The successors of the prophets had to deal with new circumstances, and

accordingly their teachings were adapted to the wants of their times. As

the result of manifold foreign influences, the visible fact of the

existence of God as manifested in the Bible had been somewhat obscured.

Prophecy ceased, and the Holy Spirit which inspired a few chosen ones took

its place. Afterwards this influence was reduced to the hearing of a Voice

from Heaven, which was audible to still fewer. On the other hand the

Rabbis had this advantage that they were not called upon to fight against

idolatry as their predecessors the prophets had been. The evil inclination

to worship idols was, as the Talmud expresses it allegorically, killed by

the Men of the Great Synagogue, or, as we should put it, it was suppressed

by the sufferings of the captivity in Babylon. This change of

circumstances is marked by the following fact:—Whilst the prophets mostly

considered idolatry as the cause of all sin, the Rabbis show a strong

tendency to ascribe sin to a defect in, or a want of, belief on the part

of the sinner. They teach that Adam would not have sinned unless he had

first denied the “Root of all” (or the main principle), namely, the belief

in the Omnipresence of God. Of Cain they say that before murdering his

brother he declared: “There is no judgment, there is no judge, there is no

world to come, and there is no reward for the just, and no punishment for

the wicked.”(112)

In another place we read that the commission of a sin in secret is an

impertinent attempt by the doer to oust God from the world. But if

unbelief is considered as the root of all evil, we may expect that the

reverse of it, a perfect faith, would be praised in the most exalted

terms. So we read: Faith is so great that the man who possesses it may

hope to become a worthy vessel of the Holy Spirit, or, as we should

express it, that he may hope to obtain by this power the highest degree of

communion with his Maker. The Patriarch Abraham, notwithstanding all his

other virtues, only became “the possessor of both worlds” by the merit of

his strong faith. Nay, even the fulfilment of a single law when

accompanied by true faith is, according to the Rabbis, sufficient to bring

man nigh to God. And the future redemption is also conditional on the

degree of faith shown by Israel.(113)

It has often been asked what the Rabbis would have thought of a man who

fulfils every commandment of the Torah, but does not believe that this

Torah was given by God, or that there exists a God at all. It is indeed

very difficult to answer this question with any degree of certainty. In

the time of the Rabbis people were still too simple for such a diplomatic

religion, and conformity in the modern sense was quite an unknown thing.

But from the foregoing remarks it would seem that the Rabbis could not

conceive such a monstrosity as atheistic orthodoxy. For, as we have seen,

the Rabbis thought that unbelief must needs end in sin, for faith is the

origin of all good. Accordingly, in the case just supposed they would have

either suspected the man’s orthodoxy, or would have denied that his views

were really what he professed them to be.

Still more important than the above cited Agadic passages is one which we

are about to quote from the tractate Sanhedrin. This tractate deals with

the constitution, of the supreme law‐court, the examination of the

witnesses, the functions of the judges, and the different punishment to be

inflicted on the transgressors of the law. After having enumerated various

kinds of capital punishment, the Mishnah adds the following words: “These

are (the men) who are excluded from the life to come: He who says there is

no resurrection from death; he who says there is no Torah given from

heaven, and the Epikurus.”(114) This passage was considered by the Rabbis

of the Middle Ages, as well as by modern scholars, the _locus classicus_

for the dogma question. There are many passages in the Rabbinic literature

which exclude man from the world to come for this or that sin. But these

are more or less of an Agadic (legendary) character, and thus lend

themselves to exaggeration and hyperbolic language. They cannot,

therefore, be considered as serious legal dicta, or as the general opinion

of the Rabbis.

The Mishnah in Sanhedrin, however, has, if only by its position in a legal

tractate, a certain _Halachic_ (obligatory) character. And the fact that

so early an authority as R. Akiba made additions to it guarantees its high

antiquity. The first two sentences of this Mishnah are clear enough. In

modern language, and positively speaking, they would represent articles of

belief in Resurrection and Revelation. Great difficulty is found in

defining what was meant by the word _Epikurus_. The authorities of the

Middle Ages, to whom I shall again have to refer, explain the Epikurus to

be a man who denies the belief in reward and punishment; others identify

him with one who denies the belief in Providence; while others again

consider the Epikurus to be one who denies Tradition. But the parallel

passages in which it occurs incline one rather to think that this word

cannot be defined by one kind of heresy. It implies rather a frivolous

treatment of the words of Scripture or of Tradition. In the case of the

latter (Tradition) it is certainly not honest difference of opinion that

is condemned; for the Rabbis themselves differed very often from each

other, and even Mediæval authorities did not feel any compunction about

explaining Scripture in variance with the Rabbinic interpretation, and

sometimes they even went so far as to declare that the view of this or

that great authority was only to be considered as an isolated opinion not

deserving particular attention. What they did blame was, as already said,

scoffing and impiety. We may thus safely assert that reverence for the

teachers of Israel formed the third essential principle of Judaism.(115)

