THE LAST STAGE.
(_a_) Movements and Training.
On the 23rd of August the Battalion moved by light railway to Proven,
and from thence by train to Audruicq. From there it marched to billets
in Nielles-lez-Ardres--some of the finest it had ever occupied. The
weather was glorious, the country delightful, and a pleasant spell of
rest and training was anticipated. But great events were happening in
the south. On August 8th the Fourth Army, with a French army on its
right, had started a brilliant offensive south of the Somme; when the
situation became more or less stationary there, the Third Army had
taken up the attack further north; and now it was time for the First
Army to play its part. Fresh troops were needed and the 49th Division
was ordered south. Moving from Nortkerque to Wavrans by train, the
Battalion went into billets at Siracourt and Beauvois. There it had its
first experience of training with tanks. A few days later it bussed
to Camblain L’Abbé, where it occupied a hutment camp for nearly a
fortnight.
At Camblain L’Abbé Brig.-General C. G. Lewes, C.M.G., D.S.O., left
the Brigade which he had commanded for almost exactly two years. He
had come to it in the latter days of the Somme battle, but was now
appointed to a home command. He had been a good friend to the Battalion
and there were many regrets when it paraded to say farewell. The men
were drawn up in a hollow square and addressed by the G.O.C., who
thanked them for their loyal support in the past and wished them the
best of luck in the future. He left amid ringing cheers. Brig.-General
H. H. S. Morant, D.S.O., who had formerly commanded a Brigade of the
1st Division, assumed command of the 147th Infantry Brigade.
The time at Camblain L’Abbé was well and pleasantly spent. Much
training in the attack was carried out under the supervision of the
new Brigadier. Various divisional concert parties at the Corps Theatre
provided welcome relaxation; and the excellent Officers’ Club, under
the management of the Canadian E.F.C., was well patronised. Perhaps the
most criticised part of the local arrangements was the exceptionally
hard type of wire bed in use in the camp; all who slept there will
remember these.
On September 13th the 49th Division took over the line immediately
north of the River Scarpe, and the Battalion moved to Roclincourt,
where it was in divisional reserve. Time still passed pleasantly. Tanks
were again to the fore in training. An inter-company Rugby football
competition was played, and provoked much enthusiasm. The 147th
Infantry Brigade never went into the front line here. After about ten
days, the 49th Division was relieved by the 51st Division, and the
Battalion moved to Feuchy.
“Old timers” saw in Feuchy some resemblance to the Johnstone’s Post of
Somme memory--but without the shelling. There was the same chalk soil,
and similar shelters and dugouts were built on the sides of a similar
valley. Accommodation was not of the best. Feuchy was in the middle of
the country over which the battle of Arras had been fought in 1917, and
the Battalion area was almost where the British front line had been for
about five months of the summer of 1918; so good billets could hardly
be expected. On the whole the weather was good, and the neighbourhood
ideal for training. The River Scarpe, with its surrounding marshes, was
useful, not only for swimming, but more than once for the working out
of bridge-head schemes. One night all officers and platoon sergeants
carried out a rather intricate compass march which will not soon be
forgotten, particularly by those who, at one point, found themselves
sitting on horses’ backs in a wide trench. Altogether the time at
Feuchy passed very happily.
Meanwhile, things were moving so quickly that, almost daily, one
looked for fresh victories. On August 26th the First Army had attacked
on both sides of the Scarpe and on that, and the following days, the
British line had been pushed forward some miles, particularly south
of the river. On September 2nd the Canadian Corps had broken right
through the famous Drocourt--Queant Line, south of the river, and had
pushed on almost to the Canal du Nord. On September 27th the passage
of that great obstacle was forced, and, during the next few days, the
high ground to the north of Cambrai was seized and held after terrific
fighting.
The time had come for the 49th Division to play its part in the final
adventure. On October 6th came the orders to move. When, late in the
afternoon, B Echelon, under the command of Major W. C. Fenton, M.C.,
marched out en route for the Divisional Reception Camp at Mont St.
Eloi, the Battalion knew that at last it was for battle; and perhaps,
during all its years of active service, it had never been fitter.
An hour or two later the Battalion,[20] over 650 strong, moved off
and, in the darkness, bussed through the historic Queant--the pivotal
point of the Hindenburg Line--to the neighbourhood of Buissy, where
it bivouaced. For two days it lay idle. Its exact role had not yet
been definitely settled. So unlikely did a move seem on the morning of
October 9th that the adjutant, and most of the company commanders, rode
up to reconnoitre the forward area. They rode on and on, until they
came to the point where they expected to find the front line; it was
occupied by a battery of 6-inch howitzers. Then they heard the news.
Cambrai had fallen that morning, and the Canadians were already well
beyond it. In haste they returned, only to meet the Battalion already
two miles forward on the road. Beyond the Canal du Nord was a sight to
be remembered by anyone who had seen the same ground on the previous
day. Then the country had been covered with transport lines, the camps
of ammunition columns, and all the details to be found immediately
behind the line. Now it was deserted, save for the few odd men left
behind to clear up. While over the hill in front, in that rolling
grass-covered country, line after line and column after column could be
seen moving slowly towards the east. The whole B.E.F. seemed to be on
the march.
