.
Wolseley had succeeded in winning over Pretorius, and the Boers in
general were sick of mass meetings. Indeed, a memorial was addressed to
Sir. G. Wolseley by a number of Boers in the Potchefstroom district,
protesting against the maintenance of the movement against Her
Majesty's rule, which, considering the great amount of intimidation
exercised by the malcontents, may be looked upon as a favourable sign.
But when it slowly came to be understood among the Boers that a great
English Minister had openly espoused their cause, and that he would
perhaps soon be all-powerful, the moral gain to them was incalculable.
They could now go to the doubting ones and say,--we must be right about
the matter, because, putting our own feelings out of the question, the
great Gladstone says we are. We find the committee of the Boer
malcontents, at their meeting in March 1880, reading a letter to Mr.
Gladstone, "in which he was thanked for the great sympathy shown in
their fate," and a hope expressed that, if he succeeded in getting
power, he would not forget them. In fact, a charming unanimity
prevailed between our great Minister and the Boer rebels, for their
interests were the same, the overthrow of the Conservative Government.
If, however, every leader of the Opposition were to intrigue or
countenance intrigues with those who are seeking to undermine the
authority of Her Majesty, whether they be Boers or Irishmen, in order
to help himself to power, the country might suffer in the long run.
But whatever feelings may have prompted Her Majesty's Opposition, the
Home Government, and their agent, Sir Garnet Wolseley, blew no
uncertain blast, if we may judge from their words and actions. Thus we
find Sir Garnet speaking as follows at a banquet given in his honour at
Pretoria:--
"I am told that these men (the Boers) are told to keep on agitating in
this way, for a change of Government in England may give them again the
old order of things. Nothing can show greater ignorance of English
politics than such an idea; I tell you that there is no Government,
Whig or Tory, Liberal, Conservative, or Radical, _who would dare
under any circumstances to give back this country_. They would not
dare, because the English people would not allow them. To give back the
country, what would it mean? To give it back to external danger, to the
danger of attack by hostile tribes on its frontier, and who, if the
English Government were removed for one day, would make themselves felt
the next. Not an official of Government paid for months; it would mean
national bankruptcy. No taxes being paid, the same thing recurring
again which had existed before would mean danger without, anarchy and
civil war within, every possible misery; the strangulation of trade,
and the destruction of property."
It is very amusing to read this passage by the light of after events.
On other occasions Sir Garnet Wolseley will probably not be quite so
confident as to the future when it is to be controlled by a Radical
Government.
This explicit and straightforward statement of Sir Garnet's produced a
great effect on the loyal inhabitants of the Transvaal, which was
heightened by the publication of the following telegram from the
Secretary of State:--"You may fully confirm explicit statements made
from time to time as to inability of Her Majesty's Government to
entertain _any proposal_ for withdrawal of the Queen's sovereignty."
On the faith of these declarations many Englishmen migrated to the
Transvaal and settled there, whilst those who were in the country now
invested all their means, being confident that they would not lose
their property through its being returned to the Boers. The excitement
produced by Mr. Gladstone's speeches began to quiet down and be
forgotten for the time, arrear taxes were paid up by the malcontents,
and generally the aspect of affairs was such, in Sir Garnet Wolseley's
opinion, as justified him in writing, in April 1880, to the Secretary
of State expressing his belief that the agitation was dying out.[10]
Indeed, so sanguine was he on that point that he is reported to have
advised the withdrawal of the cavalry regiment stationed in the
territory, a piece of economy that was one of the immediate causes of
the revolt.
[10] In Blue-Book No. (C. 2866) of September 1881, which is
descriptive of various events connected with the Boer rising,
is published, as an appendix, a despatch from Sir Garnet
Wolseley, dated October 1879. This despatch declares the
writer's opinion that the Boer discontent a on the increase.