I have still to remark that there occur in the Talmud such passages as

“the Jew, even if he has sinned, is still a Jew,” or “He who denies

idolatry is called a Jew.” These and similar passages have been used to

prove that Judaism was not a positive religion, but only involved the

negation of idolatry. But it has been overlooked that the statements

quoted have more a legal than a theological character. The Jew belonged to

his nationality even after having committed the greatest sin, just as the

Englishman does not cease to be an Englishman—in regard to treason and the

like—by having committed a heinous crime. But he has certainly acted in a

very un‐English way, and having outraged the feelings of the whole nation

will have to suffer for his misconduct. The Rabbis in a similar manner did

not maintain that he who gave up the belief in Revelation and

Resurrection, and treated irreverently the teachers of Israel, severed his

connection with the Jewish nation, but that, for his crime, he was going

to suffer the heaviest punishment. He was to be excluded from the world to

come.

Still, important as is the passage quoted from Sanhedrin, it would be

erroneous to think that it exhausted the creed of the Rabbis. The liturgy

and innumerable passages in the Midrashim show that they ardently clung to

the belief in the advent of the Messiah. All their hope was turned to the

future redemption and the final establishment of the Kingdom of Heaven on

earth. Judaism, stripped of this belief, would have been for them devoid

of meaning. The belief in reward and punishment is also repeated again and

again in the old Rabbinic literature. A more emphatic declaration of the

belief in Providence than is conveyed by the following passages is hardly

conceivable. “Everything is foreseen, and free will is given. And the

world is judged by grace.” Or, “the born are to die, and the dead to

revive, and the living to be judged. For to know and to notify, and that

it may be known that He (God) is the Framer and He the Creator, and He the

Discerner, and He the Judge, and He the Witness,” etc.(116)

But it must not be forgotten that it was not the habit of the Rabbis to

lay down, either for conduct or for doctrine, rules which were commonly

known. When they urged the three points stated above there must have been

some historical reason for it. Probably these principles were controverted

by some heretics. Indeed, the whole tone of the passage cited from

Sanhedrin is a protest against certain unbelievers who are threatened with

punishment. Other beliefs, not less essential, but less disputed, remain

unmentioned, because there was no necessity to assert them.

It was not till a much later time, when the Jews came into closer contact

with new philosophical schools, and also new creeds which were more liable

than heathenism was to be confused with Judaism, that this necessity was

felt. And thus we are led at once to the period when the Jews became

acquainted with the teachings of the Mohammedan schools. The Caraites came

very early into contact with non‐Jewish systems. And so we find that they

were also the first to formulate Jewish dogmas in a fixed number, and in a

systematic order. It is also possible that their separation from the

Tradition, and their early division into little sects among themselves,

compelled them to take this step, in order to avoid further sectarianism.

The number of their dogmas amounts to ten. According to Judah Hadasi

(1150), who would appear to have derived them from his predecessors, their

dogmas include the following articles:—1. _Creatio ex nihilo_; 2. The

existence of a Creator, God; 3. This God is an absolute unity as well as

incorporeal; 4. Moses and the other prophets were sent by God; 5. God has

given to us the Torah, which is true and complete in every respect, not

wanting the addition of the so‐called Oral Law; 6. The Torah must be

studied by every Jew in the original (Hebrew) language; 7. The Holy Temple

was a place elected by God for His manifestation; 8. Resurrection of the

dead; 9. Punishment and reward after death; 10. The Coming of the Messiah,

the son of David.

How far the predecessors of Hadasi were influenced by a certain Joseph

Albashir (about 950), of whom there exists a manuscript work, “Rudiments

of Faith,” I am unable to say. The little we know of him reveals more of

his intimacy with Arabic thoughts than of his importance for his sect in

particular and for Judaism in general. After Hadasi I shall mention here

Elijah Bashazi, a Caraite writer of the end of the fifteenth century. This

author, who was much influenced by Maimonides, omits the second and the

seventh articles. In order to make up the ten he numbers the belief in the

eternity of God as an article, and divides the fourth article into two. In

the fifth article Bashazi does not emphasise so strongly the completeness

of the Torah as Hadasi, and omits the portion which is directed against

Tradition. It is interesting to see the distinction which Bashazi draws

between the Pentateuch and the Prophets. While he thinks that the five

books of Moses can never be altered, he regards the words of the Prophets

as only relating to their contemporaries, and thus subject to changes. As

I do not want to anticipate Maimonides’ system, I must refrain from giving

here the articles laid down by Solomon Troki in the beginning of the

eighteenth century. For the articles of Maimonides are copied by this

writer with a few slight alterations so as to dress them in a Caraite

garb.

