Italy's defection. It was to no purpose that a few level-headed men
pointed out that the French government was largely answerable for the
state of mind complained of. "Pertinax," in the _Echo de Paris_, wrote
"that the alliance, in order to subsist and flourish, should have
retained its character as an Anti-German League, whereas it fell into
the error of masking itself as a Society of Nations and arrogated to
itself the right of bringing before its tribunal all the quarrels of the
planet."[242] Italy's allies undoubtedly did much to forfeit her
sympathies and turn her from the alliance. It was pointed out that when
the French troops arrived in Italy the Bulletin of the Italian command
eulogized their efforts almost daily, but when the Italian troops went
to France, the _communiqués_ of the French command were most chary of
allusions to their exploits, yet the Italian army contributed more dead
to the French front than did the French army to the Italian front.[243]
At the Peace Conference, as we saw, when the terms with Germany were
being drafted, Italy's problems were set aside on the grounds that there
was no nexus between them. The Allies' interests, which were dealt with
as a whole during the war, were divided after the armistice into
essential and secondary interests, and those of Italy were relegated to
the latter class. Subsequently France, Britain, and the United States,
without the co-operation or foreknowledge of their Italian friends,
struck up an alliance from which they excluded Italy, thereby vitiating
the only arguments that could be invoked in favor of such a coalition.
When peace was about to be signed they one-sidedly revoked the treaty
which they had concluded in London, rendering the consent of all Allies
necessary to the validity of the document, and decreed that Italy's
abstention would make no difference. When the instrument was finally
signed, Mr. Wilson returned to the United States, Mr. Lloyd George to
England, and the Marquis of Saionji to Japan, without having settled any
of Italy's problems. Italy, her needs, her claims, and her policy thus
appear as matters of little account to the Great Powers. Naturally, the
Italian people were disappointed, and desirous of seeking new friends,
the old ones having forsaken them.
It would be difficult to exaggerate the consequences which this attitude
of the Allies toward Italy may have on European politics generally. Her
most eminent statesman, Signor Tittoni, who succeeded Baron Sonnino,
transcending his country's mortifications, exerted himself tactfully and
not unsuccessfully to lubricate the mechanism of the alliance, to ease
the dangerous friction and to restore the tone. And he seems to have
accomplished in these respects everything which a sagacious statesman
could do. But to arrest the operation of psychological laws is beyond
the power of any individual. In order to appreciate the Italian point of
view, it is nowise necessary to approve the exaggerated claims put
forward by her press in the spring of 1919. It is enough to admit that
in the light of the Wilsonian doctrine they were not more incompatible
with that doctrine than the claims made by other Powers and accorded by
the Supreme Council.
To sum up, Italy acquired the impression that association with her
recent allies means for her not only sacrifices in their hour of need,
but also further sacrifices in their hour of triumph. She became
reluctantly convinced that they regard interests which she deems vital
to herself as unconnected with their own. And that was unfortunate. If
at some fateful conjuncture in the future her allies on their part
should gather the impression that she has adjusted her policy to those
interests which are so far removed from theirs, they will have
themselves to blame.
FOOTNOTES:
[194] This clause, which figured in the draft Treaty, as presented to
the Germans, provoked such emphatic protests from all sides that it was
struck out in the revised version.
[195] In an interview given to the Correspondenz Bureau of Vienna by
Conrad von Hoetzendorff. Cf. _Le Temps_, July 19, 1919.
[196] The Prime Minister, Salandra, declared that to have made
neutrality a matter of bargaining would have been to dishonor Italy.
[197] King Carol was holding a crown council at the time. Bratiano had
spoken against the King's proposal to throw in the country's lot with
Germany. Carp was strongly for carrying out Rumania's treaty
obligations. Some others hesitated, but before it could be put to the
vote a telegram was brought in announcing Italy's resolve to maintain
neutrality. The upshot was Rumania's refusal to follow her allies.
[198] On the eastern Adriatic, the Treaty of London allotted to Italy
the peninsula of Istria, without Fiume, most of Dalmatia, exclusive of
Spalato, the chief Dalmatian islands and the Dodecannesus.
[199] The present population of Fiume is computed at 45,227 souls, of
whom 33,000 are Italians, 10,927 Slavs, and 1,300 Magyars.
[200] Another delegate is reported to have answered: "As we need Italy's
friendship, we should pay the moderate price asked and back her claim to
have the moon."
