THE LAST OF YPRES.
(_a_) May, 1918.
For nearly a month the Battalion was out of the line, and most of
this time was spent at Road Camp, St. Jans ter Biezen. At first the
accommodation was adequate, but, towards the end of May, the huts were
becoming very crowded. This was due to the arrival of new drafts,
and the return of a number of lightly wounded men. By the time the
Battalion went into the line again nearly 200 had joined. Many of these
were young soldiers, who had been hurriedly despatched from England to
make good the very heavy losses suffered during the enemy’s violent
attacks in March and April. They were splendid material and quickly
developed into fine soldiers. A large draft of officers also arrived
towards the end of April. Here, too, Sergt. A. Loosemore, V.C., joined
the Battalion.
The first days were spent almost entirely in reorganisation. This was
very necessary after the enormous casualties of the last few weeks. But
the organisation of the Battalion had never broken down, and there was
a solid framework on which to build. New officers and men were quickly
assimilated; new specialists were trained. Long before the rest period
came to an end, the Battalion was almost as efficient a fighting unit
as it had been at the beginning of April.
On May 14th the 147th Infantry Brigade moved by bus to St. Martin au
Laert for four days’ shooting. Tents were pitched about a mile from the
town, and, as the weather was gloriously fine, a very enjoyable time
was spent there. St. Omer was within easy walking distance of the camp,
and the rather unusual experience of having a large town near at hand
was thoroughly enjoyed. Enemy bombing planes were common at night, but
they restricted their activities mainly to Arques, and never troubled
the camp.
Soon after its return to Road Camp, the Brigade moved to Penton Camp,
near Proven, for four days’ work on the East Poperinghe Line. At
this time an immense amount of labour and material was being used in
the construction of defences between Ypres and Poperinghe. Everyone
expected that the enemy would make a further attack in that direction,
and no less than four defensive systems were in course of construction
or improvement between the two towns. The East Poperinghe Line was the
most westerly of these systems. A definite sector was allotted to each
battalion, and every available man was sent to work on it. Parties
paraded early in the morning and were taken up to the work by light
railway trains. They did not return until late in the afternoon, so
there was not much time for recreation. At Proven, officers met an old
friend. Francois, well known to most officers who have seen much of
Poperinghe, had transferred his restaurant business to Proven, when the
German advance made Poperinghe too warm. As always, dinner at Francois’
was very popular.
The Battalion returned to Road Camp on May 26th, and another week
was spent there. At the end of May Lieut.-Col. R. E. Sugden, D.S.O.,
went on leave. He had scarcely arrived in England when an urgent wire
recalled him, to take command of the 151st Infantry Brigade, 50th
Division. He had no time to return to the Battalion, but went straight
down to the neighbourhood of the Marne, where his Brigade awaited him.
Everyone was delighted to hear of his promotion, for it was looked
upon as an honour to the Battalion--few Territorial officers attained
such high rank during the war. Another source of great satisfaction to
everyone was that Major A. L. Mowat, M.C., was appointed to the command
of the Battalion; few had seen more service with it, and none had done
more for its good than he.
While at St. Jans ter Biezen, permission was given for a photograph to
be taken of all the “old originals” still serving with the Battalion.
Four officers and 114 other ranks were included in the group. This
should have been done on April 14th--the anniversary of the Battalion’s
landing in France. But circumstances over which the Battalion had
little control--the battle of Steam Mill was fought on that day--had
prevented any celebrations.
(_b_) Zillebeke Sector.
When the enemy broke through to the south of Armentiéres, and, still
more, when he captured the Messines Ridge, the situation of the British
troops in the Ypres Salient became very critical. Their whole right
flank was laid bare, and they were in imminent danger of being cut off.
The whole line was therefore withdrawn to a position a little in front
of Ypres. With the exception of the Pilkem Ridge, all the ground gained
in the terrific fighting of 1917 was thus given up. Indeed, astride and
south of the Menin Road, the line was further back than it had been in
1915.
Early in June the 49th Division took over the line, from a point a
little north of the Zonnebeke Road, to Zillebeke Lake. This line was
divided into two brigade sectors, the third brigade being in divisional
reserve. Thus brigades had sixteen days in the front line and eight
days in rest. Each brigade had two battalions in the front line so
that, now there were only three battalions to a brigade, one battalion
had to do a continuous tour of sixteen days.
