Position of Italy--German Intrigues--the Triple Alliance--Turkey's
Activity--Plans for Attacking Egypt--A British Warning.
THE war had hardly begun before Italy officially announced her
intention of remaining neutral. From German sources rumours were
circulated to the effect that dissension had arisen in the Italian
Cabinet between Signor Salandra (the Prime Minister) and the Marchese
di San Giuliano (the Foreign Minister). These rumours, however, proved
to be unfounded, and certainly the Italian Government presented
not only a correct attitude but a united front both to the Triple
Entente and to her partners in the Triple Alliance. It may be briefly
mentioned why Italy, although nominally one of the members of the
Triplice--Germany, Austria and Italy--should nevertheless have chosen
to remain inactive while her nominal allies were engaged in fighting
Servia, Russia, France, England, Belgium, and Montenegro.
After her defeat by Germany in 1870, France found herself for a long
time unable to exercise any great influence over European politics.
Indeed, the first administrators of the Third Republic were encouraged,
or rather compelled, by Bismarck to seek an outlet for their
superfluous energies in other parts of the world; and it is from the
conclusion of the Franco-German War that we may date the real beginning
of the French colonial empire. The remarkable success of the French
efforts in Algiers, Tunis, and other parts of Northern and Central
Africa aroused the jealousy of the Germans very early in the present
century; but two decades previously Italy had become exasperated by
the French invasion and absorption of Tunis, which gave to France not
merely a very strong position in the Mediterranean but the use of many
safe harbours.
Eager to seize the advantage of having a powerful ally in the
Mediterranean, Germany and Austria, who had just previously entered
into a dual alliance, made overtures to Italy, and the dual became
a Triple Alliance in 1883. The measure was merely a political one.
It benefited none of the parties to it economically; and Italy, by
invading Tripoli in 1911, withdrew from it by that very act. It was, of
course, obvious that such a step on the part of Italy rendered her in
some measure dependent upon the French goodwill. Apart from this fact,
the alliance had never been popular among the Italian people, who had
no very great affection for Germans and intensely disliked Austrians.
Memories of the Austrian onslaught of 1866 were still very strong when
the alliance was formed; and they are almost as strong to-day. There is
still a powerful political group in Italy known as the Irredentists;
and it may be said that at a time of political crisis, especially when
Austria and Germany are involved, the whole nation becomes irredentist.
The party takes its name from those fairly considerable sections of
what was once Italian territory and where Italian is still spoken, but
which are now in the possession of other Powers. These territories,
known as _Italia Irredenta_ ("Unredeemed Italy") include the Southern
Tyrol (the "Trentino") Görz, Trieste, Istria, and Dalmatia; and also
the Swiss Canton of Tessin (Ticino), Nice, Corsica and Malta.
The Italian expedition to Tripoli in 1911 caused intense
dissatisfaction, which was but ill-concealed, in Germany and Austria.
Both the Teutonic countries in the partnership objected to their
nominal ally increasing her power in the Mediterranean--Germany because
such an action would "lock up" many thousands of Italian troops in
Tripoli who might be wanted elsewhere, and Austria because she feared
that such a movement might indicate a desire on the part of the
Italian people to expand in yet other directions. Although some of the
so-called Italia Irredenta is held by England and some by France, the
animosity of the Irredentists, as of the Italian nation as a whole,
is directed exclusively against Austria, and in recent years cordial
relations have sprung up between Italy and France. Between Italy and
England, of course, relations have always been friendly, and not least
so since the days of Garibaldi. The enthusiastic demonstrations held
by the Italians in London and Paris after the declaration of war to
show their sympathy with the Allies was a striking manifestation of the
trend of Italian feeling generally.
Further, there were at least two other reasons why Italy showed no
willingness to help her partners in the war. When the Italian army
was taking possession of Tripoli coast line under the protection of
the Italian fleet, the Austrian Government, under various pretexts,
concentrated large masses of troops in the direction of the Italian
frontier. Nothing came of this move, but it caused great resentment in
Italy at the time. Again, when the first Balkan War came to an end,
an acute European crisis arose over the possession of Albania. In
this westernmost possession of Turkey, Austrian and Italian interests
predominated, and Russia's attempt to secure a pathway to the sea for
Servia were ineffectual. After much argument it was finally resolved
that Albania should be proclaimed an independent state, and after a
long search a Teutonic nobleman, the Prince of Wied, was found willing
to assume the crown.