[201] A number of orders of the day eulogizing individual Slav officers
and collective military entities were quoted by the advocates of Italy's
cause at the Conference.
[202] Official _communiqué_ of June 17, 1918.
[203] _Journal de Genève_, April 25, 1919.
[204] Cf. _Il Corriere della Sera_ and _Il Secolo_ of May 26, 1919.
[205] In the Senate he defended this attitude on March 4,1919, and
expressed a desire to dispel the misunderstanding between the two
peoples.
[206] In April, 1919.
[207] This fact has since been made public by Enrico Ferri in a
remarkable discourse pronounced in the parliament at Rome (July 9,
1919). It was Baron Sonnino who deprecated the publication of any
statement on the subject by President Wilson. Cf. _La Stampa_, July 10,
1919.
[208] On January 10, 1919.
[209] It gave eastern Friuli to Italy, including Gorizia, split Istria
into two parts, and assigned Trieste and Pola also to Italy, but under
such territorial conditions that they would be exposed to enemy
projectiles in case of war.
[210] The National Council of Fiume issued its proclamation before it
had become known that the battle of Vittorio Veneto was begun--_i.e._,
October 30, 1918.
[211] Speech delivered at Mount Vernon on July 4, 1918.
[212] Of the United States, France, and Great Britain.
[213] Between April 5th and 12th.
[214] In his address to the representatives of organized labor in
January, 1918.
[215] _L'Echo de Paris_, April 29, 1919.
[216] _Le Gaulois_, April 29, 1919.
[217] These meetings were held from March 28 till April 23, 1919.
[218] See Marco Borsa's article in _Il Secolo_, June 18, 1919; also
_Corriere della Sera_, June 19, 1919.
[219] From May 5 to 16, 1919.
[220] _Il Secolo_, June 19, 1919.
[221] On April 23, 1919.
[222] "Can and will our allies treat our absence as a matter of no
moment? Can and will they violate the formal undertaking which forbids
the belligerents to conclude a diplomatic peace?... The London
Declaration prohibits categorically the conclusion of any separate peace
with any enemy state. France and England cannot sign peace with Germany
if Italy does not sign it.... The situation is grave and abnormal, for
our allies it is also grave and abnormal. Italy is isolated, and
nations, especially those of continental Europe, which are not overrich,
flee solitude as nature abhors a vacuum."--_Corriere della Sera_, April
26, 1919. Again: "'The Treaty of London' restrains France and England
from concluding peace without Italy. And Italy is minded not to conclude
peace with Germany before she herself has received
satisfaction."--_Journal de Genève_, April 25, 1919.
[223] On May 6, 1919, at Versailles.
[224] Cf. _Corriere della Sera_, May 10, 1919.
[225] Annex W of the Revised Treaty.
[226] This incident was revealed by Enrico Ferri, in his remarkable
speech in the Italian Parliament on July 9, 1919. Cf. _La Stampa_, July
10, 1919, page 2.
[227] Cf. _The Morning Post_, July 9, 1919.
[228] On July 10th the Italian Finance Minister, in his financial
statement, announced that the total cost of the war to Italy would
amount to one hundred milliard lire. He added, however, that her share
of the German indemnity would wipe out her foreign debt, while a
progressive tax on all but small fortunes would meet her internal
obligations. Cf. _Corriere della Sera_, July 11 and 12, 1919.
[229] Cf. _Avanti_, July 19, 1919.
[230] Shown in percentages, the rise in the cost of living was: United
States, 220 per cent.; England, 240 per cent.; Switzerland, 257 per
cent.; France, 368 per cent.; Italy, 481 per cent.
[231] Enrico Ferri, on July 9, 1919. Cf. _La Stampa_, July 10, 1919.
[232] At a later date the President reiterated the grounds of his
decision. In his Columbus speech (September 4, 1919) he asserted that
"Italy desired Fiume for strategic military reasons, which the League of
Nations would make unnecessary." (_The New York Herald_ (Paris edition),
September 6, 1919.) But the League did not render strategic precautions
unnecessary to France.
[233] _Corriere della Sera_, May 11, 1919.
[234] _La Stampa_, July 16, 1919.
[235] _Avanti_, April 27, 1919. Cf. _Le Temps_, April 28, 1919.
[236] _Corriere della Sera_, August 9, 1919.
[237] _Corriere della Sera_, September 3, 1919.
[238] Quoted in _La Stampa_ of July 20, 1919.
[239] _Ibidem_.
[240] _Corriere d' Italia_, June 29, 1919.