On the afternoon of June 3rd the Battalion moved by light railway
to near Vlamertinghe Chateau, where it detrained. As soon as it was
getting dusk, the men marched off to carry out the relief. That
night the enemy artillery was extremely active; in fact, it was the
“liveliest” night the Battalion had near Ypres the whole summer. Rome
Farm was being very heavily shelled as the men went past towards the
Menin Road, and when they reached Kruisstraat they passed into an area
thick with mustard gas. A heavy bombardment of Warrington Road and the
vicinity of the Lille Gate, with 8-inch gas shells, was in progress.
This greatly hampered the relief, as respirators had to be worn for
considerable distances; but, luckily, the Battalion got in with
practically no casualties.
The front line was about a line in length and was held by three
companies, disposed as follows:--
Right: B Company, from Zillebeke Lake to the Warrington Road.
Only one platoon occupied the front line posts, the remainder
living in the dugouts along the western edge of the Lake.
Centre: D Company, from the Warrington Road to a point
north-west of Moated Grange.
Left: A Company, from the flank of D Company to the
Ypres-Roulers Railway, about 300 yards west of Hellfire Corner.
C Company was in reserve in a line about 500 yards in rear of the front
line.
Battalion H.Q. was in the Ramparts of Ypres, not far from the Lille
Gate. Never had such a commodious place been occupied before. When
preparations were in progress for the Third Battle of Ypres in 1917,
two divisional H.Q. had been constructed in the Ramparts, one near
the Lille Gate and one near the Menin Gate. Now that the line had
been withdrawn so far, these had come into use for battalions. There
were rooms and to spare, lit up with electric light and comfortably
furnished. Every H.Q. officer had his separate room, and there were
also a fine large mess and a good office.
The front line was not very satisfactory. On the left it was continuous
and good, but on the right posts were completely isolated. It was
fortunate too that the weather was fine, for the ground was very low
and would quickly have become water-logged. The dugouts on the west
side of Zillebeke Lake provided any amount of good accommodation for B
Company, but the other companies were not nearly so well off in that
respect. The reserve line occupied by C Company was also inferior.
When the Battalion took over the line there were no communication
trenches, and all movement was across the open. The outgoing unit--the
15th Battalion King’s Royal Rifle Corps--stated that no movement in
the open was advisable by day as enemy sniping was very accurate. This
did not suit the Battalion at all, and, right from the start, officers
began to make the usual tours of inspection. At first these were
carried out with extreme care, all movement being done by crawling; but
soon it was found that the enemy was very inactive, and, even before
communication trenches were dug, movement in ones and twos became
general.
[Illustration: Capt. H. H. AYKROYD, M.C.]
[Illustration: Capt. W. N. BROOMHEAD, T.D.]
[Illustration: Capt. W. GRANTHAM.
(Died of Wounds).]
[Illustration: Capt. S. BALME.]
The sector turned out to be a very quiet one. The 1st Landwehr
Division was holding the line opposite, and these troops were of poor
discipline and low morale. If left alone they remained very quiet, and
there was little machine gun or rifle fire. The enemy artillery was
rarely active. Nothing approaching the bombardment, which had taken
place on the night of June 3rd/4th, ever occurred again. The chief
feature of the artillery fire was the use of Blue Cross gas shells,
which caused violent sneezing but were practically harmless.
From the Ramparts good observation could be obtained of much of the
area occupied by the enemy. It was very tantalising to see Germans
moving about in the neighbourhood of Kit and Kat Post, upon which A and
B Companies had expended so much labour the previous January. All this
ground, which was under observation, was well known to the Battalion,
from its experiences of the previous winter. Very little movement was
observed near the front line.
No Man’s Land was covered with thick grass and was ideal for
patrolling, either by night or day. In this department there was great
activity. It was not that identifications were needed, for these were
well known; but the more activity the Battalion could display, the less
likely the enemy would be to weaken the front. Before long, the whole
of No Man’s Land, to a depth of several hundred yards, was well known.
Several patrols were seriously interfered with by Blue Cross gas.
The first tour was not without excitement. On the night of June
10/11th a strong patrol, consisting of two officers (Sec.-Lieut. F.
