In this place he disputeth against my definition of _a sufficient
cause_, namely, that cause to which nothing is wanting needful to the
producing of the effect. I thought this definition could have been
misliked by no man that had English enough to know that _a sufficient
cause_, _and cause enough_, signifieth the same thing. And no man will
say that that is _cause enough_ to produce an effect, to which any thing
is wanting needful to the producing of it. But the Bishop thinks, if he
set down what he understands by _sufficient_, it would serve to confute
my definition: and therefore says: (_a_) “Two horses jointly are
sufficient to draw a coach, which either of them singly is insufficient
to do. Now to make the effect, that is, the drawing of the coach
necessary, it is not only required that the two horses be sufficient to
draw it, but also that it be necessary they shall be joined, and that
the owner of the horses will let them draw, and that the smith hath not
lamed them, and they be not resty, and list not to draw but when they
list: otherwise the effect is contingent”. It seems the Bishop thinks
two horses may be sufficient to draw a coach, though they will not draw,
or though they be lame, or though they be never put to draw; and I think
they can never produce the effect of drawing, without those needful
circumstances of being strong, obedient, and having the coach some way
or other fastened to them. He calls it a sufficient cause of drawing,
that they be coach horses, though they be lame or will not draw. But I
say they are not sufficient absolutely, but conditionally, if they be
not lame nor resty. Let the reader judge, whether my sufficient cause or
his, may properly be called cause enough.
(_b_) “Secondly, a cause may be said to be sufficient, either because it
produceth that effect which is intended, as in the generation of a man;
or else, because it is sufficient to produce that which is produced, as
in the generation of a monster: the former is properly called a
sufficient cause, the latter a weak and insufficient cause.” In these
few lines he hath said the cause of the generation of a monster is
sufficient to produce a monster, and that it is insufficient to produce
a monster. How soon may a man forget his words, that doth not understand
them. This term of _insufficient_ cause, which also the School calls
_deficient_, that they may rhyme to _efficient_, is not intelligible,
but a word devised like _hocus pocus_, to juggle a difficulty out of
sight. That which is sufficient to produce a monster, is not therefore
to be called an insufficient cause to produce a man; no more than that
which is sufficient to produce a man, is to be called an insufficient
cause to produce a monster.
(_c_) “Thirdly, a cause is said to be sufficient in respect to the
ability of it to act, not in respect of its will to act, &c. As God is
sufficient to produce a thousand worlds.” He understands little, when
men say, God is sufficient to produce many worlds, if he understand not
the meaning to be, that he is sufficient to produce them if he will.
Without this supposition, _if he will_, a man is not sufficient to
produce any voluntary action, not so much as to walk, though he be in
health and at liberty. The will is as much a sufficient cause without
the strength to do, as the strength without the will. To that which he
adds, that my definition is “a mere trifling between a sufficiency in a
divided sense, and a sufficiency in a compounded sense”, I can make no
answer; because I understand no more what he means by sufficiency in a
divided sense, and sufficiency in a compounded sense, than if he had
said sufficiency in a divided nonsense, and sufficiency in a compounded
nonsense.