There is not much in this part of his reply that needeth animadversion.
But I must observe, where he saith, (_a_) “the sum of my answer was,
that the stars and complexions do incline, but not at all necessitate
the will:” he answereth nothing at all to me, who attribute not the
necessitation of the will to the stars and complexions, but to the
aggregate of all things together that are in motion. I do not say, that
the stars or complexions of themselves do incline men to will; but when
men are inclined, I must say that that inclination was necessitated by
some causes or other.
(_b_) “But whereas he mentions ‘a great paradox of his own; that there
is hardly any one action, to the causing of which concurs not whatsoever
is _in rerum natura_’; I can but smile to see with what ambition our
great undertakers do affect to be accounted the first founders of
strange opinions, &c.” The Bishop speaks often of paradoxes with such
scorn or detestation, that a simple reader would take a paradox either
for felony or some other heinous crime, or else for some ridiculous
turpitude; whereas perhaps a judicious reader knows what the word
signifies; and that a paradox, is an opinion not yet generally received.
Christian religion was once a paradox; and a great many other opinions
which the Bishop now holdeth, were formerly paradoxes. Insomuch as when
a man calleth an opinion a paradox, he doth not say it is untrue, but
signifieth his own ignorance; for if he understood it, he would call it
either a truth or an error. He observes not, that but for paradoxes we
should be now in that savage ignorance, which those men are in that have
not, or have not long had laws and commonwealth, from whence proceedeth
science and civility. There was not long since a scholar that
maintained, that if the least thing that had weight should be laid down
upon the hardest body that could be, supposing it an anvil of diamant,
it would at the first access make it yield. This I thought, and much
more the Bishop would have thought, a paradox. But when he told me, that
either that would do it, or all the weight of the world would not do it,
because if the whole weight did it, every the least part thereof would
do its part, I saw no reason to dissent. In like manner when I say,
‘there is hardly any one action to the causing of which concurs not
whatsoever is _in rerum natura_;’ it seems to the Bishop a great
paradox; and if I should say that all action is the effect of motion,
and that there cannot be a motion in one part of the world, but the same
must also be communicated to all the rest of the world, he would say
that this were no less a paradox. But yet if I should say, that if a
lesser body, as a concave sphere or tun, were filled with air, or other
liquid matter, and that any one little particle thereof were moved, all
the rest would be moved also, he would conceive it to be true, or if not
he, a judicious reader would. It is not the greatness of the tun that
altereth the case; and therefore the same would be true also, if the
whole world were the tun; for it is the greatness of this tun that the
Bishop comprehendeth not. But the truth is comprehensible enough, and
may be said without ambition of being the founder of strange opinions.
And though a grave man may smile at it, he that is both grave and wise
will not.