THE ENEMY SPRING OFFENSIVE.
(_a_) Erquinghem and Le Veau.
On April 9th the enemy launched his great offensive between the
La Bassée Canal and Armentiéres. Preceded by an intense artillery
bombardment, the German infantry broke right through the centre of the
line which was held by the Portuguese; and all was confusion there. It
was the sound of this battle that the Battalion had heard as it marched
along the road towards Reninghelst.
At the moment the 49th Division was too scattered for immediate
combined action. Divisional H.Q. was still at Chateau Ségard, and in
the same area the 148th Infantry Brigade was concentrated. The 147th
Infantry Brigade had all arrived in the neighbourhood of Reninghelst
by the evening of April 9th. But the 146th Infantry Brigade was still
holding the line astride the Menin Road. It was due to this that,
during the first fortnight of the operations which followed, the
Division was not able to act as a unit.
When the Battalion arrived in camp, on the evening of April 9th,
everyone expected to remain there for two or three days. It was the
general idea that the Division would concentrate in that area, and
then move down to the Somme battlefield. Hence, preparations were
made for spending the night. The Commanding Officer was dining with
Lieut.-General A. J. Godley, at Corps H.Q., and was not expected back
until late. The Battalion was turning in for the night when he suddenly
returned, bringing early information of an immediate move. He had heard
of the disaster on the Portuguese front, and brought the news that
the 147th Infantry Brigade was to be pushed into the battle at once.
Immediately, all was bustle and excitement in the camp, and never had
the men been in better spirits than when they heard that the Battalion
was for battle at last. Little time was needed for preparation. Soon
after midnight all were in motor buses hurrying south. At Neuve
Eglise, through which the buses passed, the gravity of the situation
was apparent. Transport vehicles and guns were being hurried back,
while already enemy shells were dropping in the village. At La Crèche,
which was reached at 3-15 a.m., the Battalion debussed, and marched
through the darkness to Le Veau, arriving at 4-30 a.m. Here some empty
huts and stables were found, and into these the men were put to get
what rest they could. Picquets were posted, for the situation was so
obscure that no one knew how soon the enemy might be upon him. And the
Battalion waited for orders.
About 6-30 a.m. orders were received from 147th Infantry Brigade
H.Q., to move up to a position of readiness near the cross-roads at
L’Epinette. Packs were dumped in a hut at Le Veau, a hurried selection
was made of the personnel of B Echelon who were not to go into battle,
and about 7-0 a.m. the Battalion[15] moved off. All along the road was
witnessed one of the most pitiful sights of warfare, common enough
in the early days of 1914, but never before seen by the Battalion.
Everywhere civilians were leaving their homes and flocking to the rear;
old people, women, and young children, some driving an odd cow or two,
others pushing a few of their most valued household goods in barrows,
plodded wearily along. Fortunately the enemy was not shelling the
road, so the troops were able to advance without hindrance, except
from one low-flying aeroplane. L’Epinette was reached before 8-30 a.m.
and the men began to dig in. Little was known of the situation, but
from observation it appeared that the British were withdrawing to the
north bank of the River Lys, particularly about the loop to the west of
Erquinghem.
The Battalion had been placed at the disposal of the 101st Infantry
Brigade (34th Division), and about 9-30 a.m. the G.O.C., Brig.-General
B. C. Gore, came up, explained the situation, and issued his orders as
follows:--
1. The 101st Infantry Brigade was holding a line south of the
Bac St. Maur-Armentiéres Railway, with the 16th Battalion Royal
Scots on the right and the 11th Battalion Suffolk Regt. on the
left. This line the enemy had penetrated near the Rue Delpierre,
between the two battalions.
2. The Battalion was ordered to send up two companies to close
this gap in the line, and to place its remaining companies in
positions north of the railway, in support of the Royal Scots
and Suffolks respectively.
Company commanders were immediately summoned and the situation was
explained to them. C Company, with D Company in support, was ordered
to move up by the Rue Delpierre and close the gap. B Company, with A
Company in support, was to assemble near the Rue du Moulin and advance
to the assistance of the Royal Scots.
About 10-0 a.m. all companies moved off and Battalion H.Q. went forward
to Wigan Post, some 500 yards north of the river. Enemy shells were
already bursting around, and several direct hits were made on the road.
The numbers of wounded who were streaming back showed only too clearly
how severe the fighting was. Yet, quietly and in perfect order, the
companies marched down to the River Lys by platoons. The main bridge
was destroyed, but B Company, which was leading, succeeded in crossing
by a wooden bridge near by, though this was also badly broken and only
possible for men in single file. All the other companies crossed by a
wooden bridge near the church. From this time, except A and B Companies
which were in close touch throughout the day, companies were separated
and their doings must be told individually.
On arriving in Erquinghem, B Company marched along the main street of
the village, and took cover at the west end, while Capt. N. T. Farrar
and Sergt. R. G. Brunt went forward to reconnoitre. They soon found
that the situation was very different from what had been reported. Not
only was the enemy to the north of the railway, near the Rue du Moulin,
but he also appeared to be occupying the whole of the ground in the
loop which the river makes to the west of Erquinghem. His outposts
were in farms, only about 200 yards west of the village, and there was
no sign of any formed body of Royal Scots. In these circumstances any
attempt to advance south would almost certainly have led to disaster,
so Capt. Farrar decided to take up a position covering the west end
of the village. Between the river and the Rue du Moulin was an R.E.
yard, with piles of trench grids and other stores; this B Company
garrisoned with three platoons, pushing out its fourth platoon about
a hundred yards in front. Its left was covered by a Lewis gun section
which could fire, either along the road to the west, or down the Rue
du Moulin; to protect its right and cover a bridge over the Lys, which
was its main line of retreat, A Company sent up a platoon and a half,
under Sec.-Lieut. E. Clarke, between the R.E. yard and the river. These
dispositions opposed an enemy advance either from the west or up the
Rue du Moulin, and remained unchanged for five hours--until the order
to withdraw was received. During that time, two separate attacks were
made by the enemy on the village; but so heavy was the fire kept up by
A and B Companies that these had no success. Parts of Erquinghem were
heavily shelled, and many buildings were set on fire; but the R.E. yard
escaped the attentions of the hostile artillery. The men were much
harassed by machine gun and rifle fire. In particular, A Company’s
platoon was heavily fired on from a farm house, only about a hundred
yards away. Careful observation of this place through glasses revealed
the fact that a large store of Mills bombs and Stokes shells was in
an outhouse against the wall of the farm. Lewis guns were trained on
this dump and fired for some minutes without success; but, suddenly,
the whole dump blew up, completely destroying the farmhouse. As the
place was packed with Germans, there is no doubt that they suffered
very heavily. The British had excellent cover behind the piles of R.E.
material, and, as a result, comparatively few casualties were suffered;
but heavy losses were certainly inflicted on the enemy.
Late in the morning, an officer of the 11th Battalion Suffolk Regt.
asked for reinforcements to close a gap in the line near the Rue du
Moulin. In response, A Company sent up a platoon, which Sec.-Lieut.
B. H. Huggard saw into position. This platoon was never seen again,
and its fate was a mystery until after the armistice. Then, returned
prisoners told how it had been surrounded by the enemy, and, after
suffering heavily, the few survivors had been captured.
Meanwhile, what was happening to C and D Companies? After crossing
the Lys, C Company assembled near the top of the Rue Delpierre, while
Capt. A. M. Luty, with Sec.-Lieut. T. T. Gilroy, C.S.M. N. Hobson
and two N.C.O’s, went forward to reconnoitre. The ground was swept
by machine gun fire, and it was only by crawling that the party was
able to reach the point where the road crosses the railway. Capt.