I must dismiss the Caraites with these few remarks, my object being

chiefly to discuss the dogmas of the Synagogue from which they had

separated themselves. Besides, as in everything Caraitic, there is no

further development of the question. As Bashazi laid them down, they are

still taught by the Caraites of to‐day. I return to the Rabbanites.(117)

As is well known, Maimonides (1130‐1205), was the first Rabbanite who

formulated the dogmas of the Synagogue. But there are indications of

earlier attempts. R. Saadiah Gaon’s (892‐942) work, _Creeds and Opinions_,

shows such traces. He says in his preface, “My heart sickens to see that

the belief of my co‐religionists is impure and that their theological

views are confused.” The subjects he treats in this book, such as

creation, unity of God, resurrection of the dead, the future redemption of

Israel, reward and punishment, and other kindred theological subjects

might thus, perhaps, be considered as the essentials of the creed that the

Gaon desired to present in a pure and rational form. R. Hannaneel, of

Kairowan,(118) in the first half of the eleventh century, says in one of

his commentaries that to deserve eternal life one must believe in _four_

things: in God, in the prophets, in a future world where the just will be

rewarded, and in the advent of the Redeemer. From R. Judah Hallevi’s

_Cusari_, written in the beginning of the twelfth century, we might argue

that the belief in the election of Israel by God was the cardinal dogma of

the author.(119) Abraham Ibn Daud, a contemporary of Maimonides, in his

book _The High Belief_,(120) speaks of _rudiments_, among which, besides

such metaphysical principles as unity, rational conception of God’s

attributes, etc., the belief in the immutability of the Law, etc., is

included. Still, all these works are intended to furnish evidence from

philosophy or history for the truth of religion rather than to give a

definition of this truth. The latter task was undertaken by Maimonides.

I refer to the thirteen articles embodied in his first work, _The

Commentary to the Mishnah_. They are appended to the Mishnah in Sanhedrin,

with which I dealt above. But though they do not form an independent

treatise, Maimonides’ remarks must not be considered as merely incidental.

That Maimonides was quite conscious of the importance of this exposition

can be gathered from the concluding words addressed to the reader: “Know

these (words) and repeat them many times, and think them over in the

proper way. God knows that thou wouldst be deceiving thyself if thou

thinkest thou hast understood them by having read them once or even ten

times. Be not, therefore, hasty in perusing them. I have not composed them

without deep study and earnest reflection.”

The result of this deep study was that the following Thirteen Articles

constitute the creed of Judaism. They are:—

1. The belief in the existence of a Creator; 2. The belief in His Unity;

3. The belief in His Incorporeality; 4. The belief in His Eternity; 5. The

belief that all worship and adoration are due to Him alone; 6. The belief

in Prophecy; 7. The belief that Moses was the greatest of all Prophets,

both before and after him; 8. The belief that the Torah was revealed to

Moses on Mount Sinai; 9. The belief in the Immutability of this revealed

Torah; 10. The belief that God knows the actions of men; 11. The belief in

Reward and Punishment; 12. The belief in the coming of the Messiah; 13.

The belief in the Resurrection of the dead.

The impulse given by the great philosopher and still greater Jew was

eagerly followed by succeeding generations, and Judaism thus came into

possession of a dogmatic literature such as it never knew before

Maimonides. Maimonides is the centre of this literature, and I shall

accordingly speak in the remainder of this essay of Maimonists and Anti‐

Maimonists. These terms really apply to the great controversy that raged

round Maimonides’ _Guide of __ the Perplexed_, but I shall, chiefly for

brevity’s sake, employ them in these pages in a restricted sense to refer

to the dispute concerning the Thirteen Articles.

Among the Maimonists we may probably include the great majority of Jews,

who accepted the Thirteen Articles without further question. Maimonides

must indeed have filled up a great gap in Jewish theology, a gap,

moreover, the existence of which was very generally perceived. A century

had hardly elapsed before the Thirteen Articles had become a theme for the

poets of the Synagogue. And almost every country where Jews lived can show

a poem or a prayer founded on these Articles. R. Jacob Molin (1420) of

Germany speaks of metrical and rhymed songs in the German language, the

burden of which was the Thirteen Articles, and which were read by the

common people with great devotion. The numerous commentaries and homilies

written on the same topic would form a small library in themselves.(121)

But on the other hand it must not be denied that the Anti‐Maimonists, that

is to say those Jewish writers who did not agree with the creed formulated

by Maimonides, or agreed only in part with him, form also a very strong

and respectable minority. They deserve our attention the more as it is

their works which brought life into the subject and deepened it. It is not

by a perpetual Amen to every utterance of a great authority that truth or

literature gains anything.

