combinations were devised for the purpose of grappling with the Adriatic
problem. One commended itself to the Italians as a possible basis for
discussion. In principle it was accepted. A declaration to this effect
was made by Signor Orlando and taken cognizance of by M. Clemenceau, who
undertook to lay the matter before Mr. Wilson, the sole arbitrator in
Italian affairs. He played the part of Fate throughout. Days went by
after this without bringing any token that the Triumvirate was
interested in the Adriatic. At last the Italian Premier reminded his
French colleague that the latest proposal had been accepted in
principle, and the Italian plenipotentiaries were awaiting Mr. Wilson's
pleasure in the matter. Accordingly, M. Clemenceau undertook to broach
the matter to the American statesman without delay. The reply, which was
promptly given, dismayed the Italians. It was in the form of one of
those interpretations which, becoming associated with Mr. Wilson's name,
shook public confidence in certain of the statesman-like qualities with
which he had at first been credited. The construction which he now put
upon the mode of voting to be applied to Fiume, including this city--in
a large district inhabited by a majority of Jugoslavs--imparted to the
project as the Italians had understood it a wholly new aspect. They
accordingly declared it inacceptable. As after that there seemed to be
nothing more for the Italian Premier to do in Paris, he left, was soon
afterward defeated in the Chamber, and resigned together with his
Cabinet. The vote of the Italian Parliament, which appeared to the
continental press in the light of a protest of the nation against the
aims and the methods of the Conference, closed for the time being the
chapter of Italy's endeavor to complete her unity, secure strong
frontiers, and perpetuate her political partnership with France and her
intimate relations with the Entente. Thenceforward the English-speaking
states might influence her overt acts, compel submission to their
behests, and generally exercise a sort of guardianship over her, because
they are the dispensers of economic boons, but the union of hearts, the
mutual trust, the cement supplied by common aims are lacking.
One of the most telling arguments employed by President Wilson to
dissuade various states from claiming strategic positions, and in
particular Italy from insisting on the annexation of Fiume and the
Dalmatian coast, was the effective protection which the League of
Nations would confer on them.[232] Strategical considerations would, it
was urged, lose all their value in the new era, and territorial
guaranties become meaningless and cumbersome survivals of a dead epoch.
That was the principal weapon with which he had striven to parry the
thrusts of M. Clemenceau and the touchstone by which he tested the
sincerity of all professions of faith in his cherished project of
compacting the nations of the world in a vast league of peace-loving,
law-abiding communities. But the faith of France's leaders differed
little from unbelief. Guaranties first and the protection of the League
afterward was the French formula, around which many fierce battles royal
were fought. In the end Mr. Wilson, having obtained the withdrawal of
the demand for the Rhine frontier, gave in, and the Covenant was
reinforced by a compact which in the last analysis is a military
undertaking, a unilateral Triple Alliance, Great Britain and the United
States undertaking to hasten to France's assistance should her territory
be wantonly invaded by Germany. The case thus provided for is extremely
improbable. The expansion of Germany, when the auspicious hour strikes,
will presumably be inaugurated on wholly new lines, against which
armies, even if they can be mobilized in time, will be of little avail.
But if force were resorted to, it is almost certain to be used in the
direction where the resistance is least--against France's ally, Poland.
This, however, is by the way. The point made by the Italians was that
the League of Nations being thus admittedly powerless to discharge the
functions which alone could render strategic frontiers unnecessary, can
consequently no longer be relied upon as an adequate protection against
the dangers which the possession of the strongholds she claimed on the
Adriatic would effectively displace. Either the League, it was argued,
can, as asserted, protect the countries which give up commanding
positions to potential enemies, or it cannot. In the former hypothesis
France's insistence on a military convention is mischievous and
immoral--in the latter Italy stands in as much need of the precautions
devised as her neighbor. But her spokesmen were still plied with the
threadbare arguments and bereft of the countervailing corrective. And
faith in the efficacy of the League was sapped by the very men who were
professedly seeking to spread it.
The press of Rome, Turin, and Milan pointed to the loyalty of the
Italian people, brought out, they said, in sharp relief by the
discontent which the exclusive character of that triple military accord
engendered among them. As kinsmen of the French it was natural for
Italians to expect that they would be invited to become a party to this
league within the League. As loyal allies of Britain and France they
felt desirous of being admitted to the alliance. But they were excluded.