Luty at once realised that it was impossible for him to get to his
objective, and decided to hold the line of the railway. He returned to
his company which, by this time, had suffered several casualties from
enemy artillery fire. The company moved down the road by platoons and
took up a position along the railway line, with its right turned back
to face south-west. The position was a bad one as the straight line
of the railway was heavily enfiladed by machine guns near the Rue du
Moulin. Losses were heavy from the very first. Sec.-Lieut. M. C. O’Dowd
and several men had been hit coming down the road. C.S.M. N. Hobson was
wounded soon after the line of the railway had been taken up. After
a short time, one platoon was sent across the railway to take up a
more advanced position. Here, except for sniping, this platoon was not
much worried for some time, but the rest of the company was suffering
appalling casualties. The numbers of wounded were soon far greater than
the company stretcher-bearers could deal with. It was then that Pte.
A. Poulter earned the highest decoration that a soldier can win--the
Victoria Cross. Hour after hour he toiled, in the greatest danger,
tending the wounded and carrying them into safety.[16]
About 1-0 p.m. the situation became even worse. The enemy brought up
a field gun which enfiladed C Company’s position at a range of only a
few hundred yards. Within half-an-hour scarcely twenty men were left
unwounded. The position on the railway was clearly untenable, and
soon it was decided that a move was necessary, if any were to escape
unhurt. The few survivors crossed the railway and took up a position
a little to the south of it. Here they suffered much less. About the
middle of the afternoon the men of the 11th Battalion Suffolk Regt.,
who had been on the left of C Company all day, withdrew, having written
orders to do so. As he had received no orders, Capt. Luty remained.
It should be mentioned that orders to withdraw had been sent to him
from Battalion H.Q. some time before, but the runners had become
casualties and the orders never arrived. But before long the enemy
was seen to be advancing rapidly, both from the south and west, and
the position became hopeless. A withdrawal was ordered. Sec.-Lieut.
F. D. Chippindale went forward to warn No. 9 Platoon, which was lying
out in front; a hail of machine gun bullets was sweeping the ground,
and he had barely given the order when he was struck down. The few
survivors of this platoon were surrounded and captured. The rest of C
Company made a dash for the railway, but only about twelve ever reached
it. One by one they rushed across, suffering two more casualties
before all were over, and then made for Erquinghem. Many wounded were
collected on the way, practically every man of the party assisting one
along. They found the bridge near the church destroyed, and, before
another crossing could be found, enemy skirmishers were already
in the village. At last another bridge was discovered, about half a
mile towards Armentiéres, and over this the miserable remnants of the
company crossed, remaining on the northern bank until the bridge had
been demolished. Of the Company, 5 officers and 139 other ranks strong,
which had crossed the Lys about six hours before, little more than the
strength of a section remained.
[Illustration: Private A. POULTER, V.C.]
D Company had crossed the Lys in rear of C Company in the morning, and
had taken up a position in support, south of Erquinghem and astride the
Rue Delpierre. Here they had come under heavy artillery and machine
gun fire, and had suffered considerably. About 1-30 p.m. they received
orders to support the 11th Battalion Suffolk Regt., and moved up to
a position in rear of La Rolanderie Farm, where the H.Q. of that
battalion was situated. They had not been there long when they received
their orders to withdraw, and so returned to the north of the river.
Throughout the day Battalion H.Q. was at Wigan. It had originally been
intended to move across the river, but, owing to the uncertainty of the
situation, this was never done. The position had not been occupied long
before it was realised that the enemy had crossed the Lys, away to the
right. Indeed, it is very possible that German troops were actually
across, a little to the west of Erquinghem, before any of the Battalion
entered the village. By the middle of the morning the situation on
that flank was rapidly becoming serious, and the Commanding Officer
recommended that troops should be sent up to the neighbourhood of the
line Lancashire--Jesus Farm. By 12-20 p.m. A Company’s signallers had
established communication by means of a visual station in one of the
houses, and throughout the day they and B Company remained in touch
with Battalion H.Q. But no reports were received from C and D Companies
until the afternoon. About mid-day the neighbourhood of Wigan began to
receive attention from the enemy artillery, and, though few casualties
were suffered, great inconvenience was caused by the destruction of the
officers’ rations. At 12-40 p.m. orders were sent to D Company to move
up in support of the 11th Suffolks, these orders anticipating a very
urgent appeal from the Commanding Officer of that unit which arrived a
little later. The first report from C Company, timed 1-7 p.m., arrived
about 2-0 p.m., but gave no idea of Capt. Luty’s desperate situation.
However, it was rapidly becoming clear that Erquinghem was untenable,
though the real gravity of the situation was not known at the time.
As a matter of fact, while the Battalion was still fighting in and to
the south of Erquinghem, the enemy was right in its rear at Le Veau,
looting the packs which had been dumped there in the morning, and
fighting with the men of B Echelon who had been left behind. Early in
the afternoon, machine gun bullets from the west began to fall about
Wigan. But, by this time, the order to withdraw to Nieppe had been
received, and had been passed on to companies. B Company and part of A
Company withdrew by the bridge which they had been covering all day;
the others crossed by bridges further to the east. Battalion H.Q.
remained at Wigan until the early evening. Many buildings in Erquinghem
were burning furiously, and numbers of the enemy could be seen moving
about in the village.
All the companies had passed long before Battalion H.Q. moved. About
6-0 p.m. the line at Wigan was left in the hands of a very mixed
garrison of Royal Scots, Suffolks, Australian tunnellers and others,
and the Commanding Officer started for Nieppe. It was only then that
the full gravity of the situation was realised. Enemy machine gun
bullets were whistling across the road as the party moved along, and,
when the level crossing by Nieppe Station was reached, it was found
that an enemy machine gun was on the railway line to the north-west,
shooting straight down the line. One or two casualties were suffered
by H.Q. details in crossing the line. Near the entrance to Nieppe, the
whole of D Company was met marching out towards the Station, and Lieut.
B. M. Machin stated that he had received orders from the G.O.C. himself
to seize and hold that point. Away to the north troops could be seen
in extended order attacking towards Le Veau. These troops were A and B
Companies, though this was not known at the time. From what he knew of
the enemy’s position on the railway, near the station, it was obvious
to the Commanding Officer that the left flank of this attack was in
danger. To cope with the difficulty H.Q. details, organised in two
platoons under Sec.-Lieut. H. A. Loudoun, and one platoon of D Company,
were sent down the road to the Station. Two platoons of D Company were
directed to prolong the left flank of the attack on Le Veau, and the
other platoon was kept in reserve.
It is now necessary to return to A and B Companies. On reporting at
147th Infantry Brigade H.Q. in Nieppe they had been told to occupy
some old trenches at Les Trois Arbres. They had not been there long
before they were ordered to fall in and move along the Nieppe-Bailleul
Road towards Pont d’Achelles. Here they were drawn up by Maj. A.
L. Mowat[17] and directed to attack and expel the enemy, who was
established in the farmhouses and enclosures at Le Veau. A Company was
on the extreme left with B Company on its right; beyond B Company were
some Royal Engineers and other troops, mainly Northumberland Fusiliers.
Neither side had any artillery to support it.
The advance started and at first progress was easy; but, when the
attacking force was about six hundred yards from the enemy, very heavy
machine gun and rifle fire opened on it. Progress could now only
be made by section rushes with covering fire, and even this became
impossible when the line had got to about three hundred yards from the
enemy. It was at this point that the arrival of the two platoons of D
Company on the left restored the situation. These did not meet with
strong opposition, and were able to push forward and gain a footing
on the railway. Taken now in flank the Germans began to withdraw, and
this enabled A Company to continue its advance and reach the railway
on its whole front. Meanwhile B Company had met with strong resistance
from the farms and enclosures of Le Veau. A sniper, firing from an
attic window, had been particularly obnoxious. For a short time they
too had been held up, but Sec.-Lieut. F. Akroyd, supported by heavy
covering fire from the rest of the company, managed to push forward on
the right and establish a footing, with his platoon, in the enclosures.