Woodward and Sec.-Lieut. A. Charlesworth) and 12 other ranks, moved out
towards Hill 40. As they drew near to it, they thought they detected
movement behind a hedge. They halted and, soon after, were challenged
by a sentry in German. Sec.-Lieut. F. Woodward fired at him with his
revolver, and at once the whole patrol opened rapid fire. The enemy,
who was evidently there in strength, retaliated with a shower of
bombs, wounding Sec.-Lieut. Woodward and three of his men. The action
continued for some minutes, but at length Sec.-Lieut. Charlesworth,
finding he could make no impression on the hostile position, withdrew
the patrol. It was afterwards found that the enemy had a very strong
post on Hill 40, from which good observation was obtained of the
British line.
The next night the Battalion was relieved and went back into Brigade
Reserve. Two companies garrisoned part of the Brielen Line, astride
the Ypres-Poperinghe Road. The other two companies held a reserve line
south of Ypres, from Kruisstraat to near the Lille Gate. At this time
the Battalion was somewhat depleted in strength, owing to a mild form
of influenza, commonly known as “Chink Fever.”
(_c_) The Zillebeke Raid.
The one absorbing interest of this period of Brigade Reserve was the
raid, which eventually came off on the night of June 19/20th. There was
little opportunity for rehearsal or training, as the companies were
scattered, and many men were tied down to certain posts. But the plan
was worked out most carefully, down to the minutest detail, by the
Commanding Officer, who made nearly all the arrangements and wrote the
orders himself. The plan was as follows:--
1. The object of the operation was to secure identification and
to do as much damage to the enemy as possible.
2. Twelve platoons of the Battalion[19] were to take part, and
these were divided into three parties:--
(_a_) Two platoons of C Company, whose task was to seize
and hold Hill 40, thus guarding the left flank of the main
operation.
(_b_) A Company, operating north of the Warrington Road.
(_c_) B Company, operating south of the Warrington Road.
A and B Companies were each reinforced by a platoon from D
Company.
3. Objectives:--
(_a_) B Company: The line Hellblast
Corner--Tuilerie--Tuilerie Chimney.
(_b_) A Company: 1st Objective: Enemy posts about 100 yards east
of Cavalry Road.
2nd Objective: Halfway House.
4. All platoons were to be assembled in No Man’s Land by 11-30 p.m. At
12-0 midnight the advance was to begin. First objectives were to be
taken by the front platoons of companies. When B Company had gained
all its objectives, Capt. N. T. Farrar was to fire a red light as a
signal to A Company, the support platoons of which would then advance
on Halfway House.
5. The whole were to withdraw at 1-30 a.m.
6. The artillery was to open fire at 12-15 a.m. and put down a standing
barrage along the line of Leinster Road. If the wind were favourable,
it was also to put down a smoke barrage to cover the advance. But there
was to be no creeping barrage.
Late in the evening of June 19th, the troops who were to take part
marched into Ypres. As soon as it was dark enough to conceal movement
they assembled in the British front line, and, about 11-0 p.m., moved
out into No Man’s Land. The night was very bright, the moon being
almost at the full, and there was some anxiety that the enemy might
detect the assembly and put down a barrage. But everything went well
and not a shot was fired. All were in position by 11-45 p.m. Battalion
H.Q. was established in a dugout in the British front line, and from
there the Commanding Officer was in telephonic communication with Major
Fenton, who was in the Ramparts. At 12-0 midnight the advance began,
and, by a great stroke of luck, almost at the same moment, the moon
disappeared behind a thick bank of clouds.
About 12-10 a.m. the left flank of C Company made contact with the
enemy. As they were approaching the post on Hill 40, they encountered
a working party, about thirty strong. Shots were exchanged, and the
Germans retired a short distance; but the post had, unfortunately,
been warned. The flank party was heavily fired on, and Sec.-Lieut.
H. E. Burgoyne was wounded. Sergt. R. Wilson was also wounded in the
left arm, but remained at duty for some time, until the pain and
loss of blood from his wound weakened him so much that he was forced
to give up. Long grass and the broken nature of the ground impeded
the advance, and, by the time the post was reached, its garrison had
withdrawn. Sec.-Lieut. B. Crickmer, who had now assumed command of both
the platoons, took up a position facing north-east, about fifty yards
beyond the post. Here he became heavily engaged with large numbers
of the enemy. All attempts to advance were met by heavy machine gun
and rifle fire, and by bombs; and although several casualties were
undoubtedly inflicted, he was unable to secure an identification. About
1-0 a.m. artillery fire began to harass the party, but the men held
on to their position until it was time to withdraw, and successfully
carried out their duty of covering the left flank of the raid. At 1-30
a.m. they withdrew, covered by a small rearguard, and regained their
lines.
