treatise, _The Light of God_, about 1405. Chasdai’s book is well known for
its attacks on Aristotle, and also for its influence on Spinoza. But
Chasdai deals also with Maimonides’ Thirteen Articles, to which he was
very strongly opposed. Already in his preface he attacks Maimonides for
speaking, in his _Book of the Commandments_, of the belief in the
existence of God as an “affirmative precept.” Chasdai thinks it absurd;
for every commandment must be dictated by some authority, but on whose
authority can we dictate the acceptance of this authority? His general
objection to the Thirteen Articles is that Maimonides confounded dogmas or
_fundamental beliefs_ of Judaism, without which Judaism is inconceivable,
with beliefs or _doctrines_ which Judaism inculcates, but the denial of
which, though involving a strong heresy, does not make Judaism impossible.
He maintains that if Maimonides meant only to count fundamental teachings,
there are not more than seven; but that if he intended also to include
doctrines, he ought to have enumerated sixteen. As beliefs of the first
class—namely, fundamental beliefs—he considers the following articles: 1.
God’s knowledge of our actions; 2. Providence; 3. God’s omnipotence—even
to act against the laws of nature; 4. Prophecy; 5. Free will; 6. The aim
of the Torah is to make man long after the closest communion with God. The
belief in the existence of God, Chasdai thinks, is an axiom with which
every religion must begin, and he is therefore uncertain whether to
include it as a dogma or not. As to the doctrines which every Jew is bound
to believe, but without which Judaism is not impossible, Chasdai divides
them into two sections: (_a_) 1. _Creatio ex nihilo_; 2. Immortality of
the soul; 3. Reward and Punishment; 4. Resurrection of the dead; 5.
Immutability of the Torah; 6. Superiority of the prophecy of Moses; 7.
That the High Priest received from God the instructions sought for, when
he put his questions through the medium of the Urim and Thummim; 8. The
coming of the Messiah. (_b_) Doctrines which are expressed by certain
religious ceremonies, and on belief in which these ceremonies are
conditioned: 1. The belief in the efficacy of prayer—as well as in the
power of the benediction of the priests to convey to us the blessing of
God; 2. God is merciful to the penitent; 3. Certain days in the year—for
instance, the Day of Atonement—are especially qualified to bring us near
to God, if we keep them in the way we are commanded. That Chasdai is a
little arbitrary in the choice of his “doctrines,” I need hardly say.
Indeed, Chasdai’s importance for the dogma‐question consists more in his
critical suggestions than in his positive results. He was, as we have
seen, the first to make the distinction between fundamental teachings
which form the basis of Judaism, and those other simple Jewish doctrines
without which Judaism is not impossible. Very daring is his remark, when
proving that Reward and Punishment, Immortality of the soul, and
Resurrection of the dead must not be considered as the basis of Judaism,
since the highest ideal of religion is to serve God without any hope of
reward. Even more daring are his words concerning the Immutability of the
Law. He says: “Some have argued that, since God is perfection, so must
also His law be perfect, and thus unsusceptible of improvement.” But he
does not think this argument conclusive, though the fact in itself (the
Immutability of the Law) is true. For one might answer that this
perfection of the Torah could only be in accordance with the intelligence
of those for whom it was meant; but as soon as the recipients of the Torah
have advanced to a higher state of perfection, the Torah must also be
altered to suit their advanced intelligence. A pupil of Chasdai
illustrates the words of his master by a medical parallel. The physician
has to adapt his medicaments to the various stages through which his
patient has to pass. That he changes his prescription does not, however,
imply that his medical knowledge is imperfect, or that his earlier
remedies were ignorantly chosen; the varying condition of the invalid was
the cause of the variation in the doctor’s treatment. Similarly, were not
the Immutability of the Torah a “doctrine,” one might maintain that the
perfection of the Torah would not be inconsistent with the assumption that
it was susceptible of modification, in accordance with our changing and
progressive circumstances. But all these arguments are purely of a
theoretic character; for, practically, every Jew, according to Chasdai,
has to accept all these beliefs, whether he terms them fundamental
teachings or only Jewish doctrines.(128)
Some years later, though he finished his work in the same year as Chasdai,
R. Simeon Duran (1366‐1444,) a younger contemporary of the former, made
his researches on dogmas. His studies on this subject form a kind of
introduction to his commentary on Job, which he finished in the year 1405.