The enemy then withdrew on this front too, and B Company advanced to
the railway. As the H.Q. details had established themselves firmly in
the neighbourhood of the Station, the Battalion now held the whole of
the railway line from that point nearly up to the Steenwerck Road. The
men dug in a few yards in front of the railway line and there settled
down for the night, after a most strenuous and exciting day. During
this attack A Company had suffered heavy casualties, but both B and D
Companies had come through comparatively lightly. In all, the Battalion
had lost nearly two hundred men since it had left Le Veau early that
morning.
(_b_) Nieppe.
During the night of April 10/11th Battalion H.Q. was established in the
Hospice at the south-west end of Nieppe, and here it remained until
the following evening. With the exception of the pitiful remnants of C
Company, and one platoon of D Company, the whole Battalion was manning
the line which had been established in front of the railway, between
Nieppe Station and the Steenwerck Road. In spite of the uncertainty of
the situation, everyone whose duties would allow of it slept soundly,
tired out with the activities of the previous day and night. The night
passed quietly, the enemy, after his set-back at Le Veau, making no
further attack.
Early the next morning, the Commanding Officer made a personal
reconnaissance towards L’Epinette, and nearly reached the village
before he saw anything of the enemy. He was then heavily fired on by
a party of Germans and forced to withdraw. Other patrols were pushed
out well to the west of the railway without encountering the enemy.
From French civilians, who had remained in their homes all through the
fighting, they learned that large numbers of Germans had been there,
but had withdrawn towards the south-west after the successful attack
of the Battalion at Le Veau. The only actual encounter that took place
near the railway was with a German artillery officer, who rode nearly
up to the line with a mounted orderly about 8-30 a.m. He was shot and
fell from his horse dead, but his companion escaped. The numbers of
German dead littering the ground in front of the railway showed that,
in spite of its own heavy losses, the Battalion had made the enemy pay
even more heavily. About 9-0 a.m., units of the 101st Infantry Brigade
relieved the Battalion, and the men were concentrated in houses near
the Hospice.
The Battalion was now in Brigade Reserve, the other battalions of the
Brigade manning the Nieppe System to the east of the town. The day
was a very confused one. Continually the situation was being reported
obscure at some part of the front, and frequently a company, or two
platoons, or some other force, had to be sent off to clear it up. The
only part of the front where the situation was never reported obscure
was that held by the 147th Infantry Brigade. Such duties proved very
tiring, though for some time no serious fighting resulted. By now the
enemy was everywhere well across the Lys, the entrenched line of which
Wigan formed a part had been entirely given up, and the railway and the
Nieppe System were the outpost lines of the British. Incidentally, it
should be mentioned here that the 1/5th Battalion York and Lancaster
Regt. did the 147th Infantry Brigade a very good turn that day. By a
highly successful counter-attack in the neighbourhood of Steenwerck,
they held up the enemy’s advance, and barred his approach to the main
line of retreat from Nieppe--the road to Bailleul.
Nothing serious, so far as the Battalion was concerned, happened until
after mid-day. But about 12-30 p.m., a message arrived from Brigade
H.Q. stating that the situation was very obscure on the left of the 6th
Battalion Duke of Wellington’s Regt., near Bruna Gaye; the remnants of
C Company were already on their way there; and an additional company
was to be despatched at once. A Company was detailed for this duty, and
the Commanding Officer himself accompanied it, leaving Capt. Fenton in
charge at Battalion H.Q. Lieut.-Col. Sugden found matters in a very
critical state; artillery and machine gun fire were very heavy, and
a strong German attack was being directed against a battalion of the
Cheshires. The arrival of the 4th Battalion detachment restored the
situation, but hard fighting continued there until the evening. One
Lewis gun of A Company did great execution; it was concealed in the
upper storey of a house, found excellent targets among the masses of
the enemy, and was apparently never discovered by them. The Commanding
Officer remained at Bruna Gaye to direct operations.
Late in the afternoon there was again trouble on the right, and two
platoons of B Company were sent to the neighbourhood of Nieppe Station.
Here they had hard fighting for two hours, but held their ground
successfully.
About 7-0 p.m. the Commanding Officer returned from Bruna Gaye. He had
called at Brigade H.Q. on his way back, and had received orders for a
further withdrawal, which was to be made that night. This withdrawal
was rendered necessary by a fresh attack which the enemy had launched
at Wytschaete that day, for there was now great danger that, unless
all the troops in and around Nieppe withdrew at once, they would be
surrounded. The withdrawal was to start at 7-30 p.m. and the difficulty
was to get orders through to A and C Companies. Runners managed to
reach them just in time, when they were in imminent danger of being cut
off.
At 7-30 p.m. B and D Companies, followed by Battalion H.Q., left the
Hospice and started towards Bailleul. Enemy machine gun bullets were
sweeping the ground, and, before he had gone more than a hundred yards,
R.S.M. F. P. Stirzaker, M.C., was hit in the throat, and died within
five minutes. His death was a great blow to the Battalion which he had
fought with continuously for three years; he was a most hardworking,
conscientious and gallant man, whose place could never be filled. It
was impossible to remove the body, and he would have been the last to
wish any risks to be run by others on his account. So he was left like
a soldier on the spot where he had died, and the remainder of the party
continued sorrowfully on its way.
The sight on the Nieppe-Bailleul Road that night was such as none of
the Battalion had seen before, nor any wished to see again. Of vehicles
there were practically none, but the whole road was crowded with men
hastening to the rear. It was an army in retreat. But the crowd of
men was not disorderly; there was no panic. As each one reached his
allotted station he quietly fell in, ready to hold a fresh line.
Mercifully the enemy, for some unknown reason, scarcely attempted to
shell the road. Had he done so the casualties must have been awful, for
no shell dropped among those masses of men could have failed to hit
many. One gruesome spot, where a 15 cm. shell had burst among a number
of Royal Engineers, gave the passer-by an idea of what might have been.
All along the left of the road the enemy flares, approaching nearer and
nearer, showed how near the British troops were to utter disaster. But
they escaped. And never again had the enemy such an opportunity. By
about 11-0 p.m. the Battalion was again concentrated in a position near
Bailleul.
[Illustration: _April 10–11, 1918._]
(_c_) Bailleul.
About a mile from Bailleul the road to Armentiéres almost touches the
railway. It was at this point that 147th Infantry Brigade H.Q. was
established, the battalions occupying positions in the fields just to
the south of the railway. The position was not really intended to be a
defensive one, for other troops were well out in front of the Brigade.
Nevertheless, the men dug in, and patrols were pushed out down the
roads. The rest of the night passed quietly.
On April 12th, though there were some mild alarms during the morning,
nothing special happened until after mid-day. Occasional shells burst
near the Battalion’s positions, one of which wounded Sec.-Lieut. F.
Akroyd. But about 1-0 p.m. a heavy bombardment opened, and quickly
drove Battalion H.Q. from its cottage to seek a hole in the ground,
among the slits which had been dug the previous night. Intermittent
shelling went on for the whole afternoon and caused several casualties,
among them being Lieut. B. M. Machin and Sergt. F. Firth, the pioneer
sergeant.