The Anti‐Maimonists can be divided into two classes. The one class

categorically denies that Judaism has dogmas. I shall have occasion to

touch on this view when I come to speak of Abarbanel. Here I pass at once

to the second class of Anti‐Maimonists. This consists of those who agree

with Maimonides as to the existence of dogmas in Judaism, but who differ

from him as to what these dogmas are, or who give a different enumeration

of them.

As the first of these Anti‐Maimonists we may regard Nachmanides, who, in

his famous _Sermon in the Presence of the King_, speaks of three

fundamental principles: Creation (that is, non‐eternity of matter),

Omniscience of God, and Providence. Next comes R. Abba Mari ben Moses, of

Montpellier. He wrote at the beginning of the fourteenth century, and is

famous in Jewish history for his zeal against the study of philosophy. We

possess a small pamphlet by him dealing with our subject, and it forms a

kind of prologue to his collection of controversial letters against the

rationalists of his time.(122) He lays down three articles as the

fundamental teachings of Religion: 1. Metaphysical: The existence of God,

including His Unity and Incorporeality; 2. Mosaic: _Creatio ex nihilo_ by

God—a consequence of this principle is the belief that God is capable of

altering the laws of nature at His pleasure; 3. Ethical: Special

Providence—_i.e._ God knows all our actions in all their details. Abba

Mari does not mention Maimonides’ Thirteen Articles. But it would be false

to conclude that he rejected the belief in the coming of the Messiah, or

any other article of Maimonides. The whole tone and tendency of this

pamphlet is polemical, and it is therefore probable that he only urged

those points which were either doubted or explained in an unorthodox way

by the sceptics of his time.

Another scholar, of Provence, who wrote but twenty years later than Abba

Mari—R. David ben Samuel d’Estella (1320)—speaks of the seven pillars of

religion. They are: Revelation, Providence, Reward and Punishment, the

Coming of the Messiah, Resurrection of the Dead, _Creatio ex nihilo_, and

Free Will.(123)

Of authors living in other countries, I have to mention here R. Shemariah,

of Crete, who flourished at about the same time as R. David d’Estella, and

is known from his efforts to reconcile the Caraites with the Rabbanites.

This author wrote a book for the purpose of furnishing Jewish students

with evidence for what he considered the five fundamental teachings of

Judaism, viz.: 1. The Existence of God; 2. The Incorporeality of God; 3.

His Absolute Unity; 4. That God created heaven and earth; 5. That God

created the world after His will 5106 years ago—5106 (1346 A.C.), being

the year in which Shemariah wrote these words.(124)

In Portugal, at about the same time, we find R. David ben Yom‐Tob Bilia

adding to the articles of Maimonides thirteen of his own, which he calls

the “Fundamentals of the Thinking Man.” Five of these articles relate to

the functions of the human soul, that, according to him, emanated from

God, and to the way in which this divine soul receives its punishment and

reward. The other eight articles are as follows: 1. The belief in the

existence of spiritual beings—angels; 2. _Creatio ex nihilo_; 3. The

belief in the existence of another world, and that this other world is

only a spiritual one; 4. The Torah is above philosophy; 5. The Torah has

an outward (literal) meaning and an inward (allegorical) meaning; 6. The

text of the Torah is not subject to any emendation; 7. The reward of a

good action is the good work itself, and the doer must not expect any

other reward; 8. It is only by the “commands relating to the heart,” for

instance, the belief in one eternal God, the loving and fearing Him, and

not through good actions, that man attains the highest degree of

perfection.(125) Perhaps it would be suitable to mention here another

contemporaneous writer, who also enumerates twenty‐six articles. The name

of this writer is unknown, and his articles are only gathered from

quotations by later authors. It would seem from these quotations that the

articles of this unknown author consisted mostly of statements emphasising

the belief in the attributes of God: as, His Eternity, His Wisdom and

Omnipotence, and the like.(126)

More important for our subject are the productions of the fifteenth

century, especially those of Spanish authors. The fifteen articles of R.

Lipman Muhlhausen, in the preface to his well‐known _Book of Victory_(127)

(1410), differ but slightly from those of Maimonides. In accordance with

the anti‐Christian tendency of his polemical book, he lays more stress on

the two articles of Unity and Incorporeality, and makes of them four. We

can therefore dismiss him with this short remark, and pass at once to the

Spanish Rabbis.

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