[Illustration: Lieut.-Col. A. L. MOWAT, D.S.O., M.C.]
The night was spent in some deserted enemy shelters and dugouts, in a
sunken road to the west of Sancourt. Arriving after dark, there was
little opportunity to make oneself comfortable. The following morning
passed quietly but, about 1-0 p.m., came the orders to move again.
Early in the afternoon the Battalion started. It crossed the Canal de
l’Escaut at Escaudœuvres--the bridge had been in enemy hands barely
twenty-four hours before, but he had left too hurriedly to destroy it.
Yet he had found time wantonly to destroy in his usual manner; the
houses were full of furniture senselessly damaged--chairs broken to
bits, feather beds ripped open, crockery and glass lying smashed on the
floors. An occasional shell was still falling as the Battalion marched
through the village.
A halt was made by the railway embankment to the east of the village.
Rifles were piled, hot tea was served, and the men lay down to get
what rest they could. As darkness fell the scene was one never to be
forgotten--the long rows of piled arms, the hundreds of men lying
around sleeping or talking in whispers, the occasional glimmer of a
light. It was a scene such as one sees in pictures of old-time warfare,
and perhaps nothing showed more plainly that the long wearisome days
of trench warfare were past. The stars shone brightly overhead and, to
complete the picture, a small group of Canadian machine gunners sang
song after song in the gloom.
(_b_) October 11th and After.
About 8-0 p.m. the Commanding Officer was summoned to Brigade H.Q. He
was away for about two hours and, on his return, all officers were
summoned. By the light of three candles stuck in the ground, he marked
upon each officer’s map the objectives and boundaries of the attack
which was to be delivered the next morning, and then explained the plan
of operations:--
1. The Battalion was to assemble and dig in before dawn on the
line of the Iwuy--Rieux Road, on a frontage of about 500 yards.
The 7th Battalion Duke of Wellington’s Regt., with its right
on the Naves--Villers-en-Cauchies Road, would attack on the
Battalion’s right; the 146th Infantry Brigade on its left.
2. A Company was to be on the right and D Company on the left.
B and C Companies were to be in support on the right and left
respectively.
3. It was believed that the enemy was too shaken to put up a
vigorous resistance. Hence it had been decided to attack without
any artillery support.
4. At 9-0 a.m. the attack was to begin, the first objective
being the railway line midway between Avesnes-le-Sec and
Villers-en-Cauchies, and the second objective the high ground
east of the La Selle River.
The attack was part of a very big operation on a wide front and the
task of the 49th Division was a most important one. Opposite to the
Battalion’s front, with its crest line about a mile from the assembly
position, lay a long ridge. This was held by the enemy. The Canadians
were to make an attack on the ridge that very night. If they succeeded,
the Battalion would advance through them the next morning, and the
first part of its task would be easy. But if they failed, the ridge
must be captured by the Battalion, on its way to the first objective.
_The ridge must be taken at all costs._ This was the definite
order of the Divisional Commander. It was a point of extreme tactical
importance, and its possession by the enemy was holding up the whole
flank of the attack. Such were the orders issued by the Commanding
Officer.
An advanced party was sent forward to reconnoitre routes to the
assembly positions. Tea was served out and the Battalion waited only
for rations to arrive. Time passed, there was no sign of the convoy,
and the Commanding Officer became very anxious. It was imperative for
the men to reach their assembly positions and dig in before dawn.
The Battalion was on the point of moving off rationless when the
limbers were announced. The delay had been no fault of the transport.
Throughout the operations they always served the Battalion well. But
the roads were crowded with vehicles of all kinds, and they had had
to fetch the rations from a great distance. It was simply one of the
difficulties which had to be faced in the new warfare of movement.
Shortly after midnight the Battalion moved off. It passed through
Naves, which was thick with mustard gas, and was met about a thousand
yards beyond by Battalion scouts, who had gone forward to reconnoitre
the routes. Leaving the roads, companies crossed the Erclin River
at points where the bed was dry, and moved independently to their
positions of assembly. These were not reached without difficulty.
The night was very dark and the ground strange. Troops of the 146th
Infantry Brigade were using the same route, and there was some
confusion. To make matters worse, the enemy put down a fairly heavy
counter-preparation on the field which the companies were crossing, and
about ten men were wounded. But, by 4-0 a.m., all were up and digging
in. Everything was quiet when daylight came, and the hours dragged
slowly on.
From the road on which the Battalion was assembled, the ground sloped
gently upwards to the ridge, already mentioned. The land between was
mostly under cultivation and afforded no cover to attacking troops.
Near the top of the ridge was a stack of bean straw which formed a
very useful landmark, as it was almost on the boundary between the two
companies. The night attack of the Canadians had been unsuccessful
and the enemy still held the all-important position. It was therefore
decided that the first hour of the attack should be supported by a
thick barrage. For half-an-hour this was to fall on the crest of the
ridge; after that, it would move forward at the rate of 100 yards in
three minutes for a further half hour. This information did not arrive
at Battalion H.Q. until about 8-20 a.m., and there was barely time to
inform the attacking troops before zero hour.