About 4-0 p.m. the Commanding Officer, who had been to Brigade H.Q.,
returned with the alarming news that the enemy had entered Bailleul
from the west. The Battalion was ordered to move at once and expel
him. Company commanders were summoned, and columns were detailed to
enter the town by different roads. The operation was carried out with
unexpected ease. The report was found to be incorrect. Nothing of the
enemy could be seen in Bailleul; in fact, the town was deserted,
except for an Australian corporal who had just set fire to the
Australian Comforts Store, much to the disgust of the Battalion which
could have done with many of the articles thus destroyed. The companies
moved through the deserted town and established a picquet line in the
fields to the west of it, roughly along the line of the Becque de la
Flanche, and covering all the roads in that direction.
Up to this time there had been little activity in the area occupied
by battalions of the 147th Infantry Brigade. But early in the evening
the advanced troops began rapidly to retire through them. Numbers of
stragglers of different units entered Bailleul from the south, and the
situation began to look serious. It was restored by Capt. Fenton, who
took charge of a number of stragglers and posted them with D Company,
in and around Bailleul Station. About this time the enemy began to
shell the town, possibly attracted by the fire at the Australian
Comforts Store, which was now burning furiously. One shell burst near
a group of H.Q. details, as they were marching up the Station Road,
killing one and wounding about fifteen of them.
When darkness fell the dispositions of the Battalion were as follows:--
D Company, with a number of stragglers of other units, was
holding the railway line on both sides of the Station. The 6th
Battalion Duke of Wellington’s Regt. was holding a line in front
of it.
A Company had a line of posts along the Becque de la Flanche,
from the railway west of the Station, where it was in touch with
the right of the 6th Battalion Duke of Wellington’s Regt., to
Steam Mill.
B Company continued this line due north as far as the Meteren
Road.
Battalion H.Q. and C Company, which was in Battalion Reserve,
occupied houses on the Station Road.
Reconnaissance soon showed that a composite force, which had been
organised at the 22nd Corps Reinforcement Camp and went by the name of
the 22nd Corps Reinforcement Battalion, was holding a line of posts
from Steam Mill towards Meteren. Beyond these troops was the 19th
Infantry Brigade (33rd Division) covering Meteren itself. Thus, only A
Company was actually in the front line.
The night passed quietly. A patrol of A Company, from Steam Mill along
the Oultersteene Road, did not gain touch with the enemy until more
than a mile down the road. During the night A Company was relieved by
the 9th Battalion Northumberland Fusiliers, so that, by dawn, both A
and C Companies were in Battalion Reserve in the town.
The morning of the 13th was also uneventful. A well-stocked Y.M.C.A.
canteen was found in Bailleul, and a guard was placed over it to stop
looting; the supplies there were taken charge of, and many were issued
to the troops to supplement rations. Early in the afternoon the enemy
began to shell the town heavily, and continued to do so for about two
hours. Buildings proved a very bad protection against high explosive.
The house occupied by Battalion H.Q. did not receive a direct hit, but
windows were smashed and considerable damage caused by shells bursting
just outside. Here Sec.-Lieut. H. A. Loudoun, the Signalling Officer,
was wounded in the arm; and Cpl. A. R. Mitchell, the stout and popular
N.C.O. in charge of the Battalion runners, was so badly hit in the body
that he died shortly afterwards in hospital. It was deemed advisable
to move Battalion H.Q. to a neighbouring house which had a small but
substantial cellar.
Meanwhile, the other units of the Brigade were having serious fighting
to the south of Bailleul. About dusk, the Battalion received orders to
send up two companies to hold the line of the railway on either side
of the Station, as it was feared the enemy might break through. A and
C Companies were sent up, under the command of Capt. Fenton. These
occupied a line to the south of the railway, covering the Station, on
a frontage of about half a mile. During the night another withdrawal
took place, contracting the defences to the south and south-east of
the town. The 6th Battalion took over the defence of the railway line
and Bailleul Station, while the 7th Battalion was brought back into
the town in Brigade Reserve. D Company relieved the 9th Battalion
Northumberland Fusiliers between the railway and Steam Mill. Its
left should have been in touch with the right of the 6th Battalion,
but there was found to be a considerable gap which it could not fill
without dangerously weakening its front. A Company was moved up to
close this gap. The withdrawal had, of course, automatically brought
about the relief of the two companies south of the railway. At dawn the
Battalion was disposed as follows:--
A Company was astride the railway, west of Bailleul Station, and
in touch with the right of the 6th Battalion.
D Company held the line of the Becque de la Flanche from the
right of A Company to Steam Mill, where it was in touch with the
left of the 22nd Corps Reinforcement Battalion.
B Company was still in its old position behind the 22nd Corps
Reinforcement Battalion.
C Company was in Battalion Reserve in houses on the Station Road.
Two days had now passed without the Battalion being drawn into any
really serious fighting. There had been plenty of anxiety and much
changing of dispositions, but, compared with the activities of April
10th and 11th, it had been a rest period. The attacks which the enemy
had made to the south of Bailleul on April 13th had not been very
successful for him, and he now determined to try his luck to the west
of the town. Already, on the night of the 13th, his troops had been
seen dribbling up towards Steam Mill.
The night of April 13/14th passed quietly, as did also the following
morning. But early in the afternoon a bombardment, far heavier than on
the previous day, opened on the town and on the positions along the
Becque de la Flanche. B and D Companies were both shelled out of their
H.Q. and forced to take to the fields; in this shelling Sec.-Lieut.
W. Oldfield, M.M., of D Company, was severely wounded, and had the
grave misfortune to lose the sight of both eyes. Meanwhile, observers
reported that large numbers of the enemy were dribbling forward and
massing about three hundred yards from the Battalion’s outpost line.
It was obvious that a heavy attack was impending. Fire was opened
upon all movement, but did not appear to interfere much with the
assembly. Little could be done but wait. As a precautionary measure,
all available reserves of A Company were placed at the disposal of D
Company.
[Illustration: BAILLEUL CHURCH AFTER THE BOMBARDMENT.]
Bailleul was still being heavily bombarded, and about six big fires
were raging in the Station Road alone, without anyone to check them,
when, about 4-0 p.m., the attack came. Masses of the enemy advanced
against the fronts held by D Company and the 22nd Corps Reinforcement
Battalion. The latter gave way without much resistance, and the enemy
was able to occupy Steam Mill. This seriously threatened the right
flank of D Company, along the whole of whose front heavy fighting
was going on. For a time its centre was pressed back, but the men
soon regained the ground without assistance. Unfortunately, in this
fighting, Sec.-Lieut. J. H. Kitson was killed.
The whole situation was extremely critical. The 22nd Corps
Reinforcement Battalion had ceased to exist as a fighting unit though,
luckily, B Company was in its rear, and held up the further advance of
the enemy on that front. The loss of Steam Mill seriously threatened
the right flank of D Company, who had only just been able to beat
off the attack on its immediate front. The only battalion reserves
available were the few survivors of C Company and the Battalion H.Q.
details. Fortunately, something of the state of affairs was quickly
known at 147th Infantry Brigade H.Q., and the G.O.C. promptly placed
two companies of the 7th Battalion at the disposal of the Commanding
Officer of the 4th Battalion. Battalion H.Q. details were assembled
ready for any eventuality near the huts of the Officers’ Rest Camp,
while C Company and the companies of the 7th Battalion were warned to
be prepared to counter-attack.
About 5-30 p.m. a heavy counter-attack was launched from the north-east
towards Steam Mill, by Capt. Fenton with one and a half companies of
the 7th Battalion, and Capt. Luty with C Company. The attack met with
almost complete success. With the single exception of Steam Mill, the
whole of the ground which had been lost by the 22nd Corps Reinforcement
Battalion was regained. But Steam Mill itself was firmly held by the
enemy, and could not be retaken. Everywhere else the enemy withdrew in
confusion. During this fighting Capt. A. M. Luty was twice wounded,
once while leading his men near Steam Mill, and a second time while he
was being carried away on a stretcher. About 7-30 p.m., the Commanding
Officer was able to report to Brigade H.Q. that the situation was again
quiet.
