(_a_) “That poor discourse which I mention, was not written against any
divines, but in way of examination of a French treatise, &c”. This is in
reply to those words of mine, “this discourse containeth his opinion
about reconciling liberty with the prescience and decrees of God,
otherwise than some divines have done, against whom he had formerly
written a treatise”. If the French treatise were according to his mind,
what need was there that the examination should be written? If it were
not to his mind, it was in confutation of him, that is to say, written
against the author of it: unless perhaps the Bishop thinks that he
writes not against a man, unless he charge him with blasphemy and
atheism, as he does me.
(_b_) “My assertion is most true, that we ought not to desert a certain
truth, because we are not able to comprehend the certain manner.” To
this I answered, that it was true; and as he alleged it for a reason why
he should not be of my opinion, so I alleged it for a reason why I
should not be of his. But now in his reply he saith, that his opinion is
“a truth demonstrable in reason, received and believed by all the world.
And therefore, though he be not able to comprehend or express exactly
the certain manner how this liberty of will consists with God’s eternal
prescience and decrees, yet he ought to adhere to that truth which is
manifest.” But why should he adhere to it, unless it be manifest to
himself? And if it be manifest to himself, why does he deny that he is
able to comprehend it? And if he be not able to comprehend it, how knows
he that it is demonstrable? Or why says he that so confidently, which he
does not know? Methinks that which I have said, namely, that “that which
God foreknows shall be hereafter, cannot but be hereafter, and at the
same time that he foreknew it should be; but that which cannot but be,
is necessary; therefore what God foreknows, shall be necessarily, and at
the time foreknown”: this I say looketh somewhat liker to a
demonstration, than any thing that he hath hitherto brought to prove
free will. Another reason why I should be of his opinion, is that he is
“in possession of an old truth derived to him by inheritance or
succession from his ancestors”. To which I answer, first, that I am in
possession of a truth derived to me from the light of reason. Secondly,
that whereas he knoweth not whether it be the truth that he possesseth,
or not; because he confesseth he knows not how it can consist with God’s
prescience and decrees; I have sufficiently shewn that my opinion of
necessity not only agrees with, but necessarily followeth from the
eternal prescience and decrees of God. Besides, it is an unhandsome
thing for a man to derive his opinion concerning truth by succession
from his ancestors; for our ancestors, the first Christians, derived not
therefore their truth from the Gentiles, because they were their
ancestors.
(_c_) “To pass by all the other great imperfections which are to be
found in this sorite, it is just like an old philosophical piece: he
that drinks well, sleeps well; he that sleeps well, thinks no hurt; he
that thinks no hurt, lives well; therefore he that drinks well, lives
well.” My argument was thus: “election is always from the memory of good
and evil sequels; memory is always from the sense; and sense always from
the action of external bodies; and all action from God; therefore all
actions, even of free and voluntary agents, are from God, and
consequently necessary”. Let the Bishop compare now his scurrilous
argumentation with this of mine; and tell me, whether he that sleeps
well, doth all his lifetime think no hurt.
(_d_) “In the very last passage of my discourse I proposed my own
private opinion, how it might be made appear that the eternal prescience
and decrees of God are consistent with true liberty and contingency,
&c.” If he had meant by liberty, as other men do, the liberty of action,
that is, of things which are in his power to do which he will, it had
been an easy matter to reconcile it with the prescience and decrees of
God; but meaning the liberty of will, it was impossible. So likewise, if
by contingency he had meant simply coming to pass, it had been
reconcilable with the decrees of God; but meaning coming to pass without
necessity, it was impossible. And therefore though it be true he says,
that “he set it down in as plain terms as he could”, yet it was
impossible to set it down in plain terms. Nor ought he to charge me with
misunderstanding him, and wresting his words to a wrong sense. For the
truth is, I did not understand them at all, nor thought he understood
them himself; but was willing to give them the best interpretation they
would bear; which he calls wresting them to a wrong sense. And first, I
understood not what he meant by the aspect of God. For if he had meant
his foreknowledge, which word he had often used before; what needed he
in this one place only to call it _aspect_? Or what need he here call it
his _view_? Or say that all things are open to the eyes of God not
_discursively_, but _intuitively_; which is to expound _eyes_ in that
text, Hebr. iv. 13, not figuratively but literally, nevertheless
excluding _external species_, which the Schoolmen say are the cause of
seeing? But it was well done to exclude such insignificant speeches,
upon every occasion whatsoever. And though I do not hold the
foreknowledge of God to consist in _discourse_; yet I shall be never
driven to say it is by _intuition_, as long as I know that even a man
hath foreknowledge of all those things which he intendeth himself to do,
not by discourse, but by knowing his own purpose; saving that man hath a
superior power over him, that can change his purpose; which God hath
not. And whereas he says, I confound this aspect with the will and
decrees of God, he accuseth me wrongfully. For how could I so confound
it, when I understood not what it meant?
(_e_) “Secondly, he chargeth me, that hitherto I have maintained that
‘liberty and the decrees of God are irreconcileable’”. And the reason
why I do so is, because he maintained that liberty and the absolute
necessity of all things are irreconcileable. If liberty cannot stand
with necessity, it cannot stand with the decrees of God, of which
decrees necessity is a consequent. I needed not to say, nor did say,
that necessity and God’s decrees are all one: though if I had said it,
it had not been without authority of learned men, in whose writings are
often found this sentence, _voluntas Dei, necessitas rerum_.
(_f_) “But to cut his argument short: God hath decreed all effects which
come to pass in time, yet not all after the same manner, but according
to the distinct natures, capacities, and conditions of his creatures;
which he doth not destroy by his decree: some he acteth.” Hitherto true.