Nor was their exasperation allayed by the assurance of their press that
this was no alliance, but a state of tutelage. An alliance, it was
explained, is a compact by which two or more parties agree to render one
another certain services under given conditions, whereas the convention
in question is a one-sided undertaking on the part of Britain and the
United States to protect France if wantonly attacked, because she is
unable efficaciously to protect herself. It is a benefaction. But this
casuistry fell upon deaf ears. What the people felt was the
disesteem--the term in vogue was stronger--in which they were held by
the Allies, whom they had saved perhaps from ruin.
By slow degrees the sentiments of the Italian nation underwent a
disquieting change. All parties and classes united in stigmatizing the
behavior of the Allies in terms which even the literary eminence of the
poet d'Annunzio could not induce the censors to let pass. "The Peace
Treaty," wrote Italy's most influential journal, "and its correlate
forbode for the near future the Continental hegemony of France
countersigned by the Anglo-American alliance."[233] Another widely
circulated and respected organ described the policy of the Entente as a
solvent of the social fabric, constructive in words, corrosive in acts,
"mischievous if ever there was a mischievous policy. For while raising
hopes and whetting appetites, it does nothing to satisfy them; on the
contrary, it does much to disappoint them. In words--a struggle for
liberty, for nations, for the equality of peoples and classes, for the
well-being of all; in acts--the suppression of the most elementary and
constitutional liberty, the overlordship of certain nations based on the
humiliation of others, the division of peoples into exploiters and
exploited--the sharpening of social differences--the destruction of
collective wealth, and its accumulation in a few blood-stained hands,
universal misery, and hunger."[234]
Although it is well understood that Italy's defeat at the Conference was
largely the handiwork of President Wilson, the resentment of the Italian
nation chose for its immediate objects the representatives of France and
Britain. The American "associates" were strangers, here to-day and gone
to-morrow, but the Allies remain, and if their attitude toward Italy, it
was argued, had been different, if their loyalty had been real, she
would have fared proportionately as well as they, whatever the American
statesmen might have said or done.
The Italian press breathed fiery wrath against its French ally, who so
often at the Conference had met Italy's solicitations with the odious
word "impossible." Even moderate organs of public opinion gave free vent
to estimates of France's policy and anticipations of its consequences
which disturbed the equanimity of European statesmen. "It is
impossible," one of these journals wrote, "for France to become the
absolute despot of Europe without Italy, much less against Italy. What
transcended the powers of Richelieu, who was a lion and fox combined,
and was beyond the reach of Bonaparte, who was both an eagle and a
serpent, cannot be achieved by "Tiger" Clemenceau in circumstances so
much less favorable than those of yore. We, it is true, are isolated,
but then France is not precisely embarrassed by the choice of friends."
The peace was described as "Franco-Slav domination with its headquarters
in Prague, and a branch office in Agram." M. Clemenceau was openly
charged with striving after the hegemony of the Continent for his
country by separating Germany from Austria and surrounding her with a
ring of Slav states--Poland, Jugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and perhaps the
non-Slav kingdom of Rumania. All these states would be in the
leading-strings of the French Republic, and Austria would be linked to
it in a different guise. And in order to effect this resuscitation of
the Hapsburg state under the name of "Danubian federation," Mr. Wilson,
it was asserted, had authorized a deliberate violation of his own
principle of self-determination, and refused to Austria the right of
adopting the régime which she preferred. It was, in truth, an odd
compromise, these critics continued, for an idealist of the President's
caliber, on whose every political action the scrutinizing gaze of the
world was fixed. One could not account for it as a sacrifice made for a
high ethical aim--one of those ends which, according to the old maxim,
hallows the means. It seemed an open response to a secret instigation or
impulse which was unconnected with any recognized or avowable principle.
Even the Socialist organs swelled the chorus of the accusers. _Avanti_
wrote, "We are Socialists, yet we have never believed that the American
President with his Fourteen Points entered into the war for the highest
aims of humanity and for the rights of peoples, any more than we believe
at present that his opposition to the aspirations of the Italian state
on the Adriatic are inspired by motives of idealism."[235]
The fate of the disputed territories on the Adriatic was to be the
outcome of self-determination. Poland's claims were to be left to the
self-determination of the Silesian and Ruthenian populations. Rumania
was told that her suit must remain in abeyance until it could be tested
by the same principle, which would be applied in the form of a
plebiscite. For self-determination was the cornerstone of the League of
Nations, the holiest boon for which the progressive peoples of the world
had been pouring out their life-blood and substance for nearly five
years. But when Italy invoked self-determination, she was promptly
non-suited. When Austria appealed to it she was put out of court. And to
crown all, the world was assured that the Fourteen Points had been
triumphantly upheld. This depravation of principles by the triumph of
the little prudences of the hour spurred some of the more impulsive
critics to ascribe it to influences less respectable than those to which
it may fairly be attributed.