As is well known, Albania from the very first was in a turbulent
condition, and various causes rendered the tenure of the Prince of
Wied's kingship highly uncertain. In the first place, the century-old
jealousy among the ruling chiefs made it difficult to form a cabinet on
the western model; and in the second place the Greeks felt that they
had a right to the Epirus--that province of uncertain boundaries lying
to the north of Greece and to the south of Albania and inhabited by
people of an unmistakable Greek stamp known as the Epirotes. As soon
as the independence of Albania was announced, the Epirotes, under one
of their best known public men, M. Zographos, rose in revolt, and for
several months carried on an intermittent warfare against the newly
constituted Albanian Government.
It was openly asserted in the Austrian Press that the Epirotes were
being aided by Greece, who wished to recover the province; but there
was another group who held that the insurgents were deriving their
assistance from Italy, who wished by this means to destroy the
authority of the Austrians in the northern part of Albania. Italian
interests in Albania, as had always been emphasised, converged on the
important harbour known as Vallona Bay, which lies almost directly
opposite Brindisi. After the outbreak of the present war, this group
strongly urged that Italy was merely holding back for the time being
in order that she might at a subsequent date make a raid on this
part of Albania and annex the territory she desired. The importance
of Vallona Bay will be shown by a glance at the map. Austria's only
exit to the open sea lies through the Straits of Otranto, which are
about forty-five miles wide at the narrowest points, viz: Otranto
on the Italian side and Cape Glossa at the mouth of Vallona Bay on
the opposite side. It is obvious that if Italy had both these points
strongly fortified, it would be practically impossible for an Austrian
fleet to pass through.
Whatever Italy's ultimate designs may be--and they are not clear at the
time of writing--the fact remains that down to the middle of September,
she had taken no steps in the direction of swerving from the neutrality
which she had proclaimed at the beginning of the war.
Throughout August various hints were given as to what Italy might lose
by not joining her Allies and what she might gain if she did join them.
It soon became evident, however, even to the German Press, that Italy,
whatever she did, would certainly not come into the firing line with
Germany and Austria; and from about the middle of August onwards the
inspired German Press confined itself to expressing the hope that their
partner's Government would not at least join the other side. On August
14th, for example, the _Vossische Zeitung_ said: "After several years
of alliance the very minimum that Germany can demand from Italy is a
neutrality, not half-hearted, but having Germany's real welfare in
view." This was the tone adopted by the other semi-official organs of
the Government about this time.
This change of tone in the German Press, which at first seemed to take
it for granted that Italy would join her Allies enthusiastically, must
have been due either to forgetfulness or to an entire misconception
of the Italian nation. If, to take an inconceivable hypothesis, the
Italian Government had wished to go to war on behalf of Germany against
the wishes of the Italian people, and if, further, Italy, like Germany,
had been composed of a powerful ruling caste and a well-drilled
population, no doubt the Italian army would have invaded France. Unlike
Germany, however, Italy is composed of peoples whose nature are of a
more independent character, and whose form of government is entirely
different.
As soon as war broke out, it was clear that the sympathies of the
Italian people were wholly on the side of England, France, and Russia,
and that it was the wish of the people, if it became necessary to draw
the sword, to wield it in such a way as to recover Italia Irredenta,
which happened to be under Austrian rule.
It should be remarked that Italy's obligations under her treaty of
alliance with Germany and Austria did not compel her to take part in
any war unless the war were a purely defensive one; and the Government
at Rome made it clear from the first that it regarded the action of
Austria towards Servia, and the action of Germany towards France and
Belgium, as aggressive.
In spite of reiterated assurances of neutrality, it was persistently
rumoured, particularly in Paris, that Italy would declare war on
Austria at almost any moment. Although no general mobilisation
order was issued at Rome, it was understood that several classes of
reservists had been called up. It was indeed felt that any action which
Italy might take ought to be taken soon. Well-known military and naval
experts, such as Admiral Mahan, expressed the view that Italy "would do
well to make her strength felt early."
On August 29th an incident was reported which seemed to show that the
decisive step might come at any time. On the previous day information
was received at Malta to the effect that Herr von Bitzow, who had
been acting as German Consul at Tripoli, had been carrying on an
anti-Italian propaganda among the natives; and it was even alleged that
he had issued a secret manifesto urging them to make demonstrations.
The Italian Government, with more than its usual promptitude, had
the offending Consul arrested and removed to Italy, at the same time
lodging a protest with the German Foreign Office. No more was heard of
this incident at the time; but, as may easily be imagined if it had
occurred at any other juncture it would have brought about an acute
crisis within the radius of the Triple Alliance.
