eastern shore of the Adriatic.[198] The Jugoslavs claimed all Istria and
Dalmatia, and based their claim partly on the principle of nationalities
and partly on the vital necessity of having outlets on that sea, and in
particular Fiume, the most important of them all, which they described
as essentially Croatian and indispensable as a port. The Italian
delegates, joining issue with the Jugoslavs, and claiming a section of
the seaboard and Fiume, argued that the greatest part of the East
Adriatic shore would still remain Croatian, together with all the ports
of the Croatian coast and others in southern Dalmatia--in a word, twelve
ports, including Spalato and Ragusa, and a thousand kilometers of
seaboard. The Jugoslavs met this assertion with the objection that the
outlets in question were inaccessible, all except Fiume and Metkovitch.
As for Fiume,[199] the Italian delegates contended that although not
promised to Italy by the Treaty of London, it was historically hers,
because, having been for centuries an autonomous entity and having as
such religiously preserved its Italian character, its inhabitants had
exercised their rights to manifest by plebiscite their desire to be
united with the mother country. They further denied that it was
indispensable to the Jugoslavs because these would receive a dozen other
ports and also because the traffic between Croatia and Fiume was
represented by only 7 per cent. of the whole, and even that of Croatia,
Slavonia, and Dalmatia combined by only 13 per cent. Further, Italy
would undertake to give all requisite export facilities in Fiume to the
Jugoslavs.
The latter traversed many of these statements, and in particular that
which described Fiume as a separate autonomous entity and as an
essentially Italian city. Archives were ransacked by both parties,
ancient documents produced, analyzed, condemned as forgeries or appealed
to as authentic proofs, chance phrases were culled from various writers
of bygone days and offered as evidence in support of each contention.
Thus the contest grew heated. It was further inflamed by the attitude of
Italy's allies, who appeared to her as either covertly unfriendly or at
best lukewarm.
M. Clemenceau, who maintained during the peace negotiations the epithet
"Tiger" which he had earned long before, was alleged to have said in the
course of one of those conversations which were misnamed private, "For
Italy to demand Fiume is to ask for the moon."[200] Officially he took
the side of Mr. Wilson, as did also the British Premier, and Italy's two
allies signified but a cold assent to those other claims which were
covered by their own treaty. But they made no secret of their desire to
see that instrument wholly set aside. Fiume they would not bestow on
their ally, at least not unless she was prepared to offer an equivalent
to the Jugoslavs and to satisfy the President of the United States.
This advocacy of the claims of the Jugoslavs was bitterly resented by
the Italians. For centuries the two peoples had been rivals or enemies,
and during the war the Jugoslavs fought with fury against the Italians.
For Italy the arch-enemy had ever been Austria and Austria was largely
Slav. "Austria," they say, "was the official name given to the cruel
enemy against whom we fought, but it was generally the Croatians and
other Slavs whom our gallant soldiers found facing them, and it was they
who were guilty of the misdeeds from which our armies suffered."
Official documents prove this.[201] Orders of the day issued by the
Austrian Command eulogize "the Serbo-Croatian battalions who vied with
the Austro-German and Hungarian soldiers in resisting the pitfalls dug
by the enemy to cause them to swerve from their fidelity and take the
road to treason.[202] In the last battle which ended the existence of
the Austro-Hungarian monarchy a large contingent of excellent Croatian
troops fought resolutely against the Italian armies."
In Italy an impressive story is told which shows how this transformation
of the enemy of yesterday into the ally of to-day sometimes worked out.
The son of an Italian citizen who was fighting as an aviator was killed
toward the end of the war, in a duel fought in the air, by an Austrian
combatant. Soon after the armistice was signed the sorrowing father
repaired to the place where his son had fallen. He there found an
ex-Austrian officer, the lucky victor and slayer of his son, wearing in
his buttonhole the Jugoslav _cocarde_, who, advancing toward him with
extended hand, uttered the greeting, "You and I are now allies."[203]
The historian may smile at the naïveté of this anecdote, but the
statesman will acknowledge that it characterized the relations between
the inhabitants of the new state and the Italians. One can divine the
feelings of these when they were exhorted to treat their ex-enemies as
friends and allies.