The directing Powers were hypersensitive to the oft-repeated charge of
meddling in the internal affairs of other nations. They were never
tired of protesting their abhorrence of anything that smacked of
interference. Among the numerous facts, however, which they could
neither deny nor reconcile with their professions, the following was
brought forward by the Italians, who had a special interest to draw
public attention to it. It had to do with the abortive attempt to
restore the Hapsburg monarchy in Hungary as the first step toward the
formation of a Danubian federation. "It is certain," wrote the principal
Italian journal, "that the Archduke Joseph's _coup d'état_ did not take
place, indeed (given the conditions in Budapest) could not take place,
without the Entente's connivance. The official _communiqués_ of Budapest
and Vienna, dated August 9th, recount on this point precise details
which no one has hitherto troubled to deny. The Peidl government was
scarcely three days in power, and, therefore, was not in a position to
deserve either trust or distrust, when the heads of the 'order-loving
organizations' put forward, to justify the need of a new crisis, the
complaints of the heads of the Entente Missions as to the anarchy
prevailing in Hungary and the urgency of finding 'some one' who could
save the country from the abyss. Then a commission repaired to Alscuth,
where it easily persuaded the Archduke to come to Budapest. Here he at
once visited all the heads of missions and spent the whole day in
negotiations. '_As a result of negotiations with Entente
representatives, the Archduke Joseph undertook a solution of the
crisis_.' He then called together the old state police and a volunteer
army of eight thousand men. The Rumanian garrison was kept ready. The
Peidl government naturally did not resist at all. At 10 P.M. on August
7th all the Entente Missions held a meeting, _to which the Archduke
Joseph and the new Premier were invited_. General Gorton presided. _The
Conference lasted two hours and reached an agreement on all questions.
All the heads of Missions assured the new government of their warmest
support_."[236]
Another case of unwarranted interference which stirred the Italians to
bitter resentment turned upon the obligation imposed on Austria to
renounce her right to unite with Germany. "It is difficult to discern in
the policy of the Entente toward Austria anything more respectable than
obstinacy coupled with stupidity," wrote the same journal. "But there is
something still worse. It is impossible not to feel indignant with a
coalition which, after having triumphed in the name of the loftiest
ideas ... treats German-Austria no better than the Holy Alliance treated
the petty states of Italy. But the Congress of Vienna acted in harmony
with the principle of legitimism which it avowed and professed, whereas
the Paris Conference violates without scruple the canons by which it
claims to be guided.
"Not a whit more decorous is the intervention of the Supreme Council in
the internal affairs of Germany--a state which, according to the spirit
and the letter of the Versailles Treaty, is sovereign and not a
protectorate. The Conference was qualified to dictate peace terms to
Germany, but it wanders beyond the bounds of its competency when it
construes those terms and arrogates to itself--on the strength of forced
and equivocal interpretations--the right of imposing upon a nation which
is neither militarily nor juridically an enemy a constitutional reform.
Whether Germany violates the Treaty by her Constitution is a question
which only a judicial finding of the League of Nations can fairly
determine."[237]
It would be impolitic to overlook and insincere to belittle the effects
of this incoherency upon the relations between France and Italy. Public
opinion in the Peninsula characterized the attitude of Prance as
deliberately hostile. The Italians at the Conference eagerly scrutinized
every act and word of their French colleagues, with a view to
discovering grounds for dispelling this view. But the search is reported
to have been worse than vain. It revealed data which, although
susceptible of satisfactory explanations, would, if disclosed at that
moment, have aggravated the feeling of bitterness against France, which
was fast gathering. Signor Orlando had recourse to the censor to prevent
indiscretions, but the intuition of the masses triumphed over
repression, and the existing tenseness merged into resentment. The way
in which Italians accounted for M. Clemenceau's attitude was this.
Although Italy has ceased to be the important political factor she once
was when the Triple Alliance was in being, she is still a strong
continental Power, capable of placing a more numerous army in the field
than her republican sister, and her population continues to increase at
a high rate. In a few years she will have outstripped her rival. France,
too, has perhaps lost those elements of her power and prestige which she
derived from her alliance with Russia. Again, the Slav ex-ally, Russia,
may become the enemy of to-morrow. In view of these contingencies France
must create a substitute for the Rumanian and Italian allies. And as
these have been found in the new Slav states, Poland, Czechoslovakia,
and Jugoslavia, she can afford to dispense with making painful
sacrifices to keep Italy in countenance.