Had the enemy been able to make a second attack, the situation would
have been serious indeed. Save for the H.Q. details, the Battalion now
had absolutely no reserves, while the companies of the 7th Battalion
which had counter-attacked had to be used to man the line formerly
held by the 22nd Corps Reinforcement Battalion. But, after the failure
of their attack, the Germans attempted nothing further that day. In
all, on April 14th, the Battalion lost one officer and 14 other ranks
killed, two officers and 51 other ranks wounded, and two other ranks
missing.
The occasional crashes of burning buildings were almost the only sounds
which disturbed the night. It was not free from alarms, but nothing
came of any of them. Towards midnight, the joyful news arrived that the
Battalion was to be relieved by troops of the 59th Division, who were
already on their way. The whole of both the 4th and 6th Battalions were
to be relieved by the 5th Battalion North Staffordshire Regt., but as
this Battalion was about 900 fighting strength, and the total effective
strength of the battalions to be relieved was only about 600, no great
difficulty was anticipated by 147th Infantry Brigade H.Q. There was,
however, considerable difficulty in handing over the line, owing to
the great extension of front which the dispersal of the 22nd Corps
Reinforcement Battalion had rendered necessary. As a result, relief
was not complete until some time after daybreak. Then the Battalion,
delighted at the prospect of a rest, moved back to a position about
half a mile south of St. Jans Cappel, where the site of a new line had
been taped out the previous day.
(_d_) St. Jans Cappel.
On being relieved in Bailleul, the 147th Infantry Brigade passed into
IX. Corps Reserve, but was to be prepared to move at half-an-hour’s
notice. The 7th Battalion was in reserve in or near St. Jans Cappel;
the 4th and 6th Battalions bivouaced in the open about a thousand yards
south of the village, where the new line had been taped. Everyone was
tired out with the exertions of the past week, and the opportunity for
a sound and unbroken sleep was welcomed. No one guessed how short
the period of rest would be.
[Illustration: _Bailleul. 12-15. 4. 18._]
A few alarming rumours came through during the day, but little was
thought of them at first. Then, about 4-30 p.m., came the order from
Brigade which disillusioned all--the Battalion was to stand to at once,
and work on the taped-out line was to be pressed on with as hard as
possible. It was hinted that this line would probably be the front
line before morning. Everyone responded with the greatest readiness
and cheerfulness. Few shovels were available, but farm implements were
seized and many of the men set to work with the long-handled spades of
the district. The Battalion was responsible for a line, about half a
mile in length, on the western side of the Bailleul--St. Jans Cappel
Road. The 6th Battalion held a similar front on the opposite side of
the road, but, apart from some Lewis guns manned by a battalion of
the Tank Corps, there appeared to be no one for several hundred yards
on the right. “When positions are taken up all ranks must definitely
understand that no withdrawal is to take place excepting under written
orders” was the Commanding Officer’s message to companies. The strength
of the Battalion was very low--only 19 officers and 307 other ranks
all told--little enough to hold half a mile of front. It was then that
the Commanding Officer, thinking the extreme urgency of the situation
warranted the step, ordered up practically the whole of B Echelon.
The night which followed was one of the most depressing in the whole
history of the Battalion. About 8-30 p.m. a message had arrived from
Brigade H.Q. to warn everyone that the 59th Division would probably
withdraw through the new line. But the message was unnecessary. The men
of the 176th Infantry Brigade were already coming along the road, and
it was clear that Bailleul, the town which the Battalion had helped to
defend for three days in spite of heavy losses, had fallen. Many of the
men of the 5th Battalion North Staffordshire Regt. stopped to assist in
the defence of the new line; but most of their Brigade passed through
to Locre to reorganise. The Battalion was again holding the front line.
Picquets were pushed out well in front, a wiring party under the 57th
Field Company, Royal Engineers, did valuable work, while through the
night the men dug hard, and by dawn there was quite a good line.
The chief anxiety was the gap in the line, on the Battalion’s right.
This was eventually filled by the 5th Battalion North Staffordshire
Regt. About 350 men of this battalion had remained in the line when the
rest of their Brigade passed through, and these were now transferred to
the right, where they took over the front under their own Commanding
Officer. But, in accordance with the instructions of the G.O.C., 147th
Infantry Brigade, Lieut.-Col. R. E. Sugden, D.S.O., retained supreme
command of that part of the front, as well as of his own battalion.
The night passed without any enemy action. At dawn the next day,
patrols pushed out well in front of the line, and located the enemy
on the Becque de la Flanche. It was certain that he would soon make
an attempt to continue his advance, but the Battalion now felt ready
for him. Quite a respectable line had been dug during the night. This
was held by B Company on the right and C Company on the left; D and
A Companies were in support on the right and left respectively; B
Echelon, which had arrived during the night, was kept at Battalion
H.Q. in reserve. As time went on movement among the enemy became more
and more pronounced, and early in the afternoon it was obvious that
an attack was imminent. Large numbers of Germans were seen dribbling
down the hedge-rows, from the direction of Bailleul, and massing about
500 or 600 yards from the Battalion front. Two companies of the 7th
Battalion had been placed at the disposal of the Commanding Officer, to
strengthen his right flank, and all ranks quietly awaited the enemy’s
move.
About 4-0 p.m. the storm burst. The desultory shelling of the earlier
part of the afternoon changed to a barrage, and large numbers of the
enemy advanced to the attack. The Battalion settled down to fight. On
the right such a hail of bullets was poured into the advancing masses
by B Company that the attack scarcely succeeded in debouching from the
hedge, behind which the assembly had been carried out. On the left C
Company, whose line was packed with Lewis guns, brought the advance
to a complete standstill 300 yards from the line. A detachment of
the 176th Light Trench Mortar Battery, which was covering the road
to Bailleul, was able to burst shell after shell in the midst of the
enemy. The attack had hardly opened before it had failed. Nowhere did
a German get within 300 yards of the British line. To the east of
the road it was much the same tale; there the 6th Battalion Duke of
Wellington’s Regt. first held up the attack by Lewis gun and rifle
fire, and then, issuing from its trenches, collected a number of
prisoners. Within half-an-hour, of the whole German regiment which
had made the attack, nothing was to be seen but the little group of
prisoners moving to the rear, and the scores of dead who littered
the battlefield. “Well done all ranks” was the message received from
the Brigadier; and “Well done old 147 Brigade” was the affectionate
greeting of Major-General N. J. G. Cameron when he received the news.
Though the men of the Battalion knew it not, this was the last attack
they were to sustain on that front. After eight days of almost
continuous fighting, they had at length succeeded in bringing the
enemy’s advance to a full stop. The line which they had started to dig
late in the afternoon of April 15th, and which they had defended so
successfully the following day, was to remain the front line until the
beginning of the victorious British advance in the late summer. Through
it the enemy was never to penetrate; and while the Battalion was in
the neighbourhood he never again tried. For the time being the Germans
had had enough of the 147th Infantry Brigade. But, at the time, the
Battalion knew nothing of all this.
The days that followed were very anxious ones. So weak was the
Battalion that it could not be expected to withstand many more attacks.