"Is it surprising, then," the Italians asked, "that we cannot suddenly
conceive an ardent affection for the ruthless 'Austrians' of whose
cruelties we were bitterly complaining a few months back? Is it strange
that we cannot find it in our hearts to cut off a slice of Italian
territory and make it over to them as one of the fruits of--our victory
over them? If Italy had not first adopted neutrality and then joined the
Allies in the war there would be no Jugoslavia to-day. Are we now to pay
for our altruism by sacrificing Italian soil and Italian souls to the
secular enemies of our race?" In a word, the armistice transformed
Italy's enemy into a friend and ally for whose sake she was summoned to
abandon some of the fruits of a hard-earned victory and a part of her
secular aspirations. What, asked the Italian delegates, would France
answer if she were told that the Prussians whom her matchless armies
defeated must henceforth be looked upon as friends and endowed with some
new colonies which would otherwise be hers? The Italian dramatist Sem
Benelli put the matter tersely: "The collapse of Austria transforms
itself therefore into a play of words, so much so that our people, who
are much more precise because they languished under the Austrian yoke
and the Austrian scourge, never call the Austrians by this name; they
call them always Croatians, knowing well that the Croatians and the
Slavs who constituted Austria were our fiercest taskmasters and most
cruel executioners. It is naïve to think that the ineradicable
characteristics and tendencies of peoples can be modified by a change of
name and a new flag."
But there was another way of looking at the matter, and the Allies,
together with the Jugoslavs, made the most of it. The Slav character of
the disputed territory was emphasized, the principle of nationality
invoked, and the danger of incorporating an unfriendly foreign element
which could not be assimilated was solemnly pointed out. But where
sentiment actuates, reason is generally impotent. The policy of the
Italian government, like that of all other governments, was frankly
nationalistic; whether it was also statesman-like may well be
questioned--indeed the question has already been answered by some of
Italy's principal press organs in the negative.[204] They accuse the
Cabinet of having deliberately let loose popular passions which it
afterward vainly sought to allay, and the facts which they allege in
support of the charge have never been denied.
It was certainly to Italy's best interests to strike up a friendly
agreement with the new state, if that were feasible, and some of the men
in whose hands her destinies rested, feeling their responsibility, made
a laudable attempt to come to an understanding. Signor Orlando, whose
sagacity is equal to his resourcefulness, was one. In London he had
talked the subject over with the Croatian leader, M. Trumbic, and
favored the movement toward reconciliation[205] which Baron Sonnino, his
colleague, as resolutely discouraged. A congress was accordingly held in
Rome[206] and an accord projected. The reciprocal relations became
amicable. The Jugoslav committee in the Italian capital congratulated
Signor Orlando on the victory of the Piave. But owing to various causes,
especially to Baron Sonnino's opposition, these inchoate sentiments of
neighborliness quickly lost their warmth and finally vanished. No trace
of them remained at the Paris Conference, where the delegates of the two
states did not converse together nor even salute one another.
President Wilson's visit to Rome, where, to use an Italian expression,
he was welcomed by Delirium, seemed to brighten Italy's outlook on the
future. Much was afterward made by the President's enemies of the
subsequent change toward him in the sentiments of the Italian people.
This is commonly ascribed to his failure to fulfil the expectations
which his words or attitude aroused or warranted. Nothing could well be
more misleading. Mr. Wilson's position on the subject of Italy's claims
never changed, nor did he say or do aught that would justify a doubt as
to what it was. In Rome he spoke to the Ministers in exactly the same
terms as in Paris at the Conference. He apprized them in January of what
he proposed to do in April and he even contemplated issuing a
declaration of his Italian policy at once. But he was earnestly
requested by the Ministers to keep his counsel to himself and to make no
public allusion to it during his sojourn in Italy.[207] It was not his
fault, therefore, if the Italian people cherished illusory hopes. In
Paris Signer Orlando had an important encounter with Mr. Wilson,[208]
who told him plainly that the allotment of the northern frontiers traced
for Italy by the London Treaty would be confirmed, while that of the
territory on the eastern Adriatic would be quashed. The division of the
spoils of Austria there must, he added, be made congruously with a map
which he handed to the Italian Premier. It was proved on examination to
be identical with one already published by the _New Europe_.[209] Signor
Orlando glanced at the map and in courteous phraseology unfolded the
reasons why he could not entertain the settlement proposed. He added
that no Italian parliament would ratify it. Thereupon the President
turned the discussion to politico-ethical lines, pointed out the harm
which the annexation of an alien and unfriendly element could inflict
upon Italy, the great advantages which cordial relations with her Slav
neighbor would confer on her, and the ease with which she might gain the
markets of the new state. A young and small nation like the Jugoslavs
would be grateful for an act of generosity and would repay it by lasting
friendship--a return worth far more than the contentious territories.