Its publication thus--_apropos des bottes_--nearly two
years after it was written, is rather an amusing incident. It
certainly gives one the idea that Sir Garnet Wolseley,
fearing that his reputation for infallibility might be
attacked by scoffers for not having foreseen the Boer
rebellion, and perhaps uneasily conscious of other despatches
very different in tenor and subsequent in date: and, mindful
of the withdrawal of the cavalry regiment by his advice, had
caused it to be tacked on to the Blue-Book as a documentary
"I told you so," and a proof that, whoever else was blinded,
he foresaw. It contains, however, the following remarkably
true passage:--"Even were it not impossible, for many other
reasons, to contemplate a withdrawal of our authority from
the Transvaal, the position of insecurity in which we should
leave this loyal and important section of the community (the
English inhabitants), by exposing them to the certain
retaliation of the Boers, would constitute, in my opinion, an
insuperable obstacle to retrocession. Subjected to the same
danger, moreover, would be those of the Boers, whose superior
intelligence and courageous character has rendered them loyal
to our Government"
As the Government took the trouble to republish the despatch,
it is a pity that they did not think fit to pay more
attention to its contents.
The reader will remember the financial condition of the country at the
time of the Annexation, which was one of utter bankruptcy. After three
years of British rule, however, we find, notwithstanding the constant
agitation that had been kept up, that the total revenue receipts for
the first quarter of 1879 and 1880 amounted to £22,773 and £47,982
respectively. That is to say, that, during the last year of British
rule, the revenue of the country more than doubled itself, and amounted
to about £160,000 a year, taking the quarterly returns at the low
average of £40,000. It must, however, be remembered that this sum would
have been very largely increased in subsequent years, most probably
doubled. At any rate the revenue would have been amply sufficient to
make the province one of the most prosperous in South Africa, and to
have enabled it to shortly repay all debts due to the British
Government, and further to provide for its own defence. Trade also,
which, in April 1877, was completely paralysed, had increased
enormously. So early as the middle of 1879, the Committee of the
Transvaal Chamber of Commerce pointed out, in a resolution adopted by
them, that the trade of the country had in two years risen from almost
nothing to the considerable sum of two millions sterling per annum, and
that it was entirely in the hands of those favourable to British rule.
They also pointed out that more than half the land-tax was paid by
Englishmen, or other Europeans adverse to Boer Government. Land, too,
had risen greatly in value, of which I can give the following instance.
About a year after the Annexation I, together with a friend, bought a
little property on the outskirts of Pretoria, which, with a cottage we
put up on it, cost some £300. Just before the rebellion we fortunately
determined to sell it, and had no difficulty in getting £650 for it. I
do not believe that it would now fetch a fifty-pound note.
I cannot conclude this chapter better than by drawing attention to a
charming specimen of the correspondence between the Boer leaders and
their friend Mr. Courtney. The letter in question, which is dated 26th
June, purports to be written by Messrs. Kruger and Joubert, but it is
obvious that it owes its origin to some member or members of the Dutch
party at the Cape, from whence, indeed, it is written. This is rendered
evident both by its general style, and also by the use of such terms as
"Satrap," and by references to Napoleon III. and Cayenne, about whom
Messrs. Kruger and Joubert know no more than they do of Peru and the
Incas.
After alluding to former letters, the writers blow a blast of triumph
over the downfall of the Conservative Government, and then make a
savage attack on the reputation of Sir Bartle Frere. The "stubborn
Satrap" is throughout described as a liar, and every bad motive imputed
to him. Really, the fact that Mr. Courtney should encourage such
epistles as this is enough to give colour to the boast made by some of
the leading Boers, after the war, that they had been encouraged to
rebel by a member of the British Government.
At the end of this letter, and on the same page of the Blue-Book, is
printed the telegram recalling Sir Bartle Frere, dated 1st August 1880.
It really reads as though the second document was consequent on the
first. One thing is very clear, the feelings of Her Majesty's new
Government towards Sir Bartle Frere differed only in the method of
their expression from those set forth by the Boer leaders in their
letter to Mr. Courtney, whilst their object, namely, to be rid of him,
was undoubtedly identical with that of the Dutch party in South Africa.