which tended to defeat his own policy. Italy was paid back by her allies
in her own coin, aloofness for aloofness. After she had declined the
Jugoslavs' ingenious proposal to refer their dispute to Mr. Wilson the
three delegates[212] agreed among themselves to postpone her special
problems until peace was signed with Germany, but Signor Orlando, having
got wind of the matter, moved every lever to have them put into the
forefront of the agenda. He went so far as to say that he would not sign
the Treaty unless his country's claims were first settled, because that
document would make the League of Nations--and therefore Italy as a
member of the League--the guarantor of other nations' territories,
whereas she herself had no defined territories for others to guarantee.
She would not undertake to defend the integrity of states which she had
helped to create while her own frontiers were indefinite. But in the art
of procrastination the Triumvirate was unsurpassed, and, as the time
drew near for presenting the Treaty to Germany, neither the Adriatic,
the colonial, the financial, nor the economic problems on which Italy's
future depended were settled or even broached. In the meanwhile the
plenipotentiaries in secret council, of whom four or five were wont to
deliberate and two to take decisions, had disagreed on the subject of
Fiume. Mr. Wilson was inexorable in his refusal to hand the city over to
Italy, and the various compromises devised by ingenious weavers of
conflicting interests failed to rally the Italian delegates,
whose inspirer was the taciturn Baron Sonnino. The
Italian press, by insisting on Fiume as a _sine qua non_ of
Italy's approval of the Peace Treaty and by announcing
that it would undoubtedly be accorded, had made it
practically impossible for the delegates to recede. The
circumstance that the press was inspired by the government is immaterial
to the issue. President Wilson, who had been frequently told that a word
from him to the peoples of Europe would fire their enthusiasm and carry
them whithersoever he wished, even against their own governments, now
purposed wielding this unique power against Italy's plenipotentiaries.
As we saw, he would have done this during his sojourn in Rome, but was
dissuaded by Baron Sonnino. His intention now was to compel the
delegates to go home and ascertain whether their inflexible attitude
corresponded with that of their people and to draw the people into the
camp of the "idealists." He virtually admitted this during his
conversation with Signor Orlando. What he seems to have overlooked,
however, is that there are time limits to every policy, and that only
the same causes can be set in motion to produce the same results. In
Italy the President's name had a very different sound in April from the
clarion-like tones it gave forth in January, and the secret of his
popularity even then was the prevalent faith in his firm determination
to bring about a peace of justice, irrespective of all separate
interests, not merely a peace with indulgence for the strong and rigor
for the weak. The time when Mr. Wilson might have summoned the peoples
of Europe to follow him had gone by irrevocably. It is worth noting that
the American statesman's views about certain of Italy's claims, although
originally laid down with the usual emphasis as immutable, underwent
considerable modifications which did not tend to reinforce his
authority. Thus at the outset he had proclaimed the necessity of
dividing Istria between the two claimant nations, but, on further
reflection, he gave way in Italy's favor, thus enabling Signor Orlando
to make the point that even the President's solutions needed
corrections. It is also a fact that when the Italian Premier insisted on
having the Adriatic problems definitely settled before the presentation
of the Treaty to the Germans[213] his colleagues of France and Britain
assured him that this reasonable request would be complied with. The
circumstance that this promise was disregarded did not tend to smooth
matters in the Council of Five.
The decisive duel between Signor Orlando and Mr. Wilson was fought out
in April, and the overt acts which subsequently marked their tense
relations were but the practical consequences of that. On the historic
day each one set forth his program with a _ne varietur_ attached, and
the President of the United States gave utterance to an estimate of
Italian public opinion which astonished and pained the Italian Premier,
who, having contributed to form it, deemed himself a more competent
judge of its trend than his distinguished interlocutor. But Mr. Wilson
not only refused to alter his judgment, but announced his intention to
act upon it and issue an appeal to the Italian nation. The gist of this
document was known to M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George. It has been
alleged, and seems highly probable, that the British Premier was
throughout most anxious to bring about a workable compromise. Proposals
were therefore put forward respecting Fiume and Dalmatia, some of which
were not inacceptable to the Italians, who lodged counter-proposals
about the others. On the fate of these counter-proposals everything
depended.