Then he addeth: “with some he co-operateth by special influence; and
some he only permitteth; yet this is no idle or bare permission”. This
is false. For nothing operateth by its own original power, but God
himself. Man operateth not but by special power, (I say special power,
not special influence), derived from God. Nor is it by God’s permission
only, as I have often already shown, and as the Bishop here
contradicting his former words confesseth. For _to permit only_, and
_barely to permit_, signify the same thing. And that which he says, that
God _concurs by way of general influence_, is jargon. For every
concurrence is one singular and individual concurrence; and nothing in
the world is general, but the signification of words and other signs.
(_g_) “Thirdly, he chargeth me, that ‘I allow all men to be of his
opinion, save only those that conceive in their minds a _nunc stans_, or
how eternity is an indivisible point, rather than an everlasting
succession.’ But I have given no such allowance.” Surely if the reason
wherefore my opinion is false, proceed from this, that I conceive not
eternity to be _nunc stans_, but an everlasting succession, I am allowed
to hold my opinion till I can conceive eternity otherwise: at least he
allows men not till then to be of his opinion. For he hath said, “that
the main impediment which keeps men from subscribing to that way of his,
is because they conceive eternity to be an everlasting succession, and
not one indivisible point”. As for the many other ways which he says are
“proposed by divines for reconciling the eternal prescience and decrees
of God with the liberty and contingency of second causes”, if they mean
such liberty and contingency as the Bishop meaneth, they are proposed in
vain; for truth and error can never be reconciled. But “however,” saith
he, “though a man could comprehend none of all these ways, yet we must
remember that a certain truth ought not to be rejected, because we are
not able to understand the reason of it.” For “he knows,” he says, “the
loadstone hath an attractive power to draw the iron to it, and yet he
knoweth not how it cometh to have such a power.” I know the load-stone
hath no such attractive power; and yet I know that the iron cometh to
it, or it to the iron; and therefore wonder not, that the Bishop knoweth
not how it cometh to have that power. In the next place he saith, I
bring nothing to prove that eternity is not an indivisible point, but my
own incapacity “that I cannot conceive it”. The truth is, I cannot
dispute neither for nor against (as he can do) the positions I
understand not. Nor do I understand what derogation it can be to the
divine perfection, to attribute to it potentiality, that is (in English)
power, and successive duration; for such attributes are often given to
it in the Scripture.
(_h_) “He saith moreover, that ‘he understands as little how it can be
true which I say, that God is not just, but justice itself, nor eternal,
but eternity itself’. It seems, howsoever he be versed in this question,
that he hath not troubled his head over-much with reading
School-divines, or metaphysicians.” They are unseemly words to be said
of God: I will not say, blasphemous and atheistical, which are the
attributes he gives to my opinions, because I do not think them spoken
out of an evil mind, but out of error: they are, I say, unseemly words
to be said of God, that he is not just, that he is not eternal, and (as
he also said) that he is not wise; and cannot be excused by any
following _but_, especially when the _but_ is followed by that which is
not to be understood. Can any man understand how justice is just, or
wisdom wise? and whereas justice is an accident, one of the moral
virtues, and wisdom another; how God is an accident or moral virtue? It
is more than the Schoolmen or metaphysicians can understand; whose
writings have troubled my head more than they should have done, if I had
known that amongst so many senseless disputes, there had been so few
lucid intervals. But I have considered since, where men will undertake
to reason out of natural philosophy of the incomprehensible nature of
God, that it is impossible they should speak intelligibly, or in other
language than metaphysic, wherein they may contradict themselves, and
not perceive it; as he does here, when he says, “the attributes of God
are not diverse virtues or qualities in him, as they are in the
creatures, but really one and the same with the divine essence and
amongst themselves, and attributed to God to supply the defect of our
capacity”. Attributes are names; and therefore it is a contradiction, to
say they are really one and the same with the divine essence. But if he
mean the virtues signified by the attributes, as justice, wisdom,
eternity, divinity, &c; so also they are virtues, and not one virtue,
(which is still a contradiction); and we give those attributes to God,
not to shew that we apprehend how they are in him, but to signify how we
think it best to honour him.
(_i_) “‘In the next place he will help me to understand,’ he says, ‘how
eternity is an indivisible point.’ The divine substance is indivisible;
but eternity is the divine substance. The major is evident, because God
is _actus simplicissimus_; the minor hath been clearly demonstrated in
my answer to his last doubt, and is confessed by all men, that
whatsoever is attributed to God is God.” The major is so far from being
evident, that _actus simplicissimus_ signifieth nothing. The minor is
said by some men, thought by no man; for whatsoever is thought, is
understood. And all that he hath elsewhere and here dilated upon it, is
as perfect nonsense, as any man ever writ on purpose to make merry with.
And so is that whereby he answers to my objection, that a point cannot
comprehend all time, which is successive; namely, his distinction, that
“a point doth not comprehend all time _formally_, as time is successive;
but _eminently_ and _virtually_, as eternity is infinite”. And this,
“to-day all eternity is co-existent with this day, and to-morrow all
eternity will be co-existent with to-morrow”. It is well that his
eternity is now come from a _nunc stans_ to be a _nunc fluens_, flowing
from this day to the next, and so on. This kind of language is never
found in the Scripture. No, but the thing, saith he, is found there,
namely, that God is infinite in all his attributes. I would he could
shew me the place where God is said to be infinite in all his
attributes. There be places enough to shew that God is infinite in
power, in wisdom, mercy, &c: but neither is he said to be infinite in
names (which is the English of attributes), nor that he is an
indivisible point, nor that a point doth comprehend time eminently and
virtually; nor that to-day all eternity is co-existent with to-day, &c.
And thus much in answer to his reply upon my answer. That which
remaineth, is my reply upon his answer to my positive doctrine on this
subject.