How the situation was developed was made clear from a long statement
sent to London, by a circuitous route, by the Rome correspondent
of _The Daily Telegraph_, and published on September 5th. He said
that the Italian fleet was fully mobilised, and was ready for all
eventualities. The battle fleet was concentrated at Taranto, under the
able and energetic command of the Duke of the Abruzzi. No decree had
been issued for the complete mobilisation of the army; but six classes
of reservists had been called out. The calling out of fifteen classes
would be tantamount to a general mobilisation. Very careful and very
thorough preparations were being made. Troops were being slowly and
methodically concentrated on the Austrian frontier. Those stationed
on the French frontier, except the ordinary peace garrisons and
depôt troops, had already been transferred. Any idea of Italy acting
against France was out of the question; but these preparations did not
necessarily mean war with Austria.
The Italian Government, clearly enough, was fully alive to the
situation. Italy wished to bide her time till the psychological moment
arrived. That moment had not yet arrived. In any case, the Government
was anxious not to precipitate events until after the Conclave electing
the new Pope had finished its labours.
All sailings of the Veloce transatlantic liners were suspended at this
time. This was regarded as significant, as transports would not be
needed unless Italy were contemplating landing troops either in Albania
or on Austrian soil.
* * * * *
The correspondent added:
If Italy goes to war with Austria it will be a popular war. The
Government knows well that if Germany and Austria win they will bear
as great a grudge against Italy for remaining neutral as they would if
she threw in her lot against them. It is most important, therefore,
that Italy should see to it that Germany and Austria do not win. If,
on the other hand, the Triple Entente and their allies win, all Italy
can hope for on the conclusion of hostilities is the cession of Trent
and the protectorate of Central Albania, with Valona as a reward for
her neutrality. Whereas if Italy threw in her lot against Germany and
Austria she could hope to recover Trieste and to establish a sound
military reputation into the bargain. Moreover, if Italy remains
neutral she is likely to experience before long grave economic and
social unrest. Italy is very hardly hit by the war. There is a great
deal of unemployment. All this would be forgotten if she went to war;
and although the problems would recur after the peace, there is much
to be said for putting off the evil hour till after the new settlement.
All these facts point to the conclusion that Italy will eventually
go to war with Austria. But the moment has not arrived yet. She will
have no difficulty in finding a pretext. She may find one in Albania,
or in the treatment of Italians in Trieste. The Government may plead
the irresistible pressure of public opinion. There is no need for
Italy to feel any shame at turning against her old allies, as there is
no disguising the fact that she had remained a member of the Triple
Alliance for purely time-serving purposes. When she does act, she will
act with vigour.
The Marchese di San Giuliano has been for some time in very poor
health. He is better again now, and is back in Rome. Among a certain
section of the public and of the Press he has been called upon to
resign. A more decisive and clearer policy is demanded. But, as a
matter of fact, he is likely to remain at his post, as it is felt
that there is no man able to fill it of his experience and capacity.
The country as a whole has confidence in him. The same may be said of
the Prime Minister, Signor Salandra. Since he has been at the head of
affairs he has made something of a reputation, and he is known to be
a sound economist. The financial position of Italy is not rosy, but
there is every reason to hope that the critical period through which
she is now passing will be successfully negotiated. Her entry into the
war would not materially augment her difficulties on this score.
* * * * *
Hardly less important than the German negotiations with Italy--first,
with regard to participation, and, secondly, with regard to
neutrality--were the German negotiations with Turkey. It will be
recalled that Germany has for nearly two generations had considerable
interests in the Turkish Army, both in Europe and in Asia; and it was
to a German officer, General von der Goltz Pasha, that the Ottoman
Army owed such organisation as it had when Turkey was invaded by the
troops of the Balkan League in 1912. On the retirement of General von
der Goltz, the Turks asked for further military "advice" and assistance
from Berlin, and in reply to their request the German Government "lent"
them another experienced officer, General Liman von Sanders (whom
several North and South American papers confused with General Leman,
the defender of Liège). It was commented upon at the time as curious
that when General Liman von Sanders took up his appointment a year or
so ago, he brought with him 200 German colonels as assistants, whom he
placed at the head of Turkish regiments, together with several officers
of lesser rank. The Turkish Army thus became, for all practical
purposes, a German war machine, led by Germans, officered by Germans,
supplied with German rifles, ammunition and artillery, and liable to
march when the word of command was given to the Turkish Government by a
German diplomatist.