On April 23d I was at the Hôtel Edouard VII, the headquarters of the
Italian delegation, discussing the outlook and expecting to learn that
some agreement had been reached. In an adjoining room the members of the
delegation were sitting in conference on the burning subject, painfully
aware that time pressed, that the Damocles's sword of Mr. Wilson's
declaration hung by a thread over their heads, and that a spirit of
large compromise was indispensable. At three o'clock Mr. Lloyd George's
secretary brought the reply of the Council of Three to Italy's maximum
of concessions. Only one point remained in dispute, I was told, but that
point hinged upon Fiume, and, by a strange chance, it was not mentioned
in the reply which the secretary had just handed in. The Italian
delegation at once telephoned to the British Premier asking him to
receive the Marquis Imperiali, who, calling shortly afterward, learned
that Fiume was to be a free city and exempt from control. It was when
the marquis had just returned that I took leave of my hosts and received
the assurance that I should be informed of the result. About half an
hour later, on receipt of an urgent message, I hastened back to the
Italian headquarters, where consternation prevailed, and I learned that
hardly had the delegates begun to discuss the contentious clause when a
copy of the _Temps_ was brought in, containing Mr. Wilson's appeal to
the Italian people "over the heads of the Italian government."
The publication fell like a powerful explosive. The public were at a
loss to fit in Mr. Wilson's unprecedented action with that of his
British and French colleagues. For if in the morning he sent his appeal
to the newspapers, it was asked, why did he allow his Italian colleagues
to go on examining a proposal on which he manifestly assumed that they
were no longer competent to treat? Moreover a rational desire to settle
Italy's Adriatic frontiers, it was observed, ought not to have lessened
his concern about the larger issues which his unwonted procedure was
bound to raise. And one of these was respect for authority, the loss of
which was the taproot of Bolshevism. Signor Orlando replied to the
appeal in a trenchant letter which was at bottom a reasoned protest
against the assumed infallibility of any individual and, in particular,
of one who had already committed several radical errors of judgment.
What the Italian Premier failed to note was the consciousness of
overwhelming power and the will to use it which imparted its specific
mark to the whole proceeding. Had he realized this element, his
subsequent tactics would perhaps have run on different lines.
The suddenness with which the President carried out his purpose was
afterward explained as the outcome of misinformation. In various Italian
cities, it had been reported to him, posters were appearing on the walls
announcing that Fiume had been annexed. Moreover, it was added, there
were excellent grounds for believing that at Rome the Italian Cabinet
was about to issue a decree incorporating it officially, whereby things
would become more tangled than ever. Some French journals gave credit to
these allegations, and it may well be that Mr. Wilson, believing them,
too, and wanting to be beforehand, took immediate action. This, however,
is at most an explanation; it hardly justifies the precipitancy with
which the Italian plenipotentiaries were held up to the world as men who
were misrepresenting their people. As a matter of fact careful inquiry
showed that all those reports which are said to have alarmed the
President were groundless. Mr. Wilson's sources of information
respecting the countries on which he was sitting in judgment were often
as little to be depended on as presumably were the decisions of the
special commissions which he and Mr. Lloyd George so unceremoniously
brushed aside.
On the following morning Signori Orlando and Sonnino called on the
British Premier in response to his urgent invitation. To their surprise
they found Mr. Wilson and M. Clemenceau also awaiting them, ready, as it
might seem, to begin the discussion anew, curious in any case to observe
the effect of the declaration. But the Italian Premier burned his boats
without delay or hesitation. "You have challenged the authority of the
Italian government," he said, "and appealed to the Italian people. Be it
so. It is now become my duty to seek out the representatives of my
people in Parliament and to call upon them to decide between Mr. Wilson
and me." The President returned the only answer possible, "Undoubtedly
that is your duty." "I shall inform Parliament then that we have allies
incapable of agreeing among themselves on matters that concern us
vitally." Disquieted by the militant tone of the Minister, Mr. Lloyd
George uttered a suasive appeal for moderation, and expressed the hope
that in his speech to the Italian Chamber, Signor Orlando would not
forget to say that a satisfactory solution may yet be found. He would
surely be incapable of jeopardizing the chances of such a desirable
consummation. "I will make the people arbiters of the whole situation,"
the Premier announced, "and in order to enable them to judge with full
knowledge of the data, I herewith ask your permission to communicate my
last memorandum to the Council of Four. It embodies the pith of the
facts which it behooves the Parliament to have before it. In the
meantime, the Italian government withdraws from the Peace Conference."