Time after time reports came in that reinforcements were coming up,
that French troops would soon be there. But as the days went by, and
the Battalion still remained in that all-important part of the line,
some began to doubt whether relief ever would come. At length one day
a French cavalry officer arrived at Battalion H.Q., and informed the
Commanding Officer that he had come for liaison purposes. His regiment
was the advanced guard of considerable numbers of French troops, and
was already bivouacing in the neighbourhood. He was authorised by his
Commanding Officer to say that, although the regiment was not intended
to take part in any fighting without orders from higher authority, if
help were needed the Battalion need only let him know and the regiment
would come.
Meanwhile the Battalion was hard at work improving the line. Patrols
were active on the front, and were seldom interfered with. Two days
after his unsuccessful attempt towards St. Jans Cappel, the enemy
launched an attack further to the west, on the front which had been
occupied by the men of the 5th Battalion North Staffordshire Regt. As
luck would have it, these had been relieved the previous night by the
2nd Battalion Argyle and Sutherland Highlanders, who gave the enemy so
warm a reception that afterwards he left that front severely alone.
During these days the Battalion was not much troubled, except by
intermittent artillery fire.
On the night of April 18/19th the Battalion was relieved by the 7th
Battalion Duke of Wellington’s Regt., and went into Brigade Reserve.
Battalion H.Q. was situated in the Convent at St. Jans Cappel which
had large, though not very strongly built cellars. The Aid Post was in
a brewery on the opposite side of the road, where considerable stocks
of beer, rather better in quality than the normal French variety, were
much appreciated. Most of the men held a new switch line, which had
been dug to the south-west of the village.
Only twenty-four hours were spent in the new location, for the next
night the whole Brigade was withdrawn into Divisional Reserve. The
Battalion was relieved by the 1st Queens and withdrew to Mont Noir;
here the only billets available, with the exception of one estaminet
occupied by Battalion H.Q., were slits in the ground.
By this time the French were coming up in force and were taking over
the whole sector. Long before dawn on the morning of April 21st, the
Battalion marched out and proceeded in the darkness, through batteries
of French 75’s which were already in action, to a hutment camp on
the top of Mont des Cats. Here the men slept until the middle of the
afternoon. It was the first real piece of comfort they had had since
they were hurried into battle nearly two weeks before.
(_e_) Poperinghe.
The Battalion only stopped on Mont des Cats for a few hours and then it
moved off to Poperinghe. On the way, it passed the G.O.C., IX. Corps,
who had come to take a last look at the men who had served him so
well. Though a sorry remnant of the Battalion, which had embussed so
cheerfully at Reninghelst only twelve days before, they were well worth
a second glance. Ragged, unshaven and unkempt, with nothing clean about
them but their rifles, bayonets and ammunition, they were yet a body
of veterans whom anyone would have been proud to command. Thrown into
the battle when the enemy was flushed with success, they had fought and
beaten him time after time. It was the proud boast of the Battalion
that it had never withdrawn without definite orders to do so, and that
the enemy had never won from it an inch of ground.
Messages of thanks and congratulations had poured in to the Brigade
from all quarters--from the Commander-in-Chief, from General Plumer,
and from the IX. Corps. The G.O.C., 34th Division, on parting with the
147th Infantry Brigade, wrote to the G.O.C., 49th Division, in the
following terms:--
“The G.O.C., 34th Division, wishes to place on record his great
appreciation of the services rendered by 147th Infantry Brigade
during the period it has been attached to the Division under his
command. The action of the 4th Battalion Duke of Wellington’s
South of the Lys on 10th April, the skilful rearguard fighting
under cover of which the Division withdrew from the Nieppe
position, the stubborn defence of the right of the Division at
Steam Mill (S. of Bailleul) and the complete defeat of a whole
German Regiment on the 16th April, are exploits of which the
Brigade may well be proud.
Throughout the period the steadiness, gallantry and endurance of
all ranks has been worthy of the highest traditions of British
Infantry and the G.O.C., 34th Division, is proud to have had
such troops under his command.”
At Poperinghe the Battalion was housed in the Rest Camp by the Railway
Station, but most of the officers slept in the Convent not far away. No
training was attempted. The men were given as much rest as possible.
Time was spent in reorganisation, of which every company stood much in
need. A draft, about two hundred strong, joined the Battalion; but this
was not sufficient to bring it to full strength, for over four hundred
casualties had been suffered during the past fortnight. Here the 147th
Infantry Brigade came again under the 49th Division, as did also the
148th Infantry Brigade.
The days were fairly peaceful, but the nights were rather disturbed by
high velocity guns, which fired into the town. During the last night,
several bombing planes visited Poperinghe and caused great excitement.
Some bombs were dropped very near the camp, one in particular narrowly
missing the Battalion Transport and stampeding some of the animals.
It was fully realised that the period of rest would almost certainly be
short. The Germans had already captured the low range of hills about
Neuve Eglise, and it was certain they would make a bid for the chain,
of which Mont Kemmel is the highest point. Hence, there was little
surprise when, early in the morning of April 25th, the Battalion was
put on half-an-hour’s notice to move.
(_f_) Kemmel.[18]
About 8-45 a.m. on April 25th, the order to move arrived. The Brigade
was proceeding at once to Ouderdom in support of the 9th Division. The
Battalion was to move by march route as it was to remain in Brigade
Reserve, but motor buses were provided for all the rest of the Brigade.
However, so quickly did the Battalion fall in and move off that it
arrived at Ouderdom long before the buses appeared.
The situation was very obscure. A great battle was in progress to the
south and it was believed that the enemy had captured Mont Kemmel; but
nothing was definitely known. The 6th and 7th Battalions were moved
forward to form a defensive flank from Beaver Corner to Millekruisse,
as the Cheapside Line was thought still to be in British hands; but
touch had been completely lost with the troops on the right. All that
day the Battalion remained inactive in the fields near Ouderdom. They
were little troubled, except by an occasional aeroplane. One of these
dropped a bomb which caused one or two casualties, but otherwise the
Battalion escaped unscathed.
In the evening the Battalion moved up to positions in some old trenches
a little to the north of Millekruisse, and here it settled down for
the night. But it was not to rest for long. About 2-30 a.m., Major A.
L. Mowat arrived from 147th Infantry Brigade H.Q. with orders for an
immediate attack. The situation and details were as follows:--
1. A big counter-attack was to be launched, by French troops on
the right and the 25th Division on the left, to recapture Mont
Kemmel and establish a line to the south of it.
2. The Battalion was to co-operate on the left of the 25th
Division. It was to assemble on the Cheapside Line and attack
in a south-easterly direction, on a front of about six hundred
yards, with the trench system on the York Road as its objective.
3. In the event of the 25th Division not being able to advance,
the Battalion was to conform to its line.
4. Zero hour was fixed for 4-25 a.m., when a creeping barrage
would come down.
From the Battalion point of view, this operation was extremely
difficult. No one had any knowledge of the ground, and the assembly was
to take place and the attack to open before dawn. As the companies were
much below full strength, the Commanding Officer decided to attack on a
three-company frontage--B Company was to attack on the right, D Company
in the centre, and A Company on the left. C Company was in support,
and was to advance about two hundred yards in rear of the assaulting
troops.
At once the Battalion fell in and marched off. Owing to the darkness
of the night and the fact that everyone was completely ignorant of the
ground, companies did not quite reach their assembly positions by zero
hour, but were drawn up about the line of the Kemmelbeke. At 4-25 a.m.
the barrage--a very thin one--opened, and the Battalion advanced. It
passed through a deserted camp and came to a road, along the line of
which were some old trenches. These had been occupied by the enemy, but
he retired when the British advanced. The trenches were occupied and a
halt was made there. This was due to the failure of the next battalion
to advance.
