I had said, that nothing taketh beginning from itself, and that the
cause of the will is not the will itself, but something else which it
disposeth not of. Answering to this, he endeavours to shew us the cause
of the _will_.
(_a_) “I grant”, saith he, “that the will doth not take beginning from
itself, for that the faculty of the will takes beginning from God, who
created the soul, and poured it into man, and endowed it with this
power; and for that the act of willing takes not beginning from itself,
but from the faculty or from the power of willing, which is in the soul.
This is certain; finite and participated things cannot be from
themselves, nor be produced by themselves. What would he conclude from
hence? That therefore the act of willing takes not its beginning from
the faculty of the will?” It is well that he grants finite things (as
for his _participated_, it signifies nothing here) cannot be produced by
themselves. For out of this I can conclude that the act of willing is
not produced by the faculty of willing. He that hath the faculty of
willing, hath the faculty of willing something in particular. And at the
same time he hath the faculty of nilling the same. If therefore the
faculty of willing be the cause he willeth anything whatsoever, for the
same reason the faculty of nilling will be the cause at the same time of
nilling it: and so he shall will and nill the same thing at the same
time, which is absurd. It seems the Bishop had forgot, that _matter_ and
_power_ are indifferent to contrary _forms_ and contrary _acts_. It is
somewhat besides the matter, that determineth it to a certain form; and
somewhat besides the power, that produceth a certain act: and thence it
is, that is inferred this that he granteth, that nothing can be produced
by itself; which nevertheless he presently contradicteth, in saying,
that “all men know when a stone descends, the beginning is intrinsical”,
and that “the stone moves in respect of the form”. Which is as much as
to say, that the form moveth the matter, or that the stone moveth
itself; which before he denied. When a stone ascends, the beginning of
the stone’s motion was in itself, that is to say, intrinsical, because
it is not the stone’s motion, till the stone begins to be moved; but the
motion that caused it to begin to ascend, was a precedent and
extrinsical motion of the hand or other engine that threw it upward. And
so when it descends, the beginning of the stone’s motion is in the
stone; but nevertheless, there is a former motion in the ambient body,
air or water, that causeth it to descend. But because no man can see it,
most men think there is none; though reason, wherewith the Bishop (as
relying only upon the authority of books) troubleth not himself,
convince that there is.
(_b_) “His second argument is, _ex concessis_: ‘It is out of
controversy, that of voluntary actions the will is a necessary cause’.
The argument may be thus reduced: necessary causes produce necessary
effects; but the will is a necessary cause of voluntary actions. I might
deny his major; necessary causes do not always produce necessary
effects, except they be also necessarily produced.” He has reduced the
argument to nonsense, by saying necessary causes produce not necessary
effects. For necessary effects, unless he mean such effects as shall
necessarily be produced, is insignificant. Let him consider therefore
with what grace he can say, necessary causes do not always produce their
effects, except those effects be also necessarily produced. But his
answer is chiefly to the minor, and denies that the will is not a
necessary cause of what it wills in particular actions. That it wills
when it wills, saith he, is necessary; but that it wills this or that,
is free. Is it possible for any man to conceive, that he that willeth,
can will anything but this or that particular thing? It is therefore
manifest, that either the will is a necessary cause of this or that or
any other particular action, or not the necessary cause of any voluntary
action at all. For universal actions there be none. In that which
followeth, he undertaketh to make his doctrine more expressly understood
by considering the act of the will three ways: “in respect of its
nature, in respect of its exercise, and in respect of its object”. For
the nature of the act, he saith, that “that which the will wills, is
necessarily voluntary”, and that in this sense he grants it is out of
controversy, that the will is a necessary cause of voluntary actions.
Instead of “that which the will wills”, to make it sense, read that
which the man wills; and then if the man’s will be, as he confesseth, a
necessary cause of voluntary actions, it is no less a necessary cause
that they are actions, than that they are voluntary. For the exercise of
the act, he saith that “the will may either will, or suspend its act”.
This is the old canting, which hath already been sufficiently detected.
But to make it somewhat, let us read it thus: the man that willeth, may
either will or suspend his will: and thus it is intelligible, but false;
for how can he that willeth, at the same time suspend his will? And for
the object he says, that “it is not necessary but free”, &c. His reason
is, because, he says, it was not necessary, for example, in choosing a
Pope, to choose him this or that day, or to choose this or that man. I
would be glad to know, by what argument he can prove the election not to
have been necessitated: for it is not enough for him to say, I perceive
no necessity in it; nor to say, they might have chosen another, because
he knows not whether they might or not; nor to say if he had not been
freely elected, the election had been void or none. For though that be
true, it does not follow that the election was not necessary; for there
is no repugnance to necessity, either in election or in freedom. And
whereas he concludeth, “therefore voluntary acts in particular, are not
necessitated”; I would have been glad he had set down what voluntary
acts there are, not particular, which by his restricting of voluntary
acts he grants to be necessitated.