On this the painful meeting terminated and the principal Italian
plenipotentiaries returned to Rome. In France a section of the press
sympathized with the Italians, while the government, and in particular
M. Clemenceau, joined Mr. Wilson, who had promised to restore the
sacredness of treaties[214] in exhorting Signor Orlando to give up the
Treaty of London. The clash between Mr. Wilson and Signor Orlando and
the departure of the Italian plenipotentiaries coincided with the
arrival of the Germans in Versailles, so that the Allies were faced with
the alternative of speeding up their desultory talks and improvising a
definite solution or giving up all pretense at unanimity in the presence
of the enemy. One important Paris journal found fault with Mr. Wilson
and his "Encyclical," and protested emphatically against his way of
filling every gap in his arrangements by wedging into it his League of
Nations. "Can we harbor any illusion as to the net worth of the League
of Nations when the revised text of the Covenant reveals it shrunken to
the merest shadow, incapable of thought, will, action, or justice?...
Too often have we made sacrifices to the Wilsonian doctrine."[215] ...
Another press organ compared Fiume to the Saar Valley and sympathized
with Italy, who, relying on the solidarity of her allies, expected to
secure the city.[216]
While those wearisome word-battles--in which the personal element played
an undue part--were being waged in the twilight of a secluded Valhalla,
the Supreme Economic Council decided that the seized Austrian vessels
must be pooled among all the Allies. When the untoward consequences of
this decision were flashed upon the Italians and the Jugoslavs, the
rupture between them was seen to be injurious to both and profitable to
third parties. For if the Austrian vessels were distributed among all
the Allied peoples, the share that would fall to those two would be of
no account. Now for the first time the adversaries bestirred themselves.
But it was not their diplomatists who took the initiative. Eager for
their respective countries' share of the spoils of war, certain
business men on both sides met,[217] deliberated, and worked out an
equitable accord which gave four-fifths of the tonnage to Italy and the
remainder to the Jugoslavs, who otherwise would not have obtained a
single ship.[218] They next set about getting the resolution of the
Economic Council repealed, and went on with their conversations.[219]
The American delegation was friendly, promised to plead for the repeal,
and added that "if the accord could be extended to the Adriatic problem
Mr. Wilson would be delighted and would take upon himself to ratify it
_even without the sanction of the Conference_.[220] Encouraged by this
promise, the delegates made the attempt, but as the Italian Premier had
for some unavowed reason limited the intercourse of the negotiators to a
single day, on the expiry of which he ordered the conversation to
cease,[221] they failed. Two or three days later the delegates in
question had quitted Paris.
What this exchange of views seems to have demonstrated to open-minded
Italians was that the Jugoslavs, whose reputation for obstinacy was a
dogma among all their adversaries and some of their friends, have chinks
in their panoply through which reason and suasion may penetrate.
When the Italian withdrew from the Conference he had ample reason for
believing that in his absence peace could not be signed, and many
thought that, by departing, he was giving Mr. Wilson a Roland for his
Oliver. But this supposed tactical effect formed no part of Orlando's
deliberate plan. It was a coincidence to be utilized, nothing more. Mr.
Wilson had left him no choice but to quit France and solicit the verdict
of his countrymen. But Mr. Wilson's colleagues were aghast at the
thought that the Pact of London, by which none of the Allies might
conclude a separate peace, rendered it indispensable that Italy's
recalcitrant plenipotentiaries should be co-signatories, or at any rate
consenting parties. About this interpretation of the Pact there was not
the slightest doubt. Hence every one feared that the signing of the
Peace Treaty would be postponed indefinitely because of the absence of
the Italian plenipotentiaries from the Conference. That certainly was
the belief of the remaining delegates. There was no doubt anywhere that
the presence or the express assent of the Italians was a _sine qua non_
of the legality of the Treaty. It certainly was the conviction of the
French press, and was borne out by the most eminent jurists throughout
the world.[222] That the Italian delegates might refuse to sign, as
Signor Orlando had threatened, until Italy's affairs were arranged
satisfactorily was taken for granted, and the remaining members of the
inner Council set to work to checkmate this potential maneuver and
dispense with her co-operation. This aim was attained during the absence
of the Italian delegation by the decree that the signature of any three
of the Allied and Associated governments would be deemed adequate. The
legality and even the morality of this provision were challenged by
many.
But it may be maintained that the imperative nature of the task which
confronted the Conference demanded a chart of ideas and principles
different from that by which Old World diplomacy had been guided and
that respect for the letter of a compact should not be allowed to
destroy its spirit. There is much to be said for this contention, which
was, however, rejected by Italian jurists as destructive of the
sacredness of treaties. They also urged that even if it were permissible
to dash formal obstacles aside in order to clear the path for the
furtherance of a good cause, it is also indispensable that the result
should be compassed with the smallest feasible sacrifice of principle.