"Ah, you don't know the Jugoslavs, Mr. President," exclaimed Signor
Orlando. "If Italy were to cede to them Dalmatia, Fiume, and eastern
Istria they would forthwith lay claim to Trieste and Pola and, after
Trieste and Pola, to Friuli and Gorizia."
After some further discussion Mr. Wilson said: "Well, I am unable to
reconcile with my principles the recognition of secret treaties, and as
the two are incompatible I uphold the principles." "I, too," rejoined
the Italian Premier, "condemn secret treaties in the future when the new
principles will have begun to regulate international politics. As for
those compacts which were concluded during the war they were all secret,
not excluding those to which the United States was a party." The
President demurred to this reservation. He conceived and put his case
briefly as follows: Italy, like her allies, had had it in her power to
accept the Fourteen Points, reject them, or make reserves. Britain and
France had taken exception to those clauses which they were determined
to reject, whereas Italy signified her adhesion to them all. Therefore
she was bound by the principles underlying them and had forfeited the
right to invoke a secret treaty. The settlement of the issues turning
upon Dalmatia, Istria, Fiume, and the islands must consequently be
taken in hand without reference to the clauses of that instrument.
Examined on their merits and in the light of the new arrangements,
Italy's claims could not be upheld. It would be unfair to the Jugoslavs
who inhabit the whole country to cut them off from their own seaboard.
Nor would such a measure be helpful to Italy herself, whose interest it
was to form a homogeneous whole, consolidate her dominions, and prepare
for the coming economic struggle for national well-being. The principle
of nationality must, therefore, be allowed full play.
As for Fiume, even if the city were, as alleged, an independent entity
and desirous of being incorporated in Italy, one would still have to set
against these facts Jugoslavia's imperative need of an outlet to the
sea. Here the principle of economic necessity outweighs those of
nationality and free determination. A country must live, and therefore
be endowed with the wherewithal to support life. On these grounds,
judgment should be entered for the Jugoslavs.
The Italian Premier's answer was equally clear, but he could not
unburden his mind of it all. His government had, it was true, adhered to
the Fourteen Points without reservation. But the assumptions on which it
gave this undertaking were that it would not be used to upset past
compacts, but would be reserved for future settlements; that even had it
been otherwise the maxims in question should be deemed relevant in
Italy's case only if applied impartially to all states, and that the
entire work of reorganization should rest on this ethical foundation. A
régime of exceptions, with privileged and unprivileged nations, would
obviously render the scheme futile and inacceptable. Yet this was the
system that was actually being introduced. If secret treaties were to be
abrogated, then let the convention between Japan and China be also put
out of court and the dispute between them adjudicated upon its merits.
If the Fourteen Points are binding, let the freedom of the seas be
proclaimed. If equal rights are to be conferred upon all states, let the
Monroe Doctrine be repealed. If disarmament is to become a reality, let
Britain and America cease to build warships. Suppose for a moment that
to-morrow Brazil or Chile were to complain of the conduct of the United
States, the League of Nations, in whose name Mr. Wilson speaks, would be
hindered by the Monroe Doctrine from intervening, whereas Britain and
the United States in analogous conditions may intermeddle in the affairs
of any of the lesser states. When Ireland or Egypt or India uplifts its
voice against Britain, it is but a voice in the desert which awakens no
echo. If Fiume were inhabited by American citizens who, with a like
claim to be considered a separate entity, asked to be allowed to live
under the Stars and Stripes, what would President Wilson's attitude be
then? Would he turn a deaf ear to their prayer? Surely not. Why, in the
case of Italy, does he not do as he would be done by? What it all comes
to is that the new ordering under the flag of equality is to consist of
superior and inferior nations, of which the former, who speak English,
are to possess unlimited power over the latter, to decide what is good
for them and what is bad, what is licit and what is forbidden. And
against their fiat there is to be no appeal. In a word, it is to be the
hegemony of the Anglo-Saxon race.
It is worth noting that Signor Orlando's arguments were all derived from
the merits of the case, not from the terms or the force of the London
Treaty. Fiume, he said, had besought Italy to incorporate it, and had
made this request before the armistice, at a moment when it was risky to
proclaim attachments to the kingdom.[210] The inhabitants had invoked
Mr. Wilson's own words: "National aspirations must be respected....