Europe was astonished to learn early in August that Turkey had decided
to mobilise. As the result of an energetic protest by the British and
French Ambassadors at Constantinople, it was explained that the measure
was purely precautionary, and that the Porte did not intend to take
any active steps. There the matter was left for a day or two, when the
incident of the _Goeben_ and _Breslau_ occurred. The former was one
of Germany's largest cruisers, and the latter a smaller one of less
importance. Both these vessels, in company with a third, had spent a
few days after the opening of the war in bombarding undefended towns
in Algiers and Tunis. A combined French and English squadron gave
chase, and the result was that a German cruiser was sunk. In spite of
the efforts of the pursuers, the _Goeben_ and the _Breslau_ escaped,
first of all to Italian waters, and then after a short pause to the
Dardanelles.
As Turkey was a neutral country, international law required that the
two cruisers should be either dismantled or sent away. Neither of
these courses was adopted. Instead it was announced that the Turkish
Government had decided to buy the _Goeben_--the _Breslau_ was not
mentioned, but was presumed to be included in the purchase--in view of
the fact that two battleships which had been in process of completion
for Turkey in British dockyards, had been seized by our Admiralty
for possible use against Germany. Turkey complained that this would
alter the balance of naval power as between herself and Greece, to the
advantage of the latter.
Even legal experts were at variance as to whether Turkey was justified
as a neutral country in purchasing the warships of a belligerent.
Politically speaking, this was a matter of small consequence.
Diplomatists, knowing the close relations existing between Turkey and
Germany, were inclined rather to ask whether this alleged purchase was
not merely an excuse for assuring the safety of an expensive warship,
which would certainly have been sunk either by a French or by a British
squadron on emerging from the Dardanelles. Up to the time of going to
press that question has not been satisfactorily answered.
The Constantinople Correspondent of _The Daily Telegraph_ reported that
just before he left Constantinople on August 4th, the Germans there
spread all kinds of wild rumours which were given the imprint of their
Embassy--such, for example, as that M. Poincaré had been assassinated,
that civil war had broken out in France, that the Germans had entered
Belgium triumphantly, and that their arrival in Paris was imminent.
Moreover, the German and Austrian diplomatists told Turkey confidently
that the German and Austrian armies would very soon be both in Paris
and Warsaw. They held out to the Turks various alluring propositions,
such as the suppression of the capitulations, the crushing of the
Russian "Colossus," and so on, in order to induce the Turks not to
proclaim their neutrality, but rather to adopt a hostile attitude
towards Russia and consequently to the Triple Entente. In face of the
superhuman efforts made by the German and Austrian agents the diplomacy
of the Triple Entente remained inactive.
The German military mission under General Liman von Sanders, on its
side, commenced an agitation parallel with that of Austro-German
diplomacy among the Turkish officers, most of whom had received their
training and education in Germany. However, the Grand Vizier, Djavid
Bey, Talaat Bey, and Djemal Pasha, but not Enver Pasha, struggled
to secure in the Council of Ministers the triumph of the policy of
strictest neutrality, persuaded that for Turkey it was preferable to
maintain an attitude of prudent expectation and not to enter into
any engagement. Experience had shown them that their Balkan enemies,
for the moment divided among themselves, would probably end by
reconstituting their alliance and falling on the Turks, and agreeing
among themselves as to the partition of Turkey in Europe. These
considerations prevailed, and the Ottoman Government proclaimed strict
neutrality, while taking all military and naval precautions which
events dictated. This was solemnly declared by Talaat Bey and Djavid
Bey in Parliament on Sunday, August 2nd.
By August 31st, however, the situation had again become grave. It
was stated that Turkey might declare war at any moment--it was only
a matter of a few days, and it might be less. All the efforts of the
Powers of the Triple Entente had failed, and the situation at the
Turkish Embassy in London was admitted to be extremely grave. The
arrival of the _Panther_ at Smyrna was thought to be the concluding
incident in Turkey's preparations, as it was understood that the
vessel, like the _Goeben_ and _Breslau_, was to be bought by Turkey.
The military party at Constantinople, headed by Enver Pasha, was now
practically dominant, and it was declared that if the Grand Vizier
raised objections he would be replaced. This party had come to the
conclusion, in which it was carefully supported by Germany, that the
time was ripe for throwing its full fighting force into the balance
and securing the restoration of Macedonia--at any rate of the whole
Salonika district, as well as the islands which were conquered by
Greece in the war.