[241] Cf. _Modern Italy_, July 12, 1919 (page 298).
[242] _Echo de Paris_, July 7, 1919.
[243] Cf. "An Italian Exposé," published by _The Morning Post_, July 5,
1919.
IX
JAPAN
Among the solutions of the burning questions which exercised the
ingenuity and tested the good faith of the leading Powers at the Peace
Conference, none was more rapidly reached there, or more bitterly
assailed outside, than those in which Japan was specially interested.
The storm that began to rage as soon as the Supreme Council's decision
on the Shantung issue became known did not soon subside. Far from that,
it threatened for a time to swell into a veritable hurricane. This
problem, like most of those which were submitted to the forum of the
Conference, may be envisaged from either of two opposite angles of
survey; from that of the future society of justice-loving nations, whose
members are to forswear territorial aggrandizement, special economic
privileges, and political sway in, or at the expense of, other
countries; or from the traditional point of view, which has always
prevailed in international politics and which cannot be better described
than by Signor Salandra's well-known phrase "sacred egotism." Viewed in
the former light, Japan's demand for Shantung was undoubtedly as much a
stride backward as were those of the United States and France for the
Monroe Doctrine and the Saar Valley respectively. But as the three Great
Powers had set the example, Japan was resolved from the outset to rebel
against any decree relegating her to the second-or third-class nations.
The position of equality occupied by her government among the
governments of other Great Powers did not extend to the Japanese nation
among the other nations. But her statesmen refused to admit this
artificial inferiority as a reason for descending another step in the
international hierarchy and they invoked the principle of which Britain,
France, and America had already taken advantage.
The Supreme Council, like Janus of old, possessed two faces, one
altruistic and the other egotistic, and, also like that son of Apollo,
held a key in its right hand and a rod in its left. It applied to the
various states, according to its own interest or convenience, the
principles of the old or the new Covenant, and would fain have
dispossessed Japan of the fruits of the campaign, and allotted to her
the rôle of working without reward in the vineyard of the millennium,
were it not that this policy was excluded by reasons of present
expediency and previous commitments. The expediency was represented by
President Wilson's determination to obtain, before returning to
Washington, some kind of a compact that might be described as the
constitution of the future society of nations, and by his belief that
this instrument could not be obtained without Japan's adherence, which
was dependent on her demand for Shantung being allowed. And the previous
commitments were the secret compacts concluded by Japan with Britain,
France, Russia, and Italy before the United States entered the war.
Nippon's rôle in the war and the circumstances that shaped it are
scarcely realized by the general public. They have been purposely thrust
in the background. And yet a knowledge of them is essential to those who
wish to understand the significance of the dispute about Shantung, which
at bottom was the problem of Japan's international status. Before
attempting to analyze them, however, it may not be amiss to remark that
during the French press campaign conducted in the years 1915-16, with
the object of determining the Tokio Cabinet to take part in the military
operations in Europe, the question of motive was discussed with a degree
of tactlessness which it is difficult to account for. It was affirmed,
for example, that the Mikado's people would be overjoyed if the Allied
governments vouchsafed them the honor of participating in the great
civilizing crusade against the Central Empires. That was proclaimed to
be such an enviable privilege that to pay for it no sacrifice of men or
money would be exorbitant. Again, the degree to which Germany is a
menace to Japan was another of the texts on which Entente publicists
relied to scare Nippon into drastic action, as though she needed to be
told by Europeans where her vital interests lay, from what quarters they
were jeopardized, and how they might be safeguarded most successfully.
So much for the question of tact and form. Japan has never accepted the
doctrine of altruism in politics which her Western allies have so
zealously preached. Until means have been devised and adopted for
substituting moral for military force in the relations of state with
state, the only reconstruction of the world in which the Japanese can
believe is that which is based upon treaties and the pledged word. That
is the principle which underlies the general policy and the present
strivings of our Far Eastern ally.
One of the characteristic traits of all Nippon's dealings with her
neighbors is loyalty and trustworthiness. Her intercourse with Russia
before and after the Manchurian campaign offers a shining example of all
the qualities which one would postulate in a true-hearted neighbor and a
stanch and chivalrous ally. I had an opportunity of watching the
development of the relations between the two governments for many years
before they quarreled, and subsequently down to 1914, and I can state
that the praise lavished by the Tsar's Ministers on their Japanese
colleagues was well deserved. And for that reason it may be taken as an
axiom that whatever developments the present situation may bring forth,
the Empire of Nippon will carry out all its engagements with scrupulous
exactitude, in the spirit as well as the letter.