At 9-0 a.m., prompt to the second, the British artillery opened fire
and the Battalion went “over the top.” The advance was magnificent.
Never, either in action or at training, had it been done better.
In artillery formation, with sections in file and keeping perfect
intervals, the men went quietly and steadily forward. If there were
a fault, it was that of over-eagerness. The leading troops advanced
rather faster than had been expected, and they were on the top of the
ridge before their barrage had lifted.
Almost immediately the enemy barrage came down, consisting mainly
of high explosive. Fortunately, the bulk of it fell just behind the
assembly position and did little harm. Then the enemy machine guns
opened, and these caused more trouble than the artillery. Sections
were forced to extend in order to minimise casualties, but the rate of
advance was scarcely affected. Near the straw stack on the hill, Sergt.
A. Loosemore, V.C., D.C.M., of A Company, went down, shot through both
legs; and the Battalion thus lost a magnificent leader who was liked
by every one and almost worshipped by the men of his platoon. By 9-45
a.m. all four companies had disappeared from view over the crest line.
The enemy’s artillery fire had weakened considerably, many prisoners
were coming in, in charge of lightly wounded men, and everything
seemed to be going well. Battalion H.Q. moved up from the position it
had occupied in the dried-up bed of the River Erclin, and temporarily
established itself on the road where the Battalion had assembled. The
Commanding Officer immediately went forward to the crest of the ridge
to see for himself how the attack was progressing.
The Battalion was now meeting with much stiffer resistance and the
advance had become slower. The British barrage had ceased and the enemy
was better able to get his machine guns into action. Ground could now
only be gained by infiltration, and by manœuvring sections round the
flanks of enemy posts. Casualties were becoming heavier. At one point
the attacking infantry came up against field guns, firing point blank
at them. The 7th Battalion on the right was also meeting with strong
opposition from the enemy in the village of Villers-en-Cauchies. But
the advance still went on. The field guns were captured. It seemed as
if the resistance would gradually be worn down.
Then, about 10-45 a.m., came the great enemy counter-attack. Appearing
from the low ground to the south of Avesnes-le-Sec enemy tanks, eight
in number, advanced against the attacking troops. All men of the
Battalion agree that these tanks were of German pattern, and not
captured British ones. The main force of their first attack fell upon
the 146th Infantry Brigade on the left, which gave way before them and
began to retire. Capt. R. B. Broster of C Company and Sec.-Lieut. H.
Rosendale of D Company were shot down by machine gun fire from a tank,
whilst trying to rally the left flank. Sec.-Lieut. T. E. Jessop of A
Company, with the greatest gallantry, collected several Lewis guns and,
by a concentration of their fire, actually forced one tank to withdraw.
He was seriously wounded a little later and was carried to safety by
the men of his platoon. An unknown man of C Company was seen running
behind another tank, bomb in hand, trying to find an opening into which
to throw it; he too was shot down. Capt. W. Grantham of B Company
was so seriously wounded that he died a few weeks later--a prisoner
in enemy hands. But all was of no avail. With its left flank “in the
air,” heavily pressed by the tanks in front, with no artillery--almost
the only weapon which would have been effective--to support it, the
Battalion began to withdraw. The withdrawal was slow and there was no
panic. But all the hard-won ground, with its killed and wounded, its
field guns and other trophies, was lost.
The Battalion halted a little in front of the road from which it had
started little more than two hours before. All companies had become
hopelessly mixed; the 6th Battalion, which had advanced in rear of the
attacking troops, had become engaged, and its men were mingled with the
men of the 4th Battalion. Furthermore, men from the battalions on the
flanks had also wandered into the area in the confusion. The enemy,
following hard on the rear of his tanks, had reoccupied the ridge, and
was getting his machine guns again into action. His tanks, however, did
not appear over the crest of the ridge; perhaps they were satisfied
with the success gained, and feared to come into view of the British
artillery. There was intense disappointment and not a little confusion
everywhere.
Into the midst of this confusion the Commanding Officer threw himself.
By his presence, personal energy, and utter disregard for danger, he
quickly restored order. Time did not allow of separating the men into
their proper companies, but officers and N.C.O’s, assuming command
of whatever men were near them, including men of other battalions,
resolved confusion into order, disappointment into hope; and the
Battalion was a fighting force again. Then it advanced to the attack
once more.
This second advance was not so orderly as the first had been, but, in
some ways it was, perhaps, finer. Without a gun to support it, through
a hail of machine gun bullets, with men falling in scores, the line
went forward. The Colonel led, his Battalion followed. “_The ridge
must be taken at all costs._” Those had been the words of the
Divisional Commander the night before. And Lieut.-Col. Mowat and his
men meant to take that ridge. Slowly, at first by section rushes and
later, when casualties became heavier and heavier, by infiltration,
they pressed on towards the crest. Conditions were much worse, in every
way, than they had been earlier in the day. Losses were appalling.