The 74th Infantry Brigade of the 25th Division was attacking on the
Battalion’s right. One of its battalions did extremely well, forcing
its way right into Kemmel village, and taking about 150 prisoners
there. But the battalion on the immediate right of B Company failed
to get forward. The 4th Battalion had met with very little resistance
up to that time. Enemy machine gun fire was extremely heavy, but, as
the morning was misty, very few casualties were caused by it at first.
There is no doubt that the Battalion could have advanced further
without much difficulty, but its orders were to conform to the 25th
Division, and, as the men on its right were not advancing, it halted.
For several hours it was believed that the line of Sackville Street had
been reached, and this was the situation reported by the Commanding
Officer to Brigade H.Q. at 5.5 a.m. Later it was found that the men had
only got as far as Cheapside.
For about an hour things were comparatively quiet, except for enemy
machine gun fire. Soon after 6-0 a.m. the battalion on the right began
to withdraw, and before long the situation was becoming serious on that
flank. The mist had cleared considerably, and the enemy was making
better use of his machine guns. Taking advantage of the weakness of the
troops there, he began to work round the Battalion’s right flank, by
Beaver Corner and R.E. Farm. To cope with this menace, first half, and
later the whole, of C Company had to be sent over to the right to form
a defensive flank, facing south-west. On the rest of the Battalion
front there was little anxiety. All three companies were well in touch,
and A Company was connected up with the 9th Battalion King’s Own
Yorkshire Light Infantry (21st Division) on its left. Enemy machine gun
fire was heavy, but the troops had good cover.
As time went on, the situation on the right became more and more
serious. Here enemy machine gun fire was particularly heavy, and his
sniping very accurate. He was making determined attempts to advance to
the west of the Milky Way, and there was great danger that he might
get across the Battalion’s line of retreat. The whole of C Company
had been committed to the defence of this flank, and later, two guns
of the Machine Gun Company and a detachment of the 147th Light Trench
Mortar Battery had also been sent up. Thus, the whole available
battalion reserve, except a few H.Q. details, was engaged. C Company
had done some very useful work. They had driven the enemy from R.E.
Farm, though they were unable to occupy it themselves; but they were
suffering heavily from the enemy’s very accurate sniping. At 9-25 a.m.
a message was sent to the 6th Battalion asking it to send up a company
to reinforce the right.
By about 11-0 a.m. the strength of C Company had been very much
reduced. Man after man had been shot in the head by enemy snipers,
among the casualties being Pte. A. Poulter, the stretcher-bearer who
had so greatly distinguished himself two weeks before at Erquinghem.
Lieut. W. G. Mackie, who was commanding C Company, was also wounded,
and Sec.-Lieut. T. T. Gilroy assumed command. Soon after noon, two
platoons of the 6th Battalion arrived and were sent up to strengthen
C Company. This helped to restore the situation on the right flank,
and, for a time, things were much quieter, though the enemy sniping and
machine gun fire continued.
It was hoped that the 25th Division would take action to restore the
situation on its left, and about 1-30 p.m. a message was received that
a battalion of the South Lancashire Regt. was coming up to get in touch
there. Meanwhile, there was great difficulty in supplying the forward
troops with ammunition, owing to the heavy fire kept up by the enemy.
Everything had to be carried across the open, and there was very little
cover. In this connection, splendid work was done by some of the H.Q.
batmen, who crawled up to the line with bandoliers slung over their
backs.
During the afternoon the enemy made a further attempt to work round the
right flank. Considerable numbers of them were seen moving along the
side of a hedge, but the situation was satisfactorily dealt with by C
Company. Sec.-Lieut. T. T. Gilroy had seen them himself. He quickly got
two Vickers guns into position, and, when the enemy appeared at a gap
in the hedge, so heavy a fire was opened at close range that the party
was almost wiped out. This was the last attempt to advance that the
enemy made that day.
By this time the discovery had been made that the Battalion was
not in Sackville Street at all, but in Cheapside. This was at once
reported to 147th Infantry Brigade H.Q., as it altered the situation
considerably. The battalion of South Lancashires had come up, but was
halted by the Milky Way and did not go into action. It was now night.
Arrangements were made for wiring and other work to be done on the
front; but this was not to be. The higher authorities had realised
that the counter-attack had failed, and had decided to withdraw the
troops, who had carried it out, from their advanced positions. About
11-0 p.m., the order for the withdrawal was received, and the operation
began at 12-30 a.m. All went smoothly. The night was dark and the enemy
remained inactive. A Company withdrew first, and was followed by the
others in order from left to right, C Company moving last and bringing
out with them the few men who were left of the next battalion. All the
ammunition, which had been sent up during the day, was got away. The
Battalion moved back along the Milky Way, through the line held by the
6th Battalion, and reoccupied the same positions near Millekruisse
which it had left in the early morning of April 26th.
For the next two days the enemy made no further infantry attack,
but his artillery was often active, particularly round Millekruisse
cross roads. Not far from this spot Sec.-Lieut J. C. Whitaker, of A
Company, was killed by a shell on April 28th. There can be no doubt
that, between April 25th and 29th, the Germans were replenishing their
ammunition dumps, and making preparations for their next big attack.
During this time the Battalion was in Brigade Reserve. Much work was
done on a new line a little to the south of Millekruisse, and A Company
moved up to garrison it. Otherwise, there was no change in dispositions.
On April 28th the enemy put down a heavy barrage on the British front,
from 7-30 p.m. to 9-0 p.m., and desultory shelling continued through
the night. About 3-0 a.m. on the morning of April 29th this suddenly
changed to a barrage, the intensity and depth of which can seldom have
been equalled. From Mont Vidaigne on the right to Zillebeke Lake on
the left, the whole front was ablaze. On the sector held by the 147th
Infantry Brigade the whole country, from the front line to beyond
Ouderdom, was deluged with shells. High explosive and gas literally
rained down everywhere. Practically the first shell of the bombardment
burst in the roof of the farm house, which was occupied by Battalion
H.Q., and mortally wounded both the orderly room clerks; the R.S.M.,
who was in the same room, had a wonderful escape, and fragments
actually penetrated the roof of the cellar, in which the Commanding
Officer was sleeping at the time. By a great stroke of luck the barrage
almost entirely missed the front line, so that its garrison, though
extremely uncomfortable, was practically unharmed. No one doubted that
this was the prelude to another mighty attack.
After about two hours of this bombardment, the German infantry advanced
in great numbers to the attack. They gained nothing. Caught by the
British barrage, mown down by Lewis gun and rifle fire, they suffered
enormous casualties. It is said that, on one part of the front, they
were so demoralised that they put out a white flag and tried to come
in, but could not pass through the barrage. On the whole front attacked
they only gained a footing in the allied line in two places, and from
both of these they were ejected almost immediately by counter-attacks.
All this time the barrage continued.
Meanwhile, the Battalion was in Brigade Reserve, anxiously awaiting
information which could be acted upon. The Millekruisse Line had
been strengthened by the addition of D Company, but B and C Companies
were both available for any action. All telephone lines had been
broken within a few minutes of the opening of the bombardment, and it
was extremely difficult to obtain any news. Lieut. J. C. Walton, the
Battalion Intelligence Officer, was sent up to get in touch with the
H.Q. of the 7th Battalion, which was in the line; but he was blown to
pieces by a shell before he had gone more than two hundred yards. About
7-0 a.m. it was learned from wounded men who had come down, that the
7th Battalion had been heavily attacked, but that they had held their
ground and still had a company in reserve. On receipt of this news,
the Commanding Officer immediately communicated with Brigade H.Q.,
asking whether he should send a company to assist them. About 9-0 a.m.
a wounded N.C.O. of the 7th Battalion reported a fresh massing of the
enemy for the attack. Lieut.-Col. Sugden waited no longer, but at once
ordered up B Company to reinforce. Though the barrage was almost as
thick as ever, the company succeeded in finding a route by which it
reached its objective with very few casualties. It arrived just in
time to stop an urgent message which was being sent, asking for the
assistance of a company. But the reinforcements were never required.