To be quite frank, then, the Japanese are what we should term realists.
Consequently their foreign policy is inspired by the maxims which
actuated all nations down to the year 1914, and still move nearly all of
them to-day. In fact, the only Powers that have fully and
authoritatively repudiated them as yet are Bolshevist Russia, and to a
large extent the United States. Holding thus to the old dispensation,
Japan entered the war in response to a definite demand made by the
British government. The day before Britain declared war against Germany
the British Ambassador at Tokio officially inquired whether his
government could count upon the active co-operation of the Mikado's
forces in the campaign about to begin. On August 4th Baron Kato, having
in the meanwhile consulted his colleagues, answered in the affirmative.
Three days later another communication reached Tokio from London,
requesting the _immediate_ co-operation of Japan, and on the following
day it was promised. The motive for this haste was credibly asserted to
be Britain's apprehension lest Germany should transfer Kiaochow to
China, and reserve to herself, in virtue of Article V of the Convention
of 1898, the right of securing after the war "a more suitable territory"
in the Middle Empire or Republic. Thereupon they began operations which
were at first restricted to the China seas, but were afterward extended
to the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and finally to the Mediterranean. The
only task that fell to their lot on land was that of capturing Kiaochow.
But whatever they set their hands to they carried out thoroughly, and
to the complete satisfaction of their European allies.
For many years the people of Nippon have been wending slowly, but with
tireless perseverance and unerring instinct, toward their far-off goal,
which to the unbiased historian will seem not merely legitimate but
praiseworthy. Their intercourse with Russia was the story of one long
laborious endeavor to found a common concern which should enable Japan
to make headway on her mission. Russia was just the kind of partner
whose co-operation was especially welcome, seeing that it could be had
without the hitches and set-backs attached to that of most other Great
Powers. The Russians were never really intolerant in racial matters, nor
dangerous in commercial rivalry. They intermarried freely with all the
so-called inferior races and tribes in the Tsardom, and put all on an
equal footing before the law. Twenty-three years ago I paid a visit to
my friend General Tomitch, the military governor of Kars, and I found
myself sitting at his table beside the Prefect of the city, who was a
Mohammedan. The individual Russian is generally free from racial
prejudices; he has no sense of the "yellow peril," and no objection to
receive the Japanese as a comrade, a colleague, or a son-in-law.
And the advances made by Ito and others would have been reciprocated by
Witte and Lamsdorff were it not that the Tsar, interested in
Bezobrazoff's Yalu venture, subordinated his policy to those vested
interests, and compelled Japan to fight. The master-idea of the policy
of Ito, with whom I had two interesting conversations on the subject,
was to strike up a close friendship with the Tsardom, based on community
of durable interests, and to bespeak Russia's help for the hour of storm
and stress which one day might strike. The Tsar's government was
inspired by analogous motives. Before the war was terminated I repaired
to London on behalf of Russia, in order to propose to the Japanese
government, in addition to the treaty of peace which was about to be
discussed at Portsmouth, an offensive and defensive alliance, and to ask
that Prince Ito be sent as first plenipotentiary, invested with full
powers to conclude such a treaty.
M. Izvolsky's policy toward Japan, frank and statesman-like, had an
offensive and a defensive alliance for its intended culmination, and the
treaties and conventions which he actually concluded with Viscount
Motono, in drafting which I played a modest part, amounted almost to
this. The Tsar's opposition to the concessions which represented
Russia's share of the compromise was a tremendous obstacle, which only
the threat of the Minister's resignation finally overcame. And
Izvolsky's energy and insistence hastened the conclusion of a treaty
between them to maintain and respect the _status quo_ in Manchuria, and,
in case it was menaced, to concert with each other the measures they
might deem necessary for the maintenance of the _status quo_. And it was
no longer stipulated, as it had been before, that these measures must
have a pacific character. They were prepared to go farther. And I may
now reveal the fact that the treaty had a secret clause, providing for
the action which Russia afterward took in Mongolia.