Sec.-Lieuts. J. E. Bentley and H. M. Marsden, both of A Company, with
many N.C.O’s and men, went down. But the advance never stopped. For a
time the enemy maintained his position well, but, as the attack came
nearer and nearer, his resistance began to weaken, and at length he
gave way and retired. For the second time that day, about 1-0 p.m., the
ridge was won. But at what a cost! Of the Battalion, over 650 strong,
which had bivouaced by the railway at Escaudœuvres on the previous
evening, little more than 250 remained.
The rest of the day passed comparatively quietly. The enemy made no
further attempt to restore the situation, but any movement on the
ridge was promptly shelled. There was much work to be done. During the
afternoon the 6th Battalion was withdrawn to reorganise as Brigade
Reserve. Companies were reorganised, their own men returning to them,
and rectifications were made in the line. For a time there was some
anxiety about the left flank, the next Brigade not being so far forward
as the Battalion; this was, to some extent, met by sending up two H.Q.
Lewis gun teams to strengthen that flank. In all this reorganisation
Capt. A. Kirk, M.C., of A Company, was the right-hand man of the
Commanding Officer. He established his Company H.Q. by the, now
famous, straw stack, and exercised a general supervision over the whole
of the front line.
When darkness fell the new line had been firmly established. Rain had
fallen during the afternoon, all were thoroughly weary, and a deep
sense of disappointment oppressed everyone. No one yet understood
how great a success had really been gained; this it remained for the
morning to show.
During the night active preparations were in progress for the advance
to be continued the next day. The 6th Battalion relieved the 7th
Battalion on the right, the latter becoming Brigade Reserve. Guns were
pushed forward in the most daring fashion--some actually into No Man’s
Land--ready to deal with hostile tanks should they again appear. The
advance was to start at 12-0 noon, under cover of a heavy barrage.
In the early hours of the morning the enemy heavily shelled the
neighbourhood of Battalion H.Q. with “whizz-bangs,” but the meaning of
this was not realised until the next morning. Actually, he was shooting
away the ammunition before withdrawing his guns to the east of the La
Selle River.
Next morning everyone was about early, though there was plenty of time
before zero hour. The damp and cold of the night, and the discomfort
of the narrow slits, which were the only cover available, were no
inducement to late rising. The sun rose bright, but a thin mist hung
about the ground. Preparations for the attack were leisurely made and
the quietness of the enemy was commented on. But it was not until an
officer’s patrol had pushed far out in front of the line, and the
Brigadier himself had ridden nearly to Villers-en-Cauchies, that the
situation was realised. The capture of the ridge on the previous day
had made the enemy’s position untenable; he had withdrawn during
the night, and all touch with him had been lost. Fresh orders were
immediately issued--the Brigade was to advance at once, without any
barrage, and make good the line of the railway which had been its first
objective the day before. On the right the 24th Division had already
started, and was well forward.
By 10-15 a.m. the Battalion was on the move. Covered by an advanced
guard, consisting of the H.Q. scouts and the remnants of a platoon of
B Company, it moved forward in artillery formation, two companies in
front and two in support. The 6th Battalion maintained the alignment
on the right, but some difficulty and delay were caused by the 146th
Infantry Brigade, which did not move on the left until some time
later. At first the advance led over the ground that had been won and
lost on the previous day. Everywhere was evidence of the stern fight
that had been made. The tracks of the tanks were clear in the grass,
and the ground was strewn with the bodies of those who had fought and
died. Only then was it realised how far the advance had, at one time,
reached. The fate of many a man was cleared up. At one point a German
machine gunner was found sitting behind his gun, dead; by his side lay
the man who had killed him, also dead, with his bayonet right through
the German’s body. The inevitable “booby trap” was also in evidence--a
brand new German machine gun, with a wire running from it to a spot a
few yards away; but there was no time to examine the appliance.
On went the Battalion, across valleys and over ridges--and never a
shell nor a bullet from the enemy. By noon the advanced guard was
almost on the railway, but here the advance was again delayed for
about half-an-hour. During the night the 51st Division had relieved
the Canadians on the left, and was to have taken part in the attack
timed for noon. Unlike the 49th Division its orders were not
cancelled, and down came its barrage, promptly to time, a number of
4.5 inch howitzer shells falling about the area which the Battalion
advanced guard had reached. However, about 12-30 p.m., the advance
was resumed. The Battalion reached its objective, the line of the
Avesnes-le-Sec--Villers-en-Cauchies Railway, without further incident
about 1-30 p.m. Orders were issued for three companies to dig in on
that line, with the fourth in reserve in a sunken road west of the
railway.
Meanwhile, the advanced guard had pushed forward more than a thousand
yards beyond the railway and had, at length, gained touch with the
enemy. On approaching Vordon Wood, near the La Selle River, it was met
by rifle and machine gun fire, not only from the wood in front but also
from a small copse on the left flank. Numbers of the enemy were seen
on the high ground south-west of Haspres. It was obvious from the
volume of fire that the enemy was present in some strength, and that,
without support, further progress by the advanced guard was impossible.
[Illustration: _Oct. 11th. 1918._]
About 4 p.m. orders to advance and capture Vordon Wood were received.