Duran is not so strongly opposed to the Thirteen Articles as Chasdai, or
as another “thinker of our people,” who thought them an arbitrary
imitation of the thirteen attributes of God. Duran tries to justify
Maimonides; but nevertheless he agrees with “earlier authorities,” who
formulated the Jewish creed in Three Articles—The Existence of God,
Revelation, and Reward and Punishment—under which Duran thinks the
Thirteen Articles of Maimonides may be easily classed. Most interesting
are his remarks concerning the validity of dogmas. He tells us that only
those are to be considered as heretics who abide by their own opinions,
though they know that they are contradictory to the views of the Torah.
Those who accept the fundamental teachings of Judaism, but are led by
their deep studies and earnest reflection to differ in details from the
opinions current among their co‐religionists, and explain certain passages
in the Scripture in their own way, must by no means be considered as
heretics. We must, therefore, Duran proceeds to say, not blame such men as
Maimonides, who gave an allegorical interpretation to certain passages in
the Bible about miracles, or R. Levi ben Gershom, who followed certain un‐
Jewish views in relation to the belief in _Creatio ex nihilo_. Only the
views are condemnable, not those who cherish them. God forbid, says Duran,
that such a thing should happen in Israel as to condemn honest inquirers
on account of their differing opinions. It would be interesting to know of
how many divines as tolerant as this persecuted Jew the fifteenth century
can boast.(129)
We can now pass to a more popular but less original writer on our theme. I
refer to R. Joseph Albo, the author of the _Roots_,(130) who was the pupil
of Chasdai, a younger contemporary of Duran, and wrote at a much later
period than these authors. Graetz has justly denied him much originality.
The chief merit of Albo consists in popularising other people’s thoughts,
though he does not always take care to mention their names. And the
student who is a little familiar with the contents of the _Roots_ will
easily find that Albo has taken his best ideas either from Chasdai or from
Duran. As it is of little consequence to us whether an article of faith is
called “stem,” or “root,” or “branch,” there is scarcely anything fresh
left to quote in the name of Albo. The late Dr. Löw, of Szegedin, was
indeed right, when he answered an adversary who challenged him—“Who would
dare to declare me a heretic as long as I confess the Three Articles laid
down by Albo?” with the words “Albo himself.” For, after all the subtle
distinctions Albo makes between different classes of dogmas, he declares
that every one who denies even the immutability of the Law or the coming
of the Messiah, which are, according to him, articles of minor importance,
is a heretic who will be excluded from the world to come. But there is one
point in his book which is worth noticing. It was suggested to him by
Maimonides, indeed; still Albo has the merit of having emphasised it as it
deserves. Among the articles which he calls “branches” Albo counts the
belief that the perfection of man, which leads to eternal life, can be
obtained by the fulfilling of _one_ commandment. But this command must, as
Maimonides points out, be done without any worldly regard, and only for
the love of God. When one considers how many platitudes are repeated year
by year by certain theologians on the subject of Jewish legalism, we
cannot lay enough stress on this article of Albo, and we ought to make it
better known than it has hitherto been.(131)
Though I cannot enter here into the enumeration of the Maimonists, I must
not leave unmentioned the name of R. Nissim ben Moses of Marseilles, the
first great Maimonist, who flourished about the end of the thirteenth
century, and was considered as one of the most enlightened thinkers of his
age.(132) Another great Maimonist deserving special attention is R.
Abraham ben Shem‐Tob Bibago, who may perhaps be regarded as the most
prominent among those who undertook to defend Maimonides against the
attacks of Chasdai and others. Bibago wrote _The Path of Belief_(133) in
the second half of the fifteenth century, and was, as Dr. Steinschneider
aptly describes him, a _Denkgläubiger_. But, above all, he was a believing
Jew. When he was once asked, at the table of King John II., of Aragon, by
a Christian scholar, “Are you the Jewish philosopher?” he answered, “I am
a Jew who believes in the Law given to us by our teacher Moses, though I
have studied philosophy.” Bibago was such a devoted admirer of Maimonides
that he could not tolerate any opposition to him. He speaks in one passage
of the prudent people of his time who, in desiring to be looked upon as
orthodox by the great mob, calumniated the Teacher (Maimonides), and
depreciated his merits. Bibago’s book is very interesting, especially in
its controversial parts; but in respect to dogmas he is, as already said,
a Maimonist, and does not contribute any new point on our subject.
To return to the Anti‐Maimonists of the second half of the fifteenth
century. As such may be considered R. Isaac Aramah, who speaks of three
foundations of religion: _Creatio ex nihilo_, Revelation (?), and the
belief in a world to come.(134) Next to be mentioned is R. Joseph Jabez,
who also accepts only three articles: _Creatio ex nihilo_, Individual
Providence, and the Unity of God.(135) Under these three heads he tries to
classify the Thirteen Articles of Maimonides.