The worst of the battle was over. After two violent attacks all along
the front, the enemy made only local and spasmodic efforts for the rest
of the day. His force was broken; he had been beaten to a standstill;
and he had gained--nothing. As the Divisional Commander wrote shortly
after--“It was a great day for British Arms.”
The battle of April 29th was far more than an ordinary defeat for the
enemy. It was the final collapse of his offensive. During the next
three months he was to launch other great attacks against the French,
further to the south. But never again was he to try conclusions with
the British in a great battle, until they took the initiative into
their own hands, and, after driving him headlong from position after
position, forced him to sue for an armistice from the men he had
professed to despise. For the second time in less than three weeks the
147th Infantry Brigade had assisted in bringing the German attack to a
standstill, and had consolidated and held a line which was to remain
unbroken until all lines were left behind in the victorious advance of
the autumn.
The following days were uneventful. Work continued on the Millekruisse
Line, in which two companies were now permanently stationed. B Company
remained under the orders of the 7th Battalion. Enemy artillery was
active, but was as nothing compared with the barrage of April 29th. The
147th Infantry Brigade was strengthened by the temporary addition of
a composite battalion, made up of the remnants of the 146th Infantry
Brigade and the 19th Lancashire Fusiliers, each battalion furnishing
one company. Among the many congratulatory messages, which poured in
after the victory of April 29th, not the least appreciated was one from
the G.O.C., IX. Corps, who had not forgotten the work of the 147th
Infantry Brigade while serving under his command so recently.
On the night of May 1/2nd the Battalion relieved the 7th Battalion Duke
of Wellington’s Regt. on the left of the Brigade Sector. The front
held was a peculiar one, and lay almost at right angles to the general
line. Its left rested almost on Cheapside, where A Company had been on
April 26th. From that point it ran nearly due north to and across the
Kemmelbeke, and then turned at right angles across the Milky Way. Three
companies held this line, the men occupying small slits in the ground;
the fourth and a company of the 6th Battalion, which had been relieved
by the 146th Composite Battalion, were in support. There was still
plenty of hostile shelling but it was very scattered, and the little
slits in the ground were difficult targets to hit.
The labours and troubles of the Battalion were now nearly over for
the time being. A French Army had come up and was gradually taking
over the front, along the chain of hills. On the night of May 3/4th
the Battalion was relieved by the 3rd Battalion, 80th Infantry Regt.,
of the 32nd French Division. This Battalion, which was very strong,
took over the whole front of the 147th Infantry Brigade. They were a
magnificent body of men, and the British were much struck with their
fine appearance. While the relief was in progress some anxiety was
caused by a heavy enemy bombardment, but, apart from this, everything
went smoothly. Capt. Fenton, with a few N.C.O’s, was left in the line
for twenty-four hours to assist the French; and the Battalion started
on its march through the night to a well-earned rest.
It was daylight before the first halting-place was reached. This was a
camp which, it was rumoured, had recently been occupied by a Chinese
Labour Company. This fact did not altogether commend itself to the
Battalion, but all men were so weary that it scarcely disturbed their
sleep. In the afternoon a short march brought the Battalion to a
hutment camp at St. Jans ter Biezen, where the rest period was to be
spent.
* * * * *
The part taken by the Battalion, in what is generally known as the
Battle of the Lys, is the most glorious chapter in its history. Never
before nor since did the men fight so long continuously, nor against
such overwhelming odds. They faced the enemy in the full flush of his
successes on the Somme, when his morale was at its highest. They fought
him again and again, and never yielded an inch of ground in battle.
They taught him that he was no match for a British soldier, either in
attack or in defence. They helped to pave the way for his crushing
defeat a few months later.
And the men learned many things too. They learned that the German
will never push home an assault in the face of a really determined
resistance; that infantry fire alone is sufficient to stop his most
violent attacks. In the many engagements that they fought during April,
1918, no man of them ever used a bayonet, for never did the enemy reach
their lines. They learned too--those of them who did not know it well
before--that the spade, almost as much as the rifle, is the infantry
man’s weapon. And, perhaps most valuable lesson of all, they learned
that what appear to be the blackest and most hopeless situations can be
restored by men, if only they possess the necessary determination.
Throughout the most trying and uncomfortable conditions all ranks
continued cheerful, and morale never declined. In spite of appalling
casualties, the Battalion never became in the least disorganised.
Camaraderie and good-fellowship were never more conspicuous. Though
the Battalion was only about three hundred strong, a draft of two
hundred was incorporated so thoroughly that the men of it fought, only
two or three days later, as if they had never served with any other
unit.
[Illustration: _Kemmel_
26. 4. 18.]
The Transport and Stores too did magnificent work. Frequently shelled,
and on one occasion at least under machine gun fire, constantly on the
move and often surrounded by disorder, they carried on their work in
a way which earned the admiration of everyone. At a time when one was
continually hearing of battalions who had had no rations for days,
the 4th Battalion had never lived in such plenty. There is no doubt
that this happy state of affairs increased the fighting efficiency of
everyone enormously.
The work of the 49th Division, in which the Battalion had played no
inconsiderable a part, was recognised on all sides. On the night of
April 29th, the Commander-in-Chief expressed himself in the following
terms:--
“I desire to express my appreciation of the very valuable and
gallant services performed by troops of the 49th (West Riding)
Division since the entry of the 147th Infantry Brigade into the
battle of Armentiéres. The courage and determination showed by
this Division has played no small part in checking the enemy’s
advance, and I wish to convey to General Cameron and to all
officers and men under his command my thanks for all that they
have done.”
Among the many other messages, too numerous for reproduction, which
were received, the following, expressed in the inimitable manner of the
French, deserves special notice:--
“The G.O.C., 2nd Cavalry Corps, warmly congratulates the brave
British troops who have heroically assisted in the defence of
the chain of hills, and who, by their admirable resistance have
broken down the enemy’s effort and barred the way to Dunkerque.
Shelterless under a bombardment of the heaviest description,
surrounded by poisonous gases of various description, stubbornly
disputing every foot of ground, they have held their own against
repeated attacks by greatly superior numbers, and though at
first overwhelmed by weight of numbers they were obliged to
give ground, they have inflicted such heavy losses on the enemy
that his forces have been exhausted.
Once more the Germans have seen their hopes dashed to the
ground. France will remember that.
Robillot.”
It was a matter of the deepest regret to all that the 49th Division
could not work as a whole during a great part of the operations; and
none felt it more than General Cameron. In the confidential summary
of operations, which he circulated a few days after the Division was
withdrawn from the battle, one can clearly see his disappointment that
this should have been so. One can also distinguish clearly his pride
in the record of his men on so many different fronts. The concluding
paragraph of that summary, as looking to the future, may fittingly end
this chapter:--
“The reputation which you have won for courage, determination
and efficiency, during recent operations, has its very joyous
aspect, and it is deeply precious to us all.
It has also a serious aspect for us.
It lays on each one of us a great responsibility--a personal
responsibility for doing all he can to ensure that the next time
the Division is engaged it will perform even better service than
it has in the past.
We shall shortly, we hope, be filling up with new men.
Let every old hand put his shoulder to the wheel in the task
of instilling into our new blood the spirit of courage,
determination and efficiency which has carried you through your
recent trial so successfully.
Never fail to impress on all new hands what the rifle and
bayonet can do in the hands of a determined British soldier who
knows how to look after them and use them.
N. G. Cameron, Major-General.”