Hopes were accordingly entertained by the Italian delegates that, on
their return to Paris, at least a formal declaration might be made that
Italy's signature was indispensable to the validity of the Treaty. But
they were not, perhaps could not, be fulfilled at that conjuncture.
Advantage was taken in other ways of the withdrawal of Italy's
representatives from the Conference. For example, a clause of the Treaty
with Germany dealing with reparations was altered to Italy's detriment.
Another which turned upon Austro-German relations was likewise modified.
Before the delegates left for Rome it had been settled that Germany
should be bound over to respect Austria's independence. This obligation
was either superfluous, every state being obliged to respect the
independence of every other, or else it had a cryptic meaning which
would only reveal itself in the application of the clause. As soon as
the Conference was freed from the presence of the Italians the formula
was modified, and Germany was plainly forbidden to unite with Austria,
even though Austria should expressly desire amalgamation. As this
enactment runs directly counter to the principle of self-determination,
the Italian Minister Crespi raised his voice in energetic protest
against this and the financial changes,[223] whereupon the Triumvirs,
giving way on the latter point, consented to restore the primitive text
of the financial condition.[224] Germany is obliged to supply France
with seven million tons of coal every year by way of restitution for
damage done during the war. At the price of fifty francs a ton, the
money value of this tribute would be three hundred and fifty million
francs, of which Italy would be entitled to receive 30 per cent. But
during the absence of the Italian representatives a supplementary clause
was inserted in the Treaty[225] conferring a special privilege on France
which renders Italy's claim of little or no value. It provides that
Germany shall deliver annually to France an amount of coal equal to the
difference between the pre-war production of the mines of Pas de Calais
and the Nord, destroyed by the enemy, and the production of the mines of
the same area during each of the coming years, the maximum limit to be
twenty million tons. As this contribution takes precedence of all
others, and as Germany, owing to insufficiency of transports and other
causes, will probably be unable to furnish it entirely, Italy's claim is
considered practically valueless.
The reception of the delegates in Rome was a triumph, their return to
Paris a humiliation. For things had been moving fast in the meanwhile,
and their trend, as we said, was away from Italy's goal. Public opinion
in their own country likewise began to veer round, and people asked
whether they had adopted the right tactics, whether, in fine, they were
the right men to represent their country at that crisis of its history.
There was no gainsaying the fact that Italy was completely isolated at
the Conference. She had sacrificed much and had garnered in relatively
little. The Jugoslavs had offered her an alliance--although this kind of
partnership had originally been forbidden by the Wilsonian discipline;
the offer was rejected and she was now certain of their lasting enmity.
Venizelos had also made overtures to Baron Sonnino for an understanding,
but they elicited no response, and Italy's relations with Greece lost
whatever cordiality they might have had. Between France and Italy the
threads of friendship which companionship in arms should have done much
to strengthen were strained to the point of snapping. And worst,
perhaps, of all, the Italian delegates had approved the clause
forbidding Germany to unite with Austria.
That the fault did not lie wholly in the attitude of the Allies is
obvious. The Italian delegates' lack of method, one might say of unity,
was unquestionably a contributory cause of their failure to make
perceptible headway at the Conference. A curious and characteristic
incident of the slipshod way in which the work was sometimes done
occurred in connection with the disposal of the Palace Venezia, in Rome,
which had belonged to Austria, but was expropriated by the Italian
government soon after the opening of hostilities. The heirs of the
Hapsburg Crown put forward a claim to proprietary rights which was
traversed by the Italian government. As the dispute was to be laid
before the Conference, the Roman Cabinet invited a _juris consult_
versed in these matters to argue Italy's case. He duly appeared,
unfolded his claim congruously with the views of his government, but
suddenly stopped short on observing the looks of astonishment on the
faces of the delegates. It appears that on the preceding day another
delegate of the Economic Conference, also an Italian, had unfolded and
defended the contrary thesis--namely, that Austria's heirs had
inherited her right to the Palace of Venezia.[226]
Passing to more momentous matters, one may pertinently ask whether too
much stress was not laid by the first Italian delegation upon the
national and sentimental sides of Italy's interests, and too little on
the others. Among the Great Powers Italy is most in need of raw
materials. She is destitute of coal, iron, cotton, and naphtha. Most of
them are to be had in Asia Minor. They are indispensable conditions of
modern life and progress. To demand a fair share of them as guerdon for
having saved Europe, and to put in her claim at a moment when Europe was
being reconstituted, could not have been construed as imperialism. The
other Allies had possessed most of those necessaries in abundance long
before the war. They were adding to them now as the fruits of a victory
which Italy's sacrifices had made possible. Why, then, should she be
left unsatisfied? Bitterly though the nation was disappointed by failure
to have its territorial claims allowed, it became still more deeply
grieved when it came to realize that much more important advantages
might have been secured if these had been placed in the forefront of the
nation's demands. Emigration ground for Italy's surplus population,
which is rapidly increasing, coal and iron for her industries might
perhaps have been obtained if the Italian plan of campaign at the
Conference had been rightly conceived and skilfully executed. But this
realistic aspect of Italy's interests was almost wholly lost sight of
during the waging of the heated and unfruitful contests for the
possession of town and ports, which, although sacred symbols of
Italianism, could not add anything to the economic resources which will
play such a predominant part in the future struggle for material
well-being among the new and old states. There was a marked propensity
among Italy's leaders at home and in Paris to consider each of the
issues that concerned their country as though it stood alone, instead of
envisaging Italy's economic, financial, and military position after the
war as an indivisible problem and proving that it behooved the Allies in
the interests of a European peace to solve it satisfactorily, and to
provide compensation in one direction for inevitable gaps in the other.