These transactions one might term the first act of the international
drama which is still proceeding. They indicate, if they did not shape,
the mold in which the bronze of Japan's political program was cast. It
necessarily differed from other politics, although the maxims underlying
it were the same. Japan, having become a Great Power after her war with
China, was slowly developing into a world Power, and hoped to establish
her claim to that position one day. It was against that day that she
would fain have acquired a puissant and trustworthy ally, and she left
nothing undone to deserve the whole-hearted support of Russia. In the
historic year of 1914, many months before the storm-cloud broke, the War
Minister Sukhomlinoff transferred nearly all the garrisons from Siberia
to Europe, because he had had assurances from Japan which warranted him
in thus denuding the eastern border of troops. During the campaign, when
the Russian offensive broke down and the armies of the enemy were
driving the Tsar's troops like sheep before them, Japan hastened to the
assistance of her neighbor, to whom she threw open her military
arsenals, and many private establishments as well. And when the
Petrograd Cabinet was no longer able to meet the financial liabilities
incurred, the Mikado's advisers devised a generous arrangement on lines
which brought both countries into still closer and more friendly
relations.
The most influential daily press organ in the Tsardom, the _Novoye
Vremya_, wrote: "The war with Germany has supplied our Asiatic neighbor
with an opportunity of proving the sincerity of her friendly assurances.
She behaves not merely like a good friend, but like a stanch military
ally.... In the interests of the future tranquil development of Japan a
more active participation of the Japanese is requisite in the war of the
nations against the world-beast of prey. An alliance with Russia for the
attainment of this object would be an act of immense historic
significance."[244]
Ever since her entry into the community of progressive nations, Japan's
main aspiration and striving has been to play a leading and a civilizing
part in the Far East, and in especial to determine China by advice and
organization to move into line with herself, adopt Western methods and
apply them to Far-Eastern aims. And this might well seem a legitimate as
well as a profitable policy, and a task as noble as most or those to
which the world is wont to pay a tribute of high praise. It appeared all
the more licit that the Powers of Europe, with the exception of Russia,
had denied full political rights to the colored alien. He was placed in
a category apart--an inferior class member of humanity.
"In Japan, and as yet in Japan alone, do we find the Asiatic welcoming
European culture, in which, if a tree may fairly be judged by its fruit,
is to be found the best prospect for the human personal liberty, in due
combination with restraints of law sufficient to, but not in excess of,
the requirements of the general welfare. In this particular
distinctiveness of characteristic, which has thus differentiated the
receptivity of the Japanese from that of the continental Asiatic, we may
perhaps see the influence of the insular environment that has permitted
and favored the evolution of a strong national personality; and in the
same condition we may not err in finding a promise of power to preserve
and to propagate, by example and by influence, among those akin to her,
the new policy which she has adopted, and by which she has profited,
affording to them the example which she herself has found in the
development of Eastern peoples."[245]
Now that is exactly what the Japanese aimed at accomplishing. They were
desirous of contributing to the intellectual and moral advance of the
Chinese and other backward peoples of the Far East, in the same way as
France is laudably desirous of aiding the Syrians, or Great Britain the
Persians. And what is more, Japan undertook to uphold the principle of
the open door, and generally to respect the legitimate interests of
European peoples in the Far East.
But the white races had economic designs of their own on China, and one
of the preliminary conditions of their execution was that Japan's
aspirations should be foiled. Witte opened the campaign by inaugurating
the process of peaceful penetration, but his remarkable efforts were
neutralized and defeated by his own sovereign. The Japanese, after the
Manchurian campaign, which they had done everything possible to avoid,
contrived wholly to eliminate Russian aggression from the Far East. The
feat was arduous and the masterly way in which it was tackled and
achieved sheds a luster on Japanese statesmanship as personified by
Viscount Motono. The Tsardom, in lieu of a potential enemy, was
transformed into a stanch and powerful friend and ally, on whom Nippon
could, as she believed, rely against future aggressors. Russia came to
stand toward her in the same political relationship as toward France.
Japanese statesmen took the alliance with the Tsardom as a solid and
durable postulate of their foreign policy.
All at once the Tsardom fell to pieces like a house of cards, and the
fragments that emerged from the ruins possessed neither the will nor the
power to stand by their Far Eastern neighbors. The fruits of twelve
years' statesmanship and heavy sacrifices were swept away by the Russian
revolution, and Japan's diplomatic position was therefore worse beyond
compare than that of the French Republic in July, 1917, because the
latter was forthwith sustained by Great Britain and the United States,
with such abundance of military and economic resources as made up in the
long run for that of Russia. Japan, on the other hand, has as yet no
substitute for her prostrate ally. She is still alone among Powers some
of whom decline to recognize her equality, while others are ready to
thwart her policy and disable her for the coming race.