Meanwhile, the major part of the operation was going extremely well.
At 12-15 a.m. the British barrage opened, the bursting shells showing
up splendidly against the thick wall of smoke, which was soon built
up. It was a picture. Apparently this was the first warning the enemy
artillery had, that anything unusual was happening. Shortly after, the
enemy barrage came down, and then the wisdom of starting to advance
fifteen minutes before zero hour was clearly proved. By the time the
German guns got into action all the raiders were beyond the barrage
lines, and, that night, the Battalion did not suffer a single casualty
from shell fire.
On the extreme right, Sergt. F. J. Field’s platoon reached its
objective with very little opposition; Vickers and Lewis guns were
then brought into action, effectually guarding the right flank of the
attack. In the centre Sec.-Lieut. H. R. Newman, with No. 5 Platoon,
advanced along the C3 Line and became engaged about fifty yards in
front of the Tuilerie. This post was strongly held and wired; but
the men cut through two belts of wire, crept up to within ten yards,
and rushed the position. Four prisoners and a light machine gun were
captured, several casualties were inflicted, and the remainder of the
garrison made off. A little later, Sec.-Lieut. R. E. Jones came up
south of the Tuilerie, and the line from that point to Hellblast Corner
was firmly held until the end of the operation.
But the left platoon of B Company--No. 8 under Sec.-Lieut. W. G.
Bradley--had a very rough time. When about 150 yards from its
objective, the Tuilerie Chimney, three machine guns opened on the
leading section at only a few yards’ range. So heavy were the
casualties that only two unwounded men were left in the section after
the first burst. The other sections were also heavily engaged by an
enemy post further to the left. Three attempts were made to rush the
position, but without success. The platoon was harassed by machine guns
and trench mortars, and had become so reduced in strength, owing to
casualties, that Sec.-Lieut. Bradley was forced to break off the action
and simply hold on to the position already reached.
Capt. N. T. Farrar was anxiously awaiting the signals from his platoon
commanders, which would show that their objectives had been reached.
These were received from his right and centre platoons, but not from
his left, for the reasons already given. However, from his own position
well forward in No Man’s Land, he judged that the right flank was
sufficiently secure for A Company to advance; and so, at 1-0 a.m., he
fired his red signal light.
Meanwhile, A Company in the centre had been even more successful. The
earlier part of its advance had been quite uneventful, and contact with
the enemy had not been made until near Cavalry Road. Here a few bombs
had been thrown, but the Germans had quickly withdrawn. The two leading
platoons, under Sec.-Lieuts. R. M. Leddra and J. E. Bentley, crossed
the road and occupied a line of trenches, about 200 yards beyond. Near
the road Sec.-Lieut. Leddra came across a large dugout, which he bombed
with M.S.K. grenades; three Germans came out and were promptly made
prisoners. The Company Commander, Sec.-Lieut. B. H. Huggard, had gone
well forward to keep in touch with the situation; with the assistance
of no one but his runner, he himself rounded up four of the enemy who
were trying to escape. Considerable numbers of Germans were seen making
off to the rear, and some were shot while doing so. But at this point
the smoke screen, which had been of great assistance in covering the
earlier stages of the advance, helped the enemy. Many, who otherwise
would almost certainly have been captured, were completely lost sight
of in the smoke.
By 12-45 a.m. all five platoons of A Company had crossed Cavalry Road
and were drawn up ready to advance on Halfway House, as soon as the
signal should be fired by B Company. As has already been said, this
signal was sent up at 1-0 a.m. But it was not seen owing to the smoke.
This was very unfortunate for A Company was quite ready, and there was
ample time for the second part of the operation to be carried out.
So, no further advance was attempted, but the positions reached were
maintained by all parties until the withdrawal.
At 1-30 a.m. the withdrawal began, and was carried out very
successfully. White tapes marked the gaps which had been cut in the
wire, and rockets were sent up from the Ramparts at Ypres, to direct
any who had lost their direction. About 2-0 a.m. patrols went out to
search for wounded, the Commanding Officer personally assisting in this
work. Several wounded were brought in and the work was certainly well
done, for the Battalion had only one man missing out of over 350 who
had gone “over the top.” Platoons moved back to their former stations
in Brigade Reserve, where a well-earned sleep awaited them.