This, to my thinking, was the fundamental error of the Italian and
Allied statesmen for which Europe may have to suffer. That Italy's
policy cannot in the near future return to the lines on which it ran
ever since the establishment of her national unity, whatever her allies
may do or say, will hardly be gainsaid. Interests are decisive factors
of foreign policy, and the action of the Great Powers has determined
Italy's orientation.
Italy undoubtedly gained a great deal by the war, into which she entered
mainly for the purpose of achieving her unity and securing strong
frontiers. But she signed the Peace Treaty convinced that she had not
succeeded in either purpose, and that her allies were answerable for her
failure. It was certainly part of their policy to build up a strong
state on her frontier out of a race which she regards as her adversary
and to give it command of some of her strategic positions. And the overt
bearing manner in which this policy was sometimes carried out left as
much bitterness behind as the object it aimed at. It is alleged that the
Italian delegates were treated with an economy of consideration which
bordered on something much worse, while the arguments officially invoked
to non-suit them appeared to them in the light of bitter sarcasms.
President Wilson, they complained, ignored his far-resonant principle
of self-determination when Japan presented her claim for Shantung, but
refused to swerve from it when Italy relied on her treaty rights in
Dalmatia. And when the inhabitants of Fiume voted for union with the
mother country, the President abandoned that principle and gave judgment
for Jugoslavia on other grounds. He was right, but disappointing, they
observed, when he told his fellow-citizens that his presence in Europe
was indispensable in order to interpret his conceptions, for no other
rational being could have construed them thus.
The withdrawal of the Italian delegates was construed as an act of
insubordination, and punished as such. The Marquis de Viti de Varche has
since disclosed the fact that the Allied governments forthwith reduced
the credits accorded to Italy during hostilities, whereupon hardships
and distress were aggravated and the peasantry over a large area of the
country suffered intensely.[227] For Italy is more dependent on her
allies than ever, owing to the sacrifices which she offered up during
the war, and she was made to feel her dependence painfully. The military
assistance which they had received from her was fraught with financial
and economic consequences which have not yet been realized by the
unfortunate people who must endure them. Italy at the close of
hostilities was burdened with a foreign debt of twenty milliards of
lire, an internal debt of fifty millards, and a paper circulation four
times more than what it was in pre-war days.[228] Raw materials were
exhausted, traffic and production were stagnant, navigation had almost
ceased, and the expenditure of the state had risen to eleven milliards
a year.[229]
According to the figures published by the Statistical Society of Berne,
the general rise in prices attributed to the war hit Italy much harder
than any of her allies.[230] The consequences of this and other
perturbations were sinister and immediate. The nation, bereft of what it
had been taught to regard as its right, humiliated in the persons of its
chiefs, subjected to foreign guidance, insufficiently clad, underfed,
and with no tangible grounds for expecting speedy improvement, was
seething with discontent. Frequent strikes merely aggravated the general
suffering, which finally led to riots, risings, and the shedding of
blood. The economic, political, and moral crisis was unprecedented. The
men who drew Italy into the war were held up to public opprobrium
because in the imagination of the people the victory had cost them more
and brought them in less than neutrality would have done. One of the
principal orators of the Opposition, in a trenchant discourse in the
Italian Parliament, said, "The Salandra-Sonnino Cabinet led Italy into
the war blindfolded."[231]