German officers and men in large numbers were now pouring into
Constantinople to help the Turkish army and navy in the coming
campaign. Germany was practically taking over the control of the fleet
as well as of the army, and it was thought that Turkey would thus be
able to meet the Greek navy on the open sea. Turkey, too, apparently
counted on the fact that if she declared war the Balkan States would
quarrel among themselves. On the contrary, it was held in Triple
Entente circles that the Balkan Alliance against her, which had been so
successful in the first war, would be once again called into existence.
Moreover, the intervention of Turkey into the sphere of hostilities,
although nominally directed against Greece only, would have been
regarded as a declaration of war by the Powers of the Triple Entente.
They would have lent the Balkan Powers the support of their fleets in
the Mediterranean, in which case they would soon have disposed of all
the Turkish and German ships.
The British Government was fully aware, as were all the other Allies,
of the gravity of the situation, and of the fact that attempts would be
made to create trouble in Egypt, in India, and elsewhere. They warned
Turkey that in starting on any such campaign she would be signing her
own death-warrant.
The suggestion that an attempt would be made to stir up an insurrection
in Egypt was certainly plausible, though it may be pointed out that the
German diplomatists at the same time made another suggestion which, if
carried out, would have been equally effective or ineffective. Although
England is practically mistress of Egypt, Egypt is nevertheless in all
strictness not British territory, but Turkish territory, administered
by British officials. It might, therefore, have been argued with some
show of reasonableness that any movement of troops against Egypt on the
part of Turkey could not be construed by us in an unfriendly sense, as
Turkey would, after all, merely be moving troops from one part of her
own territories to another.
The second German suggestion was that the Turkish Army Corps at Bagdad
might be moved towards the Persian Gulf with the object of quelling the
risings in the neighbourhood of Koweit, which is in an almost perpetual
state of unrest. It happens that the Persian Gulf has always admittedly
been an English sphere of influence, and that the small Province of
Koweit, governed by a Sheik, was not unconnected with the proposed
termination of the Bagdad Railway. The status of the Sheik of Koweit
has always been obscure and was supposed to have been "regulated" by
the Anglo-Turkish agreement, the details of which were under discussion
when war broke out. It might conceivably be urged that here again
Turkey could move masses of troops to another part of her own territory
and thus strike indirectly on Great Britain.
In reply to these statements and the dishonourable implications which
they conveyed, both the Turkish Ambassadors in London and Paris and the
Turkish Department for Foreign Affairs at Constantinople gave explicit
assurances that Turkey would not take any step inconsistent with her
neutrality. It must be remembered that ever since the revolution in
1908, Turkey had received very little practical assistance from
Germany, apart from the tinkering with her army. The best advisory
officials and all the money were supplied to the Ottoman Government
by France and Great Britain. Further, it was believed that, even in
the face of German bribes and threats, Turkey would hold back if only
out of regard for the stability of her rather precarious empire of
Thrace in Asia Minor. In view of a possible Turkish participation in
the war, Russia had taken the precautionary measure of massing, it was
said, more than half a million troops on the Turkish frontier; and if
the Turks had intervened on behalf of Germany, it was believed that
Roumania and Greece would take the field on behalf of England, France,
and Russia. The position of Bulgaria was fully realised to be more
doubtful, as out of all the countries constituting the Balkan League,
Bulgaria had profited least as the result of the campaign in 1912-13;
and she had vainly appealed for some kind of "compensation" to both
groups of the Great Powers.
On September 4th, Roumania, it was announced for the first time,
had joined the Great Powers in warning Turkey that a breach of her
neutrality would be fraught with disastrous consequences to the
Ottoman Empire. In view of the questions at issue between Turkey and
Greece, delegates met at the Roumanian capital, Bucharest, to discuss
matters. On September 6th, however, the Ambassadors representing
France, England, and Russia at Constantinople deemed it advisable once
more to warn the Austrian Government, and it was stated that many
European families in Constantinople were beginning to leave the city,
as it seemed probable that war was about to be declared. It was clear
from the diplomatic intelligence which came through that the Turkish
Government had itself decided for neutrality, but was being swayed in
its decision by the German Ambassador at Constantinople, Baron von
Wanggenheim.
It need hardly be added that during this period of grave tension,
German Press agents were busy in the Balkans generally. Extraordinary
reports were sent to the newspapers in Athens, Sofia, and Bucharest,
with the customary object of showing that Germany was winning in every
direction and would eventually be the strongest Power in Europe. The
German Minister in Athens declared at the end of August that no German
port had been blockaded by the British Fleet, and that the North Sea
was still open for German commerce.