(_a_) “Supposing the last dictate of the understanding did always
determine the will, yet this determination, being not antecedent in
time, nor proceeding from extrinsical causes, but from the proper
resolution of the agent, who had now freely determined himself, makes no
absolute necessity, but only hypothetical, &c.” This is the Bishop’s
answer to the necessity inferred from that, that the will necessarily
followeth the last dictate of the understanding; which answer he thinks
is not sufficiently taken away, because the last act of the
understanding is in time together with the will itself, and therefore
not antecedent. It is true, that the will is not produced but in the
same instant with the last dictate of the understanding; but the
necessity of the will, and the necessity of the last dictate of the
understanding, may have been antecedent. For that last dictate of the
understanding was produced by causes antecedent, and was then necessary
though not yet produced; as when a stone is falling, the necessity of
touching the earth is antecedent to the touch itself. For all motion
through any determined space, necessarily makes a motion through the
next space, unless it be hindered by some contrary external motion; and
then the stop is as necessary, as the proceeding would have been. The
argument therefore from the last dictate of the understanding,
sufficiently inferreth an antecedent necessity, as great as the
necessity that a stone shall fall when it is already falling. As for his
other answer, that “the will does not certainly follow the last dictate
of the understanding, though it always ought to follow it”, he himself
says it is but probable; but any man that speaks not by rote, but thinks
of what he says, will presently find it false; and that it is impossible
to will anything that appears not first in his understanding to be good
for him. And whereas he says the will ought to follow the last dictate
of the understanding, unless he mean that the man ought to follow it, it
is an insignificant speech; for duties are the man’s not the will’s
duties: and if he means so, then it is false; for a man ought not to
follow the dictate of the understanding, when it is erroneous.
(_b_) “Of which I gave then three reasons. One was, that actions may be
so equally circumstantiated, that reason cannot give a positive
sentence, but leaves the election to liberty or chance. To this he
answers not a word.” There was no need of answer: for he hath very often
in this discourse contradicted it himself, in that he maketh “reason to
be the true root of liberty, and men to have more or less liberty, as
they have more or less reason”. How then can a man leave that to
liberty, when his reason can give no sentence? And for his leaving it to
chance; if by chance he mean that which hath no causes, he destroyeth
Providence; and if he mean that which hath causes, but unknown to us, he
leaveth it to necessity. Besides, it is false that “actions may be so
equally circumstantiated, that reason cannot give a positive sentence”.
For though in the things to be elected there may be an exact equality:
yet there may be circumstances in him that is to elect, to make him
resolve upon that of the two which he considereth for the present; and
to break off all further deliberation for this cause, that he must not
(to use his own instance) by spending time in vain, apply neither of the
plaisters, which the chirurgeon gives him, to his wound. “Another of his
reasons was, because reason doth not weigh every individual action to
the uttermost grain.” True; but does it therefore follow, a man gives no
sentence? The will therefore may follow the dictate of the judgment,
whether the man weigh or not weigh all that might be weighed. “His third
reason was, because passions and affections sometimes prevail against
judgment.” I confess they prevail often against _wisdom_, which is it he
means here by _judgment_. But they prevail not against the _dictate of
the understanding_, which he knows is the meaning of _judgment_ in this
place. And the will of a passionate and peevish fool doth no less follow
the dictate of that little understanding he hath, than the will of the
wisest man followeth his wisdom.
(_c_) “He explaineth the sense of the assertion by the comparison of the
last feather: wherewith he seems to be delighted, seeing he useth it now
the second time. But let him like it as he will, it is improper, for
three reasons.” To me this comparison seemeth very proper; and therefore
I made no scruple (though not much delighted with it, as being no new
comparison) to use it again, when there was need again. For in the
examination of truth, I search rather for perspicuity than elegance. But
the Bishop with his School-terms is far from perspicuity. How near he is
to elegance, I shall not forget to examine in due time. But why is this
comparison improper? “First, because the determination of the judgment
is no part of the weight: for the understanding weigheth all things,
objects, means, circumstances, convenience, inconvenience; but itself is
not weighed.” In this comparison, the objects, means, &c, are the
weights, the man is the scale, the understanding of a convenience or
inconvenience is the pressure of those weights, which incline him now
one way, now another; and that inclination is the will. Again, the
objects, means, &c, are the feathers that press the horse, the feeling
of that pressure is understanding, and his patience or impatience the
will to bear them, if not too many, or if too many, to lie down under
them. It is therefore to little purpose that he saith, the understanding
is not weighed. “Secondly”, he says the comparison is improper, “because
ordinarily, the means, circumstances, and causes concurrent, have their
whole weight from the understanding; so as they do not press the horse’s
back at all, until reason lay them on.” This, and that which followeth,
“that my objects, agents, motives, passions, and all my concurrent
causes, ordinarily do only move the will _morally_, not determine it
naturally, so as it hath in all ordinary actions a free dominion over
itself,” is all nonsense. For no man can understand, that the
understanding maketh any alteration in the object in _weight_ or
_lightness_; nor that _reason lays on objects upon the understanding_;
nor that the will _is moved_, nor that any motion _is moral_; nor that
these words, _the will hath a free dominion over itself_, signify
anything. With the rest of this reply I shall trust the reader; and only
note the last words, where he makes me say, _repentance hath causes_,
and therefore _it is not voluntary_. But I said, repentance hath causes,
_and that_ it is not voluntary; he chops in, _and therefore_, and makes
an absurd consequence, which he would have the reader believe was mine,
and then confutes it with these senseless words: “Free effects have free
causes, necessary effects necessary causes; voluntary effects have
sometimes free, sometimes necessary causes”. Can any man but a Schoolman
think the will is voluntary? But yet the will is the cause of voluntary
actions.