Though the second part of the operation--the attack on Halfway
House--was not attempted, the raid was a great success. Eleven
prisoners and a light machine gun had been captured, and considerable
casualties had undoubtedly been inflicted on the enemy. The total
casualties of the Battalion were 3 other ranks killed, one officer and
16 other ranks wounded, and one other rank missing. This was extremely
light, considering that three quarters of the Battalion had spent one
and a half hours in the enemy’s lines. But by far the most satisfactory
result of the raid was its effect on morale. Many of the officers and
men who took part had only been with the Battalion a very short
time, and a large number of the latter were very young and had seen
no fighting before. The old soldier has learned to take things as they
come, but success or failure have great effect on inexperienced and
young soldiers. So it was with this raid. They went into action boys;
they came out almost veterans.
[Illustration: _Raid near Zillebeke._
_19/20. 6. 18._]
For their services in connection with this raid, Sec.-Lieuts. B. H.
Huggard and H. R. Newman were each awarded the Military Cross. Sergts.
A. Loosemore, V.C., R. Wilson and F. J. Field received Distinguished
Conduct Medals; and sixteen other ranks gained the Military Medal.
(_d_) Quiet Days in the Ypres Salient.
The night after the raid the Battalion was relieved in Brigade Reserve,
and went to Siege Camp for rest. This camp lay on the east side of
the Vlamertinghe-Elverdinghe Road. It consisted mainly of Nissen
huts, but there were also a number of sandbag shelters and one or two
pill-boxes. The surroundings were very pleasant. All the time the 49th
Division remained in the Ypres Salient, the Battalion’s rest periods
were spent at Siege Camp. One period was much like another. Of the
seven complete days out of the line, the first was devoted to baths and
interior economy, and then three days were occupied with training and
three were spent at work on one or other of the defensive lines in the
neighbourhood.
All the work, of whatever nature, was allotted by tasks. If the men
could finish in two days, they had a day off. But the tasks were heavy.
Some very good work indeed was done by the Battalion during these rest
periods, and, looking back now, it seems a pity that all this work
was unnecessary; for none of the lines, so carefully constructed and
strongly fortified, ever had to be held against an enemy attack.
Training was carried out mainly under company arrangements, but, on
one or two occasions, battalion schemes were worked out, particularly
one in which the Vlamertinghe Line was used as an objective. The
Battalion had its own miniature rifle range and its own football field.
The latter was much used. Not many hundred yards away was a Belgian
detention camp, with the officers and N.C.O’s of which the Battalion
was on very good terms. Enemy shelling was not serious. There was a
good deal of searching for the many gun positions which covered the
area, but it was seldom that shells dropped dangerously near Siege
Camp. One unlucky shot severely wounded Sec.-Lieut. A. Charlesworth
during a tactical tour.
The main form of relaxation was dancing. For this the Battalion band
was in nightly demand, and the absence of ladies did not interfere
with the enjoyment. The first dance hall was an old ammunition store,
the floor being covered with a large tarpaulin. When this store was
pulled down, the band was ejected from a wooden platform which had been
built for it near the orderly room, and had to perform on the bare
earth while the dancers monopolised the floor. All ranks took part;
the Regimental Sergeant-Major could usually be seen affectionately
encircling the waist of a signaller, while the Medical Officer and
others have been known to grace the floor.
Gradually the nightmare of the enemy offensive was passing away. At
first the days were full of rumours and alarms. Most elaborate defence
schemes had been worked out, and heavy artillery counter-preparations
were common at night, and in the early morning. Reports came through
of the attacks on the French down south, but it gradually became clear
that the enemy’s power of attack was being worn out. From the first
news of his attack on July 15th, it was obvious that little success
had been gained. Then, three days later, came word of Marshal Foch’s
great counter-stroke on the flank, which not only robbed the Germans of
the little ground they had gained south of the Marne, but drove them
headlong to the Vesle. Almost at once everyone realised that the danger
was past, and that soon it would be the turn of the British to attack.
But this is anticipating.
On June 29th the Battalion returned to the line, relieving the 1/7th
Battalion West Yorkshire Regt. This time it was holding the right of
the Left Brigade Sector. The front extended from near White Chateau
to the vicinity of Dragoon Farm. It was held by three companies, each
having its platoons distributed in depth in three lines. The fourth
company was in battalion reserve, occupying a line in front of the
civilian cemetery near the Menin Gate--the cemetery in which lie the
remains of Prince Maurice of Battenberg. Battalion H.Q. occupied the
old divisional H.Q. near the Menin Gate.