The last Spanish writer on our subject is R. Isaac Abarbanel. His treatise
on the subject is known under the title _Top of Amanah_,(136) and was
finished in the year 1495. The greatest part of this treatise forms a
defence of Maimonides, many points in which are taken from Bibago. But, in
spite of this fact, Abarbanel must not be considered a Maimonist. It is
only a feeling of piety towards Maimonides, or perhaps rather a fondness
for argument, that made him defend Maimonides against Chasdai and others.
His own view is that it is a mistake to formulate dogmas of Judaism, since
every word in the Torah has to be considered as a dogma for itself. It was
only, says Abarbanel, by following the example of non‐Jewish scholars that
Maimonides and others were induced to lay down dogmas. The non‐Jewish
philosophers are in the habit of accepting in every science certain
indisputable axioms from which they deduce the propositions which are less
evident. The Jewish philosophers in a similar way sought for first
principles in religion from which the whole of the Torah ought to be
considered as a deduction. But, thinks Abarbanel, the Torah as a revealed
code is under no necessity of deducing things from each other, for all the
commands came from the same divine authority, and, therefore, all are
alike evident, and have the same certainty. On this and similar grounds
Abarbanel refused to accept dogmatic articles for Judaism, and he thus
became the head of the school that forms a class by itself among the Anti‐
Maimonists to which many of the greatest Cabbalists also belong. But it is
idle talk to cite this school in aid of the modern theory that Judaism has
no dogmas. As we have seen, it was rather an _embarras de richesse_ that
prevented Abarbanel from accepting the Thirteen Articles of Maimonides. To
him and to the Cabbalists the Torah consists of at least 613 Articles.
Abarbanel wrote his book with which we have just dealt, at Naples. And it
is Italy to which, after the expulsion of the Jews from Spain, we have to
look chiefly for religious speculation. But the philosophers of Italy are
still less independent of Maimonides than their predecessors in Spain.
Thus we find that R. David Messer Leon, R. David Vital, and others were
Maimonists. Even the otherwise refined and original thinker, R. Elijah
Delmedigo (who died about the end of the fifteenth century) becomes almost
impolite when he speaks of the adversaries of Maimonides in respect to
dogmas. “It was only,” he says, “the would‐be philosopher that dared to
question the articles of Maimonides. Our people have always the bad habit
of thinking themselves competent to attack the greatest authorities as
soon as they have got some knowledge of the subject. Genuine thinkers,
however, attach very little importance to their objections.”(137)
Indeed, it seems as if the energetic protests of Delmedigo scared away the
Anti‐Maimonists for more than a century. Even in the following seventeenth
century we have to notice only two Anti‐Maimonists. The one is R. Tobijah,
the Priest (1652), who was of Polish descent, studied in Italy, and lived
as a medical man in France. He seems to refuse to accept the belief in the
Immutability of the Torah, and in the coming of the Messiah, as
fundamental teachings of Judaism.(138) The other, at the end of the
seventeenth century (1695), is R. Abraham Chayim Viterbo, of Italy. He
accepts only six articles: 1. Existence of God; 2. Unity; 3.
Incorporeality; 4. That God was revealed to Moses on Mount Sinai, and that
the prophecy of Moses is true; 5. Revelation (including the historical
parts of the Torah); 6. Reward and Punishment. As to the other articles of
Maimonides, Viterbo, in opposition to other half‐hearted Anti‐Maimonists,
declares that the man who denies them is _not_ to be considered as a
heretic; though he ought to believe them.(139)
I have now arrived at the limit I set to myself at the beginning of this
essay. For, between the times of Viterbo and those of Mendelssohn, there
is hardly to be found any serious opposition to Maimonides worth noticing
here. Still I must mention the name of R. Saul Berlin (died 1794); there
is much in his opinions on dogmas which will help us the better to
understand the Thirteen Articles of Maimonides. As the reader has seen, I
have refrained so far from reproducing here the apologies which were made
by many Maimonists in behalf of the Thirteen Articles. For, after all
their elaborate pleas, none of them was able to clear Maimonides of the
charge of having confounded dogmas or fundamental teachings with
doctrines. It is also true that the Fifth Article—that prayer and worship
must only be offered to God—cannot be considered even as a doctrine, but
as a simple precept. And there are other difficulties which all the
distinctions of the Maimonists will never be able to solve. The only
possible justification is, I think, that suggested by a remark of R. Saul.
