[Sidenote: The Bishop’s reply.]
_J. D._ “Fifthly and lastly, the divine labours to find out a way how
liberty may consist with the prescience and decrees of God. But of this
I had not very long since occasion to write a full discourse, in answer
to a treatise against the prescience of things contingent. I shall for
the present only repeat these two things. First, we ought not to desert
a certain truth, because we are not able to comprehend the certain
manner. God should be but a poor God, if we were able perfectly to
comprehend all his actions and attributes. Secondly, in my poor
judgment, which I ever do and ever shall submit to better, the readiest
way to reconcile contingence and liberty with the decrees and prescience
of God, and most remote from the altercations of these times, is to
subject future contingents to the aspect of God, according to that
presentiality which they have in eternity. Not that things future, which
are not yet existent, are co-existent with God: but because the infinite
knowledge of God, incircling all times in the point of eternity, doth
attain to their future being, from whence proceeds their objective and
intelligible being. The main impediment which keeps men from subscribing
to this way, is because they conceive eternity to be an everlasting
succession, and not one indivisible point. But if they consider, that
whatsoever is in God is God; that there are no accidents in him, (for
that which is infinitely perfect cannot be further perfected); that as
God is not wise, but wisdom itself, not just, but justice itself, so he
is not eternal, but eternity itself: they must needs conclude, that
therefore this eternity is indivisible, because God is indivisible; and
therefore not successive, but altogether an infinite point,
comprehending all times within itself.”
_T. H._ The last part of this discourse containeth his opinion about
reconciling liberty with the prescience and decrees of God, otherwise
than some divines have done; against whom he had formerly written a
treatise, out of which he only repeateth two things. One is, that “we
ought not to desert a certain truth, for not being able to comprehend
the certain manner of it”. And I say the same; as for example, that he
ought not to desert this certain truth: that there are certain and
necessary causes, which make every man to will what he willeth, though
he do not yet conceive in what manner the will of man is caused. And yet
I think the manner of it is not very hard to conceive: seeing that we
see daily, that praise, dispraise, reward, punishment, good and evil
sequels of men’s actions retained in memory, do frame and make us to the
election of whatsoever it be that we elect; and that the memory of such
things proceeds from the senses, and sense from the operation of the
objects of sense, which are external to us, and governed only by God
Almighty; and by consequence, all actions, even of free and voluntary
agents, are necessary.
The other thing he repeateth is, that “the best way to reconcile
contingency and liberty with the prescience and decrees of God, is to
subject future contingents to the aspect of God”. The same is also my
opinion, but contrary to what he hath all this while laboured to prove.
For hitherto he held liberty and necessity, that is to say, liberty and
the decrees of God, irreconcilable; unless the aspect of God (which word
appeareth now the first time in this discourse) signify somewhat else
besides God’s will and decree, which I cannot understand. But he adds,
that we must subject them “according to that presentiality which they
have in eternity”; which he says cannot be done by them that conceive
eternity to be an everlasting succession, but only by them that conceive
it an indivisible point. To this I answer, that as soon as I can
conceive eternity to be an indivisible point, or any thing but an
everlasting succession, I will renounce all I have written on this
subject. I know St. Thomas Aquinas calls eternity _nunc stans_, an _ever
abiding now_; which is easy enough to say, but though I fain would, I
never could conceive it; they that can, are more happy than I. But in
the mean time he alloweth hereby all men to be of my opinion, save only
those that conceive in their minds a _nunc stans_; which I think are
none. I understand as little, how it can be true that “God is not just,
but justice itself, not wise but wisdom itself, not eternal but eternity
itself”: nor how he concludes thence that “eternity is a point
indivisible, and not a succession”: nor in what sense it can be said,
that an “infinite point,” &c, wherein is no succession, can “comprehend
all times,” though time be successive.
These phrases I find not in the Scripture. I wonder therefore what was
the design of the Schoolmen to bring them up; unless they thought a man
could not be a true Christian, unless his understanding be first
strangled with such hard sayings.