For sixteen continuous days the Battalion held this front. It was the
longest unbroken trench tour that it had ever done, and most men were
heartily sick of it by the time it came to an end. The tour was not
particularly exciting. The enemy remained quiet, and, until the last
few days, little but defensive patrolling was done. Almost nightly
raids by the 148th Infantry Brigade had put the enemy so much on the
alert that there was little hope of success for minor enterprises.
During the last few days patrols became more active. Early one morning
Sec.-Lieut. J. W. Entwhistle penetrated deeply into No Man’s Land and
located some enemy posts, which he believed were held at night. The
following evening he took out a fighting patrol, hoping to occupy
these posts before the enemy arrived. But he was not early enough. The
Germans were there first, were thoroughly alert, and received him with
a hail of machine gun bullets. Fortunately he succeeded in withdrawing
without casualties. It was afterwards thought that the enemy might have
discovered the visit paid to his posts in the early morning, owing
to the removal of “souvenirs” by members of the British patrol. On
another occasion Sec.-Lieut. J. A. Steele occupied West Farm, a ruined
building about 500 yards out in No Man’s Land, for a whole day, with
no result, except that his party suffered torments from the bites of
the horse flies which swarmed in the long grass. On the night of July
9/10th there was a terrific thunderstorm, with drenching rain. One
platoon, which was carrying R.E. material up to the front line along
F Track--the left boundary of the Battalion sub-sector--was struck by
lightning. Two men were killed instantly, but the rest, though thrown
violently to the ground, escaped with a severe shaking.
Messenger dogs were in use on this sector and some were even stationed
at Company H.Q. This gave an opportunity to the sporting spirits among
the officers, who backed their dogs to arrive with messages first. For
some time the same dog always won, and by so big a margin that no
one could understand the reason. At length the mystery was solved. A
sentry had made friends with the losing dog, which was in the habit of
stopping daily to see him when it passed his post.
The most important feature of this long tour was the appearance of
American troops. The 30th Division of the American Expeditionary Force
had been attached to the 49th and 33rd Divisions for instruction.
This division was recruited entirely from North and South Carolina
and Tennessee. Some of its companies boasted continuity from units
of the Confederate Army in the American Civil War, and many of the
officers and men were descendants of those who had fought under Lee
and Jackson; indeed, the Intelligence Officer of one of the regiments
of this division was a grandson of General Robert E. Lee. Physically
the men were very fine, and the standard of education among them was
very high. They were mostly recruited from agricultural districts,
and were magnificent rifle shots. During the tour many officers and
other ranks--or, as they are called in the American Army, “enlisted
men”--were attached to the Battalion for instruction in trench duties.
They proved themselves very keen to learn, and the Battalion got on
well with them.
On July 15th the Battalion went back for its second period of rest at
Siege Camp. After eight days it went into brigade reserve to the Right
Sector. But the same night, before the relief was carried out, the men
were engaged in an operation of, to them, an entirely new type. This
operation was always known as Scheme B. It was a cloud gas discharge,
and was to be carried out as follows:--
1. Nine light railway trains, each consisting of seven trucks,
all loaded with gas cylinders, were to be brought up to Austral
Dump by light engines. Here they were to be taken over by the
Battalion, six men to a truck, and pushed out into No Man’s Land
in front of White Chateau, along an old light railway which ran
there.
2. The men were then to withdraw into the support line, and the
gas from all the cylinders was to be discharged simultaneously
by a system of detonators, exploded electrically.
3. When sufficient time had been allowed for the gas to clear,
the men were to go out again and push the trucks back to Austral
Dump, where they would be taken charge of by the light railway
men again.
The Battalion’s part in the operation sounded simple, but it was to
prove far otherwise.
On the night of July 23/24th the Battalion was brought up by light
railway trains to near Ypres, and marched from there to Austral Dump.