Half-an-hour later the Battalion, preceded by an advanced guard as
before, moved forward. As the leading troops approached the wood they
were again held up by hostile fire, and had to halt until two companies
of the Battalion came up. The 146th Infantry Brigade had occupied
Avesnes-le-Sec, but had not pushed far beyond it. As a result the small
copse on the left was still held by the enemy, and seriously menaced
the attack on Vordon Wood. To counteract this the reserve company, C
Company, was moved up to form a defensive flank, facing north.
By this time darkness had fallen. The right of the wood was attacked,
and was taken without much difficulty. The enemy rearguard did not
put up much of a fight, but withdrew as soon as the situation looked
serious, leaving two prisoners in the Battalion’s hands. The wood,
though narrow, was very thick with undergrowth, and provided excellent
cover. Had they been willing to put up a better fight, the Germans
might have caused far more trouble there than they did. The left, or
northern, end of the wood lay outside the Battalion boundary, and no
attempt was made to enter it until the next day. Dispositions for the
night were taken up as follows:--
B and D Companies dug in on the eastern edge of the wood.
A Company was in support on the western edge.
C Company formed a defensive flank, facing north, from the wood
to the railway.
Battalion H.Q. dug in on the railway.
During the night a strong fighting patrol reached the La Selle River
and reconnoitred its banks for more than half a mile, without gaining
touch with the enemy.
Early the next morning it was found that the enemy had been occupying
the northern end of the wood during the night. A small party was seen
to leave it in the morning and retire towards Haspres. About 7-0 a.m.
another party of Germans approached D Company’s posts, but was driven
off by rifle and Lewis gun fire.
October 13th was, more or less, an “off” day for the Battalion. At 9-0
a.m. the 19th Battalion Lancashire Fusiliers, with the 6th Battalion
Duke of Wellington’s Regt. on its right and the 148th Infantry
Brigade on its left, attacked through the Battalion. The attack was
unsuccessful. It came under heavy artillery and machine gun fire from
the high ground east of the river, which was strongly held by the
enemy, and was unable to make any progress. Throughout the day the
Battalion maintained the positions it had won on the previous night.
Several casualties were suffered from the defensive barrage put down
by the enemy, among them being Capt. F. C. Harrison, the popular and
cheery little Medical Officer. His slit in the railway cutting was hit
by a shell, and he was so severely wounded that he died before he could
be got to the advanced dressing station. Apart from this the day was
uneventful, though there was one false alarm of tanks.
That night the ration convoy met with serious misfortune. Coming into
the village of Villers-en-Cauchies, it was heavily shelled. Company
Quartermaster Sergts. E. Walsh and B. Little, of A and B Companies
respectively, were killed. Two horses were also killed, and the rations
were scattered. Lieut. F. Irish, the Transport Officer, though himself
wounded in two places, acted with great gallantry and coolness,
and succeeded in collecting the rations and delivering them at his
destination.
The next day was warm and sunny. Not long after dawn Sec.-Lieut. E.
Maley, of C Company, was killed by a chance shell, in the rear of
the wood, while he was taking round rum to his men. Since the 148th
Infantry Brigade had come into the line it had pushed forward and
secured the Battalion’s left flank; but a gap still existed between
the two Brigades, the north end of the wood being held by no one. As
C Company was no longer necessary to form a defensive flank, it was
moved up at dusk to occupy that part of the wood and fill the gap. The
wood was very thick and tangled and bore evident signs of recent enemy
occupation; among other things, a tank had been hidden there not many
days before.
During the day, Major-General Lipsett, G.O.C. 4th Division, came up to
make a personal reconnaissance of the front, as it was expected his
division would soon relieve the 49th Division. He went right out in
front of Vordon Wood, in full view of the German posts south-west of
Haspres, was shot through the mouth by the enemy and instantly killed.
His body was brought into the British lines by Lieut. J. Spencer,
Intelligence Officer of the 147th Infantry Brigade, assisted by men of
the Battalion.
On the night of October 14/15th the Battalion was relieved by the
1/7th Battalion West Yorkshire Regt. While waiting for the completion
of the relief, Battalion H.Q. was surprised by the arrival of numbers
of French civilians on the railway. They had escaped from the village
of Saulzoir, had found their way through the lines, and were only
too pleased to be at liberty again. What to do with them was the
difficulty, and, in the midst of the excitement, the enemy opened up
on the railway with mustard gas shells. This caused much anxiety for a
time, but eventually they were got to the rear, apparently unharmed.
When the line had finally been taken over the Battalion withdrew into
divisional reserve, in the fields south-west of Avesnes-le-Sec, where
there were some old enemy shelters and dugouts.
For two days the Battalion rested. Accommodation was very poor, but
at such a time no one was particularly fanciful. What all wanted
was rest--the chance of lying down without the probability of being
awakened in a few minutes to stand to. For five days and nights there
had been little rest for anyone, and all were thoroughly done up. There
were no parades and no working parties. Sometimes the enemy shelled the
locality, and a few casualties were suffered.