And thus much in answer to his discourse; wherein I think not only his
squadrons, but also his reserves of distinctions are defeated. And now
your Lordship shall have my doctrine concerning the same question, with
my reasons for it, positively and briefly as I can, without any terms of
art, in plain English.
_J. D._ (_a_) “That poor discourse which I mention, was not written
against any divines, but in way of examination of a French treatise,
which your Lordship’s brother did me the honour to show me at York.
(_b_) My assertion is most true, that we ought not to desert a certain
truth because we are not able to comprehend the certain manner. Such a
truth is that which I maintain, that the will of man in ordinary actions
is free from extrinsical determination: a truth demonstrable in reason,
received and believed by all the world. And therefore, though I be not
able to comprehend or express exactly the certain manner how it consists
together with God’s eternal prescience and decrees, which exceed my weak
capacity, yet I ought to adhere to that truth which is manifest. But T.
H.’s opinion, of the absolute necessity of all events by reason of their
antecedent determination in their extrinsical and necessary causes, is
no such certain truth, but an innovation, a strange paradox, without
probable grounds, rejected by all authors, yea, by all the world.
Neither is the manner how the second causes do operate, so obscure, or
so transcendent above the reach of reason, as the eternal decrees of God
are. And therefore in both these respects, he cannot challenge the same
privilege. I am in possession of an old truth, derived by inheritance or
succession from mine ancestors. And therefore, though I were not able to
clear every quirk in law, yet I might justly hold my possession until a
better title were showed for another. He is no old possessor, but a new
pretender, and is bound to make good his claim by evident proofs: not by
weak and inconsequent suppositions or inducements, such as those are
which he useth here, of ‘praises, dispraises, rewards, punishments, the
memory of good and evil sequels and events’; which may incline the will,
but neither can nor do necessitate the will: nor by uncertain and
accidental inferences, such as this; ‘the memory of praises, dispraises,
rewards, punishments, good and evil sequels, do make us’ (he should say,
_dispose_ us) ‘to elect what we elect; but the memory of these things is
from the sense, and the sense from the operation of the external
objects, and the agency of external objects is only from God; therefore
all actions, even of free and voluntary agents, are necessary’. (_c_) To
pass by all the other great imperfections which are to be found in this
sorite, it is just like that old sophistical piece: He that drinks well
sleeps well, he that sleeps well thinks no hurt, he that thinks no hurt
lives well; therefore he that drinks well lives well.
(_d_) “In the very last passage of my discourse I proposed mine own
private opinion, how it might be made appear, that the eternal
prescience and decrees of God are consistent with true liberty and
contingency. And this I set down in as plain terms as I could, or as so
profound a speculation would permit: which is almost wholly
misunderstood by T. H., and many of my words wrested to a wrong sense.
As first, where I speak of the aspect of God, that is, his view, his
knowledge, by which the most free and contingent actions were manifest
to him from eternity, (Heb. iv. 13, _all things are naked and open to
his eyes_), and this not discursively, but intuitively, not by external
species, but by his internal essence; he confounds this with the will
and the decrees of God; though he found not the word _aspect_ before in
this discourse, he might have found prescience. (_e_) Secondly, he
chargeth me, that hitherto I have maintained that ‘liberty and the
decrees of God are irreconcilable.’ If I have said any such thing, my
heart never went along with my pen. No, but his reason why he chargeth
me on this manner is, because I have maintained that ‘liberty and the
absolute necessity of all things’ are irreconcilable. That is true
indeed. What then? ‘Why,’ saith he, ‘necessity and God’s decrees are all
one.’ How all one? That were strange indeed. Necessity may be a
consequent of God’s decrees; it cannot be the decree itself. (_f_) But
to cut his argument short: God hath decreed all effects which come to
pass in time; yet not all after the same manner, but according to the
distinct natures, capacities, and conditions of his creatures, which he
doth not destroy by his decree; some he acteth, with some he
co-operateth by special influence, and some he only permitteth. Yet this
is no idle or bare permission; seeing he doth concur both by way of
general influence, giving power to act; and also by disposing all events
necessary, free, and contingent to his own glory. (_g_) Thirdly, he
chargeth me, that I ‘allow all men to be of his opinion, save only those
that conceive in their minds a _nunc stans_, or how eternity is an
indivisible point, rather than an everlasting succession’. But I have
given no such allowance. I know there are many other ways proposed by
divines, for reconciling the eternal prescience and decrees of God with
the liberty and contingency of second causes; some of which may please
other judgments better than this of mine. Howsoever, though a man could
comprehend none of all these ways, yet remember what I said, that a
certain truth ought not to be rejected, because we are not able, in
respect of our weakness, to understand the certain manner or reason of
it. I know the loadstone hath an attractive power to draw the iron to
it; and yet I know not how it comes to have such a power.