The first part of the operation went off smoothly. Apart from one burst
of enemy machine gun fire, which wounded two men at Austral Dump,
nothing exciting happened. The trains were pushed into position in No
Man’s Land without great difficulty, and the men withdrew according
to plan. The gas was liberated and a dense white cloud floated slowly
across No Man’s Land. The enemy made no sign. Fifteen minutes after
the discharge, the men went out again to remove the trucks. Then the
trouble began. The trucks should have been much lighter after the
discharge, but they were undoubtedly much harder to push. The air was
thick with the gas, but so hard was the work that respirators could not
be worn properly, and most men simply had the nose-clip and mouth piece
adjusted. The oil of the wheels was clogged by the gas, the ground was
slippery from the recent rains and afforded little foothold, and there
was not sufficient room to move properly between the railway line and
the barbed wire fences beside it. The first part of the way was up an
incline, and trucks were continually derailed. To get these latter
on to the lines again, the cylinders had to be unloaded, and then
replaced. It was found impossible to move whole trains, and trucks had
to be uncoupled, and pushed in twos and threes. Even then they could
only be moved by officers and N.C.O’s shouting to the men to “heave,”
as in a tug-of-war. It was almost daylight before the last trucks
crossed the British front line. Every man was thoroughly exhausted,
and many were suffering more or less from the effects of the gas. It
had been a terribly anxious time for the Commanding Officer, who had
himself been working as hard as anyone.
Strange to say, through it all the enemy remained completely inactive.
The moon was very bright, and the noise must have been audible several
hundreds of yards away. Yet, not a shot was fired; not a shell burst
anywhere near. Could the gas have had so deadly an effect? Little was
ever heard of the result of the operation. Patrols reported many dead
rats in No Man’s Land. Later, prisoners from the 6th Cavalry Division,
which relieved the 1st Landwehr Division, spoke vaguely of the latter
having been withdrawn owing to the use of a new gas by the British. But
nothing more definite was ever learned by the Battalion.
After nine days in Brigade Reserve, the Battalion again took over the
Zillebeke Sector, this time relieving the 2nd Battalion, 118th Regiment
of the 30th American Division. This Division was now undergoing the
last stage of its instruction, and during the whole tour the Battalion
had an American company in the line with it. Each company came in for
three days, the system of instruction being as follows:--
1st Day: Every American officer and other rank was attached to
his British “opposite number,” went with him everywhere, and
shared all his duties.
2nd Day: An American platoon, under its own officer, relieved
one British platoon in each company, and for twenty-four hours
worked under the orders of the British company commander. The
American platoons, during this time, carried out exactly the
same duties as the British would have done had they been there.
3rd Day: The four American platoons were again concentrated
under their own company commander, and relieved one of the
British companies in the front line. For twenty-four hours the
American company was responsible for its sector, and carried on
the usual work, patrols, sentry duties, etc.
It will thus be seen that, quite early, American troops were placed
in more responsible positions than the Portuguese had been, when they
were undergoing similar training. Throughout this tour Major Callen,
the Commanding Officer of the 3rd Battalion, 117th Regiment, whose
companies were in the line, lived at the 4th Battalion H.Q.
Several minor events marked the tour. On August 3rd the dugouts along
the west side of Zillebeke Lake were heavily shelled, and B Company
H.Q. was demolished. This was believed to be a result of the unusual
movement caused by the American troops. It was the custom at this time
for all front line troops to move about two hundred yards into No
Man’s Land early in the morning, and remain there until nearly dawn.
This was done to avoid the enemy barrage, which would be put down on
the British front line if an attack were intended. But apparently the
enemy discovered this manœuvre, for he began to shell No Man’s Land
in the early morning, and several casualties were suffered. A relief
too had taken place opposite. The 1st Landwehr Division had gone and
the 6th Cavalry Division, which had been dismounted for some time and
had seen service as infantry in Alsace, was holding the front. These
troops proved to be of much higher morale, and stubbornly resisted all
attempts to secure prisoners. But, the last morning the Battalion was
in the line, a young Dragoon was captured near Moated Grange, by two
officers of A Company.
On the night of August 7/8th the 3rd Battalion, 117th American Infantry
Regt., relieved the Battalion, taking over the line completely for
forty-eight hours. After one night in the Brielen Line the Battalion
went back to Siege Camp for the third and last time. Its stay in the
Ypres Salient was nearly over. It again held the line from August
16th to August 20th, but, on the latter date, it was relieved by the
5th Battalion Argyle and Sutherland Highlanders (34th Division), and,
moving back to a camp near Oosthoek, said good-bye to the Ypres Salient
for ever.