On the night of October 16/17th the Battalion went back into the line,
taking over the front which it had previously held, with the addition
of some three or four hundred yards on the right. Three companies
were needed to hold this line, and even then it was very thinly held.
Battalion H.Q. lived in the cellars of some houses at the east end of
Villers-en-Cauchies. These were far more comfortable than the slits in
the railway cutting had been, but they had disadvantages too, as the
next night was to show.
Compared with the strenuous activity of the past week, the two-day
tour which followed was quiet. Both the wood and the village were
frequently shelled, and there were several casualties. But worst of all
was the gas shelling. The night after the relief Villers-en-Cauchies
was deluged with mustard gas. All the 6th Battalion H.Q. officers and
details were gassed, and Major Clarkson, M.C., had to be summoned
from the Divisional Reception Camp to take command. Over forty of the
4th Battalion H.Q. details were also so seriously gassed that they
had to be sent down. The cellars occupied by the officers and the Aid
Post were saved only by the lighting of great fires of straw at the
entrance. Box respirators had to be worn for a great part of the night.
Nightly, the enemy was expected to fall back to a fresh rearguard
position. Everyone was very much on the alert for signs of a
withdrawal, in order that the operation might be harassed by a rapid
British advance. The early morning of October 17th was very misty, the
enemy was exceptionally quiet, and the Commanding Officer, who was
up in the line at the time, began to fear that a withdrawal actually
had taken place. About four hundred yards in front of Vordon Wood,
and lying roughly parallel to it, was a sunken road, from which the
ground sloped gently to the river. This Lieut.-Col. Mowat determined
to reconnoitre in person, with the object of locating the enemy if
possible. Setting out from the right flank of the Battalion with
four others, he reached the road and proceeded along it. The mist
had lifted considerably by this time, and, as the patrol came round
a slight bend, it almost ran into an enemy post. Not more than fifty
yards away was a German sentry. With rifle slung over his shoulder,
and wearing greatcoat and soft cap, he was pacing up and down the road
like a sentry in front of the guard-room. Fortunately, when first
seen, he had his back turned, which gave the patrol a moment’s grace.
Withdrawing a few yards down the road, the men climbed the bank and
made off towards the wood. The Germans, who proved to be about twelve
strong with a light machine gun, opened fire, but their shooting was
very bad. Retiring by bounds and covered by the fire of individual men,
the patrol reached the wood without loss. Machine and Lewis guns were
immediately brought to bear on the German post, its garrison was driven
from its position and retired towards the river. The encounter had
established the fact that the enemy had not yet withdrawn.
Next day the Battalion was visited by Major-General N. J. G. Cameron.
Usually sparing of words, he was, on this occasion, profuse in his
congratulations on the success which had been gained. Particularly
was he anxious that the men should realise how much they had done on
October 11th--that their fearful losses had not been in vain, but had
made possible a great British success. His views cannot be better
expressed than by quoting his own words when he forwarded to battalions
the congratulations of the Corps Commander, on October 13th:--
“It is with feelings of great pride and pleasure that I forward
to you the attached copy of a message received from the XXII.
Corps Commander. Evidence accumulates to show that your attack
on the 11th October was a very real success. It cost the enemy
heavily and dealt him a severe and much needed blow. It entirely
turned the enemy’s position at Iwuy, the possession of which was
necessary to the further advance of the right wing of the First
Army in the required direction. My heartiest congratulations to
you all.
N. G. Cameron, Major-General,
Commanding 49th (W.R.) Division.”
The Divisional Commander had only just left when the Battalion suffered
another serious loss. The experience of the previous night had shown
the danger of cellar accommodation, and it had been decided to return
to the open. The few available men at Battalion H.Q. set to work
digging slits in an enclosure not far from the building. Foremost among
them was R.S.M. W. Lee, M.C., whose gallantry, tireless energy and
exceptional strength had been conspicuous during the operations. While
at work he was seriously wounded by a chance shell which burst near.
That night the Battalion was relieved by the 1st Battalion Royal
Warwickshire Regt. (4th Division), and withdrew to billets at Naves.
The relief was not carried out without loss. One party of D Company,
while on its way out of the line, was caught by enemy gas shelling.
Both Sec.-Lieut. J. W. Lumb and Sec.-Lieut. A. H. W. Mallalieu were
hit by fragments, the former so badly that he died in hospital about
ten days later, while the latter lost a leg.
During the night the enemy carried out his long-expected withdrawal, so
that the next day the 4th Division was able to push forward almost to
the River Ecaillon. From one point of view this was very disappointing
to the Battalion. After the hard work of the last week, and the gradual
wearing down of the enemy’s power of resistance, the men would have
liked to reap the benefits themselves. Yet, by that time, all were so
fatigued that probably they could not have taken such full advantage of
the enemy’s retirement as a fresh division was able to do.
