_T. H._ Seventhly, I hold that to be a sufficient cause, to which
nothing is wanting that is needful to the producing of the effect. The
same is also a necessary cause: for if it be possible that a sufficient
cause shall not bring forth the effect, then there wanted somewhat which
was needful to the producing of it; and so the cause was not sufficient.
But if it be impossible that a sufficient cause should not produce the
effect, then is a sufficient cause a necessary cause: for that is said
to produce an effect necessarily, that cannot but produce it. Hence it
is manifest, that whatsoever is produced, is produced necessarily: for
whatsoever is produced, hath had a sufficient cause to produce it, or
else it had not been. And therefore also voluntary actions are
necessitated.
[Sidenote: The Bishop’s reply.]
_J. D._ “This section contains a third argument to prove that all
effects are necessary; for clearing whereof, it is needful to consider
how a cause may be said to be sufficient or insufficient.
“First, several causes singly considered may be insufficient, and the
same taken conjointly be sufficient to produce an effect. As (_a_) two
horses jointly are sufficient to draw a coach, which either of them
singly is insufficient to do. Now to make the effect, that is, the
drawing of the coach necessary, it is not only required that the two
horses be sufficient to draw it, but also that their conjunction be
necessary, and their habitude such as they may draw it. If the owner of
one of these horses will not suffer him to draw; if the smith have shod
the other in the quick, and lamed him; if the horse have cast a shoe, or
be a resty jade, and will not draw but when he list; then the effect is
not necessarily produced, but contingently more or less, as the
concurrence of the causes is more or less contingent.
(_b_) “Secondly, a cause may be said to be sufficient, either because it
produceth that effect which is intended, as in the generation of a man;
or else, because it is sufficient to produce that which is produced, as
in the generation of a monster. The former is properly called a
sufficient cause, the latter a weak and insufficient cause. Now, if the
debility of the cause be not necessary, but contingent, then the effect
is not necessary, but contingent. It is a rule in logic, that the
conclusion always follows the weaker part. If the premises be but
probable, the conclusion cannot be demonstrative. It holds as well in
causes as in propositions. No effect can exceed the virtue of its cause.
If the ability or debility of the causes be contingent, the effect
cannot be necessary.
“Thirdly, that which concerns this question of liberty from necessity
most nearly, is that (_c_) a cause is said to be sufficient in respect
of the ability of it to act, not in respect of its will to act. The
concurrence of the will is needful to the production of a free effect.
But the cause may be sufficient, though the will do not concur. As God
is sufficient to produce a thousand worlds; but it doth not follow from
thence, either that he hath produced them, or that he will produce them.
The blood of Christ is a sufficient ransom for all mankind; but it doth
not follow therefore, that all mankind shall be actually saved by virtue
of his blood. A man may be a sufficient tutor, though he will not teach
every scholar, and a sufficient physician, though he will not administer
to every patient. For as much therefore as the concurrence of the will
is needful to the production of every free effect, and yet the cause may
be sufficient _in sensu diviso_, although the will do not concur; it
follows evidently, that the cause may be sufficient, and yet something
which is needful to the production of the effect, may be wanting; and
that every sufficient cause is not a necessary cause.
“Lastly, if any man be disposed to wrangle against so clear light, and
say, that though the free agent be sufficient _in sensu diviso_, yet he
is not sufficient _in sensu composito_, to produce effect without the
concurrence of the will, he saith true: but first, he bewrays the
weakness and the fallacy of the former argument, which is a mere
trifling between sufficiency in a divided sense, and sufficiency in a
compounded sense. And seeing the concurrence of the will is not
predetermined, there is no antecedent necessity before it do concur; and
when it hath concurred, the necessity is but hypothetical, which may
consist with liberty.”