“But the chiefest difficulty which offers itself in this section is,
whether eternity be an indivisible point, as I maintain it; or an
everlasting succession, as he would have it. According to his constant
use, he gives no answer to what was urged by me, but pleads against it
from his own incapacity. ‘I never could conceive,’ saith he, ‘how
eternity should be an indivisible point.’ I believe, that neither we nor
any man else can comprehend it so clearly as we do these inferior
things. The nearer that anything comes to the essence of God, the more
remote it is from our apprehension. But shall we therefore make
potentialities, and successive duration, and former and later, or a part
without a part, as they say, to be in God? Because we are not able to
understand clearly the divine perfection, we must not therefore
attribute any imperfection to him.
(_h_) “He saith moreover, that ‘he understands as little how it can be
true which I say, that God is not just but justice itself, not eternal
but eternity itself.’ It seems, howsoever he be versed in this question,
that he hath not troubled his head overmuch with reading School-divines
or metaphysicians, if he make faculties or qualities to be in God really
distinct from his essence. God is a most simple or pure act, which can
admit no composition of substance and accidents. Doth he think, that the
most perfect essence of God cannot act sufficiently without faculties
and qualities? The infinite perfection of the Divine essence excludes
all passive or receptive powers, and cannot be perfected more than it is
by any accidents. The attributes of God are not divers virtues or
qualities in him, as they are in the creatures; but really one and the
same with the Divine essence, and among themselves. They are attributed
to God to supply the defect of our capacity, who are not able to
understand that which is to be known of God under one name, or one act
of the understanding.
“Furthermore he saith, that ‘he understands not how I conclude from
hence, that eternity is an indivisable point, and not a succession’.
(_i_) I will help him. The Divine substance is indivisible; but eternity
is the Divine substance. The major is evident, because God is _actus
simplicissimus_, a most simple act; wherein there is no manner of
composition, neither of matter and form, nor of subject and accidents,
nor of parts, &c; and by consequence no divisibility. The minor hath
been clearly demonstrated in mine answer to his last doubt, and is
confessed by all men that whatsoever is in God, is God.
“Lastly, he saith, he conceives not ‘how it can be said, that an
infinite point, wherein is no succession, can comprehend all time which
is successive’. I answer, that it doth not comprehend it formally, as
time is successive; but eminently and virtually, as eternity is
infinite. To-day all eternity is co-existent with this day: to-morrow
all eternity will be co-existent with to-morrow: and so in like manner
with all the parts of time, being itself without parts. He saith, ‘he
finds not these phrases in the Scripture’. No, but he may find the thing
in the Scripture, that God is infinite in all his attributes, and not
capable of any imperfection.
“And so to show his antipathy against the Schoolmen, that he hath no
liberty or power to contain himself when he meets with any of their
phrases or tenets, he falls into another paroxism or fit of inveighing
against them; and so concludes his answer with a _plaudite_ to himself,
because he had defeated both my squadrons of arguments and reserves of
distinctions
Dicite Io pæan, et Io bis dicite pæan.
“But because his eyesight was weak, and their backs were towards him, he
quite mistook the matter. Those whom he saw routed and running away,
were his own scattered forces.”