_T. H._ Sixthly, I conceive nothing taketh beginning from itself, but
from the action of some other immediate agent without itself: and that
therefore when first a man had an appetite or will to something, to
which immediately before he had no appetite nor will, the cause of his
will is not the will itself, but something else not in his own
disposing. So that, whereas it is out of controversy that of voluntary
actions the will is a necessary cause; and by this which is said, the
will is also caused by other things whereof it disposeth not; it
followeth that voluntary actions have all of them necessary causes, and
therefore are necessitated.
[Sidenote: The Bishop’s reply.]
_J. D._ “This sixth point doth not consist in explicating of terms, as
the former; but in two proofs, that voluntary actions are necessitated.
The former proof stands thus: ‘Nothing takes beginning from itself, but
from some agent without itself, which is not in its own disposing
therefore, &c’. _Concedo omnia_; (_a_) I grant all he saith. The will
doth not take beginning from itself. Whether he understand by _will_ the
faculty of the will, which is a power of the reasonable soul, it takes
not beginning from itself, but from God, who created and infused the
soul into man, and endowed it with this power: or whether he understand
by _will_ the act of willing, it takes not beginning from itself, but
from the faculty or from the power of willing, which is in the soul.
This is certain; finite and participated things cannot be from
themselves, nor be produced by themselves. What would he conclude from
hence? That therefore the act of willing takes not its beginning from
the faculty of the will? Or that the faculty is always determined
antecedently, extrinsically, to will that which it doth will? He may as
soon draw water out of a pumice, as draw any such conclusion out of
these premises. Secondly, for his “taking a beginning”, either he
understands _a beginning of being_, or a _beginning of working and
acting_. If he understand a beginning of being, he saith most truly,
that nothing hath a beginning of being in time from itself. But this is
nothing to his purpose: the question is not between us, whether the soul
of man or the will of man be eternal. But if he understand _a beginning
of working or moving actually_, it is a gross error. All men know that
when a stone descends, or fire ascends, or when water, that hath been
heated, returns to its former temper; the beginning or reason is
intrinsical, and one and the same thing doth move and is moved in a
diverse respect. It moves in respect of the form, and it is moved in
respect of the matter. Much more man, who hath a perfect knowledge and
prenotion of the end, is most properly said to move himself. Yet I do
not deny but that there are other beginnings of human actions, which do
concur with the will: some outward, as the first cause by general
influence, which is evermore requisite, angels or men by persuading,
evil spirits by tempting, the object or end by its appetibility, the
understanding by directing. So passions and acquired habits. But I deny
that any of these do necessitate or can necessitate the will of man by
determining it physically to one, except God alone, who doth it rarely,
in extraordinary cases. And where there is no antecedent determination
to one, there is no absolute necessity, but true liberty.
(_b_) “His second argument is _ex concessis_: ‘It is out of
controversy’, saith he, ‘that of voluntary actions the will is a
necessary cause’. The argument may be thus reduced: necessary causes
produce necessary effects; but the will is a necessary cause of
voluntary actions. I might deny his major. Necessary causes do not
always produce necessary effects, except they be also necessarily
produced; as I have shewed before in the burning of Protagoras’s book.
But I answer clearly to the minor, that the will is not a necessary
cause of what it wills in particular actions. It is without
_controversy_ indeed, for it is without all probability. That it wills
when it wills, is necessary; but that it wills this or that, now or
then, is free. More expressly, the act of the will may be considered
three ways; either in respect of its nature, or in respect of its
exercise, or in respect of its object. First, for the nature of the act:
that which the will wills, is necessarily voluntary, because the will
cannot be compelled. And in this sense, ‘it is out of controversy, that
the will is a necessary cause of voluntary actions’. Secondly, for the
exercise of its acts, that is not necessary: the will may either will or
suspend its act. Thirdly, for the object, that is not necessary, but
free: the will is not extrinsically determined to its objects. As for
example: the cardinals meet in the conclave to choose a Pope; whom they
choose, he is necessarily Pope. But it is not necessary that they shall
choose this or that day. Before they were assembled, they might defer
their assembling; when they are assembled, they may suspend their
election for a day or a week. Lastly, for the person whom they will
choose, it is freely in their own power; otherwise if the election were
not free, it were void, and no election at all. So that which takes its
beginning from the will, is necessarily voluntary; but it is not
necessary that the will shall will this or that in particular, as it was
necessary that the person freely elected should be Pope: but it was not
necessary either that the election should be at this time, or that this
man should be elected. And therefore voluntary acts in particular have
not necessary causes, that is, they are not necessitated.”