Self-determination is not a mere phrase." "Peoples and provinces are not
to be bartered about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were
mere chattels and pawns in a game. Every territorial settlement involved
in this war must be made in the interest and for the benefit of the
populations concerned, and not as a part of any adjustment for
compromise of claims among rival states." And in his address at Mount
Vernon the President had advocated a doctrine which is peculiarly
applicable to Fiume--_i.e._:
"The settlement of every question, whether of territory, of sovereignty,
of economic arrangement, or of political relationship, upon the basis of
the free acceptance of that settlement by the people immediately
concerned, and not upon the basis of material interest or advantage of
any other nation or people which may desire a different settlement, for
the sake of its own exterior influence or mastery."[211] These maxims
laid down by Mr. Wilson implicitly allot Fiume to Italy.
Finally as to the objection that Italy's claims would entail the
incorporation of a number of Slavs, the answer was that the percentage
was negligible as compared with the number of foreign elements annexed
by other states. The Poles, it was estimated, would have some 30 per
cent. of aliens, the Czechs not less, Rumania 17 per cent., Jugoslavia
11 per cent., France 4 per cent., and Italy only 3 per cent.
In February the Jugoslavs made a strategic move, which many admired as
clever, and others blamed as unwise. They proposed that all differences
between their country and Italy should be submitted to Mr. Wilson's
arbitration. Considering that the President's mind was made up on the
subject from the beginning, and that he had decided against Italy, it
was natural that the delegation in whose favor his decision was known to
incline should be eager to get it accepted by their rivals. As neither
side was ignorant of what the result of the arbitration would be, only
one of the two could be expected to close with the offer, and the most
it could hope by doing this was to embarrass the other. The Italian
answer was ingenious. Their dispute, they said, was not with Serbia, who
alone was represented at the Conference; it concerned Croatia, who had
no official standing there, and whose frontiers were not yet determined,
but would in due time be traced by the Conference, of which Italy was a
member. The decision would be arrived at after an exhaustive study, and
its probable consequences to Europe's peace would be duly considered. As
extreme circumspection was imperative before formulating a verdict, five
plenipotentiaries would seem better qualified than any one of them, even
though he were the wisest of the group. To remove the question from the
competency of the Conference, which was expressly convoked to deal with
such issues, and submit it to an individual, would be felt as a slight
on the Supreme Council. And so the matter dropped.
Signor Orlando knew that if he had adopted the suggestion and made Mr.
Wilson arbiter, Italy's hopes would have been promptly extinguished in
the name of the Fourteen Points, and her example held up for all the
lesser states to imitate. The President was, however, convinced that the
Italian people would have ratified the arrangement with alacrity. It is
worth recording that he was so sure of his own hold on the Italian
masses that, when urging Signor Orlando to relinquish his demand for
Fiume and the Dalmatian coast, he volunteered to provide him with a
message written by himself to serve as the Premier's justification.
Signor Orlando was to read out this document in Parliament in order to
make it clear to the nation that the renunciation had been demanded by
America, that it would most efficaciously promote Italy's best
interests, and should for that reason be ratified with alacrity. Signor
Orlando, however, declined the certificate and things took their course.
In Paris the Italian delegation made little headway. Every one admired,
esteemed, and felt drawn toward the first delegate, who, left to
himself, would probably have secured for his country advantageous
conditions, even though he might be unable to add Fiume to those secured
by the secret treaty. But he was not left to himself. He had to reckon
with his Minister of Foreign Affairs, who was as mute as an oyster and
almost as unsociable. Baron Sonnino had his own policy, which was
immutable, almost unutterable. At the Conference he seemed unwilling to
propound, much less to discuss it, even with those foreign colleagues on
whose co-operation or approval its realization depended. He actually
shunned delegates who would fain have talked over their common interests
in a friendly, informal way, and whose business it was to strike up an
agreement. In fact, results which could be secured only by persuading
indifferent or hostile people and capturing their good-will he expected
to attain by holding aloof from all and leading the life of a hermit,
one might almost say of a misanthrope. One can imagine the feelings, if
one may not reproduce the utterances, of English-speaking officials,
whose legitimate desire for a free exchange of views with Italy's
official spokesman was thwarted by the idiosyncrasies of her own
Minister of Foreign Affairs. In Allied circles Baron Sonnino was
distinctly unpopular, and his unpopularity produced a marked effect on
the cause he had at heart. He was wholly destitute of friends. He had,
it is true, only two enemies, but they were himself and the foreign
element who had to work with him. Italy's cause was therefore
inadequately served.