While the Battalion had been in the neighbourhood of
Villers-en-Cauchies the transport lines had been established near
Rieux. Capt. H. N. Taylor who, though left out of the battle, had
not gone to the Divisional Reception Camp, organised a party of men,
consisting mainly of the Battalion Band, to search the battlefield of
October 11th. The ground was gone over systematically, the dead were
collected and were properly buried in a cemetery by the cross roads
near Rieux. The cemetery is called the “Wellington Cemetery,” and
there lie the remains of most of those who perished in this series of
actions. Their graves are well tended. French women of the neighbouring
village have taken upon themselves the duty of paying this tribute to
the men who sleep in their midst.
(_c_) Reorganisation.
For three days the Battalion lived in fairly comfortable billets
at Naves. The village had not suffered very severely in the recent
fighting and, since the enemy had fallen back to the River Ecaillon,
was out of range of anything but long distance artillery fire. While
the Battalion was resting there it was never shelled. The urgent
business was reorganisation, for it was probable that the 49th
Division would soon be back in the fighting line. Casualties could
not be replaced, so each company was reorganised on a two-platoon
basis. The loss of the many specialists, who had been gassed in
Villers-en-Cauchies, was very serious. To a certain extent these could
be replaced by the men who were at the Divisional Reception Camp, but
even then the deficiency was great. However, what could be done was
done.
[Illustration: WELLINGTON CEMETERY, Near ROEUX.
In the background is the ridge which the Battalion captured on Oct.
11th, 1918.]
On the 21st of October the Battalion marched to Le Bassin Rond, a small
village at the junction of the Canal de l’Escaut with the Canal de la
Sensée. Its appearance was not at first inviting. No one had lived
there since the Germans had left it a few days before. The houses
were all filthy and full of debris. However, a few hours’ work made a
wonderful improvement. The material structure of most of the houses had
not been injured, and many wire beds and stoves had been left behind
by the previous occupants. Before long the Battalion was comfortably
settled, and a very pleasant week was spent there. The canals were full
of fish, and one of the most popular forms of amusement was “fishing.”
The Germans had been good enough to leave behind them a large dump of
hand grenades, and many of their “potato-mashers” came in very useful
for this purpose. All the sportsman had to do was to drop a bomb into
the canal and then select what he desired in the way of fish from those
which came to the surface, stunned by the explosion. A fleet of small
boats was collected, and, in the delightful autumn weather which lasted
the whole time, many hours were spent on the water. A ferry was rigged
up across the canal between Battalion H.Q. and the companies, and it
became customary, when company commanders were due to attend at Orderly
Room, for the adjutant and his understudy to defend the crossing. It
was seldom that one arrived without a splashing. The Germans had also
left behind them a plentiful supply of fuel, and “colliers” regularly
plied on the deep, between the local “Newcastle” and the consumers on
the other side of the water.
At the same time, much solid work was done. Everyone knew that, at
any moment, the Battalion might be ordered to take its place in the
fighting line. Already the 51st and the 4th Divisions had forced the
passage of the River Ecaillon, and they were now facing the enemy near
the left bank of the La Rhonelle River. Further north the Canadians, on
both banks of the Canal de l’Escaut, had pushed forward nearly to the
western outskirts of Valenciennes, where they were held up temporarily
by the extensive floods. These floods made a direct attack on the
town from the west extremely difficult, and it was therefore decided
to outflank it on the south. To assist in this the 49th Division was
ordered forward.
(_d_) November 1st–2nd.
On October 27th the 147th Infantry Brigade marched to Douchy, where
it was billeted for the night. The next day it moved on, marching
straight across the open country, to take over the line which had been
established by part of the 51st Division. Here it was disposed very
much in depth. The 6th Battalion held the front line to the south-east
of the village of Famers, about a thousand yards west of the La
Rhonelle River. The 7th Battalion was in support among the sunken roads
to the south of Maing. The 4th Battalion was in reserve, occupying
slits in the sunken road between Thiant and Monchaux-sur-Ecaillon, just
east of the river. There was only one house on this road between the
villages, but it had quite a good cellar. Of course this was allotted
to Battalion H.Q., and, with the help of two large trusses of straw,
it was soon made very comfortable. Round about were the wagon lines of
several batteries, all camping in the open. During the first evening
Major W. C. Fenton, M.C., who was commanding the Battalion in the
absence of Lieut.-Col. A. L. Mowat on leave, had an unusual number of
callers from the gunners. Each would drop in in the ordinary way, and,
after a few minutes’ general conversation of the usual type, would
casually ask when the Battalion was going. Before long it dawned on the
occupants that it was not so much their company that was sought after
as their cellar. There were so many applicants for the first refusal
that the Battalion decided, when the next move did come, to slip
quietly away and leave them to fight it out among themselves. As events
turned out, most of them moved before the Battalion.
The next attack, which was in preparation, was delayed for some days.
Originally planned for October 28th, it was three times postponed for
a period of twenty-four hours, and eventually came off on November 1st.
The main plan of attack was as follows:--
1. The 49th Division, with a Canadian division on its left and
the 4th Division on its right, was to attack in the direction
of Saultain, force the passage of the La Rhonelle River, and
outflank the defences of Valenciennes on the south.
2. On the 147th Infantry Brigade front, the 6th Battalion was
to attack from a position south of Famers straight towards
Saultain, with the 7th Battalion in support. The final objective
for the first day was the line of the Marly--Préseau Road,
south-west of Saultain.