This author, who was himself—like his friend and older contemporary
Mendelssohn—a strong Anti‐Maimonist, among other remarks, maintains that
dogmas must never be laid down but with regard to the necessities of the
time.(140)
Now R. Saul certainly did not doubt that Judaism is based on eternal
truths which can in no way be shaken by new modes of thinking or changed
circumstances. What he meant was that there are in every age certain
beliefs which ought to be asserted more emphatically than others, without
regard to their theological or rather logical importance. It is by this
maxim that we shall be able to explain the articles of Maimonides. He
asserted them, because they were necessary for his time.
We know, for instance, from a letter of his son and from other
contemporaries, that it was just at his time that the belief in the
incorporeality of God was, in the opinion of Maimonides, a little relaxed.
Maimonides, who thought such low notions of the Deity dangerous to
Judaism, therefore laid down an article against them. He tells us in his
_Guide_ that it was far from him to condemn any one who was not able to
demonstrate the Incorporeality of God, but he stigmatised as a heretic one
who refused to believe it. This position might be paralleled by that of a
modern astronomer who, while considering it unreasonable to expect a
mathematical demonstration of the movements of the earth from an ordinary
unscientific man, would yet regard the person who refused to believe in
such movements as an ignorant faddist.
Again, Maimonides undoubtedly knew that there may be found in the
Talmud—that bottomless sea with its innumerable undercurrents—passages
that are not quite in harmony with his articles; for instance, the well‐
known dictum of R. Hillel, who said, there is no Messiah for Israel—a
passage which has already been quoted _ad nauseam_ by every opponent of
Maimonides from the earliest times down to the year of grace 1896.
Maimonides was well aware of the existence of this and similar passages.
But, being deeply convinced of the necessity of the belief in a future
redemption of _Israel_—in opposition to other creeds which claim this
redemption exclusively for their own adherents—Maimonides simply ignored
the saying of R. Hillel, as an isolated opinion which contradicts all the
consciousness and traditions of the Jew as expressed in thousands of other
passages, and especially in the liturgy. Most interesting is Maimonides’
view about such isolated opinions in a letter to the wise men of
Marseilles. He deals there with the question of free will and other
theological subjects. After having stated his own view he goes on to say:
“I know that it is possible to find in the Talmud or in the Midrash this
or that saying in contradiction to the views you have heard from me. But
you must not be troubled by them. One must not refuse to accept a
doctrine, the truth of which has been proved, on account of its being in
opposition to some isolated opinion held by this or that great authority.
Is it not possible that he overlooked some important considerations when
he uttered this strange opinion? It is also possible that his words must
not be taken literally, and have to be explained in an allegorical way. We
can also think that his words were only to be applied with regard to
certain circumstances of his time, but never intended as permanent
truths.... No man must surrender his private judgment. The eyes are not
directed backwards but forwards.” In another place Maimonides calls the
suppression of one’s own opinions—for the reason of their being
irreconcilable with the isolated views of some great authority—a moral
suicide.
By such motives Maimonides was guided when he left certain views hazarded
in the Rabbinic literature unheeded, and followed what we may perhaps call
the religious instinct, trusting to his own conscience. We may again be
certain that Maimonides was clear‐headed enough to see that the words of
the Torah: “And there arose no prophet since in Israel like unto Moses”
(Deut. xxxiv. 10), were as little intended to imply a doctrine as the
passage relating to the king Josiah, “And like unto him was there no king
before him that turned to the Lord with all his heart ... neither after
him arose there any like him” (2 Kings xxiii. 25). And none would think of
declaring the man a heretic who should believe another king to be as pious
as Josiah. But living among followers of the “imitating creeds” (as he
calls Christianity and Mohammedism), who claimed that their religion had
superseded the law of Moses, Maimonides, consciously or unconsciously,
felt himself compelled to assert the superiority of the prophecy of Moses.
And so we may guess that every article of Maimonides which seems to offer
difficulties to us contains an assertion of some relaxed belief, or a
protest against the pretensions of other creeds, though we are not always
able to discover the exact necessity for them. On the other hand,
Maimonides did not assert the belief in free will, for which he argued so
earnestly in his _Guide_. The common “man,” with his simple unspeculative
mind, for whom these Thirteen Articles were intended, “never dreamed that
the will was not free,” and there was no necessity of impressing on his
mind things which he had never doubted.(141)
So much about Maimonides. As to the Anti‐Maimonists, it could hardly
escape the reader that in some of the quoted systems the difference from
the view of Maimonides is only a logical one, not a theological. Of some
authors again, especially those of the thirteenth and fourteenth
centuries, it is not at all certain whether they intended to oppose
Maimonides. Others again, as for instance R. Abba Mari, R. Lipman, and R.