A trivial incident which affords a glimpse of the spirit prevailing
between the two kindred peoples occurred at St.-Germain-en-Laye, where
the Austrian delegates were staying. They had been made much of in
Vienna by the Envoy of the French Republic there, M. Allizé, whose
mission it was to hinder Austria from uniting with the Reich. Italy's
policy was, on the contrary, to apply Mr. Wilson's principle of
self-determination and allow the Austrians to do as they pleased in that
respect. A fervent advocate of the French orthodox doctrine--a
publicist--repaired to the Austrian headquarters at St.-Germain for the
purpose, it is supposed, of discussing the subject. Now intercourse of
any kind between private individuals and the enemy delegates was
strictly forbidden, and when M. X. presented himself, the Italian
officer on duty refused him admission. He insisted. The officer was
inexorable. Then he produced a written permit signed by the Secretary of
the Conference, M. Dutasta. How and why this exception was made in his
favor when the rule was supposed to admit of no exceptions was not
disclosed. But the Italian officer, equal to the occasion, took the
ground that a military prohibition cannot be canceled by a civilian, and
excluded the would-be visitor.
The general trend of France's European policy was repugnant to Italy.
She looked on it as a well-laid scheme to assume a predominant rôle on
the Continent. That, she believed, was the ultimate purpose of the veto
on the union of Austria and Germany, of the military arrangements with
Britain and the United States, and of much else that was obnoxious to
Italy. Austria was to be reconstituted according to the federative plans
of the late Archduke Franz Ferdinand, to be made stronger than before as
a counterpoise to Italy, and to be at the beck and call of France. Thus
the friend, ally, sister of yesterday became the potential enemy of
to-morrow. That was the refrain of most of the Italian journals, and
none intoned it more fervently than those which had been foremost in
bringing their country into the war. One of these, a Conservative organ
of Lombardy, wrote: "Until yesterday, we might have considered that two
paths lay open before us, that of an alliance with France and that of
an independent policy. But we can think so no longer. To offer our
friendship to-day to the people who have already chosen their own road
and established their solidarity with our enemies of yesterday and
to-morrow would not be to strike out a policy, but to decide on an
unseemly surrender. It would be tantamount to reproducing in an
aggravated form the situation we occupied in the alliance with Germany.
Once again we should be engaged in a partnership of which one of the
partners was in reality our enemy. France taking the place of Germany,
and Jugoslavia that of Austria, the situation of the old Triple Alliance
would be not merely reproduced, but made worse in the reproduction,
because the _Triplice_ at least guaranteed us against a conflict which
we had grounds for apprehending, whereas the new alliance would tie our
hands for the sake of a little Balkan state which, single-handed, we are
well able to keep in its place.
"We have had enough of a policy which has hitherto saddled us with all
the burdens of the alliance without bestowing on us any advantage--which
has constrained us to favor all the peoples whose expansion dovetailed
with French schemes and to combat or neglect those others whose
consolidation corresponded to our interests--which has led us to support
a great Poland and a great Bohemia and to combat the Ukraine, Hungary,
Bulgaria, Rumania, Spain, to whose destinies the French, but not we,
were indifferent."[238] A press organ of Bologna denounced the atrocious
and ignominious sacrifice "which her allies imposed on Italy by means of
economic blackmailing and violence with a whip in one hand and a chunk
of bread in the other."[239]
Sharp comments were provoked by the heavy tax on strangers in Tunisia
imposed by the French government,[240] on strangers, mostly Italians,
who theretofore had enjoyed the same rights as the French and Tunisians.
"Suddenly," writes the principal Italian journal, "and just when it was
hoped that the common sacrifices they had made had strengthened the ties
between the two nations, the governor of Tunisia issued certain orders
which endangered the interests of foreigners and the effects of which
will be felt mainly by Italians, of whom there are one hundred and
twenty thousand in Tunisia.[241] First there came an order forbidding
the use of any language but French in the schools. Now the tax referred
to in the House of Lords gives the Tunisian government power to levy an
impost on the buying and selling of property in Tunisia. The new tax,
which is to be levied over and above pre-existing taxes, ranged from 59
per cent. of the value when it is not assessed at a higher sum than one
hundred thousand lire to 80 per cent. when its estimated value is more
than five hundred thousand lire." The article terminates with the remark
that boycotting is hardly a suitable epilogue to a war waged for common
ideals and interests.