For a time the role of the 4th Battalion was uncertain. At first
it was feared the men would have to dump all arms and act as
stretcher-bearers. But in the end, it was decided to keep them in
Brigade Reserve, ready to exploit the situation should the attack
go well. Preparations for this operation, and reconnaissance of the
forward area, kept everyone fully occupied for the next few days. Only
an occasional shell fell near, and no casualties were suffered.
Zero hour for the attack was 5-15 a.m. on November 1st. The evening
before, as soon as it was dark, the Battalion moved up into the area
south of Maing, where it occupied slits in the sunken roads. These had
just been vacated by the 7th Battalion, which had gone forward to the
neighbourhood of Caumont Farm, in support to the attack. Here the night
was spent, the Battalion having orders not to move without direct word
from 147th Infantry Brigade H.Q.
At zero hour the men of the 6th Battalion went forward under a
splendid barrage. They crossed the river, partly on fallen trees,
and partly over light bridges, which were carried forward with the
assaulting troops by parties from the 19th Battalion Lancashire
Fusiliers. They captured and held the Aulnoy--Préseau Road, which was
their intermediate objective, and some of them even reached their
final objective. But the 4th Division on their right had not been
so successful; after getting into the village of Préseau, it was
heavily counter-attacked by two regiments of a fresh enemy division
from reserve, and was driven out again. Thus, with its right flank
uncovered, and having suffered heavy casualties, the 6th Battalion
could not hold its final objective. Instead, it dug in on a line in
front of the intermediate objective.
But the success gained was very great. Several hundreds of prisoners
had been taken by the 6th Battalion; indeed, the number of prisoners
captured was almost double the total number of assaulting troops, on
that part of the front. The first party to arrive at Battalion H.Q. was
about 200 strong, and its size caused some uneasiness to the corporal
and five men of the 4th Battalion, who were the only escort available.
Really they had no cause to worry, for the prisoners were only too glad
to be out of it, and all they wanted at the moment was to get well
away from the fighting. As soon as they were marched off they started
running at such a rate that the escort had hard work to keep up with
them. These prisoners were a very mixed lot. Some were fine-looking
men, but the majority were of poor physique, and the proportion of
quite young boys was considerable. Perhaps nothing showed more clearly
the straits to which German man-power had been reduced than the poor
specimens who were captured from the 6th (German) Division--one of the
active divisions which had invaded Belgium at the beginning of August,
1914, and which had been, throughout the war, one of the enemy’s most
famous assault divisions.
The 4th Battalion did not take any real part in the fighting on
November 1st. Soon after 8-0 a.m. it moved up to positions of readiness
near Caumont Farm, which then became Battalion H.Q. About the middle
of the afternoon, when an enemy counter-attack was expected, two
companies were moved further forward. But none ever came into action.
A weak counter-attack did develop in the afternoon, but it was easily
repulsed by the front line troops, who actually advanced their line
some hundreds of yards as a result of it. The enemy indulged in some
scattered shelling, mainly about the river, but no casualties were
suffered by the Battalion.
[Illustration: CAMBRAI--VALENCIENNES.]
It was expected that the Brigade would be relieved that night by the
148th Infantry Brigade. In fact, not only had all preparations been
made for the relief, but practically the whole of the relieving
troops had come up, and some details of the Battalion were on their way
out. Then a sudden alteration was made, and a fresh attack was arranged
for the next morning. During the night the 7th Battalion relieved the
6th Battalion in the front line, and the 4th Battalion moved up into
support. A and C Companies occupied the intermediate objective; B and D
Companies were on the road just east of the river. The 148th Infantry
Brigade relieved the 146th Infantry Brigade on the left. The objective
was the final objective of the previous day.
At 5-30 a.m. on November 2nd the 7th Battalion attacked and easily
gained its objective, which was not a distant one. Nevertheless, nearly
one hundred prisoners were captured during the operation. As soon as
news of the success arrived, D Company was pushed forward into some old
rifle pits behind the intermediate objective, to be ready to assist
should the enemy counter-attack. About 1-30 p.m. an urgent warning
arrived--the R.A.F. had reported that the Mons-Valenciennes Road was
packed with transport and guns moving west, and that masses of troops
could be seen in the neighbourhood of Saultain; a heavy counter-attack
was expected. But nothing happened. The Mons-Valenciennes Road was
crowded with columns; but the R.A.F. had mistaken their direction. They
were moving eastward, not westward. The enemy was in full retreat.
That night the Brigade was relieved by units of the 56th Division. As
these intended to attack at daybreak, exact dispositions were not taken
over, but troops were considered to be relieved as soon as others had
arrived. For the second time within a fortnight the Brigade had just
missed reaping the full reward of its efforts. That night the enemy
retired well behind Saultain, and the “attack” of the 56th Division the
next morning was little more than a promenade.
Perhaps, as the Battalion marched slowly through the night towards
Haulchin, where comfortable billets awaited it, no one realised that he
had seen his last fight--that so far as he was concerned the war was
finished.