Joseph Jabez, acted on the same principle as Maimonides, urging only those
teachings of Judaism which they thought endangered. One could now, indeed,
animated by the praiseworthy example given to us by Maimonides, also
propose some articles of faith which are suggested to us by the
necessities of our own time. One might, for instance, insert the article,
“I believe that Judaism is, in the first instance, a divine religion,
_not_ a mere complex of racial peculiarities and tribal customs.” One
might again propose an article to the effect that Judaism is a
proselytising religion, having the mission to bring about God’s kingdom on
earth, and to include in that kingdom all mankind. One might also submit
for consideration whether it would not be advisable to urge a little more
the principle that religion means chiefly a _Weltanschauung_ and worship
of God by means of holiness both in thought and in action. One would even
not object to accept the article laid down by R. Saul, that we have to
look upon ourselves as sinners. Morbid as such a belief may be, it would,
if properly impressed on our mind, have perhaps the wholesome effect of
cooling down a little our self‐importance and our mutual admiration that
makes all progress among us almost impossible.
But it was not my purpose to ventilate here the question whether
Maimonides’ articles are sufficient for us, or whether we ought not to add
new ones to them. Nor do I attempt to decide what system we ought to
prefer for recitation in the Synagogue—that of Maimonides or that of
Chasdai, or of any other writer. I do not think that such a recital is of
much use. My object in this sketch has been rather to make the reader
_think_ about Judaism, by proving that it regulates not only our actions,
but also our thoughts. We usually urge that in Judaism religion means
life; but we forget that a life without guiding principles and thoughts is
a life not worth living. At least it was so considered by the greatest
Jewish thinkers, and hence their efforts to formulate the creed of
Judaism, so that men should not only be able to do the right thing, but
also to think the right thing. Whether they succeeded in their attempts
towards formulating the creed of Judaism or not will always remain a
question. This concerns the logician more than the theologian. But surely
Maimonides and his successors _did_ succeed in having a religion depending
directly on God, with the most ideal and lofty aspirations for the future;
whilst the Judaism of a great part of our modern theologians reminds one
very much of the words with which the author of _Marius the Epicurean_
characterises the Roman religion in the days of her decline: a religion
which had been always something to be done rather than something to be
thought, or believed, or loved.
Political economy, hygiene, statistics, are very fine things. But no sane
man would for them make those sacrifices which Judaism requires from us.
It is only for God’s sake, to fulfil His commands and to accomplish His
purpose, that religion becomes worth living and dying for. And this can
only be possible with a religion which possesses dogmas.
It is true that every great religion is “a concentration of many ideas and
ideals,” which make this religion able to adapt itself to various modes of
thinking and living. But there must always be a point round which all
these ideas concentrate themselves. This centre is Dogma.
VII. THE HISTORY OF JEWISH TRADITION
There is an anecdote about a famous theologian to the effect that he used
to tell his pupils, “Should I ever grow old and weak—which usually drives
people to embrace the safer side—and alter my opinions, then pray do not
believe me.” The concluding volume of Weiss’s _History of Jewish
Tradition_(142) shows that there was no need for our author to warn his
pupils against the dangers accompanying old age. For though Weiss had,
when he began to write this last volume, already exceeded his three‐score
and ten, and, as we read in the preface, had some misgivings as to whether
he should continue his work, there is no trace in it of any abatement of
the great powers of the author. It is marked by the same freshness in
diction, the same marvellous scholarship, the same display of astonishing
critical powers, and the same impartial and straightforward way of judging
persons and things, for which the preceding volumes were so much
distinguished and admired.
This book, which is recognised as a standard work abroad, is, I fear,
owing to the fact of its being written in the Hebrew language, not
sufficiently known in this country. Weiss does not want _our_ recognition;
we are rather in need of his instruction. Some general view of his
estimate of Jewish Tradition may, therefore, be of service to the student.
It is, indeed, the only work of its kind. Zunz has confined himself to the
history of the Agadah. Graetz gave most of his attention to the political
side of Jewish history. But comparatively little has been done for the
Halachah, though Frankel, Geiger, Herzfeld, and others have treated some
single points in various monographs. Thus it was left for Weiss to write
the _History of Tradition_, which includes both the Agadah and the
Halachah. The treatment of this latter must have proved, in consequence of
the intricate and intractable nature of its materials, by far the more
difficult portion of his task.